INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI®

TELLING SPACE:

TOPOGRAPHY, TIME, AND NARRATIVE FROM HOMER TO XENOPHON

Alex Claire Purves

A DISSERTATION

in

Classical Studies

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial

Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

2002

_____

Supervisor of Dissertation

_____

Graduate Group Chairperson

UMI Number: 3043943

UMI®

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

Telling Space:
Topography, Time, and Narrative from Homer to Xenophon

Alex Claire Purves

Supervisor: Ralph M. Rosen

This dissertation examines the underlying tension in Greek literature between an all-encompassing, synoptic vision of the world and the human attempt to replicate that vision in language. It traces the evolution of this vision through a history of genres, from epic (where the synoptic range is imagined as the divine property of the Muses) to prose (where human perception is foregrounded, and where the god-like perspective is re-enacted through the attempt to measure, control, and map the space of the earth). It analyzes how the Muses' encyclopedic viewpoint, because it encompasses all aspects of time and memory, emerges as a model for story-telling which is reformulated by the prose authors in their attempts to create new technologies and structures through which past and future time might be scaled down into a single whole. The dissertation is divided into three sections, each comprised of two chapters. The first section analyses how, in the transition from Hesiodic epic to Herodotean geography, the vast narrative space of both earth and cosmos is transferred from the supernatural eye of the Muse to the scientific eye of the cartographer. The second section reads the story of being lost in space as a comment upon the larger problem of attempting to map, or represent, the

world in language. It reveals how, in Homer's *Odyssey* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*, the borders of both earth and narrative disappear from view as their protagonists increasingly lose all sense of proportion and scale. The third section investigates a new set of topographies that emerge with the invention of the Socratic dialogue, showing how – in Plato's *Timaeus/Critias* and Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* – the topographies of city and home are alternately 'writ large' and 'writ small' onto the fantastic models of Atlantis (Plato) and Ischomachus' encyclopedic system of cataloguing the space of the *oikos* (Xenophon). Here, I conclude by considering how memory, which in epic was presented as a form of divine inspiration, is scaled down to human proportions in the form of images or architectural structures that are visualized in the mind.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

INTRODUCTION

1. The World to Scale

When Achilles first looks upon the shield brought to him by his mother at the beginning

of *Iliad* 19, he claims that "no mortal man could have accomplished this" (Hom.

Il. 19.22). The line that Achilles draws between what is possible for the human artisan,

and what is not, is doubtless based on the intricacy of the shield's design, the brilliant

quality of its metals, and the manifest skill of its forger. But there is another way in

which the shield represents what is ordinarily beyond human grasp, and that is in its

ability to scale the entire world down into a form that is instantly legible within a single

glance. Miraculously, through the handicraft of Hephaestus, the space of the entire earth

is reproduced within the limited surface area of the Trojan plain, and – even beyond that

– made portable upon the body of a single human figure. Both panoptic and synchronic,

Achilles' shield places the viewer in the supernatural position of being above, looking

down on the world in its entirety from an imaginary immortal perspective.

The challenge of replicating what was understood to be the encylopedic, almost

supernatural viewpoint of Hephaestus' shield through the human means of narrative is

variously negotiated through the span of Archaic and Classical literature. In this

dissertation, I will focus on the two ways in which the narrator responded to the

challenge of representing what was conceived to be an incommensurate and god-like

view of space and time. The first response, as we have seen in Homer, was to

miniaturize it; to create a facsimile of the whole which was able, with varying degrees

of success, to replicate the divine viewpoint on a human scale. With the advent of prose, that practice of miniaturizing is transferred from Hephaestus to the map-maker, as Greek authors began to take a more positive interest in the process of human measurement and perception. In tandem with this development, the human eye comes to be increasingly celebrated for its capacity to record space and time, causing prose writers to worry less about narrating the full extent of an imagined divine vision, and more about counting and mapping according to their own new models and technologies. As we shall see in the development from Homer's *Odyssey* to Herodotus' *Histories*, for example, prose transformed the narrative structure of the journey from an ordeal that epitomized man's helplessness in the face of larger divine forces to an attempt to gain control over space: to measure and record it in human terms.

When human narrators attempted to enter into or represent this god-like vision of the world without utilizing the mechanism of scale, on the other hand, their subsequent loss of perspective led to the experience of becoming lost. Here, the author wanders haphazardly through a vast topography over which he is never able to gain an overview, leading to a partial and fragmented narrative. Evoked by Aristotle to describe the experience of reading a long and ungainly sentence,[1] the experience of 'losing one's way' within an incommensurate or disordered topography came to be particularly associated with the circuitous and linear viewpoint of prose.

Correspondingly, in the movement from epic poetry to Classical prose, the size of what is easy to take into human view changes, to include products of mortal, rather

---

[1] Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a27–34 (see ch.2, p.78, below).

than divine, skill. The extreme of this principle is best illustrated by Aristotle, who, in his description of the ideal size of an epic or tragic plot, a periodic sentence, or a nation-state, repeatedly calls for a magnitude that is 'easily taken in by the eye' (*to megethos eusynopton*).[2] It will be worth, briefly, turning to the *Poetics* to consider how Aristotle illustrates his concept of the *eusynopton* by contrasting it with an animal of incommensurate length (Arist. *Poet.* 7. 1450b37–1451a6):

> τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστίν. διὸ οὔτε πάμμικρον ἄν τι γένοιτο καλὸν ζῷον (συγχεῖται γὰρ ἡ θεωρία ἐγγὺς τοῦ ἀναισθήτου χρόνου γινομένη) οὔτε παμμέγεθες (οὐ γὰρ ἅμα ἡ θεωρία γίνεται ἀλλ' οἴχεται τοῖς θεωροῦσι τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας) οἷον εἰ μυρίων σταδίων εἴη ζῷον· ὥστε δεῖ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχειν μὲν μέγεθος. τοῦτο δὲ εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι. οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων ἔχειν μὲν μῆκος. τοῦτο δὲ εὐμνημόνευτον εἶναι.

Beauty resides in both magnitude as well as order. For a beautiful creature should neither be inordinately small (for the sight of it occurs in an almost imperceptible amount of time) nor inordinately large (for the viewers would not be able to see it as a single whole in one glance), just as if it were an animal ten thousand stades long. So, just as it is necessary for animals and other elements to have a magnitude which is easily taken in by the eye (*eusynopton*), so too is it necessary for plots to adhere to a certain length, which is easy to remember (*eumnêmoneuton*).

Aristotle's description of the ideal size or frame of a narrative depends on the notion of scale and measurement; of physically marking out a 'plot' (of language, but also of land)[3] with strictly prescribed borders (*horoi*).[4] The inordinately long animal, because it is measured out in units usually reserved for topography, also takes on the properties of a vast area of land. But, like the earth, Aristotle's creature would be impossible to view as a single whole unless one were to survey it from the supernatural position of above,

---

[2] Cf. *Poet.* chs.6–7 & 23; *Rh.* 3.9; *Pol.* 7.5–6. On Aristotle's concept of the unity and wholeness of a plot, cf. *Poet.* 6. 1449b24; 7. 1450b23–5: "κεῖται δὴ ἡμῖν τὴν τραγῳδίαν τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως εἶναι μίμησιν ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος·" / "I have already established that a tragedy is the imitation of a complete and whole action, having a certain magnitude;" & 23. 1459a19. For a recent discussion of the issue, cf. Belfiore 2000.

[3] The topological connotations of 'plot' are noted by Brooks 1984, 11–12 (see my ch.2, p.80, below).

[4] Arist. *Poet.* 7. 1451a9–15.

scaled down to size as if on a map or shield – a concept that Aristotle rejects. What is

eusynopton is thus, by the time of Aristotle, that which is definitively commensurate; a

portrait of the whole as seen from the ground by the human eye.[5] In the chronological

span encompassed by Aristotle and Homer's contrasting conceptions of the synoptic

point of view, therefore, the narrator is caught between the ideal, totalizing visual range

of the Muses or Hephaestus, on the one hand, and his own need to create a cohesive and

unified plot – to human scale – on the other.

2. Telling Space

The tension between the gods' encyclopedic vision of the world, and the medium of

narrative through which that vision is transmitted, can already be identified in three key

passages in epic: Homer's invocation of the Muses before the Catalogue of Ships (Hom.

Il. 2.484ff.); the description of the Shield of Achilles (*Il.* 8.478ff.); and the Muses'

address to Hesiod on Mount Helicon (Hes. *Th.* 27ff.). In each case, as I analyze in more

detail in different chapters of this dissertation,[6] the synchronic ability of the immortal

eye, which sees the past, present, and future spread out in a simultaneous vision of

---

[5] It is important to note that for Aristotle, who embraced narrative's linear form, the *eunsynoptic* plot was still persistently chronological, unfolding through a carefully prescribed sequence of human time. In order to be taken in a single glance, its length must simply be short enough to allow the beginning and the end to be grasped in a single visual frame (Arist. *Poet.* 23. 1459b19–20: "δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρηχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος." & *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a35–b1: "λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ' αὐτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον,") with enough time for a 'reversal' in the middle.

[6] Esp. chs.1, 2, 3 & 6.

perfect clarity, contrasts with the time-bound sequentiality of the poet's voice.[7] Since

words cannot help but extend through time and space, this leads to a 'telling out' or

cataloguing (*kata-legein*) of the synchronic vision into a linear, and hence temporal,

form.[8] In attempting to narrate the complete Catalogue of Ships, Homer's voice will

inevitably slow him down because he can only tell one word at a time. To recount all

that the Muses see is quite literally beyond the physical capabilities (even the life-span)

of the human body (*Il.* 2.485–91):

> Ἔσπετε νῦν μοι Μοῦσαι Ὀλύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι·
> ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα,
> ἡμεῖς δὲ κλέος οἶον ἀκούομεν οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν·
> οἵ τινες ἡγεμόνες Δαναῶν καὶ κοίρανοι ἦσαν·
> <u>πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω</u>
> <u>οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν</u>
> <u>φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος, χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη,</u>

> Tell me now Muses who have your homes on Olympus,
> You who are goddesses and are present and know/see (*iste*) all things,
> While we hear only fame (*kleos*) but know/see (*idmen*) nothing at all,
> Who were the leader and lords of the Danaans?
> <u>I could not tell nor name their vast number,</u>
> <u>Not even if I had ten tongues and ten mouths to house them,</u>
> <u>An unbreakable voice, and a heart of bronze..</u>

As Homer acknowledges, the mechanics of the human voice, as it is caught up

in the time-bound process of articulation, inevitably draws the extemporality of the

Muses' vision into the human temporality of lived experience.[9] The epic narrative, then,

not only engages in a process of translation from one kind of time to another; it is also

---

[7] On the difference between the Muses and Homer as narrators, see de Jong 1987, 45–53 (3.1.2: "The primary narrator-focalizer and the Muses").

[8] Much of my discussion of the Muses' vision here is indebted to Ford 1992, 57–89.

[9] Cf. Ricoeur 1984, 3: "the world unfolded by every narrative work is always a temporal world," & 52: "time becomes human time to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode."

continually involved in an almost mathematical process of scaling down a divine,
unfathomable breadth of vision into language that is both human and commensurate.

The Muses' position at the beginning of Greek literature exerts such a strong
influence over the way that space and time are represented in narrative that, as I argue
in the following chapters, the legacy of their synoptic vision continues on through the
prose genres of the fifth and fourth century BCE. Within that tradition, the difficulties of
the translation from immortal to mortal conceptions of space are intensified, as the
global perspective of the Muses is increasingly set at odds with the linear or
'hodological' viewpoint of prose.[10] For the prose author, whose model of narrative is
often based on the idea of a journey or road, 'telling' space involves making it
quantifiable and relative according to a man-made system of metrical lengths and
divisions, drawing out the numerical subtext of the notion of 'telling' in epic catalogue
poetry (*OED, tell:* "II. To mention numerically, to count, reckon"). As I show in each
chapter, the attempt to represent space in Archaic and Classical literature (from the
space of the cosmos to the space of the house) is always associated in some way with
the human practice of marking out and measuring topography, based on an underlying
association between the temporal or spatial aspects of narrative and the physical space
of the earth.

That process of narrating the plot through a system of measuring can also be
combined with another, earlier meaning of 'tell' (*OED* s.v. I.1: "To mention or name (a
series of things) one after another in order; to recount, enumerate; to give a list of"), just

---

[10] As documented in chs.2, 4 & 5. I borrow the concept of 'hodological space' from Janni 1984 (on
which, see my discussion in ch.2, below, pp.117–121).

as it functions in my translation of the introduction to the Catalogue of Ships above ("I could not tell nor name their vast number.."). It is important to emphasize this numerical basis of narrative, because it helps to underscore first that language, because it is bound by the laws of human time, is always sequential and commensurate, and secondly, that a plot, if it is to be whole and comprehensive, must – as in Aristotle's counter-example of the ten thousand stade creature – fit within the human dimensions of measurement and number.

3. Chthonie's Robe

Every chapter in the dissertation, apart from chapter 1 which deals exclusively with epic, balances to a greater or lesser degree on the pivot between poetry and prose. This is because it is often in the transition from verse to sentence structure, and from Muse to prose author, that the disjunction between an idealized synoptic vision of space and a mortal, hodological one (whose viewpoint is often limited) comes most to the fore. In attempting to substitute for the Muses' effortless vision across time and space, the prose authors made use of a number of new devices and technologies. Some of these, such as the practices of measuring and surveying, allowed them to monitor the representation of space on their own terms. Hartog has brilliantly observed, for example, how Herodotus' measurement of the Black Sea serves as a kind of corrective to the Muse or Delphic oracle, whose optic range is so extensive that she knows "the number of the sands and the measures of the seas" (Hdt. 1.47.3: "ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης").[11]

---

[11] Hartog 1988, 342. See also my comments in ch.2, n.40; & ch.3, p.155, below.

Other technologies, such as the map and later the index, helped to create the illusion of a synoptic, god-like vision, since they were themselves encyclopedic in their scope, yet accessible to the human eye.

An idea of how those new technologies were put to use by the prose writer can be glimpsed in a fragment of Pherecydes, the fabled teacher of Pythagoras who lived in the mid sixth century BCE. Pherecydes composed a prose treatise titled variously the *Theogony,* the *Mixing of the Gods,* or the *Seven Nooks,* [12] and although most of his book does not survive, two columns have been recovered from what is surmised to be the middle of the work (the line number '600' has been preserved). [13] Since these two columns are emblematic of other Greek attempts to measure and depict the space of the cosmos, they will provide a useful introduction to many of the issues raised in the dissertation as a whole.

The fragment describes the wedding of 'Zas' to Chthonie, out of which the Earth ('Gê') is created. [14] According to Diogenes Laertius, the first line of Pherecydes' book states that Zas, Chthonie, and Chronos have always existed ("ἦσαν ἀεί,") but that Gê is the name given to Chthonie when Zas bestowed the earth upon her as a gift of honour (*geras*) (Schibli fr.14 = Diog. Laert. 1.119):

---

[12] I am in agreement with the majority of scholars in assuming that Pherecydes of Syros (a mythographer) is a different person altogether to Pherecydes the Athenian (a historian). This argument, first made by Jacoby 1947 against Wilamowitz, has recently been defended by Fowler 1999, after Toye's challenge to the separate author theory in 1997.

[13] See Schibli 1990 (who has re-assemble and re-edited the fragments); West 1963, 157–72; K&R, 50–71.

[14] 'Zas' is interchangeable, for all intents and purposes, with 'Zeus,' 'Gê' with 'Gaia,' 'Ogenos' with 'Okeanos,' and 'Chronos' with 'Kronos,' but see Schibli 1990, App.1 (135–39), & West 1971, 50–52, on Pherecydes' unusual name choices for his gods.

σώζεται δὲ τοῦ Συρίου τό τε βιβλίον ὃ συνέγραψεν. οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· ᾿Ζὰς μὲν καὶ Χρόνος
ἦσαν ἀεὶ καὶ Χθονίη· Χθονίῃ δὲ ὄνομα ἐγένετο Γῆ. ἐπειδὴ αὐτῇ Ζὰς γῆν γέρας διδοῖ.

The terms of Chthonie's transformation are particularly interesting, for Zas

creates the earth by weaving an immense, variegated robe for his new bride (Schibli

fr.68):[15]

Col. I   [αὐ-
τῶι ποιεῦσιν τά ο[ἰ]κία
πολλά τε καὶ μεγάλα·
ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἐξετέ-
λεσαν πάντα καὶ χρή-
ματα καὶ θεράποντας
καὶ θεραπαίνας καὶ
τἆλλα ὅσα δεῖ πάντα.
ἐπεὶ δὴ πάντα ἑτοῖ-
μα γίγνεται. τὸν γά-
μον ποιεῦσιν. κἀπει-
δὴ τρίτη ἡμέρη γί-
γνεται τῶι γάμωι. τό-
τε Ζὰς ποιεῖ φᾶρος μέ-
γα τε καὶ καλόν. καὶ
ἐν αὐτῶ[ι] ποικ[ίλλει Γῆν
καὶ ᾿Ωγη[νὸν καὶ τὰ ᾿Ω-
γηνοῦ [δώματα ....
... [πι]..... .....

Col. II   [βουλόμενος
γὰρ σέο τοὺς γάμου[ς
εἶναι. τούτωι σε τιμ[έω.
σὺ δέ μοι χαῖρε καὶ σύ[ν-
ι]σθι. ταῦτά φασιν ἀν[α-
καλυπτήρια πρῶτον·
γενέσθαι. ἐκ τούτου δ[ὲ
ὁ νόμος ἐγένε[το] καὶ
θεοῖσι καὶ ἀνθρ[ώπ]οι-
σιν. ἡ δέ μι[ν ἀμείβε-
ται δεξαμ[ένη εὖ τὸ
φᾶ[ρος..... .....
σ[..... ....
κλ[.... ....
[..... ....
θ .[..... ....

Col. I   They make him many and large halls, and when they have accomplished everything –
         that is, when the goods and the attendants and serving-maids and as many other things
         as were necessary have been made ready – they perform the wedding. On the third day
         of the wedding, Zas fashions a vast and beautiful robe, and on it he depicts Earth and
         Ocean and the dwelling-places of Ocean. . .

[15] DK B2 [4] = P. Grenf. II. I I (B. P. Grenfell & A. S. Hunt (eds.) Greek Papyri, Series II (Oxford 1987).

Col. II   ".. Wishing marriage with you I honour you with this (robe). Welcome me, and form a union with me." It is said that this was the first *anakalupteria*.[16] From this event, the custom (of the *anakalupteria*) originated among gods and men. And she accepted the robe and answered him..

When Chthonie (the base matter, or interior of the earth) dresses herself in the robe given to her by Zas, she transforms into 'Gê' because her surface is now covered with land and ocean. One might say that the robe which Zas embroiders for Chthonie resembles a giant map, which – when spread over her body – transforms the goddess into a topographical space. Its bestowal upon her as a gift thus mirrors, on an explicitly visual level, Pherecydes' attempt to describe the space of the earth in words, with Zas taking on the role of master craftsman, map-maker, but also author. For Zas' arrangement of the space of the earth into a single, synoptic whole reflects on the narratological endeavour of Pherecydes to make a comprehensive 'plot' of the cosmos in his writing.

As Clement of Alexandria observed in his commentary on this fragment, Chthonie's robe, fashioned by a divine artist as a replica of the world, has much in common with Hephaestus' crafting of Achilles' shield (DK B2 [4] = Clem. Al. *Strom.* VI 9):

αὖθίς τε 'Ομήρου ἐπὶ τῆς ἡφαιστοτεύκτου ἀσπίδος εἰπόντος· ' ἐν μὲν γαῖαν ἔτευξ'. ἐν δ' οὐρανόν. ἐν δὲ θάλασσαν· ἐν δ' ἐτίθει ποθαμοῖο μέγα σθένος 'Ωκεανοῖο' [Σ 483. 607].

Homer said the same thing about the shield fashioned by Hephaestus: "He fashioned the earth on it, the heavens, and the sea. And he set on it the great strength of the river Ocean." [Hom. *Il.* 18. 483, 607].

---

[16] The *anakalupteria* were presents offered by the bridegroom to the bride at the point when she first took off her veil.

Like the Shield of Achilles, Chthonie's robe can be held in the hands of its protagonists, and is readily able to be taken in at a glance. By means of the designs depicted on both robe and shield, moreover, the concept of the earth *as a whole* is able to be captured and framed in the imagination. Pherecydes achieves this effect by playing with scale in a somewhat complicated way. For the robe, because it covers the body of Chthonie point for point, can only have been depicted on a one-to-one ratio. In other words, the robe is not a scaled-down map of the world, but the world itself: its bestowal upon Chthonie is what creates Earth (Gê), after all. On the other hand, the notion of scale is implicit in the narrative, if only because the episode stands at the intersection between two different registers of both time (that of the gods, marked by the divine wedding, and that of mortals, marked by the introduction of the human *nomos* of the *anakalupteria*) and space (the topography of the poem moves from the elemental 'nooks' from which the gods are born to the human-scale architecture of the palace and the arrangement of its furniture). To 'see' the narrative according to the divine view of the world, the earth must become miniature – a small gift, or synecdoche of its larger self – exchanged between gods within a world set to their dimensions.

Pherecydes' fragment shows that, in order to move between the two viewpoints of mortals and immortals in Greek narrative, there must always be a process of scaling down, so that a supernatural view of space and time can be made to fit into the limited dimensions of human vision. In the exchange between Zas and Chthonie, it is possible to see from both of these viewpoints at once; that is, from the supernatural plane of the gods, and from the human 'translation' of that plane – the perspective of the sixth

century map-maker. Like his slightly earlier contemporary Anaximander (with whom he jostles in the scholarship for the position of the 'inventor of prose'),[17] Pherecydes may have had some contact with cartography, specifically the map-making practices of the Near East.

West has twice suggested that Pherecydes may have written his *Theogony* with a map of the world spread out before him, perhaps one like the Babylonian world-map of the early fifth century, now in the British Museum. Like the text that accompanies that map (Unger 1937), Pherecydes' narrative deals with a monster-god who is destroyed by Chronos/Marduk and settled in the sea (West 1997, 146 & n.193), and West believes that Pherecydes' curious reference to the "homes" ("δώματα") of Ogenos (Ocean) may be on account of the fact that "he has in view a map on which they are prominently marked" (1971, 19).[18] West has also noted the spatial arrangement of Pherecydes' narrative, as if he had divided his cosmos into parts which he is describing in turn (Schibli fr.83 reads "and next below that division..."). Likewise, his description of the soul's journey between lives is markedly topographical; one fragment (Schibli fr.88) speaks of "nooks, pits, caves, doors, and gates" (West 1971, 24–5). Later on in this dissertation (chapter 2) I will proceed to suggest that the coupling of prose and cartography in their early stages functioned, in a very deliberate sense, to create a new spatial template for narrative, which – at the same time as it discarded the Muses and

---

[17] Schibli frs. 2, 9, 10, 11, 12. See further Jacoby 1947; West 1971, 5–7; Kahn 1985, 240.

[18] See Unger 1937, who includes a reconstructed drawing of the world map, with the seven islands of the ocean marked (2).

the ekphrastic description of Achilles' shield in the *Iliad* – still borrowed from the synoptic range of those models by replaying them through the man-made panorama of the map.

In the course of a single fragment, then, we have seen Zas' robe unfold into both real space and representational space, as it alternates between the surface of the earth and the surface of a map. In the shift in scale between mortal and immortal contexts, we have seen how language itself may act as a scaling device, with its own ability to bring an extensive range of space within view of the human eye. As I move through the chapters of this dissertation, I will continually engage with this notion of scale, choosing to focus on smaller and smaller surface areas from chapter to chapter.

Thus, in part one, I deal with the global topographies of the cosmos and earth as they are represented in Hesiod and Herodotus, showing how their attempts to narrate history are mediated through the topographies of the landscapes they describe.[19] In part two, I look at what happens when the shift in scale between real and represented space becomes so abrupt that the subject finds himself lost. Here, I map the conceptual space of Greek narrative onto the actual space of Greek geography, by arguing that, for the protagonists of Homer's *Odyssey* and Xenophon's *Anabasis*, that space is located inland, away from any sense of an edge or boundary. Finally, in part three, I narrow my focus to consider two topographies that Aristotle might have called *eusynopton*: the *polis* and the *oikos*. In the *Timaeus/Critias*, I examine Plato's idealized city according to

---

[19] For more detailed breakdown of the contents of each chapter, see the separate introductions to parts I, II, & III.

the several layers of temporality that stretch it back through time, showing how the characters in the dialogue strive, unsuccessfully, to bring a mental picture of the city to life through words. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, I analyse how the space of the house is arranged – like a filing cabinet or the memory of a computer – into intricate compartments, leading Xenophon to argue that what is most *eusynopton* (condensed into the smallest range of space that one can easily take in with the eye) is also *eumnêmoneuton*, or easiest to remember.[20]

The impulse to capture the world, in its totality, with the instantaneous clarity of a picture or snapshot is negotiated differently by each author in this study. Taken together, these six texts trace a movement through Greek literary history from a world shaped by poetry to a world shaped by prose. They demonstrate how the evolution of prose and scientific thought through the Archaic and Classical periods reformulated the Muses' epic vision into one that was increasingly based on the ability of the human eye to measure and record on its own terms. This resulted in a concept of space that was continually challenging (and reappraising) the boundaries of narrative.

---

[20] On Aristotle's pairing of the two concepts, see *Poet.* 7.1451a (p.3, above); *Rh.* 1409b (3.9.3).

Introduction to PART I: From Muse to Map

Hesiod's description of the mythic space of the cosmos in the *Theogony* and Herodotus' account of the geography of the earth in the *Histories* may both be understood as attempts to map the space of the world in language. In the following two chapters, I explore how both authors come to terms with the problem of reconciling space with the temporal form of narrative. I show how, for each, space is strongly determined through the experience of time – whether by the forward movement of history, as it is in the *Theogony*, or the movement of the traveller's body across a landscape, as it is in Herodotus' *Histories* – and that the interrelationship between space and time is most immediately identifiable on the level of narrative structure. In both cases, I argue that the narratives themselves stand as two very different kinds of maps, within which temporal or spatial inconsistencies are sometimes resolved, and at other times deliberately obfuscated.

In the movement from the mythological terrain of Hesiod's cosmos to the geographical terrain of the *Histories*, Herodotus is presented with the new technologies of cartography and prose with which to mark out the space of his narrative. That movement also reflects an approach to seeing the earth on a smaller scale, in terms that are more insistently 'human' than the immortal scope of Hesiod's world. These two chapters are placed side by side in an attempt to uncover the terms of those differences in representation, especially as they are presented in the transition from poetry to prose.

CHAPTER 1

Topographies of Time in Hesiod's *Theogony*

> The light that we see from distant galaxies left them millions of years ago, and in the case of the
> most distant object that we have seen, the light left some eight thousand million years ago. Thus,
> as we look at the universe, we are seeing it as it was in the past.
>
> Stephen Hawking, *A Brief History of Time*, p. 28

Just one of the temporal paradoxes that a contemporary astrophysicist like Stephen

Hawking will encounter in the course of his research is the impossibility of ever

viewing the cosmos in its own present moment. Instead, the deeper into space that he

trains his telescope, the more minutely that he focuses on a particular star, the more

certain it is that he will travel further back in time, widening the gap between his own

present vision of the star, still burning, and its demise thousands of millions of years

ago. The cosmos that Hawking views through his telescope thereby emerges as a

landscape of the past untouched by the decay which should mark its contact with the

present: an immaculately preserved archeological site which lives on in its own time

scheme. In the physicist's universe, moreover, past, present and future are inherently

spatial concepts, each measuring a different point across the vast distance of the

universe.

As the title of Hawking's book, *A Brief History of Time*, acknowledges, its

author is part astrophysicist, but also part historian, and as much as his subject matter is

cosmology, it is also deeply engaged with the problem of time. Hawking's remarkable

success as a best-selling author stems, in part, from his ability to compress the magnitudes of cosmic space and time into the terrestrial and 'human' dimensions of narrative.[1] If we were to borrow again from the paradox of the distant star, which generates the illusion of occupying the same time-in-space as ourselves, then we might also see that the temporal disjunction between the star's life (as an event) and our reception of it (as a representation of that event) is analogous to the dual and disjointed time schemes inhabited by *histoire* and *récit* in narratological studies.[2] For as every narrative recounts the plot of an event in the past as if it were happening in the present, it leads the reader (or observer, or listener) into a complex web of different time frames, depending on which perspective in time or space he or she takes at any particular point. The experience of reading, therefore, signals the entry into a world which Peter Brooks has described in the following terms (Brooks 1984, 3):

> If the past is to be read as present, it is a curious present that we know to be past in relation to a future we know to be already in place, already in wait for us to reach it. Perhaps we would do best to speak of the *anticipation of retrospection* as our chief tool for making sense of narrative: the master trope of its strange logic.

If the furthest reaches of the universe thereby offer us an insight into a past which is both long extinct and, from another perspective, ever-present, then we can already glimpse – without even entering into Hawking's black holes, 'wormholes' and

---

[1] For narrativization as a particularly *human* activity, see my discussion in ch.2, below, pp.128–33.

[2] Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 3; Genette 1980, 33ff; Shklovsky 1921/1965, esp. 57; Tomashevsky 1925/1965. Almost everyone who has studied narratology, since its conception with the Russian Formalists, has agreed that a distinction between *histoire* / 'story' (the real or fictional sequence of events as they occurred *before* their description in narrative) and *récit* / 'plot' (the representation of those events in verbal form) exists, but there is no general consensus on how these terms should be labeled. My own use of *histoire* and *récit* throughout this chapter (taken from Genette's French edition, revised in 1982, 10–11) should be understood as being in essence identical to the Formalists' *sjuzet* and *fabula*, the Germans' *erzählte Zeit* and *Erzählzeit* or Rimmon-Kenan's *story* and *text*.

backward arrows of time[3] – a pattern which is also at work in Hesiod's *Theogony*. For, in a similar way, the *Theogony* establishes a time frame which is mapped onto the spatial structure of its cosmos, and as the narrative delves deeper into that structure the order of movement through time and tense becomes increasingly disconnected.

Irrespective, then, of how differently Hawking and Hesiod understand the history of the universe, for both the cosmos functions as a space within which the normal patterns of time are altered and recast. In Hesiod's case, I shall argue that cosmic space itself exists as a kind of mirror of the narrative process: as an arena that is large, and malleable, enough to accommodate for the complex shifting of temporalities which are intrinsic to the narrative form and content of the *Theogony*. As I will proceed to show, by writing his own 'history of time,' starting at the very beginning, Hesiod provides us with one of our first Greek examples of an attempt to fit the spatial order of the world into temporal form.

There are two points at issue concerning time in the *Theogony*. The first arises from a basic tenet of narratological analysis which states that while Hesiod's language and, in large part, his story *(histoire)* follow a linear arrow of time that moves from past to future – because words and events can only unfold in forward sequence – the ordering of those events in the plot *(récit)* do not. Instead, in the *récit* (the telling of the story), time may run backwards, in circles, or even jump haphazardly between past and

---

[3] Hawking 1998, chs. 6–10 (83–170).

future, depending on where the poet chooses to begin and which elements of the story he wishes to emphasize proleptically or retrospectively.[4]

The second point, which is more complicated, and more particular to the *Theogony*, stems from the problem of immortal time: of reconciling the eternal present of the gods' existence (the Olympians who belong to the "race of those who always are"/ "γένος αἰὲν ἐόντων," *Th.* 21 = 33, 105, 801) with the genealogical history of the elements which gradually give shape to the cosmos. At a certain point within the *Theogony*'s narrative, the order of time in the universe shifts from a diachronic sequence of events to a synchronic, eternal present ushered in by Zeus. The temporal discrepancy between *histoire* and *récit* is thereby re-plotted, at the level of narrative content, onto the temporal discrepancy between human and immortal time.

As I have already suggested in my analogy between 'deep space' and complex time, my aim in this chapter is to illustrate how the inconsistencies between the varying levels of temporalization in the *Theogony* (fixed/evolving; immortal/mortal; synchronic/ diachronic; eternal/chronological) provide the basic underpinnings for Hesiod's architecture of a cosmic geography. That is, I will reveal how the intersection of space and time in the *Theogony* takes place on two different planes which may be termed explicitly *topographical*. They are the topography of narrative (the textual space by which words are ordered and events are organized into a sequence) and the topography of the cosmos, whose design gradually unfolds in the course of the poem.

---

[4] Genette 1980, 33–85.

In accordance with these two 'topographies,' which evolve in parallel throughout the poem, I have divided this chapter into a series of sections, each of which deals with a particular place, or aspect of space, which in turn adds meaning to the representation of time in the narrative. In what follows, therefore, I show how Helicon, Delphi, Tartaros, and underground space in general, function as sites through which narrative and cosmos are both ordered and resolved. In the process, I demonstrate how the struggle for authorship passes between Hesiod, on the one hand, whose extended deliberations over where to start and where to end provide the basic structure of the proem, and Zeus, on the other, whose successful engineering of different levels of time within the universe may be understood according to a narratological frame.

1. The Proem

Helicon

The peaks of Mount Helicon upon which the Muses sing and dance at the opening of the *Theogony* draw us into a physical space which is both fantastic and familiar. As a topographical index, they lead the way not only into the world of Boeotia, and Hesiodic 'autobiography,' but also into the poetic tradition, which famously placed the Muses upon Helicon's slopes.[5] Situated at the crossroads between terrestrial and mythical geography, Helicon functions as a zone where several different types of space overlap,

---

[5] On Helicon as an autobiographical marker, see Lamberton 1988, esp. 27–35. For Helicon as the conventional site of the Muses (and Erinna's composition of a *certamen* between Helicon and Cithaeron), see West, *Th.* ad loc.

from the hymnic[6] to the geographical, the real to the imagined. As the site of the

Theogony's beginning, moreover, it is also the space from which time moves

backwards, from the present to the past, marking the initiation of the poet, the poem,

and thus, I shall argue, of narrative itself.

Helicon, then, exists as a physical space with manifold meanings, within whose

folds different registers of time and space are housed. Arthur and West have both

observed the dense concentration of divergent tenses at the very beginning of the poem

whose aspect shifts as the Muses travel through space.[7] For the Muses first appear in a

'timeless,' cyclical zone on the top of Helicon, where their habitual activities are

reported in atemporal tenses (*Th.* 2,4,7,8,10),[8] but, as they reach the bottom of the

mountain, they enter a topography of linear, or chronological time, which is fixed in the

finite category of the past ("vύ ποθ'," "ἐδίδαξαν," *Th.* 22; "ἔειπον." *Th.* 24). The spatial

transition from one place ("ἔνθεν," *Th.* 9) to another is marked by the verb "στεῖχον"[9]

(*Th.* 10), which suggests that time, like the goddesses in the ordering of their descent, is

filing into order. As they proceed, moreover, they sing a 'mini-Theogony' which itself

traces a route through several different aspects of time. As Arthur puts it, they pass

"from the timeless world of the Olympians," (Zeus, Hera, etc., *Th.* 11–18) "through the

---

[6] On the resemblance between Hesiod's opening 'hymn to the Muses' and the longer hymns in the Homeric collection, see Friedländer 1966/1914 & West, *Th.* pp.150–151.

[7] Arthur 1983, 100; West *Th.* ad loc. See also Thalmann 1984, 136–8 & 227, n.9. For the temporal complexities of the proem as a whole see Hamilton 1989, 10–43; Rudhardt 1996; Clay 1988; Østerud 1976; Schwabl 1966; Bal 1983.

[8] West *Th.* ad loc.

[9] *LSJ*, s.v. 2: *march in line* or *order*.

divinities who demarcate temporal order" (Dawn, Helios, Moon, *Th.* 19), "into the darker realms of the primal powers" (Gaia, Ocean and Night, *Th.* 20);[10] a sequence that roughly follows the *Theogony* proper (*Th.* 116ff.) in reverse, as has long been noted.[11]

As the Muses travel from the peaks of the mountain to its base, therefore, they trace their movement from the celestial to mortal sphere by the flow of song which documents both the passage of their journey and the lineage of the gods. Finally, then, they traverse not only a temporal and spatial landscape, but also a narratological one, for their descent is enacted through the telling of a story, which – as it traces a pathway from Zeus to Night – itself initiates a movement from the present back into the past.

Helicon's role at the beginning of the *Theogony* is thereby an important one to consider, for it not only provides Hesiod's audience with a familiar point of reference, which by the nature of its verticality creates an axis between mortal and immortal landscapes, but it also marks the starting point of the narrative itself. For Hesiod's encounter with the Muses is located at the spot where the poem's celestial and earthly landscapes meet, and it is from here that a second topography – the cosmos of the *Theogony* – will unfold, initiated by the gift of song which the Muses bestow upon him.

World and Poem

Hesiod's description of his own investiture by the Muses, and the subsequent composition of a poem inspired by their divine knowledge, situates his divine encounter

---

[10] Arthur 1983, 100.

[11] Clay 1988, 325, n.10.

in an intratextual relationship with the *Theogony* proper. For the creation of the world,
as Hesiod recounts it from 116ff, is structurally embedded – as a kind of embryonic
mirror-image – within the story of the *poem's* inception upon the slopes of Mount
Helicon. In this way, both text and cosmos are set in parallel, with the two accounts of
composition taking shape along a trajectory which moves from unformed, 'negative'
space to space which has been marked, ordered and filled.

The dark nothingness of Chaos from which Gaia is born, and which marks the
beginning of the *Theogony* proper (*Th.* 116), is thereby anticipated in the unproductive
hollowness of Hesiod's *gastêr* (*Th.* 26), into which the Muses breathe the creative
impulse of narrative (*Th.* 31–2). Indeed Hesiod, before his investiture, appears to be
nothing but belly, or so the Muses address him (*Th.* 26):

ποιμένες ἄγραυλοι. κάκ' ἐλέγχεα. γαστέρες οῖον
Rustic shepherds, base wretches, mere bellies

It is only after he has been imbued with voice, an act which Arthur compares to
conception (1983, 107) that Hesiod achieves an identity which separates him from the
sea of anonymous shepherds ("'Ησίοδον." *Th.* 22; [12] "με." *Th.* 24, 34; "μοι." *Th.* 30, 31,
35; "τύνη." *Th.* 36), and a body which is marked not by the *gastêr* but rather the
physical apparatus of voice, breath and sceptre. Furthermore, before the arrival of the
Muses or the birth of Gaia, Chaos and Hesiod inhabit the space of the *very* beginning

---

[12] Some argue (Nagy 1982, 49) that Hesiod's name is etymologically derived from and '*ieh' and '*huod,'
meaning 'Sender-Forth of Song.' See West *Th.* ad loc (p.161). Although this meaning cannot be
definitively proven, it suggests that Hesiod had no identity (except 'Belly' or 'Fatso') before his investiture
by the Muses.

(πρῶτος recurs frequently throughout the proem, but πρώτιστα occurs only here),

which – were it not for the action which marks the advent of narrative[13] – might have

stretched out indefinitely through an eternal, unchanging present (*Th.* 24; 116):

> τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαί πρός μῦθον ἔειπον
> In the very beginning the Muses said this to me… ("Base wretches, mere bellies," etc.)

> ἤτοι μέν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ᾽ ᾽ αὐτάρ ἔπειτα.
> In the very beginning there was Chaos, but then…

As if each were the blank page of a *pinax* or animal skin, or a *tabula rasa*, both

Chaos and the *gastêr* are inscribed by the invention of narrative.[14] That process of

inscription, moreover, is based on the principle of progression from one event to

another (the 'drive' of the plot) which in the *Theogony* is enacted through genealogy

and birth. It is the birth of Gaia from Chaos that marks the beginning of cosmic history,

and the subsequent births of Kronos and Zeus which ensure the continuation of the plot.

Similarly, Hesiod's initiation as a poet anticipates, both formally and thematically, the

description of the Muses' birth at *Th.* 53–67.[15] Here, the motif of birth is explicitly

coupled with the creative impulse of narrative as the Muses, who are famously born

from Memory in order to provide a "forgetfulness from evils" (*Th.* 55: "λησμοσύνην..

---

[13] See Todorov 1971, 38 on narrative as a movement which requires the development of an *action* (i.e. change/ difference) out of an initial description of a *state*.

[14] On the role of the *gastêr* in the *Odyssey* (7. 211–15 & 15. 343–5), and its complex relationship to narrative in book 15 – where it both holds Odysseus back from song, but also imitates narrative in its ability to make man forget his sufferings – see Svenbro 1976, 46–74; Thalmann 1984, 88–9,143–46.

[15] Nagy's insistence on the importance of this moment - "the first attested identification of an author in Greek literature takes place in the Hesiodic *Theogony*, where the figure of Hesiod names himself as the poet of this colossal poem (*Hêsiodon, Th.* 22)" (1992, 119) should not go unnoticed. The practice of authorship is not only thematized, but also, in a sense, originates, in the proem of the *Theogony*.

κακῶν") combine the ability to recover the past with the impetus (forgetting) to move beyond it; a necessary prerequisite of all story-telling.[16]

The birth of the Muses, then, which is thematically and structurally[17] connected with the 'birth' or initiation of the poet and Chaos' first cosmic act of reproduction, functions as a metonymy for the birth of the world in narrative. Their birth is thereby the first and last requirement in the creation of the world, since it appears, chronologically, at the end of the cosmogony, but it is the first requirement in order for the world to be narrated in human terms.

Like Hesiod, both Pindar and Alcman began their cosmogonies with an account of the Muses' birth and, as Detienne has observed, the prophets in Philo's *De Plantatione* similarly stipulate that the daughters of Memory be created as the final, vital piece in the genesis of the world (vital because without them its genesis could not be recorded).[18] But if the Muses quite definitively give us a place from which to begin a history of the cosmos, then Hesiod himself confuses the issue by mapping that

---

[16] Quint 1993; Brooks 1984, (see below, n.24). On the much-discussed topic of forgetfulness/memory in Hesiod, and its relationship to truth (*alêtheia*) see Detienne 1996/1967, 85–86 & passim; Nagy 1990b, 58–9, 1992; Thalmann 1984, 147–148; Walsh 1984, 22–36; Pucci 1977, 16–31; Cole 1983; Vernant 1983/1965, 75–90.

[17] Structurally, the birth of the Muses functions as both a flashback (analepsis) to the original birth of a divinity and flash-forward (prolepsis) to their gift of song to mankind. It provides a chronological link between everything that has happened so far in the narrative (Muses on Helicon, their appearance to Hesiod, their singing to Zeus) and that which is about to take place in the narrative/*récit* but has already taken place in the time of the story, or *histoire*, (the birth of the gods, issuing from Chaos). In addition to the investiture, the birth of the Muses is one of the many potential narratological starting points which Hesiod offers up in the proem, all of which serve as a prelude to Chaos' final/original claim on that position at *Th.* 116.

[18] Alcman fr.81, col. II (Calame ed.) = P. Oxy. 2390, fr.2, col. II, 22 ss.; Pindar's lost *Marriage of Zeus* is summarized in Aristides (Dindorf ed.) 1964, 2.142; Detienne 1996, 40; Philo, *De Plantatione* 128–30.

beginning onto not one but three topographical sites. For no sooner has the *Theogony* settled its beginning on Helicon (with the initiation of the poet, and the mini cosmogony of the Muses as they descend the mountain at 9–21), than it begins all over again ("Τύνη. Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα.." 36) this time on Olympos (37).[19]

This is only one of the several false starts in the proem; a third might be located at Pieria, where the Muses are born and from where they begin the procession to their father's home on Olympos. Indeed, it is fair to say that although the proem is abundant in both spatial and temporal markers (ἔνθεν (9); νύ ποθ'(22); τυτθόν, (62); ἔνθα (63); τότ'(68)), they can themselves be disorienting as the narrative shifts from one starting point to another. Time, in the proem at least, does not run in linear sequence. Rather, it is circular in much the same way as the Muses describe it to Hesiod after they have imbued him with divine voice (*Th.* 31–4):

> ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι <u>αὐδήν</u>
> θέσπιν ἵνα <u>κλείοιμι</u> τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα.
> καί μ' ἐκέλονθ' <u>ὑμνεῖν</u> μακάρων γένος αἰέν ἐόντων.
> σφᾶς δ' αὐτάς πρῶτον τε καί ὕστατον αἰέν <u>ἀείδειν</u>.

> They breathed into me a divine <u>voice,</u>
> In order that I might <u>celebrate</u> the things that will be and the things that were
> And they bid me to <u>hymn</u> the eternal race of the blessed ones
> But to <u>sing</u> always of themselves both first and last.

The emphasis in these lines upon the voice and its ability to tell a story (for which Hesiod supplies three different verbs in this short space of text) draws attention to the role of narrative in framing the discordance between *aiēn* ("αἰέν ἐόντων / αἰέν

---

[19] For discussion of this 'return to the beginning,' see among others Thalmann 1984, 136; Hamilton 1989, 11ff. On repetition in the proem in general, see Sellschopp 1967, 106–22 (=ch.7, 'Wiederholung als Mittel der Gedandkenführung und Begriffsbildung'); Schwabl 1966, 13.

ἀείδειν") and the division of time into past and future ("τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρὸ τ' ἐόντα / πρῶτον τε καὶ ὕστατον.") The Muses appear to be presenting Hesiod with two different versions of time at once – one which is static and all-encompassing, the other which passes like an arrow from the past to the future. But by mixing these two versions, however, the goddesses in fact come close to imitating the narratological movement of the *Theogony*, which, although it obsessively experiments with the idea of a beginning, itself reverses and loops through a time-frame which is often far from being either chronological or linear.

Repetition, Scale, and Narrative Structure

Just as the Muses cross fluidly between the three spaces which define them at different moments (and aspects) of time, words like πρῶτος and ἐξ ἀρχῆς in Hesiod's narrative carry within them the qualities of repetition and exchange. Like the scratch in a record, πρῶτος brings us back to that point in the text that we thought we had left behind, except that, each time it jumps back to an earlier point, the song replays with a difference.[20] The frequent recurrence of words meaning "beginning" or "first" in the proem reveal the dynamics of that pattern, as outlined below.

*Th.*1:

μουσάων Ἑλικωνιάδων ἀρχώμεθ' ἀείδειν.

Let us begin to sing from the Heliconian Muses

---

[20] The masterful analysis of repetition and difference in Hesiod remains that of Pucci 1977. For a critique of Pucci's Derridean model (and a replacement of it with the model of good/bad exchange) see Ferrari 1988.

Th. 24:

τόνδε δέ με πρώτιστα θεαὶ πρὸς μῦθον ἔειπον,

First of all, the goddesses said this thing to me

Th. 34:

σφᾶς δ' αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν.

(The Muses bid me) to always sing of them both first and last.

Th. 36:

τύνη. Μουσάων ἀρχώμεθα....

You! Let us begin from the Muses.. (on Olympos)

Th. 44—51:

θεῶν γένος αἰδοῖον πρῶτον κλείουσιν ἀοιδῇ
ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οὓς Γαῖα καὶ Οὐρανὸς εὐρὺς ἔτικτεν.
οἵ τ' ἐκ τῶν ἐγένοντο θεοὶ δωτῆρες ἐάων.
δεύτερον αὖτε Ζῆνα. θεῶν πατέρ' ἠδὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν.
[ἀρχόμεναί θ' ὑμνεῦσι θεαὶ † λήγουσαι τ' ἀοιδῆς.]
ὅσσον φέρτατός ἐστι θεῶν κράτεί τε μέγιστος.
αὖτις δ' ἀνθρώπων τε γένος κρατερῶν τε Γιγάντων
ὑμνεῦσαι τέρπουσι Διὸς νόον ἐντὸς 'ολύμπου

First they celebrate the holy race of the immortals in song
From the beginning, whom Gaia and wide Ouranos bore
And those gods who were born from them, givers of good things.
Second they sing of Zeus, father of gods and men,
[Beginning and ending their song in celebration of him]
In as much as he is the mightiest of the gods in strength and greatness.
Third they sing of the race of men and of the very strong Giants
And their singing delights the mind of Zeus on Olympos.

Th. 108:

εἴπατε δ'. ὡς τὰ πρῶτα θεοὶ καὶ γαῖα γένοντο

Tell me, how in the first place the gods and Earth came into being

Th. 113—6:

ἠδὲ καὶ ὡς τὰ πρῶτα πολύπτυχον ἔσχον "Ολυμπον.
ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι. 'Ολύμπια δώματ' ἔχουσαι
ἐξ ἀρχῆς. καὶ εἴπαθ'. ὅ τι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν.
ἦ τοι μὲν πρώτιστα Χάος γένετ'. αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα

And how in the first place they (the gods) inhabited many-folded Olympos
Tell me these things Muses, you who have your homes on Olympos,
From the beginning, and tell me, which of them came into being first.
Well, first of all there was Chaos, and then..

What Bal has termed "an obsession with beginnings" (1983, 119) in Hesiod is represented here by the poet's circular treatment of chronology, where first and last appear to be interchangeable terms (*Th.* 34; 47–8), and by the compartmentalization of time into several overlapping sections, each of which has its own point of origin. As these originary points gradually accumulate in the proem, however, they increasingly build towards the final/first coming-into-being of Chaos. In particular, we move from an emphasis upon the composition and performance of song (*Th.* 1, 24, 34, 36, 44, 48), to an emphasis upon the composition or creation of the world (*Th.* 45–51, 108, 113–6). In both cases, Hesiod's repetitive movements towards, and returns to, the concept of 'beginning' speak to the human difficulties involved in constructing a 'history of time' – of fixing both the spatial and temporal order of the world in language.

When Odysseus began to tell his story to the Phaeacians, he too pondered the question of narrative order (*Od.* 9.14):

τί πρῶτόν τοι ἔπειτα. τί δ' ὑστάτιον καταλέξω:

What shall I narrate first then, and what last?

For the process of recounting a series of events demands that they first be sorted into the temporal framework of a plot. Even, as in the case of Odysseus, when that order roughly follows the chronology of the events themselves, the narrator cannot help but always speak from the position of 'last,' since – even at the very beginning of his tale – his own hindsight shapes the story he is about to relate. It is only from the position of the end that the author is able to order the events in his story into a sequence that

confers meaning.[21] In a similar way, Hesiod grants the Muses their request to occupy

both first and last positions in his song (*Th.* 34) because their appearance on Mount

Helicon is both the first event of his narrative and the last event, chronologically, of the

story he is recounting (and it is only from the position of 'hindsight' which they afford

him that he is able to recount the story at all).

I have already touched upon the discrepancy between the way a story is told and

its actual (real or imaginary) occurrence in time, which Genette has formulated as the

difference between *histoire* and *récit*.[22] It has been a central tenet of Genette and other

theorists that narrative is structured on two temporal levels – at "the time of the story

and the pseudo-time of the narrative" (1980, 34–5). The proem, therefore, can be seen

as an exercise in bringing these two narrative layers together – as an attempt to

reconcile the temporality of the narrative process (the story of Hesiod's investiture, his

invocations to the Muses as to where, and how, to begin) with the beginning of the

Theogony proper ("In the very beginning there was Chaos..," *Th.* 116). As we progress

through the proem, following the trail of (re-)starts that the poet has laid for us, these

two temporalities draw closer and closer together, until the time of narrative and the

time of the story appear to merge ("ταῦτά μοι ἔσπετε Μοῦσαι.. ἐξ ἀρχῆς. καὶ εἴπαθ'.

ὅτι πρῶτον γένετ' αὐτῶν."/ "Tell me these things Muses... from the beginning, and

tell me, which of them came into being first" *Th.* 114–5). Although these two

---

[21] White 1980, 19. On the subject of narrative's relation to the end, the definitive work remains that of Kermode 2000/1966.

[22] See above, p.17 (with note).

temporalities can never actually overlap,[23] since it is, of course, impossible to close the gap between an original and its representation, there are ways in which that gap, or the relationship between original and image, can be negotiated and made meaningful. In what follows, I suggest that we should understand narrative, like cartography or model building, as operating on the simple principle of scale in order to close the gap between *histoire* and *récit*.

Later on in this dissertation (ch.2), I discuss how the Greeks ran into difficulties when attempting to conceptualize the entire space of the earth on a map. Borges' "On Exactitude in Science" (1998, 325) elaborates upon the fantasy of creating a map of the world which is not to scale, but rather covers the earth on a one to one ratio, square foot by square foot. The same hermeneutic problem applies to time, which can also *only* be re-presented according to some kind of scale. The director Peter Brook opens his memoirs with an anecdote which points to just such an incompatibility between narrative, history and event (Brook 1988, 3):[24]

> At this moment, somewhere in Scandinavia, a man with a prodigious capacity for total recall is also recording his life. I am told that as he puts down every detail that his memory provides, it is taking him a year to write a year, and as he started late he can never catch up.

---

[23] Just as, when we look into the cosmos, a gap will always exist between the actual time of a star's existence in space and the time of our reception of it (see above, pp.16–18) so is it impossible for any author to close the gap between the dual time sequence of *histoire* and *récit*.

[24] See also Borges' short story "Funes, His Memory" (1998, 131–137) about a young man who, upon regaining consciousness after a fall, achieves perfect memory and perception: "Two or three times he had reconstructed an entire day; he had never once erred or faltered, but each reconstruction had itself taken an entire day.,"135. The same point is made by the narrator of Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, p.286 (Penguin 1967).

In attempting to 'map' the world in both space and time, then, Hesiod's proem focuses on the disjunction between narrative and story/event (*récit* and *histoire*) in order to theorize the difficulty of encompassing (or 'scaling down') the time of the whole world into the time of narrative. But Brook's anecdote also points to a crucial factor in the composition of narrative: in order for a history to have any meaning (or at least narrative end) it must work through a process of selection.[25] And the filter which ensures that selection, for Brook, is forgetfulness. For Hesiod, too, poetry is made up of a curious mixture of memory and oblivion. In the translation not only from divine to mortal voice, but also from divine to mortal conceptions of time, the Muses equip man with the ability to forget in order that his narrative might be finite. In the *Theogony*, that forgetfulness is also classified as a form of repression; a psychological necessity which enables the listener to forget the trauma of his or her own individual past (*Th.* 53–5; 98–103).[26]

There is a tension, therefore, between the narrative compulsion to repeat and poetry's ability to induce forgetfulness as it reaches back into the past. Both Brooks and Quint have examined this tendency of narrative to repeat itself and, borrowing from Freud's "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," have applied the model of psychoanalysis to narrative structure.[27] Having established that "repetition is... basic to our experience of

---

[25] See White 1980, 14–15 & my ch.2, p.129, below.

[26] See above, n.16.

[27] Brooks 1984, ch.4 "Freud's Masterplot: A Model for Narrative," 90–112; Quint 1993 applies Brooks' essay to the *Aeneid*, showing how "the Trojans' nostalgic attempts to repeat or relive their past" determines the narrative patterns of circularity and digression in the epic (56). It is only after the Trojans

literary texts" (1984, 99), Brooks shows how forgetfulness is its necessary antithesis.

Furthermore, it is the tension which exists between the two qualities which provides the

driving force of narrative, allowing it to evolve out of a trapped obsession with a single

moment in time. Each repetition of the past thereby functions – in narratological terms –

as a kind of re-emplotment, which depends on the intrinsic seed of variation[28] in order

to move forward into the future. That variation, and eventual severance with the past, is

made possible through the theraputic process of forgetting.[29]

Like Elpis stuck inside the rim of Pandora's jar, forgetting is a 'gift' which is

unique to humans. As hope gives mortals a means of envisioning the future, so does

forgetting afford them with a means of envisioning the past, and we might term the

combination of these qualities the dynamic which eventually allows narrative to move

forward. But the delaying tactics of repetition and regression are equally intrinsic to

narrative form, for they provide the 'dilatory space' necessary to prevent the beginning

and end of a story from collapsing into one another.[30]

I have paid particular attention to a pattern of repetition in the proem which in

itself thematizes a basic principle of narrative structure. For as words meaning 'first' or

'beginning' recur in the *Theogony*, they cast light on the circular or repetitive ordering

of the poem as a whole, especially as it is enacted through the doomed cycle of son

---

learn to forget the past that their story is able to move forward, rather than backwards or sideways. Psychotherapy is also evoked as a model for narratology by White 1978, 86ff.

[28] Todorov's "repetition with difference," 1977, 218–33, esp. 233. See also Pucci 1977 (above, n.20)

[29] See especially Quint 1993, 63ff., on the "theraputic effects of forgetting" as they are played out in the narrative structure of the *Aeneid* (& above, n.27).

[30] Brooks (1984, 92ff.) borrows the expression 'dilatory space' from Barthes (1977, 117–121).

overpowering father before it is broken by Zeus. It would be possible, moreover, to show how this pattern continues beyond *Th.* 116 and throughout the poem,[31] with each new instance of "πρῶτος" or "ἐξ ἀρχῆς" serving to move the plot forward just as it simultaneously threatens to pull it backwards, as if by a process of entropy, into its original state of Chaos. Later in the chapter, I will address the ways in which Zeus takes control of the narrative, and is able to free it from the time-bound cycle of repetition which neither Ouranos nor Kronos could escape. His victory is a close one, however, and it is fought on a narratological as well as a cosmic battlefield. For as the earth shakes under the weight of Zeus' thunderbolt during the battle with the Titans, earth and heaven are almost reunited (*Th.* 700–703), signalling a return to a time before the separation of space – a leap backwards to a point where the narrative almost cancels itself out, and where beginning and end all but collapse into one another.

2. The Depths of the Past: Temporal Architecture in the *Theogony*

Si enim sunt futura et praeterita volo scire, ubi sint.

If there really is a future and a past, I want to know where they are.

Augustine, *Confessions* 11.18.23

ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ χρόνῳ

Epic time has no boundaries

Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449b13–14

In the previous section, I explored the ways in which hope and forgetfulness, or the future and the past, are kept separate in narrative by the 'dilatory space' of

---

[31] Cf. *Th.* 126, 156, 188, 202–3, 309, 397, 408, 425, 452, 482, 497, 512, 513, 617, 713, 741, 765, 886, 895, for instances of "πρωτ-" and "ἀρχ-" (in the sense of 'first' or 'beginning') outside the proem.

repetition. But what exactly do the Muses mean when they instruct Hesiod to sing of the 'future' and the 'past' (*Th.* 32: "τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα")? Certainly, the poem does not follow a clearly ordered sequence of time and tense. Not only do its multiple beginnings move backwards in time, but its narrative thread jumps out of sequence continually, shifting between habitual time and the time of a single completed action, between the eternal present of the immortals and the past and future of mankind, and between the recent past in Hesiod's own life and the mythical beginning of time itself. This has caused editors and commentators of the *Theogony* some consternation. To begin with, Hesiod appears to diverge from some celebrated rules about Homer's treatment of time: that it should focus on a single, completed incident as an 'organic unity' (Aristotle); that it should have no concept of the past or the future outside the eternal 'now' of its narrative (Auerbach); and that it should present two simultaneous acts as if they occurred successively, rather than at the same time (Zielinski).[32]

I have already touched upon the first point, which is to say that the *Theogony* covers a time-span far longer than the Homeric model set forward by Aristotle at *Poetics* 1450b35–1451b36, (esp. 1451a15ff.), and I have evoked the analogy of scale in order to show how Hesiod attempted to combine the double time frames of *récit* and *histoire*. But the second and third divergences deserve more of our attention. In the first half of the twentieth century, both Auerbach and Zielinski examined the concept of 'epic time' from different but related angles, and both argued for a particular treatment of tense and chronology which was subsequently altered, or even lost, with the

---

[32] Arist., *Poet.* 1451a15ff.; Auerbach 1953, ch.1: "Odysseus' Scar;" 3–23; Zielinski 1901, 419–449.

movement of literature out of the early Greek period. In what follows, I show how the combined methodologies of their two quite separate approaches to Homer may help to shed light on Hesiod's construction of time in the *Theogony* (although perhaps not in a way that either of them intended). In some cases, this will be in order to show how one or another of their points does not hold true for Hesiod, but what is more interesting, for my purposes, is the language and imagery, such as the 'depths of the past,' or the 'three-dimensionality of time,' which both scholars employ in order to chart the progress of time through epic. These have provided me with a framework and vocabulary with which to begin uncovering the complexities of Hesiod's temporal landscape.

I shall begin with Auerbach, whose description of Homeric epic, as typified by his famous reading of Odysseus' scar, insisted that every scene "knows only a foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective present" (1953, 7).[33] In Auerbach's reading of Homer's world, "nothing must remain hidden and unexpressed" (6).[34] Rather, the moment of the now, the ever present, shines so brightly in Homer as to obliterate all traces of a past or future, causing each time frame (each new 'now') that the poem steps into to glow with a fully externalized, all-consuming, reality.[35]

---

[33] Since my reading of Auerbach depends as much upon his choice of language as his ideas, I include the German here (1967, 9): "er kennt nur Vordergrund, nur gleichmäßig beleuchtete, gleichmaßig objektive Gegenwart."

[34] 1967, 8: "nichts verborgen und unausgesprochen bleiben."

[35] Auerbach 1953, 4–5: "Homer .. knows no background. What he narrates is for the time being the only present, and fills the stage and the reader's mind completely" / 1967, 6–7: "Allein Homer.. kennt keinen Hintergrund. Was er erzählt, ist jeweils allein Gegenwart, und füllt Schauplatz und Bewußtsein ganz aus."

Key to Auerbach's analysis is his use of the imagery of light and darkness to describe the effects of time. Taking his cue from a scene which itself plays on exactly these themes (Odysseus turns away from the hearth towards the darkness in his attempt to hide the scar at *Od.* 19.389 and the boar which attacks him is hidden in a lair "untouched by the streams of the sun," *Od.* 19.440–3), Auerbach consistently uses terms such as "illumination," "clear," "light" and "visible" to describe the uniform effects of Homer's monolithic present.[36] Such a reading excludes, quite forcefully, all hints of "depth," "background," "obscurity," "lacunae," the "hidden" or the "fragmentary" (Auerbach 1953, 6–7):[37]

> [all is] brought to life in perfect fullness...never is there a form left fragmentary or half-illuminated, never a lacuna, never a gap, never a glimpse of unplumbed depths.

> so treten auch ihre Verhältnisse.. in vollendeter Bildung ans Licht;.. und sich nirgends eine Fragment gebliebene oder nur halb beleuchtete Form, nirgends eine Lücke, ein Auseinanderklaffen, ein Blick in unerforschte Tiefen zeigt.

For Auerbach then, the temporal landscape of Homer's style is flat and exposed, lacking in either perspective or depth. A similar resistance to the spatial 'layering' of time is found in Zielinski, whose treatment of plot in ancient epic is founded upon the concept of "das Flächenhafte und Einplanige" (1901, 408): of events

---

[36] For a critique of Auerbach, see Austin 1966 and especially Lynn-George 1988, who lays out the terms of the problem in addition to offering his own interpretation of the issue. (I borrow the term 'monolithic' from him).

[37] See also 1953, 4: "all is narrated..[so] as to leave nothing in obscurity" / 1967, 6: "alles wird erzählt, wiederum mit vollkommener, nichts im Dunkeln lassender Ausformung aller Dinge und aller sie verbindenden Glieder;" 1953, 5: "Homeric style leaves nothing...in half darkness" / 1967, 7: "in dem Bedürfnis des homerischen Stils, nichts von dem was überhaupt erwähnt wird, halb im Bunkel und unausgeformt zu lassen;" 1953, 6: "Homer...will not permit it to appear out of the darkness of an unilluminated past," / 1967, 8: "und es ist, für das homerische Gefühl, nicht erträglich, sie nur einfach aus einem unaufgehellten Dunkel der Vergangenheit hervortauchen zu sehen; sie muß hell ans Licht,..." and passim.

stretched out upon a single, two-dimensional plane. Just as Auerbach will do some fifty

years after him, Zielinski uses landscape as a metaphor for narrative, constructing an

imaginary scene (a country road, cornfield, and windmill) upon which his entire theory

of poetic time is modelled. That scene may have a foreground (the road) and

background (the mill) which the eye can register simultaneously – *but only so long as*

the picture is at rest. As soon as an event (in Zielinski's example, the wind setting the

windmill in motion) enters the scene, the viewer's attention is instantly drawn to focus

upon it exclusively, making it impossible for him to look upon the other events which

the wind precipitates (the sudden surging of the cornfield or the swirling of dust in the

road) at precisely the same moment as he observes the rotation of the windmill. With

the introduction of an event, then, Zielinski argues that time displaces the three-

dimensionality of space, forcing it to narrow out into a singular plane within which

events, even if they actually happen simultaneously, can only be perceived in sequence

(Zielinski 1901, 409):

> So ist mein Sehn aus einem dreiplanigen plötzlich ein einplaniges geworden: die neu
> hinzugetretene Dimension der Zeit hat die Raumdimension der Tiefe verdrängt.
>
> In this way, my sight is drawn from a three-dimensional to a one-dimensional plane: the newly
> introduced dimension of time has replaced the spatial dimension of depth.[38]

Like Auerbach, then, Zielinski proposes that there is no 'depth' to time. This

provides the basis for his larger claim that poetry, like aesthetics, cannot present the

---

[38] Translation mine.

simultaneous events of a plot in parallel space.[39] Indeed, he goes on to argue that

ancient epic follows this rule to the letter by never describing two events as if they

happened at the same time. That is, in the representation of a story,[40] the epic poet will

engage in a kind of false synchronism by rearranging events which actually occurred

simultaneously (in three-dimensional space) into a linear, two-dimensional sequence, so

that they are narrated as if they happened one after another.

Thus articulated, 'Zielinski's law' solved the discrepancy between *Od.* 1.84ff.

(the council of the gods in which it is decided that Hermes should be sent to Ogygia and

Athena to Ithaca) and *Od.* 5.18–20 (where, with the entire Telemachy having been

narrated, there appears to be a second council, during which Hermes is finally

dispatched to Ogygia). Here, and at several other points in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*,[41]

Homer's narrative avoids moving backwards in time in order to cross the same temporal

space twice (otherwise known as the "Meanwhile, back at the ranch..." style of story-

telling).[42] As Zielinski conceived it, this was precisely because Homer understood that

---

[39] "Was für die räumlichen Zustände die Malerei, das ist für die zeitlichen Vorgänge die Poesie (im weitesten Sinne);... die Poesie ist die Kunst des Nacheinanders schlechthin." / "Just as for the spatial arrangement of a painting, so for the temporal events of a poem (in the broadest sense);... Poetry, without doubt, is the art of consecutive action," Zielinski 1901, 414.

[40] 'Die scheinbare Handlung,' as opposed to 'die wirkliche Handlung,' or the (real or imagined) actual occurrence of the events. Zielinski's use of *scheinbar* and *wirklich* (on which, see Krischer 1971, 91ff.) are of course apposite to Genette's *récit* and *histoire*.

[41] The best known is *Il.* 15.150–235. For others, see Whitman & Scodel 1981; Olson 1995.

[42] Zielinski's theory, as well as the response that it generated, is considerably more complex than I have space to go into here. Suffice to point out that Zielinski exempted indirect description or speeches of recollection from his law, reasonably asserting that the stories which characters narrated within the epic occupied an independent space from the larger narrative (Zielinski 1901, 410, 417, 441; Krischer 1971, 93–4). In the wake of Zielinski's observations, see Fränkel 1968/1931, who boldly went on to argue that

in the perception of time (as it is marked by the beginning and end of events) space was incapable of expanding beyond the dimensions of a single plane.

By eliminating the concept of 'meanwhile' from the Homeric lexicon, therefore, Zielinski's theory refutes the possibility of epic time occupying transverse or 'horizontal' space.[43] But this is precisely the position that I wish to argue against for Hesiod, who violates Zielinski's law on two occasions (*Th.* 617, 711) in order to introduce, and conclude, the Titanomachy. At these moments his text jumps out of the time of its plot in order to retrace an aspect of time from the past – recovering the ground which his narrative has already traversed by returning to the time of Ouranos at *Th.* 617-8.[44]

Unlike Homer then, the architecture of Hesiod's narrative allows for time to be 'stacked' on various levels which can run simultaneously through the text.[45] At *Th.* 617ff., we are told that Ouranos bound the Hundred Handers in strong chains and sent them to dwell under the earth, where they would have remained indefinitely had Zeus

---

the early Greeks had no concept of abstract time: "Das Wort χρόνος hat bei Homer einen genau begrentzten Sinn und Gebrauch. Es bezeichnet immer eine *Dauer*, nie einen Punkt" (1968/1931,1), cf. Page 1955; Krischer 1971. More recently, see Frazer 1981 (on Zielinski's law in the *Theogony*), Whitman & Scodel 1981, & Olson, 1995. Olson provides the most balanced and comprehensive take on Zielinski's theory since Krischer, as well as offering his own interpretation of temporal patterning in the *Odyssey*. While Olson acknowledges the importance of Zielinski's work, he concludes "there can be little doubt that Homer's treatment of time is far more complex and nuanced than has generally been recognized. Despite appearances, the *Odyssey* balances uneasily between simultaneous and consecutive action." (1995, 118).

[43] Cf. Benjamin's "empty, homogenous time" (1968, 261) and Anderson's description of how the concept of meanwhile in the novel helped foster in the national imagination a sense of horizontal connection across space (1991, 22–31).

[44] See West, *Th.* ad loc.

[45] Cf. Vernant's description of Hesiodic time as a "stratification of layers" (1983/1965, 36).

and the other gods not "brought them back up into the light again" – *Th.* 626) in order for them to aid Zeus in his battle against the Titans. In breach of Zielinski's law, then, the *Theogony* houses a different register of time under the earth, which runs independently of the time upon its surface. At *Th.* 626, these two temporal threads are reunited into a single narrative plane, as the Hundred Handers are brought out of the 'depths of the past' and re-integrated with the present.

Time Underground *(the Archive)*

The space underground thereby serves as a kind of narrative repository, within which the plot 'stores up' time for the future. In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod gives directions as to the importance of sinking grain underground in large jars, in order that they might be preserved beyond the immediacy of the present (*Op.* 30–32; 473ff; 600). Even Pandora, who otherwise lets the contents of her jar escape, is able to at least stop up hope for future time inside the *pithos* (*Op.* 96–99).

I wish to suggest that the ground "archives" time in Hesiod in a way that Auerbach and Zielinski earnestly sought to deny for Homer; I borrow the analogy of the archive from a medieval scholar, who in turn adapts it from Derrida's *Archive Fever.*[46] In Strohm's words "the archive does not arrest time, but rather exists as an unstable amalgam of unexhausted past and unaccomplished future" (2000, 80). In divine terms, the past is always unexhausted. Since the gods cannot pass out of existence, so too can

---

[46] Strohm 2000, ch.6 (80–96); Derrida 1996.

the past never be brought to full completion. It can only be contained, arrested for some moment in the future.

When Ouranos traps Gaia's children within her subterranean belly, therefore, he too transforms her womb into a kind of jar within which he hopes to store, or postpone, the onset of the plot's chronological sequence, just as his 'binding' of the Hundred Handers and imprisonment of them under the earth may be understood, metaphorically, as a 'binding' of narrative time.[47] Faraone has shown how the techniques of both binding and burial were commonly practiced in apotropaic ritual precisely in order to avert or ward off some future event.[48] By binding an image of a god, or by sealing such an image or token (such as an animal) within a pot and burying it, the actant sought to exert his own control over time; to manipulate the approach of the future or to temporarily arrest time within the present.[49] In Homer, Odysseus nearly transcends the long passage of time which separates him from Ithaca, thanks to the temporary binding of the winds by Aeolus. In the *Iliad*, on the other hand, we are told of how Ares was bound and encased in a bronze cauldron so strong that it almost destroyed him (*Il.* 385–91) – a testimony to the considerable power that binding and burial can exert over even the immortals' hold upon the present.

---

[47] See Brooks 1984, 101, on 'binding' as a narratological metaphor.

[48] Faraone 1992, esp. 74ff. & 118.

[49] Cf. Faraone 1992, 286, n.3: "The *Geoponica* (10.87.6) recommends attaching verse 5.387 of the Ares passage ("and three months and ten he lay chained in a bronze cauldron") to a tree to prevent it from prematurely casting its fruit-that is, it "binds" the tree to hold on to its fruit until the correct moment in its annual cycle."

As the *Theogony* moves forwards toward the 'everlasting present' of Zeus'

reign, therefore, it is also restrained by a narrative movement which seeks to bind time

within a space which – as the narrative progresses – will come to symbolize the 'depths

of the past.' The exit of the Hundred Handers from the dark regions underground at *Th.*

617 is therefore a narratological move as well as a spatial one, as the text retraces its

steps into the archive of its past in order to return certain key elements of the plot to the

light of the present.

As each god who sets out to author his own cosmic narrative learns in turn, the

relegation of an event or a divine being to the past (or at least out of the 'present') can

only occur on a spatial plane. Since gods are not endowed with the capacity to forget or

die, nothing in the immortal sphere can simply pass out of existence. Instead, the

narrative builds compartments to harbour past time which are themselves embedded,

and develop concurrently, with the architecture of the cosmos. Just as Auerbach

imagines the present to be a flat, fully-illuminated plane, and the past to be located

somewhere in the "unplumbed depths," Hesiod's *Theogony*, when it breaks Zielinski's

law and steps back in time, travels not only underground ("ὑπὸ χθονί." *Th.* 621–2) but

also to the outermost edges of the earth (" ἐν πείρασι γαίης." *Th.* 623) in order to

access its narrative archives.

As an epistemological concept translated into spatial terms, the present thereby

emerges as that which is visible or light, while the past and the future linger under the

cover of darkness or ground – a phenomenon I have already noted in Auerbach's use of

dark and light imagery to illustrate temporal states, and in Ouranos' 'hiding' of the

future underground at *Th.* 157–8 ("πάντας <u>ἀποκρύπτασκε</u> καὶ <u>ἐς φάος οὐκ ἀνίεσκε/</u>

Γαίης ἐν κευθμῶνι"– "He would not let them come up into the light, but hid them all/

Within the passages of the earth").[50] If we were to plot (contra Zielinski, who claimed

that more than one spatial dimension could not exist within time) a temporal landscape

for the *Theogony*, then its past and the future would perhaps resemble the dark, hidden

caverns within which Augustine imagined time residing in book 11 of the *Confessions*

(11.17):

> an et ipsa sunt, sed ex <u>aliquo</u> procedit <u>occulto</u>, cum ex futuro fit praesens, et in <u>aliquod</u> recedit <u>occultum</u>, cum ex praesentia fit praeteritium?

> Or is that that [the past and future] do exist, but that time emerges from <u>some hidden place</u> when it moves from the future into the present, and goes back into <u>some hidden place</u> when it moves from the present into the past?

Augustine's placement of the future and the past within a physical topography

evokes the spatial metaphors employed for memory in Classical rhetorical technique,

where images reflecting the order of the speech were housed in specific *loci* within a

memory palace of the orator's invention.[51] In a similar way, the *Theogony* charts the

development of time on a three dimensional plane, complete with pockets and dwellings

within which the past and the future can 'hide.' When the infant Zeus is hidden within

---

[50] The cavern has long been used as refuge or hide-out from chronological time. Epimenides, who – legend has it – fell asleep in a cave, slipped out of time for a period of 57 years. See DK 3; Dodds 1951, ch.7.

[51] Cic. *De orat.* 2.86, 351–4; *Rhet. Her.* 3.16–24; Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.17–22. Augustine's own description of memory is also applicable here, for – like the author of the *Rhet. Herr.* (3.16.28) he likens its regions to coffers or storehouses "thesauri innumerabilium imaginum," (Aug. *Conf.* 10.8.12) . See O'Donnell's commentary (1992 *vol. III*) ad loc. & 173ff: "Excursus: Memory in Augustine." On time in Augustine, both in terms of its relation to narrative and for its 'quasi-spatiality,' see also Ricoeur 1984, 5–30. I discuss the spatial compartmentalization of memory in more detail in ch.6, below (pp.276–84).

a subterranean cave (*Th.* 482–3) until he grows strong enough to wrest power from his

father, therefore, or when we are told that the thunderbolt awarded to Zeus by the

Cyclops had previously ("τὸ πρίν") been hidden beneath the earth (*Th.* 505), as if being

saved up for its crucial role at a later point in the story, we come to understand that

another level of temporality exists below the surface of the ever-visible present of

eternal, immortal time.

Time Above Ground (the Arc)

It is from the earth, too, that the tool is carved which will first divide time into the

distinct categories of past, present, and future. For the sickle which Gaia invents, the

first manifestation of *technê* (160) within the *Theogony*, acts – according to the rules of

almost every technology – to change the perception and ordering of time in the world of

the poem.[52] The ancient allegorists were of course right to identify a connection

between Κρόνος and χρόνος,[53] for the god's castration of his father creates a

movement, or differentiation, through space which in turn expands the geography of

time. Having severed Ouranos' genitals, Kronos "threw them back behind him" –

"πάλιν δ' ἔρριψε φέρεσθαι/ ἐξοπίσω" (181–2), devising an arc which contains the

seeds not only of germination (the Furies and Aphrodite are born from them) but also of

future time. In his release of the genitals Kronos thereby invents a new shape in space.

---

[52] On technology's role in changing the human perception of time, see Nowotny 1994; Mumford 1963, esp. 12–17 ("The Monastery and the Clock").

[53] Cf. Cic. *De nat. deo.* 2.26. The earliest explicit connection between Κρόνος and χρόνος may have occurred in Pherecydes' *Theogony* (see intro, above, pp.7–14);West 1971, 10; Schibli 1990, 29.

But not only in space. For, as the act engenders from Ouranos a promise of revenge, it also creates a new movement in time (*Th.* 209–10):

φάσκε δὲ τιταίνοντας ἀτασθαλίῃ μέγα ῥέξαι
ἔργον. τοῖο δ' ἔπειτα τίσιν μετόπισθε ἔσεσθαι.

He said that, straining in arrogance they had performed an awesome act
For which they would pay the penalty in the future.

The backward arc of Ouranos' genitals ("ἐξοπίσω") is thus mirrored in the concept of the 'afterward' expressed in his speech ("μετόπισθε"). In both cases, the temporal and spatial meanings (behind/afterwards) of the words overlap,[54] opening up the topography of the *Theogony* into a 'plot' wherein future and past time can co-exist.[55] The juxtaposition of "μετόπισθε" with "ἔσεσθαι," (the future tense stated in its plainest form), thereby denotes a turning *backward* towards the future. This not only mirrors the reader/listener's linear perspective of the future, from whose position at the end of the story such 'future' events as the overthrow of Kronos are chronologically located in the past, but also suggests that, as Vernant has written, time in Hesiod is based upon a pattern which is inherently circular.[56]

The events leading up to the castration of Ouranos begin, then, with a compressed earth and sky, co-joined in the continuous act of intercourse, and end with their separation – a vital, primary step in the evolution of the universe. For as long as

---

[54] As documented for both in *LSJ*.

[55] For the spatial associations of 'plot,' in word and concept, see Brooks 1984, 11–12 , and below, ch 2, p.80.

[56] Vernant 1983, "Hesiod's Myth of the Races: An Essay in Structural Analysis" & "Hesiod's Myth of the Races: A Reassessment," 1–72.

the children are trapped inside Gaia and she is burdened by the lack of space both within and above, the narrative is frozen in a state of inactivity and restraint, a dilatory space within which the present moment of narrative action is held back in darkness (*Th.* 157). It is only through the agency of mind and *technê* (160), physically manifested by the tool with which Gaia carves narrative action, that the plot escapes from underground and emerges into the light. The speed with which the action takes place ("ἄιψα" 161; "ἄιψ" ("quickly'")169; "ἐσσυμένως" ("hurriedly")181) is noticeable for its contrast with the painful burden of inactivity which proceeded it ("ἡ δ' ἐντὸς στοναχίζετο Γαῖα πελώρη/ στεινομένη" ("Gaia groaned, full and constrained within") 159–60). The larger problem of establishing temporal order within the cosmos is thereby always already a narratological problem, and in each case the intricacies of that ordering are solved through the medium of space and geography.

In contrast to Auerbach's formulation for the *Odyssey,* within which he stated that "Homeric style knows only a foreground, only a uniformly illuminated, uniformly objective present" (1953, 7), in Hesiod the 'depths of the past' cast a considerable shadow over narrative movement, as if to suppress and all but overwhelm the emergence of the present. Ouranos' restraining of his children within the belly of Gaia serves to indefinitely postpone the transition from the past to the present,[57] just as Kronos' own swallowing of his children attempts to put a hold on the passage of time. Even when those attempts to trap time have been thwarted, the weight of the past still

---

[57] Compare Aug. *Conf.* 11.17, as quoted above, p.44, who also imagines the past as an underground cavern from which the present emerges.

adumbrates the forward movement of the plot to such an extent that, towards the end of

the *Theogony*, the sheer force of action during the Titonamachy has the reverse effect of

almost causing the narrative to fold back into itself with the convergence of earth and

sky. (700–703). The poem hints that it is only a few degrees from a return to the

beginning of the world ("It seemed.. as (it would) if.. (and when) earth and heaven were

coming together before our eyes); for even such a noise would (in that event) be

arising")[58] just as its entire narratological structure simultaneously teeters on the brink

of collapse, ready to submerge itself back into a previous, as-yet-unwritten existence.

Human vs. Divine Time

In a reverse impulse to the suppressive, delaying pull of the past, genealogy and birth

serve as the engine through which the *Theogony*'s plot is propelled; a relentless

metaphor for the onward drive of human time, which each new author of the world

(Ouranos, Kronos, Zeus) attempts to stop. It is here that the clash between human and

divine time becomes most acute: each god needs a birth from which to begin, but the

necessary temporality of that birth causes a rupture in the transcendent, timeless surface

of the gods' existence. For Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus, the future – stored in the bellies

of their partners like Elpis caught within Pandora's jar–[59] symbolizes succession: that

is, both the successive sequence of narrative and the successive sequence of rule passing

---

[58] West *Th.* ad loc., p.353, offers this translation of the passage after a detailed examination of its 'abnormal syntax.' As he explains, "It is not clear whether Hesiod is presenting the collapse of heaven upon earth as something which once took place, or only as something that could be imagined to take place."

[59] The comparison is made by Zeitlin 1996, 66.

from father to son. All three thereby attempt to contain or hold back the future within

the enclosing space of the *gastêr* or jar (by forcing their issue back into the mother's

belly, by swallowing their children, or by swallowing the mother herself when the child

is still inside her). As I outlined above in my discussion of the Muses' address to Hesiod

and in my description of Chaos (pp.23–4), the *gastêr* is temporally located at the

moment just *before* narrative begins. It thereby symbolizes the space of proto-narrative,

or of narrative as-yet-unwritten, and in this sense denotes the ideal site for storing, or

restraining, the onset of chronological time.

In successively attempting to author the textual/cosmic space of the *Theogony*,

therefore, Ouranos, Kronos and Zeus each turn their attention to controlling the passage

of time.[60] Each of them, in effect, wants to bring chronological time to an end: to break

the cycle of birth and repetition and supplant it with his own lasting rule. But the

impulse of narrative to move forwards, into the future, is represented by more than the

welling up of children in the parent's belly. Rather, it is through language that the

evolution of the world is determined, for as the prophesying of Gaia creates the impulse,

in two cases, for the forward movement of the poem (*Th.* 464, 475; 627),[61] it functions

as a kind of master-plot for a story in which world and narrative take place

concurrently. Just as binding thereby serves to delay the plot, holding it in reserve

---

[60] For timekeeping as a key to political and social power, see below, n.75.

[61] Kronos swallows his children only after having been persuaded by Gaia ("πεύθετο" *Th.* 463) to do so after she has prophesied to him that he would be overpowered by his son. The text emphasizes her role by repeating it (*Th.* 464; 475–6). Likewise, the Hundred Handers are only released from their captivity under the earth after Gaia has recounted "everything, from beginning to end:" "ἅπαντα διηνεκέως κατέλεξε" (*Th.* 627).

potentially *ad infinitum*, so does prophecy serve as a narrative prolepsis,[62] or 'flash-forward,' inscribing the future into the past before it has occurred.

Furthermore, both of the narratological devices which I have identified for the *Theogony*, binding and prophecy, are taken from the world of Greek religion and divination; both are media used by the individual in order to shape the pattern of his or her own life. Hesiod's use of these motifs to structure the temporal sequence of the *Theogony* thus serves to translate the vast scope of immortal time into the human dimensions of narrative. Gaia's ability to prophesy is thereby god-like, but it is also the determining factor in a quintessentially human structure of time, where a multitude of events are not perceived simultaneously, but rather – like language – one event follows another in chronological sequence, and where the present is always framed by its relation to a future and a past.

3. Zeus' Control over Time: Fixing the Stone at Delphi

There has been a considerable amount of discussion on the *Theogony* which has centred on Zeus' successful appropriation of the female's reproductive capacities in order to gain control over the sequence of time.[63] As I have outlined above in my analysis of the jar or *gastêr* as a time-storing receptacle within which the future is indefinitely held in reserve, the womb becomes a primary site for just such an archiving, and is ultimately the battle prize over which the *Theogony* is lost and won. Towards the end of this

---

[62] Rimmon-Kenan 1989, 46; Genette 1980, 35ff.

[63] The best essay in this regard is probably still Arthur 1982, but see also Bergren 1992.

chapter, during my commentary upon Tartaros, I will argue that the womb/jar is toponymically displaced onto the landscape of Hesiod's world, and that it structures his description of the unseen space, and time, which exists beneath the earth. Before I reach that point, however, I wish to examine in more detail the very moment at which Zeus succeeds in wresting rule from his father, and how he simultaneously, at that point, gains control over time, narrative and space. In this way, I will suggest that Zeus takes over the role of author from Hesiod, but that his method of doing so follows a similar narratological order to the one we have already observed in the proem.

So far in the *Theogony* we have encountered a landscape which is evolving through time, whether that evolution has taken place through the sequence of genealogy or narrative, both ultimately engendered by Gaia.[64] But half way through the poem we reach a point at which the cosmos is explicitly marked as a stable and fixed entity. For this is the moment when Zeus, having overpowered the tyrannical might of his father Kronos, erects a stone at the midpoint of his universe (*Th.* 497–500):

πρῶτον δ' ἐξήμησε λίθον. πύματον καταπίνων·
τὸν μὲν Ζεὺς στήριξε κατὰ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης
Πυθοῖ ἐν ἠγαθέῃ. γυάλοις ὕπο Παρνησσοῖο.
σῆμ' ἔμεν ἐξοπίσω. θαῦμα θνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι

First he (Kronos) regurgitated the stone, which he had swallowed last
Which Zeus set up upon the wide-paved earth
In very holy Pythos, down in the folds of Parnassos
To be a sign for the future, a marvel for mortal men.

---

[64] For language and birth as interchangeable terms for creation, note Hesiod's "summoning of the Muses into existence through language" (Thalmann 1984, 138) at *Th.* 77–9.

The stone marks the centre of the earth both laterally (Delphi is the mythical point where the two eagles meet after being released from opposite ends of the earth) and vertically (as the site through which one might gain access to both gods and underworld).[65] For mortals and poem alike, therefore, it serves as an important orientating device, by which the traveller / reader might gain his bearings after a journey through a landscape which has been overwhelming in its proliferation of places yet undifferentiated by any real separation of physical space.

The sign (sêma) which Zeus sets up is thereby an important one in the evolution of the earth's geography, for – like a boundary stone or signpost – it serves as a clear indication of place on both a local and global level. Its location at the foot of Parnassos is significant, for this mountain intersects both geographically and thematically with the Theogony's opening landscape of Helicon and Olympos, providing a third point of reference between the terrestrial and divine space which the Muses pass between.

Furthermore, as McInerney (1997, 1999) has shown, Delphi and Parnassos represent the opposite ends of the spectrum of order and chaos, with each topography serving to balance and equalize the other. The stone's place in the narrative is thereby mirrored by its role in the landscape – as a midway point between the disorder of Chaos

---

[65] Delphi symbolized the 'navel' of the world which was believed to house a passage to the Underworld. See Vernant's 'Hestia-Hermes' (1983, 127–175) and West 1997, 150ff., who discusses the Nr. Eastern parallels of the 'navel,' a cosmic centre to which the shaman repairs in order to access time and space in all directions (horizontal, vertical, past, future) at once. The ancient sources for the omphalos are collected in Frazer 1965. The connection to the upper regions is perhaps strengthened by a myth that the stone was a meteorite which acquired its divine properties by 'falling from the sky' (West Th. ad loc.) On the substitution of the stone for Zeus, and ancient interpretations of the stone at Delphi, see Davidson 1995.

and the fixed, lasting continuum of Zeus' rule.[66] But this is not the only mediating role

which the stone will enact. For it is just at the period of the *Theogony*'s composition (c.

8th century BCE) that Delphi is beginning to take on a strong identity as an important

centre in the Greek world – as the site of a Panhellenic festival where poems such as the

Theogony would have been sung,[67] and as the site of Apollo's oracular sanctuary. For

the prophetic voice of the Delphic Oracle, towards which the traveller journeys on a

kind of pilgrimage, is located in a place which not only marks the half-way point of the

visitor's journey (from which, having received his answer, he will turn back for home),

but it also situates him explicitly at a mediary point between the past and the future,

marking a point at which the questioner of the oracle seeks to turn a corner in time, by

gaining access to an ordinarily obscured future or past.[68] As the visitor travels towards

Delphi, he attempts,[69] temporarily, to transcend the restrictions of human time, entering

into that eternal present of the Olympians for whom the past and the future are eternally

---

[66] Zeus appears to be taking the role of Apollo in this context, who symbolizes the force of order over chaos in his killing of the Pythian serpent in the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*.

[67] See Nagy 1982 on the importance of the Panhellenic festival in Hesiodic poetry.

[68] In this sense, the stone at Delphi also evokes Hesiod's investiture, at which the Muses bestow upon him a laurel sceptre, possibly marking him as a priest of Apollo. See West, *Th.* ad loc. & Rudhardt, 1996, who, in noting the use of oracular language at *Th.* 31, points out that an oracle more often reveals past than future events. Hesiod's investiture, therefore, like the stone at Delphi, is positioned in a present which looks simultaneously both backwards and forwards in time.

[69] Attempts, but usually fails: the semantic slippage routinely takes place within the translation from divine 'vision' to human narrative. I discuss this slippage in more detail in ch.2, pp.128–33 (see also Ford 1992, 57–89).

visible.[70] Like an author, too, he attempts to gain control over his own lived experience, by anticipating that his own future or past will fit into a coherent narrative sequence.

The stone's role as a focal point through which the eye can make sense of its place in the broader landscape of both text and earth is thereby bound up with its status as an inherently temporal marker within the narrative of the *Theogony*. For the λίθος, as much as it represents a sign-post or boundary stone, also represents a monument – a memorial of an act (Zeus' succession, or more precisely Kronos' regurgitation of the stone) which will live on into the future as a "reminder for men" (*Th.* 500: "σῆμ' ἔμεν ἐξοπίσω"). Like the gravestone to which it is semantically linked, therefore, or like its original identity as a statue (a crude image crafted by Rhea in the likeness of her newborn son) the stone fixes an image from the past within a stable, continuous present. Vernant's essay on the early Greek colossus (1983), a roughly hewn stone which functions as a double for the dead man (whose actual corpse is often missing) may help us to understand the relationship between Zeus' paradoxical presence through absence, or doubling, and how the symbolism of death allows him to situate this mediation on the borderline between mortal and immortal geographies.

It is through the stone, therefore, that Zeus is able to physically manifest his control over time; by setting it in the earth he creates a central point from which his own authoring of both geography and chronology radiate outward through world and poem. For it is at this point in the narrative that Zeus brings the sequence of divine time to a

---

[70] On the shrine as a site within which 'profane' time is set aside, see (with some caution) Eliade 1996/1958, 374–385.

halt, freezing the cycle of immortal reproduction at an intermediary point between birth

(Rhea and Kronos' bellies; the navel of the earth) and death (the tombstone, or *sēma*).

By using the stone to re-enact, symbolically, his own birth and death, Zeus creates a

substitute narrative for himself just as his mother had created a substitute body. Most

effectively, by sealing his narrative with death,[71] he – alone of all the characters, or

authors, in the *Theogony* – is able to bring its sequence to a close.[72]

Vernant has discussed the enduring quality of the gravestone, or memorial, in

Greek thought, and its affinities to the function of epic song (Vernant 1991, 69):

> The hero is .. commemorated in the *mnēma*, the memorial constituted at the end of the
> funeral rites by the construction of a tomb and the raising of a *sēma*, serving like epic to
> evoke for men to come *(essomenoisi)* a glory that is now certain not to perish.[73]

For the Homeric hero, then, the material presence of the *sēma* (fixed, immutable,

enduring) attracts both past and future into a unifying, all encompassing present. The

tombstone allows the hero, at least partially, to escape human time and enjoy an eternal,

god-like *kleos*.[74]

---

[71] The shift between body and grave is easily made. For the etymological overlap (whether 'true' or 'false') between 'σῶμα' and 'σῆμα.' see Plato, *Cratylus* 400c and Nagy 1990a, 214ff.

[72] For narrative as an 'orbituary' which runs "from death to birth," see Brooks 1984, 95. Just as the Homeric hero lives his life as a kind of retrospective narrative which runs backwards from the moment of his glorious death, (Vernant 1991), so does "death provide the very "authority" of the tale, since as readers we seek in narrative fictions the knowledge of death which in our own lives is denied to us" (Brooks 1984, 95). See also Rimmon-Kenan on Nabokov's description of the gravestone as a "site of narrative, where man's life is summed up." (1989, 53–4), and Kermode 2000/1966, passim.

[73] See also Lynn-George 1988, 266: "The *sēma*'s significance includes the sense in which it functions within the text as a sign for the text, both conceived as monuments conferring *kleos*."

[74] See esp. *Od.* 4.584 (Menelaus orders a tomb for Agamemnon "so that his *kleos* might remain forever" & *Il.* 7.91. Vernant 1991, 69, n.34.

Zeus' stone at Delphi functions as a suspension in chronological time – as a severance from the time of the past as it was represented by the progressive sequence of genealogy and narrative. As a monument which by its very status as a memorial looks both backwards (its role in the succession of Zeus) and forwards ("ἐξοπίσω") in time, its placement upon the earth sets itself up as the new referent through which the present is measured and defined.[75]

I have tried to show how the *sêma* of *Th.* 497–500 has a significance which extends into the overall development of space and time within the *Theogony.* At certain points in that discussion, I have turned (and returned) to the issue of narrative, demonstrating how Zeus' planting of the stone symbolizes not only his authority, but also his authorship – especially in his ability to achieve narrative closure. His reversal of the order of narrative sequence, where first is substituted for last, and last for first, ("πρῶτον δ' ἐξήμησε λίθον. πύματον καταπίνων" / "First he regurgitated the stone, which he had swallowed last" *Th.* 497) not only enables Zeus to occupy the position of first-born son, but it also restructures time by taking us back to opening of the proem, and the 'first and last' position of the Muses in song ("σφᾶς δ'αὐτὰς πρῶτόν τε καὶ ὕστατον αἰὲν ἀείδειν" / "And always to sing of themselves both first and last" *Th.* 34). Like the Muses, Zeus thereby succeeds in condensing the beginning and end of narrative into an all-encompassing present, from which time can simultaneously run

---

[75] In this way, Zeus' setting up of the stone is something like the Christian introduction of the clock into the Ottoman Empire, which radically altered that nation's conception of time. In both cases, a shift in religious thought brings with it new temporal patterns and perspectives. See Goodwin 1999, 306–8 & Davidson (ed.) 1999, 9–11; Mumford (n.52, above).

either backwards or forwards, and which is fixed in the very centre of the spatial/temporal landscape it mediates. [76]

4. Tartaros

I have discussed how Zeus uses the stone as a *sêma* for his own displaced birth and death, and how in doing so he manages to escape from the cycle of human, or genealogical, time. But the implications of Zeus' 'grave,' like the lump which his stony birth left in the throat of Kronos, speak to the larger problem of the organization of time within the poem as a whole. For although Zeus, in fixing his *sêma* immutably in the ground, ensures that the story of his *kleos* will be told and retold through the future generations, [77] drawing "the things that were" and the "things that will be" into a single, precise point of simultaneity, there still remains – in the space of the text that extends beyond the monument – an unresolved divergence of contradictory time schemes. These may be reduced to a pair of conflicting impulses: the impulse to move forward in time, following the linear progression of language, genealogy, or biography, and the impulse to suspend time, to hold it back within a dilatory space which, instead of sending time

---

[76] See Ford 1992, 142: "What Zeus does to make the stone a sign is to fix it, plant it in the earth; in itself the unwrought stone is no sure sign: it has already been disguised, misread, swallowed up, and moved. But once set fast, it becomes the most fixed sign of all, providing a point of orientation in the wide-wayed earth."

[77] On the gravestone as a site which calls upon the visitor's voice to retell its corpse's past, see Svenbro 1993.

forward, pulls it backwards into the past.[78] The *Theogony*, of course, has reckoned with

this tension from the very beginning,[79] as it has been played out in the plot's movement

from matrilineal to patrilineal descent, and from diachronic to synchronic time.[80] As

Zeus attempts to close the gap between these two poles, he is left with the need for a

place where his own troubling history, as manifested by the paradoxically ancient-but-

ageless Titans ("οἱ πρότεροι θεοί." *Th.* 486), can be disposed of.

Hesiod solves that problem by creating a space within the text (a metaphor for

the gap, or Barthes' 'dilatory space' which always exists within narrative) where those

temporalities may be contained. Earlier in this chapter, I argued that Hesiod used the

space underground as a kind of archive, or jar, within which he could store up narrative

elements for the future. In terms of the stratification of time in his poem, I have

described how the earth provides Hesiod with a second layer of temporal space which

runs in parallel to the surface narrative, although often at a different rate. This is no less

true for his description of Tartaros, a region sunk deep beneath the earth with a

geography and chronology of its own. For Hesiod, I shall argue, Tartaros functions as

that place in the text where the narrative may resolve the complexities of its own

transferal from one perception of time to another, and within which it may even confine

---

[78] For repetition, delay, and forward movement as important components of narratological structure, see Brooks 1984, 90–112. A similar point is made by Genette 1980 in his discussion of narrative 'anachronies.'

[79] See my discussion of the proem's complex weaving of repetition and different temporal juxtapositions above, 11ff.

[80] The binary has been cast in other terms as well. Particularly instructive is Arthur's recasting of the male/female dichotomy as a tension between metaphor and metonymy in the narratological structure (1982).

those complexities, in much the same way as Zeus uses it as a space to restrain and confine the Titans.

Tartaros is not only enclircled, therefore, by an impenetrable wall of bronze and three layers of darkness; it is also physically bound by the language of the text. As West and others have noted, the descriptions of Tartaros are embedded within a ring pattern, which moves through a sequence of Hundred Handers >Titans > roots of the earth and sea > source of the earth, sea, sky and Tartaros > Titans > Hundred Handers.[81] Although ring composition is by no means an unusual motif in epic poetry, its design here mirrors the topography of the Underworld in such a way as to suggest that the poem itself is creating its own space of isolation and exclusion. Indeed, the body of the description has seemed so out of place to some commentators that they have demanded that the passage (either entire or in part) be athetized from the text.[82] In fact, however, what many scholars have identified as problematic turns out to rather be consistent with the overall pattern of the narrative. For, as the topography of the Underworld leads us into a trapped, disoriented space from which there is no way out and no way forward, the terms of its description are similarly drawn into a state of circularity and stasis.

Like the backward flowing movement of the river Ocean, to which the Underworld is geographically and genetically linked (*Th.* 776), Hesiod's language

---

[81] West, *Th.* ad 720–819; Johnson 1999, 8–9.

[82] So Jacoby 1930, 22–7: "Nam, ut finem iam huic quoque faciam disputationi, cum Arthuro Meyer nullus dubito, quin tota Tartari descriptio farrago sit ab Ascraeo poeta prorsus aliena." (22); Solmsen 1982, 16. More typically, many scholars have argued for interpolations of select passages only (Schwenn 1934, 15–36; West, *Th.* ad. 720–819), arguing that the unified structure of the whole would otherwise suffer (Schwenn 1934, 16): "Athetesen einzelner Verse können hier nicht mehr zum Ziel führen, Ordnung in das Ganze dieses Komplexes zu bringen."

cycles through a series of repetitions, which either follow too closely upon one another

(*Th.* 722-3, 724-5) or, atypically for Hesiod, replay without variation[83] (*Th.* 736-9

=807-10), and structural inconsistencies, such as the regressive and illogical narrative

step of returning the Hundred Handers to the Underworld (*Th.* 734-5, rejected by

West). It is possible to identify, therefore, in this problematic section of the poem, a

compression and refraction of the poetic formulae from which epic style is assembled.

Consider how, at *Th.* 742-3 (also rejected by West), words and sounds fold into one

another with emphatic repetition and alliteration, at the same time as the space of

Tartaros opens into a vacuum without direction, gravity or bearings (*Th.* 742-3):

ἀλλά κεν ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα φέροι πρὸ θύελλα θυέλλης
ἀργαλέη δεινὸν δὲ καὶ ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι.

(But if someone fell into the great chasm, he would not reach the ground for a full year)
But would be carried here and there from gust to dreadful gust,
A terrible place even for the immortal gods.

Indeed, the indeterminate path of the body floating through space, travelling not in a

straight, vertical line but horizontally, in all directions ("ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα"), is

paradigmatic of the use of "ἔνθα" to introduce the different sections of the underworld

(*Th.* 729, 734, 736, 758, 767, 775, 807, 811) in a series of paratactic segments which

suspend or delay narrative movement.[84]

Both narratologically and topographically, therefore, Tartaros is a place without

progress or development through time. Instead, it is bound by the laws of stasis and

repetition. In some cases, as with the exchange of Night and Day across its threshold

---

[83] For Hesiod's practice of repetition with variation, see Sellschopp 1967, 106-22.

[84] There is nothing unusual per se about this kind of horizontal expansion, especially in catalogue poetry. But this is one instance when narrative form accentuates content.

(*Th.* 749–54), that repetition validates the cyclical, natural patterns of time in the world above. Within the walls of Tartaros, on the other hand, there is explicitly no exit, no 'place' for time to go (*Th.* 732, 772). The Underworld is thus, in both cases, the site of repetition, but repetition without variation, without movement forwards or out.[85] We have already encountered locales in the course of the poem where time has been held back (in the 'archive' of the space underground) or cast into a numbing state of identical repetition (the edges of the earth, where Prometheus' liver is endlessly replicated – "τὸ δ' ἀέξετο ἶσον ἅπαντη" / "it grew back the same in every way," *Th.* 524); Tartaros, which draws together both of these regions,[86] similarly traps or hides time at the edges of the narrative.[87]

In terms of the geography of plot, Tartaros thus serves as the site to which all dead ends lead – within which the machinery of various unfulfilled (but ever-present) story-lines wind down and are abandoned. Although Zeus cannot destroy his immortal forebears, he can stop their succession through narrative. By placing them within the isolated, sequestered space of Tartaros he creates a topographical equivalent of the 'depths of the past' to which their mythic identity will always be bound.

---

[85] On the importance of repetition and variation in narrative, see Todorov "Narrative Transformations," 1977, 233: "Narrative is constituted in the tension of two formal categories, difference and resemblance," & Brooks 1984, 90ff. For the motif of repetition and variation in Hesiodic narrative, see Pucci 1977.

[86] For Tartaros as a site which is located at the edges as well as the depths of the earth, note its proximity to the river Ocean and the limits (*peirata*) of the world (*Th.* 789; 738).

[87] Cf. Johnson 1999, 13: "Tartarus mediates between linear and cyclical phenomena, imaging both beginning of things and their present state – a place for the past and the repeating present."

As I have already observed, Zeus' actions in this case are similar to those of the Titans before him, who sought to fix the present in their own time by breaking the cycle of genealogical/narratological succession. Ouranos' entrapment of his children within Gaia's womb, like Kronos' entrapment of his children within his own belly, is analogous to Zeus' suppression of those who pose a threat to the permanence of his sovereignty and imprisonment of them within the belly of the Underworld. For, in order to reach Tartaros, one must first pass through a "χάσμα μέγα" (740) which West links with the goddess Chaos, and suggests may be envisioned as a throat.[88] That throat, which the enemies of Zeus travel down to reach Tartaros, looks back to the throat of Kronos, and forward to Zeus' own swallowing of Metis later on in the poem. In Tartaros, moreover, the movement from throat to belly is enacted twice – once during the passage into the Underworld, and once during the attempt to get out, when Cerberus' digestive system provides the final link in the cycle from mouth to belly.

But there is more than the metaphor of eating, and its association with hiding or the suppression of truth,[89] that comes into play here. For the chasm represents not only the throat leading to the belly but also the vagina leading to the womb, whose passage Ouranos obstructed when Gaia attempted to give birth. In the case of Ouranos and of his descendents, the movement of a male god to control and overcome time is directly linked to his attempt to suppress the female's capacity to give birth, as the narrative

---

[88] West *Th.* ad 116

[89] The Muses appear to be contrasting the truth of their own speech with the false speech of shepherds ("mere bellies") at *Th.* 26; Prometheus tricks Zeus and gains the best portion of the meat for man by hiding it within the *gastēr* of an ox ("καλύψας γαστρὶ βοείη") at *Th.* 538ff; Pandora's *gastēr* is a site for gluttonous hoarding at *Th* 599. Cf. n.14, above, & ch.6, pp.256–60.

moves from a matrilineal to patrilineal order. The chasm of Tartaros, which occupies

the same dark, primeval space as parthenogenic Chaos, brings us back to that original

point of matrilineal descent which the *Theogony* has been struggling against at every

stage of its plot.

The association between Tartaros and a womb, the interior space of female

pregnancy, has further ramifications for the workings of the narrative as a whole. For,

as the poem progresses (and crosses laterally into the *Works and Days* with its second

description of Pandora), Hesiod gradually constructs an anatomy of inside and outside

which circles around the female body (belly, womb, lips, mouth, throat) and its

connection with birth and gestation. Thus Hesiod's *gastêr* at the very beginning of the

poem is only the first in a chain of bellies which run through the sequence of Gaia's

womb, Kronos' (and later Zeus') surrogate womb (*nêdus*), the stomach (*gastêr*) of the

oxen, and Pandora's ravenous belly (*gastêr*), as hunger, trickery and pregnancy are all

attracted into the same semantic field.[90] In turn, the jar which Pandora holds, and which

functions as a symbolic double for her womb,[91] has lips (χείλεα, *Op.* 97) which

figuratively represent the lips of both her mouth (through which she never stops

ingesting at *Th.* 599ff.) and her uterus, which – according to the Greek medical texts –

eagerly closes its lips upon the seed at conception.[92] Finally, the gaping mouth (χάσμα,

---

[90] On the connection in Greek thought between pregnancy and deceit, see Bergren 1992, 14.

[91] Zeitlin 1996,66; King 1998, 26ff. *Gastêr*, like *nêdus*, (*Th.* 460) can mean either 'belly' or 'womb' (*LSJ* s.v. II), cf. Hes. Fr.58, v.13.

[92] The uterine lips are described as 'pursed' when closed. Hanson 1990, 324 (cf. 316–7).

Th. 740)[93] and throat (δειρή. *Th.*727) which lead to the Underworld also lead to a space

which Walcot[94] and West have both compared to a large metal jar (West 1997, 297):[95]

> The first words that Hesiod uses to describe [Tartaros], 'round it a bronze barrier is
> driven, and three layers of night are poured about its neck' might suggest the image of a great
> metal vessel, a larger version of the 'bronze jar' in which Ares is said to have been bound for
> thirteen months.

Tartaros, then, is imaged in the fashion of a jar, which itself replicates the shape

and function of the Hesiodic/Hippocratic womb.[96] The presence of a dog, Cerberus,

within that womb is thereby all the less surprising – closely allied with the exit (the

Hippocratic term for the vagina) its devouring belly not only evokes Pandora's 'bitch-

like mind' ("κύνεόν τε νόον" *Op.* 67) but also the language of pregnancy, for the

Greeks associated the dog with exceptional sexual appetite, and employed the term

kuein as short-hand for conception.[97]

I have established, therefore, an anatomy of lips, throat and belly which runs

through Hesiod's narrative, symbolizing the female body and also, in turn, the jar that

---

[93] *LSJ* s.v. II.

[94] 1966, 61. Walcot draws convincing parallels between Pandora's jar and the Underworld, which he argues should be imagined as a pot. Drawing upon the scholarship of Wagenvoort (1956, 102–31), Walcot points out that the Latin word *orcus* takes its "name as a god only as secondary development, and that basically it is the name of the Underworld which is depicted as a type of pitcher with a narrow neck (cf. *orca*)." Walcot 1961, 250, argues that Pandora's jar is probably made of bronze.

[95] West also provides a Nr. Eastern parallel for the underground jar/enclosure in the following Hittite ritual text: "Let it (Telibinu's anger) go the road of the Sun-god of the earth. The doorkeeper has opened the seven doors, drawn back the seven bolts. Down in the Dark Earth bronze cauldrons stand...What goes in does not come out again, it perishes therein." West 1997, 298.

[96] For the Hippocratic comparison of the womb with a vessel or jug, see Dean-Jones 1994, 65. Soranus is also explicit on this point, describing the uterus as similar in shape to a broad, round cupping vessel, with a 'neck' (τράχηλος / αὐχή) (*Gyn.* 1.9–10). See the illustration in Temkin 1956, facing p.10.

[97] King 1998, 24–5.

her reproductive organs were imagined to represent. Since I have also established, at the beginning of this chapter, that the jar – when stored beneath the earth – has a particular relationship to time, it remains for me to explain how the temporality of pregnancy and childbirth fit into the larger scheme of the *Theogony*'s structure. For if, as I have been arguing, time runs at a different pace underground, and if Tartaros, moreover, represents a 'holding-bay' for the past, then how can it also be connected with the insistently forward thrust of procreation and genealogy?

It is precisely because the Underworld is kept securely closed, because there can be no exit from the vagina, that Tartaros remains trapped in the past: it is a place where the dangerous, regenerative aspects of plot and pregnancy are repressed and displaced, or within which the seeds of the future are stored but not let out.[98] Through the actions of Pandora, moreover, pregnancy is explicitly connected in Hesiod with the pitiful cycle of birth and death, for by opening the jar / her womb Pandora creates a new temporal order from which not only marriage and the 'race of women' spring, but also toil, death and disease (*Works and Days*, 90–99):

πρὶν μὲν γὰρ ζώεσκον ἐπὶ χθονὶ θῦλ' ἀνθρώπων
νόσφιν ἄτερ τε κακῶν καὶ ἄτερ χαλεποῖο πόνοιο
νούσων τ' ἀργαλέων αἴ τ' ἀνδράσι κῆρας ἔδωκαν·
ἀλλὰ γυνὴ χείρεσσι πίθου μέγα πῶμ' ἀφελοῦσα
ἐσκέδασ' · ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἐμήσατο κήδεα λυγρά.
μούνη δ' αὐτόθι 'Ελπὶς ἐν ἀρρήκτοισι δόμοισιν
ἔνδον ἔμιμνε πίθου ὑπὸ χείλεσιν. οὐδὲ θύραζε
ἐξέπτη· πρόσθεν γὰρ ἐπέμβαλε πῶμα πίθοιο
αἰγιόχου βουλῇσι Διὸς νεφεληγερέταο.

For before that time, the race of men who lived upon the earth
Were far from evils, grievous toil,
And the baneful diseases which bring death to men.

---

[98] See Hanson 1990, 324, on uterine amulets which "often depict a uterus equipped with a lock at the mouth."

> But the woman removed the great lid of the jar with her hands,
> Scattering them all. And she brought hard sorrows to mankind.
> Hope alone remained there in its well-built house,
> It stayed inside the jar, beneath the lip, nor did it fly outside
> <u>Before</u> she put the lid of the jar back on,
> By the plan of aegis-bearing, cloud-gathering Zeus.

Between "πρίν" (*Th.* 90) and "πρόσθεν" (*Th.* 98), therefore, Pandora opens up

a new region in time as she opens the space of the jar. For in the gap between these two

temporal modifiers the Race of Iron is created,[99] forever caught in the cycle of mortal

birth (and death) which hovers in that brief period between the opening and shutting of

the jar. We have already seen how Kronos' castration of Ouranos, whose genitals

'stopped up' Gaia's womb in a similar fashion to Pandora's lid, allows for the arc of

future time to evolve. So with Pandora's unstopping of the jar does she allow the time

to escape, ever running forward and regenerating images of itself (in the form of

offspring) which do not last much further than a single reproductive cycle.

The Underworld, on the other hand, may be seen as the divine *inverse* of what

Pandora's jar represents for human time. For the nine days which it takes for an anvil to

fall into Tartaros, through the neck (*deirê*) of the chasm/jar, arriving on the tenth

(*Th.* 722–5) corresponds to the amount of time, in months, which it takes for the foetus

to move from conception to birth.[100] Similarly, the period of confinement for false-

---

[99] *Op.* 174ff.

[100] The period from conception to birth was set at approximately nine or ten months in the Greek medical texts, ("It is in the tenth month in the womb that [the foetus] acquires an access of force sufficient to rupture the membranes, and that is when the mother gives birth." Hippocr. *The Nature of the Child* 30) but could vary wildly from seven to eleven months (only 'eighth month children' were believed not to survive). The question of exact length of pregnancy was complicated by a general uncertainty about the time of actual conception. See Lloyd 1983, 76ff.; Dean-Jones 1994, 209ff.

swearing immortals in Tartaros resembles the gestation period of the womb, with the first year being spent in a deep sleep, or "κῶμα," during which the sufferer neither eats nor breathes, followed by a nine year estrangement from the gods. The punishment of the gods thereby resembles a return right back to the state of the foetus in the womb, which may be perceived as lying inert and unbreathing, in a deep kind of sleep, in the bed of its mother's belly. Furthermore, as the gods revert to this state, they are described as being "covered over" or "hidden" (*kaluptô. Th.* 798) as they are withdrawn from the time of action in the poem.[101] This is the same verb which Hesiod used to describe Ouranos' oppressive 'covering' of Gaia at *Th.* 127 as he continually impregnated her and obstructed her from giving birth.

The subsequent nine years which the gods spend in isolation highlight their human-like subservience to time through the period of growing to adulthood, in contrast to the other gods (θεοί .. αἰὲν ἐόντες, *Th.* 801). Thus, in descending to Tartaros for breaking an oath, immortals are temporarily bound to accept not only the entrapment of human time but also the evils ("κακὸν κῶμα," 798; "νοῦσαν," *Th.* 799) of pregnancy and birth. Their re-birth, moreover, is also cast as a kind of death, for by entering into the cycle of gestation and generation they also enter into the cycle of mortality with which the mother is associated.[102]

---

[101] So too does Odysseus' removal to Kalypso's island take him outside time, and 'hiding' him away from both action and *kleos*. For the earth and the mother's body as a place of concealment, see Murnaghan 1992, 244ff.

[102] Murnaghan (above, n.101); Demand 1994.

In many ways, the experience of the punished gods mirrors that of Ares, whose imprisonment in the jar at *Il.* 5.385–91 can be seen as a near-fatal period of gestation. For his time in the jar, at thirteen months, just exceeds the normal pregnancy term.[103] By suppressing the time of Tartaros in a similar way, so that it represents an endless period of gestation, Zeus ensures that its 'exit' will always remain closed.[104]

Tartaros then, with its bronze walls, underground setting, and connotations of Chaos and gestation, draws together the two images of jar and womb which have served as the principle containers for time throughout the *Theogony*. Above ground, Zeus leaves the time of Tartaros behind by giving birth to Athena through his head: an act which dissociates birth from the womb-belly altogether and spatially aligns it with his own realm, the peak of Olympos. So too, does the section end with Poseidon's betrothal of his daughter, Kymopoleia, upon Briareos (817–19) – the first formal exchange of a bride between father and groom, which marks the advent of Zeus' exclusively male-ordered rule and male-controlled generation.[105]

Like the proem, which occupies the position of both first and last in the poem, Tartaros embodies both the beginning and end of all things ("πάντων πηγαὶ καὶ

---

[103] Abnormally extended pregnancies were not unheard of. See LiDonnici 1995 for the well-attested phenomenon of frustrated birth in Greek thought, best represented by the text of Stele A [1] at Epidaurus: "Kleo bore a burden in her stomach for five years, until she slept here, and he (the god – Asklepios?) made her well"/ "πένθ' ἔθη ὡς ἐκύησε ἐγ γαστρὶ Κλεὼ βαρρος. ἔστε ἐγκατεκοιμάθη καὶ μιν ἔθηκε ὑγιή." (LiDonnici 1995, 84–5). The prolonged 'weight' that the patient carries in her stomach bears obvious resemblance to Gaia's long-suffering pregnancy. Cf. also Stele A2 and Demand 1994, 93–4.

[104] The uterus closes around the seed after pregnancy, and should not open again until after birth (Hanson 1990, 324).

[105] See Arthur 1982 on Zeus' establishment of a society based on gift-exchange.

πείρατ' ἔασιν," 738), as well as the time of death and birth. But while the proem uses repetition to move the plot forward, through the process of variation outlined in Todorov's 'narrative transformation,'[106] Tartaros, as a place where there is no narrative progression but only cyclical, inward-turning stasis, represents the counter-site of that process. At the same time, however, the dreadful continuum of its cycle is removed from the eternal existence of Zeus' rule, for his province attempts to begin, and takes its meaning, only from the present, by enclosing the horrors of endless repetition within a carefully constructed 'past.' But Zeus also consigns another kind of time to Tartaros; a time which is measured by the human life span from birth to death, and which is determined by the transferal of rule from one generation to the next. In order to escape this chronological sequence of existence, Zeus seals up the mortal signifiers of belly and womb within a bronze enclosure, and hides them away forever within the invisible, subterranean regions of the earth.

If humans use forgetfulness and hope to categorize that which is past and that which remains to take place in the future, then the Olympians, who can instantly see through both of these devices, are left with the problem of having nowhere to 'put' their past, or at least of setting it out of sight. Just as human narrative needs to have the capacity to forget in order to be finite, so does the divine narrative need to create a space that substitutes for the process of forgetting. Tartaros, therefore is an 'oubliette' in both senses of the word; as an underground dungeon, on the one hand, and as a

---

[106] Todorov 1977, 218–33, & above, n.85.

manifestation of the forgetfulness that is so vital to the successful workings Zeus' plot, on the other.

Conclusion

Before the invention of geometry and the mathematical space within which Anaximander located the cosmos,[107] Hesiod pictured the world in a space which was not so much scientific as abstract and narratological. In this chapter, I have tried to isolate how the organization of space in that world was dependent not upon the measurement of distances from A to B, nor upon a logical compartmentalization of place upon a single horizontal surface, but rather upon the organization of time, and temporal sequences, within the narrative structure of the poem. When the Muses visit the poet, they command him to translate the immortal scope of world and time into human language, to 'scale down' the entire history of the world into just over a thousand lines. The poetic model, or map, that he creates, therefore, cannot be read according to a scale which indicates the proportionate difference between places – such a system was not, as far as we know, even available to Hesiod.[108] Rather, it is through the medium of narrative that Hesiod reduces the world to a legible size, and it is narrative which acts as the scale through which we may interpret the difference between the 'original' story (or *histoire*) and its model (*récit*).

---

[107] Vernant 1982, 121.

[108] West, *Th.* ad 740–3: "Maps and models of the world were unknown to the Greeks of [Hesiod's] time, and cosmology was not bound by the realities of geometrical space."

I have argued, therefore, that the narrative structure of Hesiod's poem should be understood as a kind of topography, upon which the temporal discrepancies of the *Theogony* (but also of story-telling in general) are externalized and transformed into physical, spatial components. By moving through the *Theogony* as if through a landscape, I have sought to identify how – at different points within the narrative – the plot displaces its own moments of crisis within the evolution from diachronic to synchronic time onto the physical environment of the poem.

I have ended by claiming that Zeus frees himself, and his rule, from the diachronic order of birth and generation by dispatching the human, temporal elements of procreation into the closed womb-like space of Tartaros. In this way, the gods who are sent there endure a punishment in the form of slow growth, from infancy to adulthood, but those outside Tartaros (for the remainder of the *Theogony)* are born – like Athena – fully grown, with absolutely no physical evolution into or beyond the fixed, present moment of their existence.[109] Although the narrative draws to a close in that present, therefore, the traces of the past and the future – and of those tenses and temporalities upon whose pivot the *Theogony* has balanced (from sequential to still, mortal to immortal, story to plot, *prôtos* to *aiên)* – are still legible within the topography over which Zeus and the Olympians hold sway.

---

[109] Athena is the first god in the *Theogony* to experience a birth which is fully dissociated from the womb, and – as a virgin – she ensures that Zeus' present will not be regenerated, and thereby displaced, through the act of reproduction. For the same reason, Hekate is one of the few original gods to be fully integrated into Zeus' present, because she, like Athena, does not engage in sexual reproduction. See also the *Homeric Hymn to Athena (H.H.* 28), which focuses on the single defining moment of Athena's birth, fully armed, from the head of Zeus.

CHAPTER 2

Map and Narrative in Herodotus' *Histories*

...In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single
Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the maps of the Empire, the entirety of a Province.
In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a
Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with
it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their
Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was
it, that they delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West,
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; in all the
Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.
> Suárez Miranda, *Viajes de varones prudentes,* Libro IV, Cap. XLV, Lérida, 1658.

> Jorge Luis Borges, "On Exactitude in Science"

In his short piece, "On Exactitude in Science," Borges plays upon the relationship

between map and mimesis in his sketch of an Empire which is covered, "point for

point," by a map that corresponds to it exactly in size.[1] Cartography, as it reaches

towards the illusion of not only accurate, but *complete* representation, is revealed as a

double of the Empire itself: a medium which becomes so real that its texture is made

indistinguishable from the landscape over which it is laid. In the world of the

Cartographers Guild, a journey across the Empire becomes, in the most literal sense, a

journey across the map, as routes which were previously traced by finger or pencil upon

the cartographic surface are now marked by the tread of real footsteps from one region

---

[1] 'MUSEUM: On Exactitude in Science,' from *Jorge Luis Borges: Collected Fictions,* transl. by Andrew
Hurley, New York: Penguin (1998), 325. Copyright 1998 by Maria Kodama, translation copyright 1998
by Penguin Putnam Inc. Reprinted with permission of the publisher, Penguin Putnam Inc. (The piece
comes from Borges' collection of prose and poetry entitled alternately *Dreamtigers* and *The Maker* by
English translators.) This text is also the subject of a chapter by Louis Marin, entitled "Utopia of the
Map" (Marin 1984, 233–237).

of the map to another. With the eradication of difference (in scale, but also, if only

temporarily, in the textures of the earth and its 'covering' of paper or cloth) [2] the

Cartographers Guild achieves, for a brief instant, an absolute and totalizing power over

the space they inhabit. In one sense, their map is thus a political and imperial

document,[3] an instrument in the Cartographers' larger project of Empire-making, but in

another it is also an attempt simply to grasp space in human terms – an absurd

realization of the optical illusion towards which every map aspires – to make the eye

see so clearly, and so extensively, that it finally becomes blind to the distance which

separates the object of representation from the representation itself.

In the language of Borges, therefore, cartography is revealed as a mechanism by

which the earth may be not only represented but also physically reproduced; a man-

made device which approaches the supernatural in its ability to encompass the whole of

the earth within its scope. Here, I explore the ways in which the Greek map, invented by

Anaximander in the sixth century BCE and described by Herodotus on two separate

occasions in the *Histories*, offered the viewer a similarly supernatural vantage-point by

carefully eliding the difference in scale between cartography and territory, and thereby

allowing him to comprehend the entire earth as a single, discrete whole. In this way, the

map suggests itself as a more complete and totalizing 'narrative' than narrative itself,

because it appears to offer its reader unmediated access to a vision which neither author

---

[2] On the true-to-scale map as a covering of the earth, see also my reading of Pherecydes fr. DK 7B2 in the introduction (above, pp.7–14).

[3] The literature on this topic, mostly written by the now well-established school of 'critical geographers,' is extensive. See esp. Harley 1988a, 279–80;1988b; Anderson 1983, 170–178.

nor poet had thus far been able to achieve.[4] But, at the same time, the 'Discipline of Geography' that cartography represents survives, in Borges' story, only in the instant: as soon as it is subjected to the rigours of time its perfect integrity disintegrates into the 'Tattered Ruins' and 'Relics' of a vast, abandoned desert. So too, in Herodotus, will the map's all-encompassing vision be revealed as no more than a mirage when countered against the external forces of time and history. And yet, as I will proceed to demonstrate, the map remains a crucial visual force within the development of early prose, both as a spatial template for the narrativization of geography and history, and as a counterpart to the sequential, linear thread of language.

In this chapter I turn from poetry to Herodotus' *Histories*, arguing that the newly emerging medium of prose combined with the development of cartography in the early Classical period to create a new world picture that, in a transition that was far from clear-cut and certainly moved both ways, substituted the technological advances of the map for the supernatural vision of the Muses. In order to better explain the alliance of cartography and prose in this period, I begin by briefly outlining Herodotus' position within the history of early prose, drawing out the latter's formative associations with travel-writing and, more broadly, geography. In particular, I shall demonstrate that the twofold invention of both map and book by the Presocratic philosopher Anaximander established a complementary relationship between cartography and prose which

---

[4] In the latter part of this chapter, I elaborate upon the map's relationship to the Muses' vision, which – although complete to the point of being cartographic – nevertheless became impartial and fragmented as soon as it was translated into human speech. (See below, pp.128–133).

Hecataeus brought to fruition in his *Periodos Gês* – a work that depended on the co-existence of map and narrative in order to make its representation of the earth complete.

With Herodotus' *Histories*, however, the terms of that close connection between the map and geographical prose are significantly altered. Herodotus breaks from the tradition of his predecessor by choosing *not* to accompany his description of the earth with a pictorial representation. Instead, he designs a narrative that attempts to substitute language for the descriptive power of illustration, by incorporating the visual element of the map within an exclusively *verbal* narrative form. In so doing, as I will show, Herodotus' work borrows from such different ways of viewing or representing space as the itinerant perspective of the traveller, the structure of the labyrinth, and the epic figure of ekphrasis. Furthermore, although Herodotus does not attach a map to his text, he does describe two different Ionian maps in considerable detail. Here, I will focus on the map's appearance at the very centre of the *Histories*, when an inscribed *pinax* of the earth, brought to Greece by the Ionian tyrant Aristagoras, plays a leading role in the narrative – both as a connecting device for the Barbarian and Greek sections of the *Histories* and as the catalyst for Xerxes' invasion of Greece.

My analysis of Aristagoras' map within the context of Herodotus' own writing should finally be placed within a broader inquiry into the nature of graphic representations of the world in the mid to late fifth century. I conclude the chapter with an examination of the three surviving examples of writing about the Classical map outside the *Histories*, in order to better contextualize Herodotus' critique of cartography's powers of illusion and deception. Finally, I demonstrate that, despite

Herodotus' apparent rejection of the map in his writing, its singular ability to represent the entire world in a discrete and all-encompassing form is intricately connected to, and embedded within, the narrative project of the *Histories*.

1. The Geography of Prose

Throughout this chapter, my discussion of the *Histories* will repeatedly circle back to its status as a work of prose. This new written language, belonging to the medical writer, the architect, the natural scientist and the explorer (practitioners of the "Ionian school"), presented a novel way of representing the world that was freed from both the metrical demands and generic expectations of the poetic tradition. In addition, the prose writer, newly released from the epic vantage point determined by the Muses, was at liberty to choose a new, independent perspective from which to tell his story.[5] As our earliest complete prose text of any reasonable length, Herodotus' *Histories* occupies an important place within the history of prose's transition into a fully established literary form.[6] This chapter takes as its focus one particular strand of that transition, by outlining a chronological development, from Anaximander to Hecataeus to Herodotus, of what I shall term 'cartographical' prose – writing which engages in, or exists as a commentary upon, a larger picture of the world.

---

[5] On the role of the third person, independent narrator in ancient historiography, see Wheeldon 1989, 45; Marincola 1997, 3–11; Connor 1984, 3–19. On the extent to which the epic narrator may be termed independent, see de Jong 1987, 45–53.

[6] The bibliography on the history of prose is substantial. For different influences on Herodotus, see e.g: Murray 1987; Thomas 2000; Kahn 1983; Humphreys 1996; Jacoby 1909 (& below, n.16). On the development of geographical writing as a genre, see Romm 1992.

By the same token, a second history can be detected beneath the surface of

Herodotus' use of a non-poetic discourse to map the earth, and that is the relationship of

prose to its 'unmarked' antecedent, song.[7] Consequently, at several points in this

chapter I will return to the poetic tradition from (and against) which the prose genre

took shape. In particular, I will explore the ways in which Aristagoras' story engages in

several intertextual parallels with Homer's description of the Shield of Achilles, arguing

that Herodotus entertains, and then rejects, the use of ekphrasis as a medium by which

Aristagoras' map might take on a narratological role.

Geography in the Histories

As has frequently been observed, Herodotus' movement through the events of history,

from Croesus to the Persian Wars, also reads as a geographical treatise that

encompasses a broad span of the known and unknown world. Similarly, his prose,

which will proceed (προβαίνω) through big and small cities alike,[8] mirrors a journey

across the surface of a map as it threads from one location to another. Like a traveller

with a meandering and circuitous itinerary, Herodotus' narrative expands

geographically in as many directions as it can, even if this means – as he radiates out to

different areas in Egypt or Scythia, for example – repeatedly retracing one's steps back

to an original starting point. In this sense, therefore, Herodotus' style is in apparent

---

[7] Nagy has identified a development from an unmarked, proto-'SONG' to an oral prose form which is explicitly predicated upon its derivation from poetry. See Nagy 1990, 17–51, and, on Herodotus, 215ff.

[8] Hdt. 1.5.3. Herodotus' introduction can be compared with that of the first literary 'journey' (Hom. *Od.* 1.3), as also noted by Hartog (1988, 343).

conflict with the linear, teleological thrust of the historical genre he is credited with

inventing. Further, his frequent digressions on the ethnography or geographical layout

of a site often call an abrupt halt to chronological sequence by stepping outside history

altogether into a gnomic and a-temporal present. We might say, then, that Herodotus'

syntax is not only paratactic but also peripatetic, since it wanders from one place to the

next with no definite route in mind.

It is in these terms that Aristotle represents Herodotus' sentence structure at

Rhetoric 3.9, when he uses the metaphor of the runner to describe what he classifies as

the old-fashioned prose style of the *Histories* (Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a27–34):

ἡ μὲν οὖν εἰρομένη λέξις ἡ ἀρχαία ἐστίν [["Ἡροδότου Θουρίου ἥδ' ἱστορίης
ἀπόδειξις"]]· ταύτῃ γὰρ πρότερον μὲν ἅπαντες. νῦν δὲ οὐ πολλοὶ χρῶνται. λέγω δὲ
εἰρομένην. ἡ <u>οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὑτήν.</u> ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. <u>ἔστι δὲ
ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον·</u> τὸ γὰρ <u>τέλος</u> πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς
καμπτῆρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ <u>τὸ πέρας</u> οὐ κάμνουσι
πρότερον.

The 'running' style is old [e.g: "This is an account of the inquiry of Herodotus of Thurii"] (in the
past everyone used this style, but now not many do). I mean by the 'running style' that which
has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the action being narrated. It is disagreeable
due to its endlessness (*to apeiron*). For everyone always wants the end (*to telos*) to be in sight.
But because of all the turns they become exhausted and give up – only if they see the finish (*to
peras*) up ahead will they not tire out ahead of time.

Aristotle compares the Herodotean '*lexis eiromenê*' or 'running style' with the

'eusynoptic' clarity of the sentence which has 'a beginning and end in itself' (a

phenomenon which I have discussed in the introduction).[9] But, as Aristotle proceeds to

explain, even the ideal 'periodic' sentence will leave its reader behind if it goes on for

too long (*Rh.* 3.9. 1409b22):

---

[9] Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a35–b1:"λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ'
αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον," / "The periodic sentence has a beginning and an end in itself, and a
size that is easy to take in by the eye." Cf. my intro., pp.2–4, & n.5, above.

τὰ δὲ μακρὰ ἀπολείπεσθαι ποιεῖ. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐξωτέρω ἀποκάμπτοντες τοῦ τέρματος·
[ἀπολείπουσι γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι τοὺς συμπεριπατοῦντας.]

The long sentences leave the reader behind, just as those who veer off on the outside of the turn
leave behind those who are walking with them.

Herodotus' prose style, guilty on both these counts, is thereby contrasted with

the balanced measurement and clear *telos* of the periodic sentence. It is worth noting

how many geographical terms Aristotle includes in his analysis of syntax, transforming

the Herodotean text into a kind of Scythian landscape, through whose *aporia* the

listener or reader wanders as hopelessly as Darius, and the final limits (*peras/peirata*) of

which even its author cannot tell.[10] So too does Aristotle's ordered sentence take its

name from a particular type of geographic treatise, the 'route around,' or '*periodos*,'

whose carefully recorded measurements are suggestive of the units of days or stades by

which distances between places were noted.[11] This likening of the prose narrative to a

terrain, which the reader or listener physically traverses along the course of a sentence,

encourages us to think of the prose genre in terms of a 'geography.' Even at the primary

level of syntax, as Aristotle implies, the prose sentence is grounded in space and place

as much as it is determined by the successive movement of its action from beginning to

end.[12]

---

[10] Herodotus' language captures precisely this sense of endlessness in his description of the Scythians'
disappearance into the North, prompting Darius' pleas for "an end to the running" ("παυσάμενος τοῦ
δρόμου"), Hdt. 4.126.1. Cf. "ὡς δὲ πολλὸν τοῦτο ἐγίνετο καὶ οὐκ ἐπαύετο" and "παυσάμενος
πλάνης" also at 4.126.1. For Scythia's unknown borders, see 4.17.2; 4.18.3; 4.20. For *peirata* as a term
denoting the edges of both countries and the world, see Bergren 1975 and Romm 1992, ch.1 (9–44).

[11] Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409b5–6: "The periodic style has number, which is the easiest of all things to
remember."

[12] For an analogous association between the Herodotean period and geographic space, see Cic. *Orat.* 39 &

It is only fitting, therefore, that Peter Brooks should begin his seminal study of narrative, *Reading For the Plot*, by uncovering the spatial meaning at the heart of the word 'plot' (1. a measured area of ground; 2. a ground plan, chart or diagram; 3. the outline of action; 4. a secret plan or scheme).[13] As for the modern novel, so for the ancient prose narrative – both situate themselves at some point between the organization of space and the organization of action. This paradox is also captured in physical terms, since the narrative (and here Brooks paraphrases Genette) is "literally a spatial form" (a book or scroll), "but its realization depends on its being gone through in sequence and succession." At the same time, however, the book "metonymically 'borrows' a temporality from the time of its reading: what [Genette] calls the 'pseudo-time' of the text."[14]

Finally, the conflict between time and space in narrative style as it is discussed by both the ancient and modern literary critic resurfaces in the work of the geography theorist Edward Soja, whose *Postmodern Geographies* seeks to rescue the spatial narrative from the grips of a nineteenth century obsession with history, time and linear progression. Rather, Soja argues that we should "see the text as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings that are tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal logic."[15] His demonstration of the modern reader's privileging of time over

---

De or. 2–55, where he likens Herodotus' style to a flowing river ("quasi sedatus amnis fluit").

[13] Brooks 1984, 11–12.

[14] Brooks 1984, 20, quoting Genette, "Discours du récit" in *Figures III* (Paris: Editions du Seuil 1972), 77–8.

[15] Soja 1989, 1. See also Foucault 1986, 22 for the spatial model of structuralism as a critical tool for

space and history over geography sheds light on the scholarly reception of Herodotus

since the nineteenth century, the title of whose work (though posthumously ascribed)

inevitably invokes associations closer to our own conception of history than Herodotus'

understanding of *historiê* as a form of visual enquiry.[16] Jacoby's theory that the

Histories were best understood as a teleological evolution of genres (with the original

'ethnographical' books maturing, in tandem with their author's increasing

sophistication, into the final truly 'historical' war monographs of books 7– 9) stands as

a testimony to a widely held reluctance to reconcile space and time within the historical

narrative.[17]

We are left, then, with a *Histories* which reads both ways, appearing to travel

along the horizontal, simultaneous axis of space as much as the vertical, teleological

axis of time. We might imagine Herodotus' text as a series of alternating cuts between

two different 'ways of viewing' – one in which we view, through the eyes of a runner,

---

reading, & Anderson 1983, 24ff., who attaches the rise of print culture to the development of concepts of 'place,' made possible by the prose narrative's lateral extension across Benjamin's 'homogeneous, empty time.' In a Classical context, see Nicolet 1990, 8, who writes "The history of Rome...can be written in the linear style of an annalistic narrative. Yet it can also be written according to a rhythm linked to geographic space."

[16] Thomas 2000, 9: "it is a platitude that *historie* (literally 'enquiry') for Herodotus did not yet mean 'history,' yet it always deserves reiterating." For a detailed analysis of the term, see Nagy 1990, esp. 250ff, and Connor 1993.

[17] See Jacoby 1909 for his arguments for organizing *die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* according to an evolution of generic development which he identified for Greek historiography (mythology/ genealogy; ethnography; chronography; contemporary history (*Zeitgeschichte*); horography); & 1913 for the argument that Herodotus' *Histories*, as they 'progressed' from geography to ethnography to war monographs, were believed to represent this evolution in microcosm (as noted by Marincola 1999, 291). For the pervasiveness of Jacoby's arrangement (especially his separation of ethnography from true history), see Fornara 1983, 1–46. More recently, Marincola 1999 has disputed the validity of such a system, arguing that fixed categories such as 'ethnography' did not exist in Greek history before Jacoby. By contrast, Clarke sees Jacoby as an ally for a more integrated view of geography and history (1999, 59–66).

the finishing posts clearly visible on the straight road ahead, as we progress

chronologically through the plot of the Persian Wars, and another in which we follow

the wavering path of the explorer who, to quote a topographical simile from our own era

which has been applied to Herodotus, "will not deny himself the pleasure of picking

flowers at the roadside."[18]

2. The Map and the Prose Narrative: Anaximander's Double Invention

The analogy between narrative and journey which I have outlined above, current at least

since Homer's and Pindar's twofold use οἴμη /οἶμος and evident in Herodotus, who

describes his *logos* as a road at which the divergent accounts of his narrative split,[19] is a

useful one for understanding the close relationship between the map and prose narrative

in this period. According to the ancient sources, both of these new forms were invented

concurrently by Anaximander of Miletus – the first philosopher to record his theories in

a prose treatise,[20] as well as the first to "draw an outline of the land and sea" ("καὶ γῆς

καὶ θαλάσσης περίμετρον πρῶτος ἔγραψεν," DK 12A1(2)/K&R fr.94). The intricate

alliance of these two activities is emphasized by the use of a single verb, *graphein*, in a

---

[18] Lesky 1966, 322, on Herodotus' 'digressions.'

[19] See Homer, *Od.* 8.74, & Nagy 1999, 18 (§1.4.n.3); Pind. *Ol.* 9.47, *Pyth.* 2.96; *Hymn. Hom. Herm.* 451; Hdt. 1.5.3: "προβήσομαι ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου" ("I will proceed further along my argument"), & 1.95.1: "ἐπιστάμενος περὶ Κύρου καὶ τριφασίας ἄλλας λόγων ὁδοὺς φῆναι" ("I know that there are three other roads of narrative concerning Cyrus"). See also Hdt. 1.117.2 & 2.20.1, as cited by Dewald 1987, 149. Nagy 1990, 233, also compares the process of narration to the process of travelling along a road and provides parallels from both epinician poetry and the *Odyssey*. See also Plato, *Critias* 106a, and my chapter 5, below (p.219, n.25).

[20] Kahn 1985, 6ff., 240; K&R 1983, 102–3. There has been some disagreement concerning the nature of the work, or works, that he is believed to have composed. See n.23 below. For the history of the 'book' (i.e. prose narrative) in ancient Greece, see Thomas 1992, 13 & passim.

language that reveals no distinction between the acts of drawing and writing. The quotation from Diogenes Laertius (II 1–2), above, may be compared with the remaining ancient testimonia on Anaximander's penmanship, all of which indiscriminately apply a form of *graphein* to both of his innovations.[21] Moreover, since Anaximander's map is said to be depicted on a *pinax*, or writing tablet (see below, DK 12A6/K&R fr.98), the overlap between map and narrative, which I identified in the preceding section, is here made explicit by the fact that both are inscribed upon the same physical surface.

The Suda tells us that Anaximander wrote several prose works, including *On Nature*, *The Circuit of the Earth*, *On the Fixed Stars* and *The Celestial Globe* (DK12A2/K&R, fr.95). Whether we accept that Anaximander did write a *Periodos Gês*,[22] as the Suda informs us, or whether we interpret the map as an accompaniment to a more meteorological vision of the world as described in the *Peri Physeôs*,[23] it is

---

[21] DK12A6 / K&R, fr.98 = Agathemerus 1.1; DK12A2/K&R 95 = Suda s.v.; DK12A7/K&R 96 = Themistius *Or.* 26.b–d; Strabo I.1.11, C7.

[22] As Romm 1992, 26 points out, the phrase 'περίοδος γῆς' marks a departure from the poetic tradition (and a point of entry into the prose tradition) because it cannot be metrically scanned (contrast epic's 'πείρατα γαίης'). Note also the similarity here not only in subject matter but also in phrasing between the description of Anaximander's map ('γῆς περίμετρος' – DK 12A1) and book ('Γῆς Περίοδος' - DK12A2).

[23] While it is widely accepted that Anaximander did construct the first Greek map of the world, and while – most recently – Romm has taken the Suda at its word and ascribed a *Periodos Gês* to Anaximander (1992, 26–7, & n.51), scholarly opinion is divided on the issue of whether Anaximander actually wrote a geographical treatise, with much of the argument hinging on a passage from Eratosthenes (Strabo I.1.1 C 1 = Eratosthene, *Fragm.*, 1 A 1, Berger) which (although the Greek is ambiguous) credits Anixamander with the first map and Hecataeus with the first *Periodos Ges*. In 1921, Heidel argued that the *Peri Physeôs* was written as a companion piece to the map, calling it "the first Greek geographical treatise." Although his theory - that 'περὶ φύσεως' referred to geography rather than astronomy and meteorology - has been rejected by several scholars (see e.g. Jacoby *Fr. Gr.Hist;* Jacob 1988, 281, n.24), Van Paassen 1957, 58–61, despite his own disagreements with Heidel, has persuasively demonstrated that "Anaximander's map...cannot possibly have been a mere drawing without a commentary" (58) and that "Anaximander must have used his treatise *On Nature* as a basis for his map of the world" (59). As both Van Paassen, Kahn 1981, 81–84, and Jacob 1988, 277–81, have rightly recognized, the distinction

possible to see the map and prose narrative as two mutually reciprocating halves of a single, complete 'text.' This has significant, and hitherto unexplored, ramifications for our understanding of the development of Greek prose, because it indicates that the art of narrative was - at least at its origins - inherently bound up with the art of pictorial representation. The map, which stands at the gateway between the worlds of drawing and writing,[24] may therefore be said to comment and reflect upon the text that describes it (and vice versa).

How does it alter our understanding of prose to consider it alongside the map, the inverse, or parallel, of itself? One could say that, in prose, the geometry of the metrical form (where carefully measured lengths of syllables make up the whole)[25] has been displaced onto the geometry of the measured distances between places as represented by the map. Anaximander, the fabled importer of the *gnômon* (a kind of giant ruler),[26] has transferred the unit of measurement from language to space, resulting in a prose which – as Charles Kahn has demonstrated in his study of the associations between early prose writing and geometry – shares a practical association with

---

between cosmography, geometry and cartography was very slight during this period. Not only does Anaximander's map fit neatly onto the top surface of his cylindrical model of the world (as described probably in the *Περὶ Φύσεως*), but its circular, symmetrical design, divided into the two halves of Asia and Europe by a diametrically flowing river (Kahn op. cit.) should be indication enough that Anaximander's cartography is intricately connected to, and illustrative of, the subject matter of his prose.

[24] For cartography as an art form, see the introduction to Woodward 1987; & Rees 1980.

[25] See ch.3, below, pp.151–59, where I discuss the use of the term *μέτρα* to describe verse.

[26] DK12A1 & 12A2/K&R, frr. 94 & 95, who define the *gnômon* as "a set-square or any vertical rod whose shadow indicates the sun's direction and height" (K&R, 103).

architecture and city planning.[27] As prose is aligned with the external units of
measurements by which cities are designed and distances between places are recorded,
the geometries of language and space merge into the same sphere and begin to reflect
upon and shape one another.[28]

We know very little about Anaximander's map and book(s), but we do have
some idea of his influence (DK12A6; K&R, fr.98):

> Ἀναχίμανδρος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀκουστής Θαλέω πρῶτος ἐτόλμησε τήν οἰκουμένην ἐν πίνακι
> γράψαι· μεθ' ὃν Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀνήρ πολυπλανής διηκρίβωσεν. ὥστε θαυμασθῆναι
> τό πρᾶγμα.

> Anaximander the Milesian, successor of Thales, first dared to depict the inhabited world on a
> tablet. After him, Hecataeus the Milesian, a much-travelled man, corrected it with the result that
> it became an object to be marvelled at.

Hecataeus, like Anaximander, also wrote a text, the *Periodos Gês*, some of which
survives in fragments. Like Anaximander, he also appears to have illustrated his text
with a map, a representation of the earth which was so accurate that it became a source
of wonder, according to our fragment. Agathemerus' language – although very late
(second century CE) – is particularly suggestive here, for ἐτόλμησε and θαυμασθῆναι
both take Anaximander and Hecataeus' scientific enquiry into the world of geographic
transgression and exploration, suggesting another parallel with the act of journeying.[29]

---

[27] Kahn 1986, 112–3, who points to the descriptions in prose of several famous archaic temples, recorded
by their architects, and the likelihood of a lost prose treatise by Hippodamus of Miletus, the city planner
from the mid fifth century who designed the geometric grid system. Kahn also puts his finger on prose's
special ability to demarcate and map space, when he observes that "we may say that whereas poetry tends
to produce an art work as a kind of substitute for the everyday world, prose serves on one hand to record
and preserve the world as it is, and on the other, to draw up a blueprint for changing the world" (119).

[28] This will be particularly true for Xenophon, as I explore in chs. 4 & 6, below. On a related topic (the
use of geometry in both cosmography/world-mapping, and political town-planning), see Lévêque and
Vidal Naquet 1996.

[29] For *thauma* and exploration, see below pp.102–106.

Anaximander's courage in being the first to plot the world is something like the *andreia*

of those heroes who reach the Pillars of Heracles in Pindar (*Nem.* 3.20; *Isth.* 4.11–14).[30]

In a somewhat different (if equally pioneering) context, bravery appears again in

Themistius (26c),[31] this time to describe Anaximander's use of writing (DK 12A7):

> Ἀναξίμανδρος ἐθάρρησε πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν Ἑλλήνων λόγον ἐξενεγκεῖν περὶ φύσεως ξυγγεγραμμένον.
>
> Anaximander... of all the Greeks whom we know, first dared to set out his *Peri Physeos* account in writing.

which associates his deed with the trope of literary invention. Similarly, Hecataeus'

'correction' *(διηκρίβωσεν)* of Anaximander's map is described in language often used

to discuss words or arguments, and which denotes thorough scrutiny at the level of

minute detail.[32] Agathemerus thereby describes Anaximander's map as a kind of

philological document or text, whose original (like a scroll) has been both copied and

corrected by Hecataeus.

I have established, then, that a series of connections between map and book

were established in the late sixth century, which drew especially upon the association

between writing or drawing the earth and exploring it. In the following section, I will

proceed to show how Herodotus inherited and transformed that legacy in his own

writing of the *Histories*.

---

[30] As cited in Romm 1992, 17–18.

[31] An orator from the fourth century CE.

[32] s.v. *LSJ.* # 2, and n.75, below.

3. Herodotus

In the opening pages of the *Histories* (Hdt. 1.1–1.5), Herodotus devises an account of

the beginning of Greek and Persian hostility, which, because it takes as its narrative

thread the movement of a series of ships from coast to coast, may be compared to the

contemporary prose genre of the *periplus*.[33] Beginning with the Phoenicians – famed

explorers, sailors, and writers of *periploi* in Herodotus' time – each incident in the

chronicle is triggered by the arrival of a ship at a different port, thereby enabling the

narrative to move between various co-ordinates on a map (Phoenicia to Argos, Argos to

Egypt, Greece to Tyre, Greece to Colchis, Troy to Greece, Greece to Troy). The

temporal progression of events leading up to, and beyond, the Trojan War is therefore

ordered into a single, chronological sequence through the spatial analogy of a ship's

itinerary.

Herodotus soon states that he will reject this literary form, however, in favour of

one which will follow a sequence of barbarian aggression against the Greeks and which

can be traced from man to man, beginning with the Lydian monarch Croesus (1.5.1ff.).

But, as quickly becomes clear, Croesus' narrative is not able to proceed without

attaching itself to a genealogical model, by returning both to his ancestor Gyges and to

the previous sovereignty of the Heraclidae, who "ruled for twenty-two generations of

men, or five hundred and five years, with son succeeding father" (Hdt. 1.7.4), and who

are destined to resume their kingship in the fifth generation of Gyges' ancestors.

---

[33] For a description of the *periplus*, see Gisinger 1937; Romm 1992, 19–20; Dilke 1985, 130–133; Kaplan 1999, 180–87. For a distinction between the cartographic and 'hodological' model, see Janni 1984, and below pp.117–121.

Herodotus constructs a steady replacement of fathers by sons as an ordering device for

his narrative, where the story of Persian expansion across space is also one of

genealogical succession from king to king. But the ancestors and descendants from

whom Croesus' story ultimately derives its meaning are, after all, plotted as a kind of

geography, through which Herodotus travels on his journey through the 'small and large

cities of mankind' (Hdt. 1.5.3).

Herodotus opens his work, therefore, with a combination of both spatial and

temporal models for his reader/listener, which may be plotted on a trajectory of literary

motifs from the *periplus* to the family tree. Furthermore, this combination situates

Herodotus squarely in a post-Hecataean tradition, with the opening of the *Histories*

appearing to blend and incorporate the two separate works of his predecessor, the

Genealogies and the *Periodos Gês*.[34] But, although Herodotus follows Hecataeus'

model of collecting material about the world through travel (both famously visit Egypt,

for example (Hdt. 2.143ff.)), he diverges from it in significant ways. Most importantly

for our purposes, Herodotus, unlike Hecataeus, does not accompany his written text

with a pictorial version of his travels. In fact, he derides those of his predecessors who

have done so (Hdt. 4.36.2):[35]

> γελῶ δὲ ὁρῶν γῆς περιόδους γράψαντας πολλοὺς ἤδη καὶ οὐδένα νόον ἐχόντως
> ἐξηγησάμενον· οἳ Ὠκεανόν τε ῥέοντα γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς
> ἀπὸ τόρνου. καὶ τὴν Ἀσίην τῇ Εὐρώπῃ ποιεύντων ἴσην. ἐν ὀλίγοισι γὰρ ἐγὼ δηλώσω
> μέγαθός τε ἑκάστης αὐτέων καὶ οἵη τίς ἐς γραφὴν ἑκάστη.

---

[34] In actuality, we cannot know how separate they were. The fragments of Hecataeus are too incomplete to offer much in the way of differences between the two works. See Clarke 1999, 60–62.

[35] Most scholars identify Herodotus' target as Hecataeus, who – in turn – is understood to be basing his ideas on Anaximander. See Jacoby 1912, cols. 2702–2707; Lloyd 1976, vol.2, passim; my n.39, below.

> I laugh when I look at the many men who have drawn maps of the earth, not one of whom has described it sensibly. They draw the river Ocean flowing around an earth which is spherical, as if drawn with a compass, and they make Asia equal in size to Europe. For I will show in a few (words) the size of both of them and what shape each (continent) is on a map.[36]

In this passage, Herodotus juxtaposes the two types of representation evoked by the term *graphein*, used twice to deride the activity of his predecessors, and once to suggest his own, preferable version *en oligoisi*. By changing the terms of *graphein* from drawing to writing, and by marking the difference between the compass, or carpenter's lathe (*tornos*), and words, Herodotus' prose directly engages with the language of cartography as it simultaneously distances itself from the art of drawing and design. Instead of portraying the world through the map, a visual double which exists independently alongside the text, Herodotus subsumes the *graphein* of cartography within the *graphein* of language, in his attempt to embed its visual element within his own exclusively verbal account.

The World in Prose: Herodotus' 'Rewriting' of the Map

Herodotus not only redraws the map by changing the shape and size of the two continents as Hecataeus had done before him, but he also, specifically, rewrites it. His own version of the shape of the world, following directly on from the laughing statement about his predecessors and their methods (Hdt. 4.37–41), incorporates the forward movement of the explorer across a seemingly infinite topography within the

---

[36] The Greek here is ambiguous (and I think deliberately so), since ἡ γράφη can mean both picture and text (*LSJ*). Jacob 1988 discusses the terminology of map-drawing (also noting that the map is 'published' (ἐκδοῦναι) like a legal document).

structure of a series of long, paratactic sentences, which join one land to the next by the

simple juxtaposition of clauses, and uses the repetition of key prepositions (ἀπό; ἐς;

πρός; ἔνθεν; κατύπερθε; μέχρι) or peoples ("τούτων δ' ὑπεροικέουσι πρὸς βορέην

ἄνεμον Μῆδοι, Μήδων δὲ Σάσπειρες, Σασπείρων δὲ Κόλχοι..")[37] as a linking device.

The frequency of τείνω and its compounds[38] in his depiction of the earth might also be

applied to the shape of Herodotus' own extended sentences, resulting in a syntax whose

geography imitates the landscape of the world it describes. As Romm observes (1992,

35), Herodotus borrows from the language of voyages of exploration in his rewriting of

the map – particularly as, following this section, he goes on to corroborate his own

world picture with the accounts of Scylax's tour of the Indian Ocean and the Persian

and Phoenecian circumnavigations of Africa.

We can go back further in the *Histories*, however, to uncover the original design

of Herodotus' 'verbal map.' It is first outlined in Book 2, when, in addition to his

critique of previous representations of the world,[39] Herodotus gives precise

measurements of the length and breadth of Egypt, including the distances between

places (in either stades or travelling time) and the topography en route.[40] His project, in

---

[37] Hdt. 4.37.1. "the Medes live above the [Persians], towards the North, the Saspeirians live above the Medes, and the Colchians [above] the Saspeirians.."

[38] τείνει (Hdt. 4.38.2); κατατείνουσι (4.38.1); παρατέταται (4.38.2; 4.39.1).

[39] The main passages are Hdt. 2.15.ff (Ionians' tripartite division of the world); 2.21 ff. (theories about the Nile); 4.32.3 (see above); 4.42.1 (tripartite division of the world); 4.45.2 (names and boundaries given to the earth). Herodotus' sometimes inconsistent critique of his (unnamed) predecessors is complex and lies outside the scope of this chapter. For a recent assessment of the evidence, see Zimmermann 1998.

[40] This also corresponds to his measurements of the Black Sea at Hdt. 4.85.2–86.4, which, as Hartog has observed, sets Herodotus in competition with the Pythia who "knows the measures of the seas" (Hdt.

this sense, corresponds to that of the earliest Egyptian king, Sesostris, who first marked out the breadth of his territory by erecting stone columns as far as his army was able to travel undefeated, and who – upon returning to Egypt – 'invented' geometry (Hdt. 2.109.3) by dividing his land into meticulously measured sections through the digging of canals. In both his use of measurement, therefore, and his establishment of the outer limits of his territory, Sesostris paves the way for Herodotus' own traversal and assessment of the space in and around Egypt (Hdt. 2.6–11; 2.29–32).

Like the movement of Sesostris' army across Asia or the progression of his warships over the Red Sea, Herodotus' act of surveying Egypt is successive, represented as an investigative journey whose progression across space corresponds to the linear flow of his words through the course of a sentence. By the same token, however, the static image which Sesostris creates by partitioning his country into segments resembles the overall design of a map, whose division of space is both simultaneous across time and fully comprehensive.

But these two approaches to geography, represented by the models of cartography and travel (and which I have, up till now, treated as contiguous), are brought into subtle conflict in the course of Herodotus' narration of Egyptian topography.[41] For while a map portrays an enclosed space whose edges are clearly

---

1.47.3, see below p.132). "Thus, to know the dimensions of the Black Sea, not through inspiration but through calculation, is to demonstrate exceptional, almost superhuman, knowledge," Hartog 1988, 342).

[41] Janni 1984 formulates a marked difference between the former (two dimensional, cartographical space by which we are accustomed to perceive the world today) and the latter (one dimensional 'hodological' space found in the *periploi* and itineraries of ancient Greece). I will return to this theory later in the chapter (see pp.117–121, below).

defined, Herodotus' eye is only able to see as far into the distance as his travels and

research can take him. In marked contrast to the bold circumference drawn by the map-

maker's compass, the parameters of Herodotus' world blur into obscurity and

emptiness.[42] The reader of the *Histories*, even after he or she has reached the end of the

sentence, is often confronted with a *telos* which is both invisible and unknowable.[43]

Consider the following conclusion to a description of the Nile's course, in which the

language becomes increasingly vague the further one travels towards the periphery

(Hdt. 2.31):

> Μέχρι μέν νυν τεσσέρων μηνῶν πλόου καὶ ὁδοῦ γινώσκεται ὁ Νεῖλος πάρεξ τοῦ ἐν
> Αἰγύπτῳ ῥεύματος· τοσοῦτοι γὰρ συμβαλλομένῳ μῆνες εὑρίσκονται ἀναισιμούμενοι ἐξ
> Ἐλεφαντίνης πορευομένῳ ἐς τοὺς αὐτομόλους τούτους· ῥέει δὲ ἀπὸ ἑσπέρης τε καὶ
> [ἡλίου] δυσμέων. τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε <u>οὐδεὶς ἔχει σαφέως φράσαι</u>· ἔρημος γάρ ἐστι ἡ
> χώρη αὕτη ὑπὸ καύματος.

> The course of the Nile beyond Egypt is known as far as a four month journey by sail and road.[44]
> These four months, added together, are spent in travelling from Elephantine to the Deserters
> whom I have already mentioned. Then it flows from the west and the setting of the sun. But from
> there nobody can say clearly where it goes. For this land is desolate due to the scorching heat.

As with the uncertainty which defines the desert (ἔρημος) on the edges of

Scythia, where Herodotus sentences tail off with the inconclusive "ὅσον ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν"

(Hdt. 4.17.2; 4.18.2; 4.20.2), or the 'snow of feathers' which obscures the writer's view

in the North (Hdt. 4.7.3), Herodotus' prose never achieves the map's effect of total and

---

[42] For a full inquiry into the edges of the earth, as well as the contrast between Herodotus' *erêmoi* and the earlier concept of *peirata*, see Romm 1992, esp. 35–7.

[43] The same may be said of the 'rewriting of the world' passage (Hdt. 4.37–40) discussed above, pp.89–90, whose narrative can only go so far "τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἔρημος ἤδη τὸ πρὸς τὴν ἠῶ. <u>οὐδὲ ἔχει οὐδεὶς φράσαι οἷόν δή τι ἐστί</u>." ("From that point the land is deserted towards the East, nor is anyone able to say what kind of land is there," Hdt. 4.40.2).

[44] As described in Hdt. 2.29–30.

simultaneous visibility across space.[45] Rather, his writing undermines the map's

authoritative, closed vision by suggesting that space, like narrative, evolves through

time.[46] In terms unavailable to the cartographer, Herodotus describes Egypt as a

topography in motion, with a landmass that continually rises and expands (Hdt. 2.13.2),

borders that stretch, unseen, for miles beneath the water (2.5.2), mountains that are

littered with the seashells left over from their time beneath the sea (2.12.1), and black

earth that carries traces of a former life amidst the silt and swamps of Ethiopia (2.12.2).

The deficiencies of the map's representation, just hinted at in Herodotus'

description of Egypt, come into closer definition with the shift to Scythian terrain in

book 4 of the *Histories*. This quintessentially 'unmappable' landscape, the subject of an

important book by François Hartog (1988), is perhaps best defined by what it is not.

The absence of not only clearly defined edges but also a fixed centre in the Scythians'

world confounds both 'arms' of the map-maker's compass,[47] while its placelessness is

further emphasized by a lack of ploughed land or cities, and the elusiveness of its burial

plots (Hdt. 4.97; 4.127); all a result of the Scythians' nomadism.[48] As I have outlined

above in my analogy of the Scythian landscape to Aristotle's 'continuous' sentence, and

---

[45] The limits of human vision, writ large upon the landscapes of Egypt and Scythia, may also be contrasted with the Muses, who see/know (*eidō*) all things. On which, see below, pp.129–30.

[46] Hdt. 1.5.4: "Τὰ γὰρ τὸ πάλαι μεγάλα ἦν. τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῶν σμικρὰ γέγονε. τὰ δὲ ἐπ' ἐμεῦ ἦν μεγάλα. πρότερον ἦν σμικρά. τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὦν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τωὐτῷ μένουσαν ἐπιμνήσομαι ἀμφοτέρων ὁμοίως." / "For those (cities) which were once big, many of them have become small, and those which are big in my time, were small before. Since human nature is such that nothing stays in the same place, I will relate both big and small alike."

[47] See Part II (chs.3&4) below, for my analysis of the 'lost' or ambiguous place of the centre in Greece's imaginary geography.

[48] Hartog 1988.

in my discussion of Scythian borders (p.79), this is the terrain par excellence for losing

one's sense of direction, sense of place, and, inevitably, one's way.[49]

Just as Sesostris had done for Egypt and its surrounding territories, Darius

attempts to 'place' Scythia through measurement and markers. First, on the banks of the

Bosporus, he erects two *stêlai* recording how far he has travelled and the nations he has

conquered (Hdt. 4.87.1), while the architect of the bridge, Mandrocles, commissions a

painting to commemorate its construction and the movement of the Persian army over

the Bosporus. (4.88). Next, Darius sets up another *stêlê* at the Tearus river (4.91), and

finally, having designated a certain place in the Artescos river, he orders each man in

his army to deposit one stone, thereby leaving behind a monument which records not

only the Persians' progress, but also the precise number of his men (4.92).

These acts of representation, both graphic and monumental, firmly ground

Darius' progress through a space which is fixed and measurable. It should not be taken

as coincidental, as I mentioned above, that Darius employs these techniques after

having passed through Egypt, a country which relied heavily on its own system of

geometry and land-surveying.[50] One of the Egyptian methods of surveying was by

---

[49] On the concept of being 'lost in space,' especially when that means losing all traces of civic and domestic architecture, see Wigley 1996. See also Hdt. 4.12.2, where the Scythians invade the Medes only because they got lost ("ἁμαρτόντες τῆς ὁδοῦ,") and 4.140.1, where they miss the Persians ("ἡμάρτανον πάσης τῆς ἐκείνων διεξόδου").

[50] These were invented in order to repartition land after boundary markers were washed away each summer by the flooding of the Nile (Hdt. 2.109.3); cf. Dilke 1987, 7.

means of the measuring cord, or *schoinion*, a long, twisted rope with knots (*hammata*)

set along it at various intervals.[51]

When Darius enters Scythia he imitates these Egyptian surveying practices by

creating what I suggest should be interpreted as his own, makeshift version of the

schoinion (Hdt. 4.98). For he devises a long leather strap, with sixty knots (*hammata*)

tied into it, which he leaves behind with the Ionians, instructing them to release one

knot a day for as long as he is inside Scythia. If he has not returned by the time sixty

days are up, the Ionians are to sail back to their own land.

Although the strap is ostensibly intended to measure time, not space, its

resemblance to the *schoinion* betrays Darius' larger project to master the Scythian

landscape. For, as Herodotus has made clear throughout the *Histories*, the counting off

of days is often the most stable indicator in the measurement of distance across space.[52]

Darius' strap is designed to serve as both a mnemonic and measuring device, which –

by the release of one knot a day – will keep a record of the progress of time both inside

and outside of Scythia. The chronological sequence of the knots along the strap

anticipates a movement through Scythia which will be equally linear and ordered, in a

scheme within which the co-ordinates of time are designed to match reciprocally with

the co-ordinates of space. In this way, the Persian king attempts to construct, through

the strap, a scale by which time may be measured, just as he had attempted to use rocks

---

[51] Dilke 1987, 7–8; Lewis 2001, 19–22; Lyons 1927. The *schoinion* can be clearly seen being put to use in an Egyptian wall-painting found at a tomb in Thebes (reproduced in Lyons 1927, 133).

[52] In his measurement of the Black Sea, for example, the author takes great pride in explaining how he has arrived at his calculations (by counting the number of days and nights sailing time, Hdt. 4.85–86).

and *stêlai* to keep a record of the number of his men and the they had travelled. Like the Egyptian priests, who habitually re-established not only the boundaries, but also the proportions, of their landscape by use of a knotted measuring rope, Darius turns to geometry and measurement in an attempt to master a new and unknown topography.

But Darius' model is more accurate than he had realised, for as the Ionians unknot the strap its length will become progressively longer, until – after sixty knots have been released – it is likely to have doubled in length. It is precisely this extension of space that Darius has not accounted for; like the strap which symbolizes the progress of his journey, Darius' expedition into Scythia follows a single line which can only increase in length (seemingly inexhaustibly), and whose end stretches ever more into the distance the further along it he progresses.[53] Moreover, as Darius' army is transformed, simultaneously, into hunter and quarry,[54] the normal sequence of time begins to slip into the same mutability as the Scythian landscape, culminating in the Scythians unknowingly (and self-defeatingly) overtaking the Persians in an absurd 'race' towards the finish in which, even when they loop backward to catch their quarry, they still end up missing them (Hdt. 4.136–140).

The 'unravelling' of Scythia that I have described above, resulting in Darius' failure to capture it despite repeated efforts to measure and record the landscape he

---

[53] Like the *telos* of a Herodotean sentence (see above, p.78–9) the Northern limits of the world (p.92), or the movement of the Scythians themselves (Hdt. 4.124.2). Darius' progress through Scythia might be best compared with the movement of a traveller through a maze. See below, pp.119–120. Borges' short story "The Two Kings and the Two Labyrinths" (1998, 263–4) similarly sees the topography of the desert as being analogous with that of the labyrinth.

[54] Hartog 1988, 41.

traverses, speaks to the more abstract difficulty of capturing any space through representation, whether in words or pictures. Darius' authorial practice of leaving his name alongside a series of marvels for future generations to admire is reminiscent of Herodotus' own statement in the prologue of the *Histories*, while the successive progression of the knots along his strap betray an attempt to 'plot' Scythia in both the spatial and narratalogical contexts which Peter Brooks has described.[55] It can therefore be argued that this linear, narrative sequence in fact leads to a failure to achieve any kind of plot at all, whether by 'plot' we mean a piece of land or a narrative event. Furthermore, the confusion of Darius' journey corresponds well to Herodotus' own labyrinthine and tangled description of Scythia just before his protagonist enters it.[56]

On the other hand, the flat (πεδίας Hdt. 4.23; 4.47), open landscape of Scythia does lend itself to a comparison with the surface of a map. Apart from the walls left behind by the Cimmerians (Hdt. 4.12) and the tomb of the king in the outermost area of the Gerrhi (Hdt. 4.71) there is no architecture to speak of in Scythia, leading to an extensive range of visibility across space. Scyles is only able to (temporarily) hide himself from the scope of that visibility by taking refuge within the walls and gates of a

---

[55] Brooks 1984, 20 (see above, p.80).

[56] Hdt. 4.99–101, (sandwiched between the description of the strap and Darius' invasion) in which Herodotus attempts to describe the land of Tauris by comparing it to other semi-real, semi-hypothetical places (like Attica, if a different tribe to the Athenians lived on Sounium, and as if Sounium stretched farther into the sea; or like Iapygia , if a tribe other than the Iapygians were separated from them and lived on the promentary). Finally, Herodotus' exactly symmetrical vision of a four-cornered Scythia, with sides of equal length (4.101), comes suspiciously close to his earlier criticism of cartography at 4.36. Herodotus' overall geography of Scythia is described as "a mess" by Thomson (1948, 60).

Greek city (Hdt. 4.78.4),[57] just as Anacharsis attempted to escape from view within his country's only wooded area (Hdt. 4.76). But while both of these transgressors may divorce themselves from Scythian customs with some measure of success, neither of them are able to evade their nation's extensive and penetrating gaze, whose range appears to be as all-encompassing as the map's. Walls and gates are no help for Scyles when he is viewed from an aerial perspective by the spectators in the tower, in much the same way as the cartographer's perspective 'flattens' visual obstacles on the ground.

So too is the Scythian landscape composed of a curious exposure and proximity of land to sky. The Scythians' story of their own foundation, which begins with the falling of certain gold objects from the sky to earth, and which in turn engenders certain taboos about sleeping in the open air (Hdt. 4.5–7), evokes the same flat, two-dimensional environment of a map, an object which invites the eye to view a horizontal surface area 'from the air.' Goryas' interpretation of the signs sent by the Scythians to Xerxes (Hdt. 4.132.3) elicits a similar horizontal topography – unable to escape to the sky (like a bird), underground (like mice) or underwater (like frogs), the Persians are trapped by their exposed position on the surface of the Scythian land.

Yet it is precisely the pockets of *invisibility* that Herodotus perceives in this landscape (the vanishing of the Scythians (Hdt. 4.124.2); the disappearances of Salmoxis for three years in Thrace (4.95); the disappearance of Aristeas' corpse from a

---

[57] Hartog 1988, 65: "Scyles... passes through the walls (of Borysthenes), which are the precise demarcation of this division in the spatial fabric, drawing the line between "this side" and "beyond." "Beyond," once the intermediary zone of the outskirts is crossed, is the Scythian space, the open range; "this side," once the door is closed (for the Scythians cannot even see what goes on within) is a Greek space, the space of the town." Once again, it is civic architecture which both orders and orients the descriptions of space in prose narrative (see above, n.27, and Wigley 1996 (above, n.49).

fuller's shop in Proconnesus (4.14); the absence of both centre and periphery as

mentioned above) which suggest that the map's all-encompassing perspective is not

only incomplete, but also illusory.[58]

Scythia remains as something of a blind spot for both Herodotus and Darius; an

unsolved landscape or counter-site within the *Histories*, which in Foucauldian terms,

might be labelled a 'heterotopia;' a real place which nevertheless stands outside all

other places, as it reflects, distorts and inverts them.[59] Like the Scythia that I have been

describing, Foucault's heterotopias are "sites that seem to be pure and simple openings,

but that generally hide curious exclusions" (Foucault 1986, 26), or which transport

those who enter them into the ambiguous space of "elsewhere." These sites can take the

form of railway carriages, cemeteries, gardens, or even, quite simply, the mirror: a

reflective, illusionistic surface which, like the map, nevertheless presents the external

gaze with a double of itself that exists both inside and outside of 'real space.'

Before we leave Scythia, I would like to return to the problem of movement-

through-time which proved, finally, to be the crux of Darius' misperception about the

landscape he set out to capture. Although, as I have outlined above, Scythia begins by

resembling the map – whose aggregate and discrete form suggests the ideal not only for

a writer attempting to document the space of the earth, but also for a despot setting out

---

[58] This may have something to do with the fact that the map is only two dimensional (and thus cannot account for the 'underground' space into which Salmoxis disappears) and that it is discrete (and therefore cannot follow the Scythians when they wander off its edges).

[59] Foucault 1986. As with the mirror, the viewer cannot look upon a map of the world without seeing her real or imagined self within (Cf. Aelian *VH*. 3.28, pp.123, below). Hartog 1988 argues the same for the Greek who reads Herodotus' Scythia.

to capture the world – it ends up as a shifting, illegible landscape which confounds its author as soon as he begins to travel through it. For both Egypt and Scythia, then, the map offers a form of visual description which runs into serious difficulties when confronted with the forward progression of time. In the following section, I shall look more closely at what happens when the static, fixed image of cartography is juxtaposed with the temporal impulse of narrative.

Putting the Image into Words: Ekphrasis

One way in which Herodotus is able to situate the map's all-encompassing perspective within a narrative framework is by turning to the language of the poets. The vanishing point of his own incomplete perception as geographer and explorer often marks the beginning of the poetic narrative, in a tradition within which, since the *Odyssey*, wide-ranging geographies and fiction have comfortably overlapped.[60] In his description of the land to the North of Scythia, therefore, Herodotus takes his evidence from the poetry of Aristeas (Hdt. 4.13), Hesiod and Homer (Hdt. 4.32). But, if the fictional world of the poets is something Herodotus generally tries to steer clear of or discount (as with their 'invention' of the river Ocean at Hdt. 2.23), only turning to it in situations of particular narrative duress, he nevertheless comes much closer to another poetic model, the ekphrasis, in his attempt to put the map – a picture of geographical space – into words.

The epic figure of ekphrasis, a 'still' digression in the text in which a visual representation is narrated verbally, can be compared with the 'ethnographic' sections of

---

[60] See Romm 1992, particularly ch.5 on 'Geography and Fiction' (172–214).

the *Histories*, which function as pauses in the narrative, even as snapshots which freeze time, as the author shifts narratological modes and turns his attention to the shape, or outline, of the earth.[61] I am not, at this point, suggesting that Herodotus' ethnographic digressions are in fact ekphrases. But I do want to bring the notion of ekphrasis into the picture because it offers us an ancient way of thinking about the confluence of the verbal and visual which I have been trying to isolate in the relationship between early prose and its visual double, the map.

Our first and best-known ekphrasis, the shield of Achilles at *Iliad* 18. 478-608, may be understood as a description of space which is essentially cartographic.[62] Like the map which Kahn has outlined for Anaximander,[63] and like the maps which Herodotus describes at 4.36, the shield of Achilles is a round object which represents the world encircled by the river Ocean. The space on the shield, as on the ancient map, is organized so as to represent other places, such as rivers, fields and cities, on a reduced scale. In both cases, the artist creates his world picture by demarcating images upon a surface of metal or wood. In fact, Hephaestus' handicraft is able to go one step further than the map, perhaps coming close to the model of Anaximander's globe

---

[61] The association between 'ethnographic' description and ekphrasis has also been noted by Clarke (1999, 37).

[62] Woodward and Harley 1998, 130–132. Cf. DK12A6/K&R fr.99 (Strabo I, p.7 Casaubon: "τοὺς πρώτους μεθ' "Ομηρον δύο φησὶν 'ερατοσθένης. 'Αναξίμανδρόν τε Θαλοῦ γεγονότα γνώριμον καὶ πολίτην καὶ 'Εκαταῖον τὸν Μιλήσιον." ("Eratosthenes says that the first to follow Homer were two, Anaximander the friend and fellow citizen of Thales, and Hecataeus the Milesian").

[63] Kahn 1985, 82–4.

(DK12A1(2)), by mirroring the depth of the earth's bands with its five layers of metal (*Il.* 18.481).

Homer twice uses a form of the word for amazement to describe the spectator's reaction to the shield (*Il.* 18.496, 549). Similarly, the ps-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles* intersperses its own ekphrasis of a shield – also surrounded by Ocean and composed of concentric bands (*Asp.* 143; 314) – with the phrase θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι/ἰδεῖν ("wondrous to look upon").[64] Attached to the trope of ekphrasis, therefore, is the explicit notion of amazement. As the poet attempts to portray the object verbally, he simultaneously reassures his reader of the image's impact as a spectacle by his recurrent use of *thauma* or *thaumazō*. Furthermore, the arresting affect which amazement has on the spectator's body, described by Greenblatt as a kind of paralysis, is re-enacted on a textual level by a temporary paralysis within the narrative itself, as its flow is halted by the descriptive 'pause.'[65] Again, therefore, ekphrasis may prove to be a particularly useful model for approaching the Herodotean 'ethnographic' sections (such as the description of Egypt, which is notable for the frequency of its *thaumata*) which have received considerable scholarly attention for their position vis-à-vis the movement of plot and narrative.[66]

Herodotus' own interest in *thauma* and its place in the writing of history is given significant emphasis in his prologue, where he promises to focus on preserving the

---

[64] *Asp.* 140; 224; 318. Cf. also *Asp.* 218 "θαῦμα μέγα φράσσασθ'". See Lamberton 1988, 141–44 for a comparison of the shields of Homer and ps-Hesiod.

[65] Greenblatt, 1991, 20, drawing evidence from Spinoza. For description as a narrative pause, see Fowler 1991.

[66] Dewald 1987, 148–9; Clarke 1999, 37ff.

"ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά" ("great and wondrous deeds/monuments," Hdt. 1.1)

of Greeks and Barbarians alike. Not only does Herodotus' opening sentence introduce a

concept, the marvellous, that is more than twice as common in poetry as it is in prose,[67]

he also links these ἔργα θωμαστά to Homeric diction in his wish to save them from

becoming "ἀκλεᾶ" (unrenowned).[68] Herodotus, like the poetic authors, uses *thauma*

relatively often[69] and in just under half of its occurrences the marvellous is directly or

indirectly related to the *histor*'s role as eyewitness, just as it is most often connected

with verbs of seeing in Homer and Hesiod.[70] Becker's study of Homeric ekphrasis has

emphasized how *thauma* brings the viewer into the picture, serving as "an index of the

interpreter" since "there can be no amazement or wonder without a viewer," while

Hartog has classified Herodotus' *thauma* as an indicator of "the eye of the travelling

beholder."[71] In preserving those deeds which are *thaumasta*, and by exhibiting a steady

stream of *thaumata* in his *Histories*, Herodotus thereby participates in a display of awe-

---

[67] It occurs only 0.07 times every 10,000 words in Thucydides; but 1.56 times (in 10,000) in Euripides; 1.67 in Sophocles; 5.56 in Hesiod; 0.90 in Homer; 6.22 in the Homeric Hymns; 0.94 in Pindar; & 2.13 in Bacchylides.

[68] The first four word of the text also scan as a line of dactylic hexameter "Ἡροδότου Ἁλικαρνησσέος ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις."

[69] There are 95 citations of -θωμα- in the *Histories*. Although it may be objected that there are very few extant prose authors *before* Herodotus to compare him with, he nevertheless employs a term which is studiously avoided by later writers of prose, suggesting that they, at least, identify it as poetic.

[70] "θαῦμα ἰδέσθαι / ἰδεῖν" = 8 / 17 times in Homer; 5 / 8 times in Hesiod; "θαῦμα τοδ' ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὄρομαι" = 4 / 17 times in Homer.

[71] Becker 1985, 129; Hartog 1988, 236. The role of the viewing eye (whether the author's or his internal or external audience's) in ekphrastic description is well-documented in the scholarship. See e.g. Fowler 1991, esp. 28–31 and 1990 (on 'focalization') and Gombrich 1980/1974, 190ff. (on the 'eye-witness principle').

inspiring works of art which we might then label poetic, with special reference to the theme of ekphrasis.

Yet what makes Hephaestus' creation so extraordinary goes beyond the marvels of verbal technique alone. It is also the skill which is reflected in the smith's ability to represent the entire world upon a single material object. His 'map' thereby engages in the same sense of wonder that Herodotus records in his travels to distant lands: both bring the unfamiliar, hitherto unseen places of the world into a startling proximity with the observable and known. Thus Hephaestus' shield surrounds the familiar Greek landscapes of festival, war and agriculture with the mythical streams of Ocean, while Herodotus uses the marvellous to 'translate' the wonders of the other into the same discourse which the Greeks use to talk about themselves, thereby nullifying the considerable geographic and cultural distance between self and other.[72] It is even possible to go a step further, as Stephen Greenblatt has done for the New World,[73] and claim that wonder is a central precept of the geographer's traversal of space (for what is close to home is blunted by its familiarity, and therefore rarely truly startling), thus serving as a measuring device of the distance which separates the far-ranging traveller from his stationary audience. The presence of the marvellous in the geographer's

---

[72] Hartog 1988, 231: "*thoma* may be reckoned among the procedures used by the rhetoric of otherness" & 232: "*thoma* can be regarded as translating difference: one of the possible transcriptions of the difference between what is here and what is there, far away." See also Redfield 1985, passim & 97: "Oddity is an ethnocentric principle."

[73] Greenblatt 1991, intro. & 30: "From antiquity, these [travelers'] marvels served as one of the principal signs of otherness and hence functioned not only as a source of fascination but of authentication."

narrative thereby legitimates his journey, even if, paradoxically, its subject matter more properly belongs in the realm of fiction.[74]

The *thauma* which comes with the movement of the beholder's eye across extraordinary lengths of world space reappears in Agathemerus' description of Hecataeus' newly corrected and improved version of Anaximander's map ("ὃν' Ἑκαταῖος ὁ Μιλήσιος ἀνὴρ πολυπλανὴς διηκρίβωσεν.[75] ὥστε θαυμασθῆναι τὸ πρᾶγμα.")[76] Here, in a surprising move, Agathemerus equates the more accurate picture of the world with the one which is more marvellous, bringing the categories of *thauma* and truth into an uneasy juxtaposition.[77]

The key to both that accuracy and that wonder may lie in Hecataeus' status as πολυπλανὴς (well-travelled), but it is nevertheless the case that the wonder of Hecataeus' achievement – to condense the entire known world into a single space which

---

[74] Jeanette Winterson's *Sexing the Cherry* illustrates this point effectively by opening with the wondrous display of a banana in Renaissance London, brought back from the New World and serving as proof, by means of its extraordinariness, of the distance its importer has travelled (Winterson 1989, 4–6). By the same token, however, the presence of the legitimating banana at the beginning of the novel sets the tone for a narrative based on fantasy and magical realism, whose "journeys [are] bounded only by the limits of the imagination" (author's blurb). Winterson's choice for her "wonder" (5) of what has become the most ordinary of fruits also speaks to the necessity of distance and inaccessibility in order that the status of wonder be maintained. (On the "displacement and stabilizing of wonder," see Hepburn 1984, 133.)

[75] The verb means to examine something minutely, often step by step, until one reaches an accurate answer; thus also to make or portray accurately. Plato and Aristotle both use the term to denote the systematic refining and perfecting of a point to reach a clear, accurate answer which is usually associated with 'truth.' (Pl. *Th.* 184d7, *Soph.* 245e6, *St.* 292c3, *Ti.* 38b5; Arist. *End. Eth.* 1227a1, *Nic. Eth.* 1178a23).

[76] "...Which Hecataeus, the Milesian, a much-travelled man, corrected with the result that it became an object to be marvelled at," DK12A6, see above, p.85.

[77] A juxtaposition which Aristotle, who believed that wonder could lead both to the truth and the irrational, was later to wrestle with (the main passages are *Rh.* 1 and *Poet.* chs.9 & 24. Cf. Pl. *Th.* 155d). For discussion and commentary, see Halliwell 1987, 111 ff. & ad. loc., & 1986 ad. loc.

can be traversed in the blink of an eye – negates the underlying premise that distance is the crucial factor upon which the geographer's *thauma* is evaluated. A similar paradox holds for ekphrasis, where the verisimilitude of the depicted scene typically becomes so accurate that the picture itself, as it acquires a three-dimensionality across time and space, becomes utterly unrealistic. Within ekphrasis, therefore, it becomes possible to portray something to such a degree of accuracy that it becomes an illusion, engendering an amazement at the microscopic level of detail which ultimately renders the object more surreal than real.

The relationship between map and ekphrasis which I have outlined above, mediated in large part by the spectator's amazed reaction, may also, therefore, be connected with the *erga thaumasta* that Herodotus encounters as he travels through the geography of the *Histories*. Although Herodotus displaces the map from his narrative, he may also be said to replace it by his recurrent emphasis on visual marvels. Once again, it is worth applying the metaphor of scale here, for *thauma*, like cartography, has the ability to compress vast distances of space into a single, legible narrative.

Aristagoras' Map

In book 5 of the *Histories*, the Milesian tyrant Aristagoras travels to Sparta in search of an alliance in the Ionian revolt, carrying a particular device by which he hopes to persuade the Spartan king Cleomenes (Hdt. 5.49.1):

τ' δὴ ἐς λόγους ἦιε. ὡς Λακεδαιμόνιοι λέγουσι. ἔχων χάλκεον πίνακα ἐν τ' γῆς ἁπάσης περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο καὶ θάλασσά τε πᾶσα καὶ ποταμοὶ πάντες.

> As the Lacedaimonians tell it, he (Aristagoras) came into dialogue with him (Cleomenes), holding a bronze tablet on which was inscribed the circuit of the whole earth and all the sea and all the rivers.

The map that Aristagoras brings to Sparta is etched into bronze (traditionally, maps were either made of bronze or painted onto wooden *pinakes*), and probably circular (as maps seemed to have been at that time, imitating the perceived shape of the Ocean-encircled earth).[78] Given that it is brought over from Ionia, the centre of the map-making world, and given Sparta's backwardness in technological matters, we can presume that Cleomenes has never seen one before. Aristagoras places considerable weight on the map's powers – its rhetorical value can be equated with the large amounts of money he later offers the Spartans in its place. Furthermore, since we have already been told that Cleomenes is not quite sound of mind (Hdt. 5.42.1), the stage has been set for a dazzling display of visual persuasion and illusion.

At first sight, it is hard to see how Cleomenes could have failed to be impressed by the bronze map. Aristagoras uses its picture as a narrative thread, tracing the route from country to country with his finger (Hdt. 5.49.5: "δεικνὺς δὲ ἔλεγε ταῦτα ἐς τῆς γῆς τὴν περίοδον. τὴν ἐφέρετο ἐν τ' πίνακι ἐντετμημένην"/"As he said these things he pointed them out on the map of the earth engraved into the tablet which he carried.") As he shows Cleomenes the various places along the route from Ionia to Susa, Aristagoras attempts to bring the impressioned bronze to life by conjuring up images of gold and fertile plains in language which is rich in superlatives and πολυ-

---

[78] Hdt. 4.36; Heidel 1937; Dilke 1998, 24; Kahn 1981, 83. The standard reference work on the *pinax* remains that of Regenbogen (*RE*), but see also the valuable comments of Pritchett 1956, 250–253, & n.256 (with further references).

prefixes.[79] Furthermore, the juxtaposition of precious metal and crops evokes a famous

ekphrastic moment from the *Iliad* (18.548–9):

ἣ δὲ μελαίνετ' ὄπισθεν. ἀρηρομένῃ δὲ ἐῴκει.
χρυσείη περ ἐοῦσα· τὸ δὴ περὶ θαῦμα τέτυκτο.

the field darkened behind them, and looked like the ploughed earth,
even though it was made of gold. Such was the wonder of his craftsmanship.

As has often been noted, Homer's skill in this passage lies in his ability to combine two

different visual registers (the material of the shield and the colour of the field) in a

simultaneous visual/verbal moment. The wonder of the craftsmanship – which opens up

a space wherein the viewer can see both things at once – turns on the art of illusion,

allowing the spectator to see things which are not really there. Like Homer or

Hephaestus then, (if we are to imagine that Aristagoras is the creator of his own map),

Herodotus' narrator attempts to seamlessly open up the bronze tablet into a picture of

the world, a narrative which describes wondrous and abundant landscapes which can

somehow come to life on the surface of the pinax.[80] Aristagoras tries to facilitate that

transition between the two visual registers (the one which exists on the surface of the

picture, and the other which can only be seen through the 'window' of narration) by

stressing how *easy* the movement across the map is,[81] and, as Murnaghan has pointed

out, by emphasizing the contiguity of the different countries, so that they emerge as "an

unbroken stream of riches from the coast to Susa" (2001, 69).

---

[79] πολυαργυρώτατοι; πολυπροβατώτατοι; πολυκαρπότατοι (Hdt. 5.49.5).

[80] One of the great successes (or, depending on the critic, failures – see Becker 1985, 10) of the ekphrasis is its ability to bring scenes to life, allowing the spectator to see movement and hear sounds, as in the *Iliad*'s dancing scene (*Il.* 18.593–606).

[81] εὐπετέως (Hdt. 5.49.3; 5.49.8); εὐπετέες (5.49.4).

The emphasis on wealth in Aristagoras' narrative (the Lydians' silver at Hdt. 5.49.5; the 500-talent tribute of the Cappadocians at 5.49.6; and the treasure house at Susa at 5.49.7) provides a link between the inner and outer picture through the dazzling effect of the bronze upon which the map is engraved. In both the ps-Hesiodic *Shield of Heracles* and the *Iliad*'s shield of Achilles, the presence of the different metals on the shield is repeatedly juxtaposed with the internal reality of the ekphrastic narrative.[82] Whether it is the row of vines fashioned from gold (*Il.* 18.561; *Asp.* 296–7) or that Ares and Athena are both embossed in gold *and* clothed in golden armour (*Il.*18. 516–17), the splendour of Hephaestus' working materials are repeatedly evoked to reinforce the brilliance of the internal scene. The imagery of silver and gold that Aristagoras draws upon in his own image-making can therefore be said to mirror both the technique and language of ekphrasis.

Finally, both Aristagoras' map and Achilles' shield are inherently political objects through which wars are waged. Aristagoras may be said to offset the Persians' military regalia of trousers and turbans (Hdt. 5.493) by means of the physical resemblance between the map he holds and the heroic armour of the Achaeans (where shining, hard metal easily defeats the 'soft' cloth of the enemy's oriental garb).[83] The comparison also implies, by extension, that the 'magical' scientific qualities of the map might afford the same protection (and victory) for Cleomenes as Hephaestus' divine

---

[82] *Il.*18.507; 516–7; 534; 548–9; 561–5; 574; 577; 597–8; *Asp.* 183; 188; 192; 199; 203; 204; 208; 212; 220; 222; 224–5; 225–6; 231; 271; 295; 296–7; 299; 312–13.

[83] On the 'othering' of the Oriental by the Greeks, see Said 1994; Hall 1989.

handicraft had bestowed upon Achilles and Heracles, the legendary wielders of his shields.

Both imagistically and metaphorically, then, Aristagoras transforms his map into an instrument of war, and at the same time he builds upon a series of intertextual parallels with the shield of Achilles in order to trick Cleomenes into reading the map in the manner of an ekphrasis. In the context of Herodotus' *Histories,* the map plays upon, and even attempts to replace, the position that the shield occupies in Homer's *Iliad.* This rhetorical move renders Aristagoras the author of more than just a war, moreover; for his attempt to integrate not only word and image, but also the texts of the *Histories* and *Iliad,* into a single whole brings Herodotus' narrative close to epic practice and style.[84]

In spite of Aristagoras' efforts, however, Herodotus changes the terms of ekphrasis in two important ways. Firstly, he does not give us a spectator's perspective. We are not invited to view the map with Cleomenes, nor are we given access to his own reaction (we cannot even tell if he is impressed by the map). Secondly, we are never given a description of the map itself. Just as with the naked body of Candaules' wife, we as readers only watch other people looking at the objects towards which we are denied visual access. Candaules may have been right to believe that men's ears are more untrustworthy than their eyes (Hdt. 1.7.2: "ὦτα γὰρ τυγχανει ἀνθρώποισι ἐόντα ἀπιστότερα ὀφθαλμῶν,") especially in a narrative which repeatedly reiterates

---

[84] Ekphrasis, perhaps because it opens up a 'window' in the narrative through which other texts might be glimpsed, has a rich history within the tradition of intertextuality. In particular, the Shield of Achilles is a favourite intertextual site. Cf. Putnam 1998 on ekphrasis in the *Aeneid.*

the power of the visual,[85] but Herodotus never offers us the direct, simultaneous, and all-encompassing view of history that a single glance at a map fulfils. As if to only reinforce the point, the text's (invisible) display of the map's total visibility is narrated indirectly and at second-hand, having been carried over from the *logos* of the Lacedaemonians (Hdt. 5.49.1).

Herodotus' divergence from the Hecataean tradition and exclusion of the map from his *Histories* is thereby subtly reinforced in this section, despite his inclusion of a character who does physically transport a map into the body of the work and attempt to utilize its potential for expanded visualization. We can say, then, that Herodotus appears to be rejecting two models of visual description at once – both the prose form, by choosing to omit Hecataeus' map, and the poetic – by causing ekphrasis to 'fail' in his work. Even without a narrator as artful as Aristagoras, moreover, the map offers a second *trompe l'œil* which is related to the critic's overall 'problem' with ekphrasis,[86] and that is its deceptive use of scale. The fluidity with which both Aristagoras' finger and Cleomenes' eye scan across the surface of the *pinax* – allowing for the entire route to be covered in one glance and for an expanse of territory stretching from Greece to Asia to fit within the range of a naked human eye – subtly collapses, in Borgesian fashion, the difference between the surface of the *pinax* and the land it purports to represent. Aristagoras' stratagem depends precisely on this illusion; by deceiving Cleomenes as to the distance, arduousness and temporality of the journey, he hopes to

---

[85] For Herodotus' complex presentation of the visual, see Dewald 1993 & Murnaghan, 2001.

[86] See n.80, above.

enlist Spartan support for an expedition, which – when removed from the surface of the map – is, as Cleomenes eventually surmises, in fact much lengthier and more problematic than the quick movement of Aristagoras' finger across the surface of the world would imply.

Aristagoras' map ultimately fails as an instrument of persuasion and illusion, and that failure reveals a reversal of the effects of both ekphrasis and compressed scale on Herodotus' part. Instead of allowing the picture to exist as one hermetically sealed whole, Herodotus interrupts the map's simultaneous, ekphrastic narrative with the intrusion of the external 'real' time of his *Histories*. By removing himself from the map for an interval of two days, Cleomenes undoes its 'amazing' effect,[87] and when the two reconvene Cleomenes intrudes upon the map's self-enclosed spatiality by forcing its narrative to engage in external, or 'real' time (Hdt. 5.50.1):

επείτε δὲ ἡ κυρίη ἡμέρη ἐγένετο τῆς ὑποκρίσιος καὶ ἦλθον ἐς τὸ συγκείμενον. εἴρετο ὁ Κλεομένης τὸν Ἀρισταγόρην ὁκοσέων ἡμερέων ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τῆς Ἰώνων ὁδὸς εἴη παρὰ βασιλέα.

When the appointed day for a decision arrived and they came to the agreed place, Cleomenes asked Aristagoras how many days from the Ionian sea was the road to the King.

Cleomenes' question causes the map's deceptively 'easy' illusion of scale to collapse, forcing Aristagoras to move from a narrative model of space to a narrative model of time. Aristagoras' reply – that the expedition will take three months – is radically at odds with the map's presentation of time-through-space. His reply swiftly undoes the

---

[87] There has been much scholarly treatment of ekphrasis' peculiar ability to stop narrative time. See e.g. Putnam 1998, 2; Fowler 1981; Becker 1985. Of particular relevance is Heffernan 1991, 301 who qualifies the notion of "atemporal eternity" by stressing the ekphrasis' insistent "embryonically narrative impulse." Following Heffernan, we can then posit two simultaneous, and mutually exclusive, kinds of narrative time – the internal, which opens up *inside* the ekphrastic space, and the text's external narrative, which is frozen for the duration of ekphrastic time.

illusion of the 1:1 scale which Aristagoras' combination of image and narrative had suggested, forcing its narrator to translate the terms of his own ekphrastic conception of scale into the dimensions of real time, or reality ("τὸ ἐόν," Hdt. 5.50.2). As Herodotus' own straightforward account of the distance goes on to prove, Cleomenes' outraged rejection of such a lengthy journey corresponds, in broader terms, to the failure of both cartography and ekphrasis as models for encompassing and depicting the world.

The map's role in the larger pattern of Herodotus' narrative is not so easily dismissed, however, for it also illuminates the strong dialectic between outside and inside,[88] or seen and unseen, within the *Histories*. As Aristagoras' description showed, cartographic representation purports to make all space visible and accessible, even minimizing obstacles such as geographic borders as it effortlessly opens up space to the viewer, allowing him to enter not only foreign territory but even, finally, the royal palace at Susa. (Hdt. 5.49.7):

> ἔχεται δὲ τούτων γῆ ἥδε Κισσίη. ἐν τῇ δὴ παρὰ ποταμὸν τόνδε Χοάσπην κείμενα ἐστὶ τὰ Σοῦσα ταῦτα. ἔνθα βασιλεύς τε μέγας δίαιταν ποιέεται. καὶ τῶν χρημάτων οἱ θησαυροὶ ἐνθαῦτα εἰσί· ἐλόντες δὲ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν θαρσέοντες ἤδη τῷ Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε.

> Here is the land of Cissia which they hold, within which, along this river Choaspes, is situated Sousa where the king spends a great deal of his time, and the treasure houses of his gold are right here. If you take this city, you need not fear to challenge the wealth of Zeus.

The map's transparent depiction of space stands in marked contrast to an alternative Herodotean template for imagining the world, Deioces' extraordinary palace at Hdt. 1.98, whose seven variously-coloured concentric circles also mirror ancient

---

[88] As formulated by Bachelard 1994, ch.9 (211–231).

representations of the cosmos in the manner of early Greek maps.[89] For Deioces'

designs for his palace are based on an architecture of blocked sight-lines and hidden

spaces, ensuring that no-one from the outside is able to lay eyes upon the king (Hdt.

1.99). Furthermore, in direct juxtaposition to Aristagoras' easy revelation of Darius'

treasure house, Deioces' *thesaurus* is sequestered within the innermost walls of his

palace.

The king's *thesaurus*, like the bedroom that Candaules shares with his wife, is

one of the most interior and closely guarded spaces with the *Histories*;[90] it is no

surprise, therefore, to find that the map's uncovering of space should end with a view of

Darius' gold. Aristagoras' narrative looks back to Solon's visit to Croesus in book 1 of

the *Histories* (1.30ff.), where the great king's display of his treasure house, presented as

if a static symbol of his fortune, was intersected by the wise Athenian's insistent

emphasis on the passage of time. By opening the doors to his treasure house and making

its contents visible, Croesus prefigured his own impending downfall. In a similar way

Candaules, by giving his bodyguard visual access to the most private room of his palace

(significantly, Gyges is placed right inside the door),[91] sealed his own fate in the

---

[89] The idea of a universe composed of several concentric spheres, each of a different colour (upon which the planets were housed) was prevalent both in the East and among the Greeks (e.g. Pl. *R.* 616b–617d, where Er views the 'Spindle of Necessity').

[90] As is perhaps best exemplified by the story of King Rhampsinitus and the thief (Hdt. 2.121; Lloyd 1976, vol. 2, ad. loc.)

[91] See Bachelard 1994, 222–24, on doors. The prominence of the door in the Candaules' episode replays the tension between inside and outside space as it is represented by the skene doors on the Greek tragic stage (see Padel 1990 for an excellent discussion of theatre's mediation of interior and exterior space). The Candaules/ Gyges episode's close affinity to tragedy has been noted by scholars, and the discovery of a papyrus containing scenes from a *Gyges* tragedy (perhaps fifth century, perhaps Hellenistic) only goes to strengthen the scene's dramatic quality (for text and bibliography of the fragment, see Raubitschek

narrative. Both characters confused the categories of inside and outside, seen and unseen space. Deioces, on the other hand, maintained the structure of his power precisely via the careful control of visual access.[92] In a similar fashion, Cleomenes counteracts the expansive space of the map by retreating inside his house, into a space marked as both interior and private by the presence of his young daughter Gorgo.

As the terms of space move from the political to the domestic, exterior to interior, Aristagoras increasingly loses sway over his audience (significantly, in Athens, he is able to persuade because he presents his map within the open, public space of the pnyx – Hdt. 5.97). And, just as in the Gyges episode, it is the initially passive characters of Gorgo and Candaules' wife who unexpectedly take back control of their space. When Aristagoras follows his failure with his map with an attempt at bribery, Gorgo tells her father to go into another room in order to resist Aristagoras' gifts, a plan that is brilliantly effective. By placing a closed door between himself and Aristagoras, Cleomenes re-establishes the spatial boundaries which the map had so easily dissolved. Further, by making himself unseen, he corrects the map's illusory power as a window into any and every space.

1955.) Finally, the map's position at the crossroads of interior and exterior space is best illustrated by its own frequent occurrence on doors, to which *pinakes* were often attached. Symbolically, the map itself can be seen as a kind of door which provides 'entry' to an alien and hidden space. Nicolet 1991, 100, discusses this practice in Rome (Agrippa's map was displayed on a portico in the Campus Martius). The evidence is simply too scarce to make judgment for fifth-century Greece, although Aelian's anecdote about the posted map which Socrates shows Alcibiades may suggest that the map was displayed on a door (see below, pp.123).

[92] See Murnaghan 2001, 65–68.

But if Aristagoras' map fails as a 'window to the world,' where does this leave

the role of the *histor*'s text? It is only, Herodotus implies, through his own non-pictorial

version of the route (a description which relies neither on maps nor on poetic devices,

but only on simple and stripped-down language, as we shall see below) that an accurate

representation of geographical space might be achieved. Having stepped in and

criticized Aristagoras' management of his cartographic narrative (Hdt. 5.50.2):

ὁ δὲ 'Αρισταγόρης τἆλλα ἐὼν σοφὸς καὶ διαβάλλων ἐκεῖνον εὖ ἐν τούτῳ ἐσφάλη· χρέον
γάρ μιν μὴ λέγειν τὸ ἐόν. βουλόμενόν γε Σπαρτιήτας ἐξαγαγεῖν ἐς τὴν 'Ασίην. λέγει δ'
ὧν τριῶν μηνῶν φὰς εἶναι τὴν ἄνοδον.

Aristagoras had been wise in all other respects and deceived him (Cleomenes) well, but in this
matter he tripped up. For he should not have told the truth, if he wanted to draw the Spartans out
to Asia, by saying that the journey would take three months.

Herodotus proceeds to narrate his own description of the route. Unlike the

mapped version, his territory is marked by regular borders (πύλαι (gates), ποταμοί

(rivers) and οὖρα (boundaries) predominate), and highly specific, neutral distances from

place to place. He offers his traveller practical information ("the road is safe," "there is

a guard station at this point") but avoids Aristagoras' deceptive, decorative emphasis.

Furthermore, Herodotus' reliance on number to mark out the distances of the journey,

which is based on a series of measurements and mathematical equations, from

parasangs to furlongs to days (Hdt. 5.53.1) undoes the synchronic impression of

Aristagoras' description. The only other place where the *Histories* gets this

mathematical is during Solon's calculation of the number of days in a man's life at

1.32.2–4. In both passages, measurement through time acts as the key with which to

unlock the dazzling, instantaneous effect of Croesus and Aristagoras' marvellous

displays, and the counting up of days or parasangs acts as a 'true' scale to counter the false one presented by maps or pictures. In this way, the effect of space evolving through time replaces the 'snapshot' model of the map or a glimpse at the treasure house with the model of the film; a visual medium which – whether in the form of biography (Solon's vision of human life) or travelogue (Herodotus' description of the route to Susa) – can only be understood as a progressively unfolding sequence.

Cartographical vs. 'Hodological' Narrative.

Instead of providing the 'objective' perspective of the map, Herodotus describes the road to Susa in terms of what Pietro Janni has labelled 'spazio odologico'[93] That is, his understanding of space follows a trajectory from point A to point B, following the traveller's experience and perspective rather than that of an objective, overseeing eye. The 'hodological' narrative thereby only proceeds in one direction (forward) and usually presents the space it traverses as a series of places and landmarks en route. In contrast to Aristagoras' journey through cartographical space, Herodotus' hodological narrative does not necessarily proceed as the crow flies. Rather, he structures his route according to both the topography and architecture of the terrain which the King's road passes through. As Janni observes, it is only in the hodological model of space that the

[93] Janni 1984, part II. He attributes the term to the psychologist Kurt Lewin (see p.84).While I cannot agree with Janni's argument, in Part I of *La Mappa e il Periplo*, that the map barely existed at all in the Classical period (see also Janni 1999), I have found his concept of hodological space to be extremely useful in formulating my own thesis. See also de Certeau's distinction between 'tours' and 'maps,' (1984, 119–120) in which he observes (thus corroborating the general thrust of Janni's argument) that humans tend to think in terms of routes, not maps, or at least those who live in New York apartments do, with 97% of those who were asked to describe their homes doing so in the (hodological) style of a tour ("you enter the hallway...") as opposed to a (cartographical) tableau ("there are three rooms adjacent to one another," etc.) For an application of Janni's theory to Apollonius' geography, see Meyer 2001.

time taken to cross from point A to B can be measured, since a cartographical layout of space does not necessarily indicate delaying factors such as mountains, fortresses, or the fordability of rivers. As we have already seen, the map, on the other hand, virtually erases the passage of time by the unbroken contiguity of all its points, as well as by the single instant within which the surveyor's glance crosses from any given place to another.

What is perhaps best illustrated by Janni's model, however, is the difference in visual range between cartographical and hodological space. The layout of hodological space, because it can only look forward and because its vision is limited to only that which can be seen by the naked eye from a particular point along the route, is disorienting and fragmented. Janni compares it to inhabiting a large house and never knowing how close the armchair is to the bed until the wall between the living room and the bedroom is knocked down or a new door is opened (86). Alternatively, he suggests that a hodological conception of space explains the possibility for a 'secret room' within the palace or castle (1984, 86). The secret chamber in the Gothic novel, for example, which is only accessible by a journey through long, dark passage-ways, and which is hidden away as a surprise for both reader and protagonist, cannot be represented on a map precisely because it takes time, and intrigue, to find.

The unexpected, indirect discovery of the concealed chamber within the Gothic novel corresponds, in narratological terms, to both the fourth definition of 'plot' outlined by Peter Brooks ("a secret plan or scheme," 1984, 12) and Aristotle's hidden finishing posts at *Rhetoric* 3.9 (see above, p.78–9). In this case, the revelation of the

secret room completes the structure of the narrative, by revealing at the very end the full

layout of the castle, including the secret passages between walls and chambers beneath

floorboards.[94] The experience of reading, therefore, is something like filling in a

narratological blueprint upon which the architecture of the text gradually emerges. The

cartographical layout of Aristagoras' narrative, on the other hand, could not be more

different. Before he has even begun his journey, the reader/protagonist is provided with

a explicit plan of the entire space he is about to traverse, including the revelation of the

king's hidden gold (a space which is usually not brought to light until the dénouement).

What Aristagoras presents to Cleomenes, in other words, is a text of exact and instant

legibility.

Following Janni's binary, we can plot the topography of narrative on a trajectory

which runs from the complex plot-turns and fantastic architecture of the laborious

Gothic novel to the instantaneous clarity and simplicity of Aristagoras' map.

Herodotus' description of the labyrinth at Moeris is perhaps the closest model that the

Histories provide for a movement through hodological space. For the labyrinth is a

structure which severely restricts the orientation and view of the internal 'maze-treader'

(Doob 1990, 1) and which, although consisting of an elaborate overall pattern in the

---

[94] See also Foucault's analysis of the Gothic novel in relation to Bentham's project of total exposure in designing the Panopticon (1980b, 154): "The landscapes of Ann Radcliffe's novels are composed of mountains and forests, caves, ruined castles and terrifyingly dark and silent convents. Now these imaginary spaces are like the negative of the transparency and visibility which it is aimed to establish."

architect's or map-maker's eye (2.148.4), can be experienced only as a paratactic,

meandering path by the one who travels through it (Hdt. 2.148.6):[95]

> αἵ τε γὰρ διέξοδοι διὰ τῶν στεγέων καὶ οἱ ἑλιγμοὶ διὰ τῶν αὐλέων ἐόντες ποικιλώτατοι θῶμα μυρίον παρείχοντο ἐξ αὐλῆς τε ἐς τὰ οἰκήματα διεξιοῦσι καὶ ἐκ τῶν οἰκημάτων ἐς παστάδας. ἐς στέγας τε ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν παστάδων καὶ ἐς αὐλὰς ἄλλας ἐκ τῶν οἰκημάτων.

> The complex exits through the chambers and the twisting turns through the halls are an unending marvel, and they proceed out from the hall into the living quarters and from the living quarters into the porches, and into other chambers from the porches and into other halls from the living quarters.

The maze has such an endless variation of routes that it exhausts all the

possibilities of narrative. For Herodotus, it is simply beyond words (Hdt. 1.148.1:

"λόγου μέζω"), while for Hecataeus, who also describes the Egyptian labyrinth, it is

the prelude to "many other things which would take too long to write."[96] In this sense,

the voyager's journey through the space of the labyrinth is paradigmatic of an

unselected or plot-less narrative.[97] In Herodotus, therefore, the labyrinth and the map

both exist as complete, closed systems upon which space can be marked out, but neither

of which give the traveller any indication of a specific route to follow. His own prose,

however, moves beyond these static, self-enclosed models to offer a hodological

---

[95] See Doob, 1990, 1: "[The maze] may be perceived as a path (a linear but circuitous passage to a goal) or as a pattern (a complete symmetrical design)." The mythical character who best captures both these forms of viewing is perhaps Daedalus, architect of both the interior, hodological space of the labyrinth and of the wings which (if all too briefly) offer Icarus and himself an aerial view of the world (cf. Morris 1992). For an essay on Daedalus' 'aerial perspective,' which I read as a counterpart to Janni's description of hodological space, see Jacob 1984. On Jaeger's use of the labyrinth as a guiding metaphor to describe Livy's narrative style, see Jaeger 1999, and more generally on the use of spatial patterns in Livy's narrative, Jaeger 1997.

[96] *Fr. Gr. Hist.* 3A, 264, F25, 89.4: "παραπλήσια δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγουσιν [(ὑπὲρ ὧν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον μακρὸν ἂν εἴη γράφειν." See also Hecataeus' comments on the labyrinth at *Fr. Gr. Hist.* 264, F25, 61.2ff & 97.5.

[97] On which, see also Paul Carter's description of Australian explorers' "plot-less" journals (1990).

narrative whose sequence through both time and space is presented as a more accurate alternative to Aristagoras' deceptively obscure map.

The Map and the Written Word

The map, like so many other visual objects in the *Histories*, is presented as a dangerously illusive index to truth. As with the ekphrasis which shows more than can possibly be depicted in reality, the image's powers of representation are so strong that they end up taking over and distorting the object of representation itself. But as the ekphrasis looks outward to the world it describes, it also, characteristically, looks inward to the text which contains it. In Becker's words, the ekphrasis is a *mise en abîme*,[98] rather like a mirror reflecting back on the poetics and craftsmanship of the larger work. The connections between Aristagoras' map and the written word are unmistakable – most obviously, the map is inscribed upon a *pinax*, or writing tablet. Just after the Spartan episode, when Aristagoras has left for Athens, Herodotus juxtaposes the map's journey from Ionia to Greece with that of the alphabet, which, having arrived in Ionia, travelled to Greece by the same route as Aristagoras' map (5.58).[99]

---

[98] "A miniature replica of a text embedded within that text; a textual part reduplicating, reflecting, or mirroring (one or more than one aspect of) the textual whole" (Graff, *A Dictionary of Mythology*, 53) cited in Becker, 1985, 5. Many readers of the *Iliad* have noted that the shield stands in many ways as a model or replica of the poem, either as a whole or in part. See e.g. Hubbard 1992, 17; Taplin 1998; Schadewaldt 1965.

[99] See Steiner 1994, 147–50, for the connection between cartography and writing.

Later on in the *Histories*, a second tablet arrives at the court of Cleomenes, this time a wooden *deltion* with a written message hidden beneath a layer of wax (Hdt. 7.239.2–4). Once again, it is only Gorgo who understands how to 'read' the tablet, this time by guessing, and revealing, the secret message underneath. The two tablets work in interesting parallel – one deceptively uncovers space, the other hides it – resulting in Gorgo's closing and opening of that space respectively. Just as Deioces used writing and closed spaces as the tools for his successful governance of the Medes, Herodotus – like Gorgo – suggests that, although the written word is less instantaneous and harder to immediately uncover than pictures, and even though writing can, for these very reasons, be used for deceptive ends,[100] it nevertheless brings us closer to the truth than pictures.

4. Cartography in Classical Athens

The same ambiguous relationship of maps and words to the representation of truth and illusion can be found in the limited number of other references to maps in texts from or about the fifth century. Our only other description of cartography from the Classical period is in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where one of Socrates' students produces a map from a variety of other scientific paraphernalia to show the simple Athenian, Strepsiades (*Clouds*, 206–217):

Μα. αὕτη δέ σοι γῆς περίοδος πάσης. ὁρᾷς; αἵδε μέν Ἀθῆναι.
Στ. τί σὺ λέγεις; οὐ πείθομαι. ἐπεὶ δικαστὰς οὐχ ὁρῶ καθημένους.
Μα. ὡς τοῦτ' ἀληθῶς Ἀττικὸν τὸ χωρίον.
Στ. καὶ ποῦ Κικυννῆς εἰσιν οὑμοὶ δημόται;
Μα. ἐνταῦθ' ἔνεισιν. ἡ δέ γ' Εὔβοι'. ὡς ὁρᾷς. ἡδὶ παρατέταται μακρὰ πόρρω πάνυ.
Στ. οἶδ'· ὑπὸ γὰρ ἡμῶν παρετάθη καὶ Περικλέους. ἀλλ' ἡ Λακεδαίμων ποῦ 'σθ';

---

[100] Steiner, 1984.

Μα. ὅπου 'στίν; αὐτηί.
Στ. ὡς ἐγγὺς ἡμῶν. τοῦτο πάνυ φροντίζετε. ταύτην ἀφ' ἡμῶν ἀπαγαγεῖν πόρρω
πάνυ.
Μα. ἀλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε.
Στ. νὴ Δί' οἰμώξεσθ' ἄρα. [101]

The remaining two examples are set in the Classical period, although they are written

over five centuries later,

Plutarch *Nicias* 12.1-2:

> ὁ δ' οὖν Νικίας. τῶν Αἰγεστέων πρέσβεων καὶ Λεοντίνων παραγενομένων καὶ πειθόντων
> τοὺς Ἀθηναίους στρατεύειν ἐπὶ Σικελίαν. ἀνθιστάμενος ἡττᾶτο τῆς βουλῆς Ἀλκιβιάδου
> καὶ φιλοτιμίας. πρὶν ὅλως ἐκκλησίαν γενέσθαι. κατασχόντος ἤδη πλῆθος ἐλπίσι καὶ
> λόγοις προδιεφθαρμένον. ὥστε καὶ νέους ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ γέροντας ἐν ἐργαστηρίοις
> καὶ ἡμικυκλίοις συγκαθεζομένους ὑπογράφειν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς Σικελίας. καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῆς
> περὶ αὐτὴν θαλάσσης. καὶ λιμένας καὶ τόπους οἷς τέτραπται πρὸς Λιβύην ἡ νῆσος. [102]

Aelian, *Varia Historia* 3.28:

> Ὁρῶν ὁ Σωκράτης τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην τετυφωμένον ἐπὶ τῷ πλούτῳ καὶ μέγα φρονοῦντα
> ἐπὶ τῇ περιουσίᾳ καὶ ἔτι πλέον ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀγροῖς. ἤγαγεν αὐτὸν ἔς τινα τῆς πόλεως
> τόπον ἔνθα ἀνέκειτο πινάκιον ἔχον γῆς περίοδον. καὶ προσέταξε τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ τὴν
> Ἀττικὴν ἐνταῦθ' ἀναζητεῖν. ὡς δ' εὗρε. προσέταξεν αὐτῷ τοὺς ἀγροὺς τοὺς ἰδίους
> διαθρῆσαι. τοῦ δὲ εἰπόντος "ἀλλ' οὐδαμοῦ γεγραμμένοι εἰσίν ἐπὶ τούτοις οὖν" εἶπε
> "μέγα φρονεῖς. οἵπερ οὐδὲν μέρος τῆς γῆς εἰσιν." [103]

---

[101] Student. This is a map of the world. Do you see? Here's Athens.
Streps   What are you saying? I don't believe you, since I don't see any jurors sitting at their benches.
Student. No really, this land is Attica.
Streps. Well then, where are my fellow demesmen from Cicynna?
Student. They're here. And this is Euboia, as you can see. This area, laid out a long way across the mainland
Streps. That's for sure, since we laid it out with Pericles. But where's Sparta?
Student. Where is it? Right here.
Streps. But it's so close to us. You'd better rethink that one, and move it further away.
Student. But that's not possible.
Streps. You'll be sorry if you don't!

[102] Nicias, when the ambassadors from Egesta and Leontini arrived and persuaded the Athenians to attack Sicily, opposed the motion. He was defeated, however, by Alcibiades' plans and ambition. Before the assembly had even met, he had already got a hold of the masses and corrupted them with his words and promises, with the result that both the youth in the wrestling schools and the old men in the workshops and at the theatre were sitting together and drawing the outline of Sicily, the shape of the sea around it and its harbours and the places in which the island is turned towards Libya.

[103] Socrates, seeing Alcibiades all puffed up on account of his wealth and thinking himself special on account of his property and particularly his land, led him to a certain place in the city where a *pinax* was set up showing a map of the earth, and he told Alcibiades to find Attica on it. When he had found it, he told him to point out his own land. But Alcibiades said, "but they are not marked anywhere" to which Socrates replied, "Are you so proud, then, of that land which is not even a fraction of the earth?"

It is striking how each of these three texts associates the map with Socrates and /or Alcibiades,[104] both characters who, in their different ways, problematized the notion of truth in late fifth century Athens. For Socrates, particularly in Aelian, the map is an objective index of truth against which all other realities should be measured. The image itself, because it represents scale, undoes the existence of what Alcibiades had previously seen in 'real space.' Socrates therefore uses the map to teach the opposite lesson to Aristagoras, by insisting that his spectator read according to scale. In this sense we might call his use of the map (like Herodotus' 'prose map' at 5.52–3) truthful and straightforward, entailing a direct correspondence between the representation and its object. But it is precisely the *lack* of correspondence between Alcibiades' world (as it exists in Attica) and its representation (as it exists on the map) which calls that equation into question. Strepsiades' inability to understand the map's representation of space speaks to exactly this problem. What he actually expects, and does not get, is for the map to serve as the same ekphrastic window which Aristagoras tried at and failed; Strepsiades expects to be able to look 'into' the picture of Athens and see jurymen sitting at their benches.

Strepsiades' comments about the map also speak to deeper anxieties which might be transferred to the *Histories'* imperialist narrative. His desire to change the map's shape by moving Sparta is, cartographically speaking, not as impossible as the

---

[104] It is of course possible that Aristophanes *Clouds* influenced the Aelian text, although the connection with Alcibiades is presumably independent.

student implies. The map itself is a mini version of the world with no fixed place, easily portable from country to country, as Aristagoras showed. Not only does its physical presence prove the portability of nation space and the ease with which countries can be carried across borders, but the artist's organisation of that space on the map is also necessarily subjective.[105] Just as the map of the British Empire increased its own size and moved other countries 'further away' by its use of colour and perspective, so too does Aristagoras cleverly minimize the borders on his map and shrink the distances between places.

Furthermore, the possession of a map is an important step in the process towards the possession of the land which the map depicts (which is why Scythia cannot be captured). Aristagoras' map is a concrete representation of the power Cleomenes might hold. Once a nation's land has been charted and put under surveillance, it has effectively been laid open to attack. The young and old men who draw maps of Sicily are engaging in just such a politics of imperialism. Yet Plutarch represents the Athenians themselves as duped by the maps they draw – not only was the Sicilian expedition a disaster, but the maps themselves are the products of Alcibiades' corrupting influence. The map, instrument of illusion, politics and rhetoric, has replaced the youth's noble, aristocratic exercise in the *palaestra* and the old men's productive work in the *ergasterion*. For both Plutarch and Aristophanes, cartography fits squarely into the category of the dangerous and the new in fifth-century thought.

---

[105] Geography scholarship since the late 80's has paid particular attention to the power and deception embedded within the seemingly objective map. See Harley 1988a, 1988b, 1989; Monmonier 1991.

Benedict Anderson introduces the map as a similar 'new technology' within the context of 19th/20th century Siam, which (as with Aristagoras' joint production of both a map and written treatise about the earth in sixth century Greece) coincided with the mass printing and distribution of geography textbooks.[106] His analysis shows how, as the mapped shape, or logo, of a country becomes engrained on a nation's consciousness, that country becomes infinitely reproducible, and even detachable from its geographic context. In much the same way, every time the shape of Sicily is scratched in the sand at the *palaestra*, the island is separated from its location and depersonalized. In other words, Sicily ceases to be Sicily but instead becomes a formal, stylized representation of itself.

Anderson is only one of the many scholars who have effectively illustrated the "alignment of map and power" (1983, 173). In Nicolet's words "the map is a monumental display in which decorative effect is combined with ideological meaning [stressing] the will to know, conquer, exploit, convert" (1991, 6). I do not think that this role can be denied, especially in the current climate of post-colonialist thought, and it is emphatically present in the package which Aristagoras offers Cleomenes. Indeed, although the map disappears from the *Histories* after book 5, Xerxes' invasion of Greece, which is nothing more than a bid to place the world, spatially, under his control, stands as the final intervention of cartography into the narrative. Xerxes' project, as he sees it, is to redraw the map of the world by eliminating all of its borders; by transforming Persia into a space which is so all-encompassing that it even verges upon a

---

[106] Anderson 1983, 170–8.

representation of the cosmos (Hdt. 8C,1–2):

γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῷ Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν. οὐ γὰρ δὴ χώρην γε
οὐδεμίαν κατόψεται ἥλιος ὅμουρον ἐοῦσαν τῇ ἡμετέρῃ. ἀλλὰ σφέας πάσας ἐγὼ ἅμα ὑμῖν
χώρην θήσω

I will make it so that the Persian land borders only upon the aether of Zeus. For the sun will look
upon no country bordering upon ours, but I will set them all into one land for you..

As Steiner has pointed out, Xerxes' "reshapes" the landscape that he moves

through during his expedition "treating the ground like a geometric surface or fabricated

object whose areas and dimensions may be redrawn at the ruler's will" (1994, 146). Not

only does Xerxes' army (who, by their size, themselves represent a giant nation on the

move) dig through mountains and redirect rivers, but his army actually drinks several

rivers dry (Hdt. 7.43; 127; 196), thereby erasing and redrawing the landscape's

topographical markers.

It is not so much the movement of the Persian army through 'history' (with

which books 7–9 have been explicitly identified),[107] therefore, but rather through

geography, which I have set out to emphasize in demonstrating cartography's role as a

framing device for Herodotus' account of the Persian wars. For the map serves both as a

catalyst of the original invasion for which Darius unremittingly planned revenge, and as

a *tabula rasa* of the world which Xerxes intends to re-inscribe. Finally, as I hope to

have shown throughout this chapter, the map's ability to represent space within a

synchronic and synoptic moment is both a desirable and problematic sticking point for

---

[107] See above, n.17.

Herodotus' overall project in the *Histories*, which, at a fundamental level, attempts to fit

a similarly expansive range of time and space into the form of a prose narrative.

Conclusion

From Visual to Verbal: Map, Muse and Aleph

Perhaps we can imagine Herodotus faced with a dilemma similar to Borges' at the

moment when he discovers the limitless, simultaneous space of the 'Aleph' beneath a

flight of cellar steps in Buenos Aires (J.L Borges, "The Aleph," from *Collected*

Fictions 1998, 283):

> It was then that I saw the Aleph. I come now to the ineffable center of my tale; it is here that a
> writer's hopelessness begins....In that unbounded moment, I saw millions of delightful and
> horrible acts; none amazed me so much as the fact that all occupied the same point, without
> superposition and without transparency. What my eyes saw was *simultaneous;* what I shall write
> is *successive*, because language is successive. Something of it, though, I will capture.[108]

Although Borges laments the failure of language to contain the simultaneous and visual,

it is nevertheless within the written word itself that his vision is hidden. The author

finds his expansive, all encompassing, impossible space within the first letter of the

Hebrew alphabet. Borges' audacious attempt to write the amazing brings the dialogue

between verbal and visual description full circle from the θαῦμα πραγμά which

Anaximander originally dared to depict and the ἔργα θωμαστά which Herodotus first

set out to write.

But Borges' confusion in the face of the unutterable panorama of time and space

has a well-established precedent. For it was Homer, in his introduction to the

---

[108] I have borrowed the use of Borges' *Aleph* as a metaphor for spatial narrative from Soja 1989, 2.

'Catalogue of the Ships,' who first expressed a similar incapacity to verbalize the full

extent of history and to narrate the supernatural vision of the Muses (*Il.* 2.488–491):

πληθὺν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἐγὼ μυθήσομαι οὐδ' ὀνομήνω.
οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλῶσσαι. δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν.
φωνὴ δ' ἄρρηκτος. χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνείη.

I could not tell nor name the vast number [of the host of the Danaans],
Not even if I had ten tongues and ten mouths to house them,
an unbreakable voice, a heart of bronze.

Andrew Ford has discussed precisely this 'crisis of selection' for the Homeric voice,

which must present only a partial representation of reality in the interests of narrative

unity, but which – at the same time – is forced to sacrifice the totality of the Muses'

unlimited gaze in its representation of the past (1992, 57–89). So too has Hayden White

made similar claims for the narrativization of history, situating it at the crux between

our desire for a completeness, stressing "the extent to which narrative strains to produce

the effect of having filled in the gaps" (1980, 15), and the necessity of achieving that

completeness only through a process of selection ("For in fact every narrative, however

seemingly "full," is constructed on the basis of a set of events which *might have been*

included but were left out;" [italics his], 1980, 14).

As I have discussed in chapter one, Hesiod was faced with a similar paradox

when the Muses bid him to translate their own synchronic vision of past, present and

future into the verbal narrative of the *Theogony* (*Th.*32–3). Later, Augustine was to

confront the same problem, this time with God, whose eternal, unchanging vision

(Logos) the narrator strives to divorce from the sequence which words inevitably fall

into (*Confessions* 11.1, 9, 41).[109] As Ford has shown for Homer, the representation of

the past is a form of translation from the visual (the Muses who see/know (*$\varepsilon i\delta\omega$) all

things in a simultaneous instant) to the verbal (the successive, selective narrative of

Homeric verse) (Ford 1992, 75):

> There is a gap between the multifariousness of experience and an account of it in speech; and this gap is repeatedly portrayed by Homer as a gap between the powers of sight and speech. The truest account of experience would replicate all one has taken in. But the problem arises because sight includes its objects in a comprehensive sweep, whereas speech is basically a catalogue (*kata-legein*), a naming that articulates each element of what is seen. Sight can represent a complex reality to the mind at once, whereas to tell things requires a sequence, which takes time.

This brings us back to Herodotus, who may be said to desire to emulate the

map's all-encompassing, visual totality in his description of the *Histories'* world. But

the map itself, because it is *un*selected and 'complete,' is both an impossibility within

the terms of historical narrative (and therefore illusory) but also, and perhaps more

importantly, a destructive force upon narrative itself. Carlos Argentino Daneri, who

reveals the Aleph to Borges in his story, is not by accident also a bad poet; a writer of

an overly-ambitious and tedious work entitled *The Earth*, no doubt inspired by his

unmediated (and unedited) access to the vision at the bottom of his cellar steps ("Daneri

had in mind to set to verse the entire face of the planet, and, by 1941, had already

displaced a number of acres of the State of Queensland, nearly a mile of the course run

by the River Ob, a gasworks to the north of Veracruz.. [etc.]," Borges 1970, 7). Ford, on

the other hand, describes this destructive power as a threat of paralysis, which has the

---

[109] For an analysis of the interplay between time and narrative in Book 11 of the *Confessions*, especially with reference to the time taken to speak a hymn aloud (*Conf.* 28.38), see Ricoeur 1984, 5–30. Note the central problem for Augustine is once again the inability to fit time into a human system of measurement.

potential to turn Homer's heart to bronze (*Il.* 2.491) or lock Odysseus indefinitely into the sweetness of the Sirens' all-knowing song. Like the paralysing *thauma* of ekphrasis which I discussed above, then, the Muses' infinite, all-encompassing vision brings narrative flow, and ultimately time itself, to a standstill.

If, following Borges, we read Aristagoras' failed map as an exercise in story-telling, we might then see it as a metaphor for the impossibility of ever escaping the axis of successive, linear time. But, at the same time, the map is an important order of representation for Herodotus, not only when the narrative moves through cartographic, as opposed to historical, space, or itself offers geographical description, but also through the recurrent emphasis on seen and unseen space and visual display in the *Histories*. Unlike Anaximander and Hecataeus, whose maps stand opposite their texts, Herodotus' visual map insists on being written into the body of his work. In doing so, Herodotus appears to be rejecting the visual language of both prose and poetry (map and ekphrasis), as he instantaneously rescues and rewrites them into his own model of history.

In arguing, throughout this chapter, that cartography in some way replaced the role of the Muse in Greek prose, I have attempted to show how Herodotus articulates his own poetics through the twin legacy of map and book which he inherited from the geographical tradition that preceded him. But there is one final perspective in the *Histories* that I have not yet accounted for, and that is the all-encompassing visual range of the Pythia. For, upon being questioned by Croesus' messengers as to his secret machinations within the closed, interior space of his kitchen, Herodotus' Pythia is

instantly able to cross the distance between Lydia and Delphi, with the result that she

not only sees, but even smells, Croesus' gastronomic concoction as if he were in the

very next room. The priestess makes clear that number (*arithmos*) and distance (*metra*),

the mechanisms by which humans measure and record their world, are no obstacles to

her supernatural vision (Hdt. 1.47.2–3):

> οἶδα δ' ἐγω ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης.
> καὶ κωφοῦ συνίημι. καὶ οὐ φωνεῦντος ἀκούω.
> ὀδμή μ' ἐς φρένας ἦλθε κραταιρίνοιο χελώνης
> ἑψομένης ἐν χαλκῷ ἅμ' ἀρνείοισι κρέεσσιν.
> ᾗ χαλκὸς μὲν ὑπέστρωται. χαλκὸν δ' ἐπίεσται.

> I know the number of the sand's grains and the measurement of the seas
> I understand the dumb man and can hear the mute.
> A smell enters my sense of a hard shelled tortoise,
> boiling in a bonze pan with the meat of a lamb,
> Encased by bonze on the top and the bottom.

Instead, like the map-reader, she can not only perceive the world in a single

instant, but also travel from one part of it to another in the blink of an eye. With her

own instantaneous vision across time and space, the Pythia renders trivial Croesus'

ambitious attempt to synchronize time, for Herodotus tells us that – in setting up his

experiment – Croesus had carefully counted out the number of days till each messenger

should, simultaneously, pose their identical questions.[110] Somewhat uniquely for an

oracle, Croesus challenges the Pythia's vision not over the future or the past, but over

now, the all-encompassing present. But – as he learns too late – to try and live, or write

history, according to these rules is beyond the capabilities of human perspective or

language.

---

[110] Hdt. 1.47.1; 1.48.2. I wish to thank Sarah Morris for this observation.

In the gap that remains between the Pythia and Aristagoras' map, on the one hand, the Herodotean attempt to recount the world, and time, on the other, I hope to have isolated a tension between the failure of cartography in the *Histories* and the possibilities for spatial representation which that failure suggests. For Herodotus, who must negotiate a similar tension in his own work between sequential, historical narrative and ethnographic descriptions of place, and who must somehow find a way of incorporating into the *Histories* the visual aspect of cartography upon which early prose texts were founded, the analogy of map with ekphrasis is allied to a serious attempt, in narrative terms, to grasp the world in its entirety.

Introduction to PART II: Lost in Space

Every culture, no matter how good its surveillance systems or how exact its science, will always contain places in which it is possible to become lost. In this section, I argue that the profound sense of dislocation that both Homer's *Odyssey* and Xenophon's *Anabasis* enter into when their protagonists lose sight of the sea speaks to an underlying Greek perception that the world is shaped, and made coherent, by its relation to the coast. I begin by investigating Odysseus' journey inland with the oar, to a people whose conceptual image of the world creates a radical disruption of scales within the frame of Homeric poetry. As the *Odyssey* veers, at its very end, towards a whole new discourse on what it means to be 'lost in space' it also, I suggest, moves beyond the realm of epic and towards a narrative system whose co-ordinates elude the traditional measuring devices (such as the hexameter and the distance between Troy and Greece) through which the Homeric world is viewed. I then go on to argue that in the 'realistic' and prosaic narrative of Xenophon's *Anabasis,* the mythic structures of the *Odyssey* carry over into Xenophon's own perception, and construction of, a lost and trackless interior which extends indefinitely from the secure perimeters of the sea, and which similarly confounds the author/navigator's sense of both direction and measurement.

In both authors, I show how the adjustment of focus between these two ways of viewing is accentuated and thematized to such a degree that it causes a breakdown within the structure of the narrative itself. In each text I detail how the terms of geography and spatial perception are dramatically recast to expose spaces that had

previously been lost or hidden within the topography of a particular genre or tradition. In uncovering those spaces, both authors force their audiences to readjust their focus, and in so doing, draw their attention to the inevitable gaps which accrue in human vision, in the attempt to write history, and, finally, in the attempt to map the world down to the last detail of space and time.

CHAPTER 3

Beyond Epic Geography:
The Journey Inland in Homer's *Odyssey*

In the last chapter, I considered how the map functioned as an instrument of total

visibility, allowing its reader to look down upon an area of space and see its coherent

logic: to read it as a 'complete' text from a god-like vantage point. Similarly, in chapter

1, I investigated the tension between an immortal, and therefore synoptic, vision of the

world, in which all time is caught in the eternal present of Zeus' rule, and the ordering

of time-bound narrative sequence within that vision. In each text, therefore, I have

sought to identify two different vantage points from which topography can be

understood – the instantaneous, encyclopedic position of being above, and the

sequential, fragmented perspective of being within – and to show how the author, as he

calls upon the Muse, the Delphic oracle, or the map to globalize his own incomplete and

earth-bound perspective, constructs a coherent narrative by moving back and forth

between these two positions.

In architecture theory, Bernard Tschumi has described these two perspectives as

the "The Architectural Paradox," explaining that architecture, because it is both

conceptual and perceptual, can be imagined in terms of two opposite models: the

Pyramid, in which one looks down on space from above, and the Labyrinth, in which

one is placed within space, at ground level, as it were.[1] Tschumi's experience of

architecture, as one critic has described it, "is wedged in the gap between [these] two

architectural surfaces."[2] As I have been arguing throughout this dissertation, the same

structure applies to the spatial experience of Greek narrative. In the last chapter, I

explored how Pietro Janni's "spazio odologico" articulated an ancient perspective of

space which had much in common with the experience of walking through a maze,

while his "spazio cartografico," like Tschumi's Pyramid, presented space from an

empirical, totalizing vantage point.[3] Both of these critics have sought to reveal the

mechanics of how space is 'read,'[4] showing how the architect, cartographer, or traveller

envision topography as a kind of narrative whose story may be told from varying points

of view.

But perhaps the most effective model for my purpose is Michel de Certeau's

use of the elevator in the World Trade Center as a mechanism by which to move along

the trajectory of those two perspectives.[5] From the vantage point of the elevator, the

viewer is transformed from the position of Daedalus, lost "in mobile and endless

labyrinths far below," to that of Icarus, before whose panoptic gaze the world is spread

out like a text. The technological advancements of elevator and architecture, therefore,

"allows one to read [the city], to be a solar Eye, looking down like a god," indulging in

---

[1] Tschumi 1994.

[2] Hays 1998, 216.

[3] Janni 1984. See above, ch.2, pp.117–121.

[4] Cf. Tschumi 1994, 31.

[5] de Certeau 1984, 91–110. (The following section was written before the events of 9/11/01).

the spectator's "lust to be a viewpoint and nothing more." From this exalted position, which the author compares to that of a Medieval map-maker, the viewer surveys those who live 'down below,' on the streets of the city, "whose bodies follow the thicks and thins of an urban 'text' they write without being able to read it." These city-dwellers, like those who walk through a labyrinth, de Courteau calls 'blind' to the manifold stories which they weave. Living "below the threshold of visibility," they inhabit their own unknown or "other" spaces, which are invisible to the "celestial eye" of both cartographer and tourist. As de Certeau sees it, therefore, two types of narrative co-exist in the city at once, and both, in their own ways, offer only limited perspectives. While the city-dwellers are "blind" and unable to "read" or "recognize" the rhetoric of the paths which they trace, those who look down from an elevated perspective see "[nothing] more than a representation, an optical artefact." Participating in a "fiction of knowledge," in which "the panorama-city is a 'theoretical' (that is, visual) simulacrum, in short a picture," the roof-top spectator is shown to be equally blind to the fragmented and mobile narratives which run, undetected, below the surface of her technological and god-like gaze.

These invisible or lost spaces may therefore be said to offer any number of counter-narratives to the unifying, encyclopedic narratives of place provided by cartography, technology, or the all-seeing eye of the immortals. As Greek literature moves away from the domain of the Muses, moreover, and towards the more sequential,

or hodological, movement of prose,[6] it increasingly turns to these narratives of lost

space in an attempt to bring the earth's topography into what I have been calling

'human' (and therefore necessarily incomplete) focus. As the Greeks' understanding of

the world around them changed over the course of the Archaic and Classical periods,

particularly in response to the increasing practices of exploration, colonization, and

trade (all of which was taking place in faster, better equipped ships), their geographical

horizons both expanded *and* decreased, as they were forced to bring their image of the

world into a larger (and hence more limited) scale.[7]

In addition, the representation of space in Greek thought shifted not only

according to empirical observations in the field of geography, but also in relation to the

changes within the form of narrative itself, which – as it moved from epic poetry into

the fields of scientific treatise, historiography, philosophical text, and beyond – placed

more emphasis upon the internal subject-position of the narrator-within-space and less

upon an external and omniscient authorial voice. At the same time, the meandering,

paratactic flow of the prose sentence upon the blank, concrete space of *pinax* or papyrus

roll began to mirror the progress of a traveller across the surface of a landscape.[8]

---

[6] As I have argued in chapter 2, above.

[7] On which, see Morris 2000, 257–59; Dougherty 2001, 5; Malkin 1998; Purcell 1990.

[8] Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.9 (and ch.2, above, pp.78–79)

Since I have examined the global picture of the world forwarded by epic Muse, Olympian blacksmith, Ionian map-maker, Delphic oracle, and Persian imperialist,[9] I intend now to retrace my steps back to Homer, and investigate how the world looked from the perspective of those invisible or lost spaces which de Certeau identifies as a kind of blind spot within the gaze of god or roof-top spectator. In so doing, I will reveal how these lost spaces exist as counter-narratives beneath the surface of the more totalizing and comprehensive geographies which frame them. I have already touched upon this concept in both of my previous chapters. In chapter 1, I demonstrated that Hesiod's Tartaros operated as a hidden, alternative *topos* within which the complexities of the *Theogony*'s narrative time were contained, and, in chapter 2, my analysis of Scythia in Herodotus emphasized its role as a 'lost' and unmappable space within the larger geography of the *Histories*. In both of these cases, I revealed how the concept of a lost space functioned, narratologically, as an important compensatory or balancing device within the plot's larger global picture.

The 'Edges of the Earth' Theory

The current tendency in modern scholarship, articulated most effectively by James Romm in his *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought*, is to interpret the Greek's conception of their world predominantly from the exterior, synoptic view-point of its 'edges.' Romm argues that the edges of the earth-encircling Ocean form a boundary

---

[9] All of whom construct the world as a discrete and perceptible entity, whose scale may be sufficiently shrunk for it to fit into (imaginative) visual range.

which not only provides a stability and context for the earth as a whole but also exists

as the site within which the fictional and imaginary are located (author's blurb, 1992):

> For the Greeks and Romans the earth's farthest perimeter was a realm radically different from
> what they perceived as central and human. The alien qualities of these "edges of the earth"
> became the basis of a literary tradition that endured through antiquity and into the Renaissance,
> despite the growing challenges of emerging scientific perspectives.

While it should not be denied that the edges of the earth *were* a repository for the

imaginary and mythical in the Greek imagination, and that Romm has illustrated this

better than any other scholar in the field, the success of his book has paradoxically had

both a positive and negative effect upon our understanding of the Greeks' imaginative

geography. For, in order to make the earth's edges 'alien' and extraordinary, Romm

makes its centre 'human' and ordinary, thereby paying scant attention to the Greeks'

perception of interior space as a *topos* in its own right. My intention is to argue not only

that the space of the interior is ultimately more unsettling to the Greek imagination than

the space around the edges, but also that to travel inland is to travel off the map, along a

plot which is no longer defined by contours that clearly mark the world's horizons. In

ancient cartography, as on the epic shields, those horizons were emphatically carved

into the shape of the *pinax* or shield by a compass or lathe, or welded with thick bands

of metal, with the result that they provided a framework within which the earth as a

whole might be conceived.[10] Such strong boundary lines also provided a clear structure

for Greek narrative, since they outlined, upon an explicit topographical grid, a

---

[10] The shields of Heracles and Achilles are both encircled by deep layers of metal, representing the river Ocean. For the ancient technique of drawing maps with compass or lathe, see Kahn 1981, 83–4. See also Hdt. 4.36 (and my discussion in ch.2, above); Pl. *Crit.* 113d (and my discussion in ch.5, below, p.240). Note also the term *perimetron* (or outline) used by Diogenes Laertius to describe Anaximander's map at DK 12 A1(2).

geometrical system whose edges, like the beginning and ending of a story, provided cohesion and closure.

Furthermore, since travel literature's beginnings in the *periplus*, and since the advent of Greek colonization in the early Archaic period, the coastline has always been a familiar and orienting space in the Greek world. These sea voyages, which traditionally hugged the coast (Dilke 1985, 130; Gisinger 1937), framed their accounts from the perspective of sea-to-shore, offering a sailor's eye view of the land, islands, and estuaries as they were mapped upon a point to point itinerary along the water's edge.[11] The same was true, as Malkin has shown, for Greek colonizing expeditions of the Archaic and Classical periods, which always approached new sites from the perspective of ship to shore, and which predominantly settled in coastal areas.[12] This maritime perspective is already self-evident in the *Odyssey*, a poem which Malkin has convincingly argued presents its protagonist as a 'proto-colonial hero'[13] (Malkin 2001, 20):

> Above all, it is the maritime perspective – the view from the sea and approach to new lands – which characterizes the *Odyssey*...
>
> We first glimpse Ithaca from the point of view of Phaiakan sailors, from ship-to-shore. Such a maritime perspective was familiar, even self-evident, for an audience in the eighth and seventh century when trade, exploration and colonization ranged from the western Mediterranean to the Black Sea – to say nothing of local maritime travel and fishing.

The Greeks perception of space, then, whether in the case of colonization or exploration, was clearly bounded by the line of the shore. In the *Anabasis*, as we shall

---

[11] On the *periplus* as the dominant mode of Greek hodological mapping, see Janni 1984.

[12] Malkin 1998 & 2001; cf. Thuc. 1.7.

[13] Malkin 1998, 9 (& passim).

see in the next chapter, it is not until the Ten Thousand reach the Euxine coast that

Xenophon seriously considers founding a colony. To do so inland, as he jokingly

suggests, would be to "enter into the Land of the Lotus Eaters:" to lose oneself in an

alien perspective which was wholly antithetical to the Greeks' understanding of

realistic geography.

Whether seen on the macro- or micro- level, therefore, the edges of both the

mythical river Ocean and the sea of Greek colonization and trade provide a clearly

demarcated topographical boundary around which different types of space are located,

according to an ethnocentric taxonomy of myth, cultural relativism and geography.[14] I

will proceed to argue that for the *Odyssey*, a poem that lays the blueprint for a

distinctively Greek concept of geography, to lose one's bearings inland, away from any

sense of an edge, is to no longer fit within the secure categories of an ordered system of

classification. On the contrary, for Odysseus to lose his way in the interior is also for

him to lose all sense of direction, reference and ultimately identity.

Odysseus' Journey with the Oar

In my reading of this passage of the *Odyssey* I will start at what Bergren has shown to

be in some sense the foundational space of epic: the edges, or *peirata*, of the earth, and

move inwards from there towards a whole new discourse on what it means to be 'lost in

space.' What the *Odyssey* does is to insert, at the very margins of its text but also at its

---

[14] For the division of space into 'zones' depending upon their proximity or distance from reality, see Romm 1992, 32–44, & passim; Hartog 1996, 32–38.

centre, an invisible and uncharted terrain which can only be seen through the incomplete viewpoint of the subject – the lost *Odysseus* – , rather than through the omniscient eye of the Muse or through the divine, synoptic revelation of the cosmos forged by Hephaestus onto Achilles' shield. The sudden revelation of a previously unseen inland space, I'll argue, throws Homer's conceptual map of the earth into sharp relief.

Odysseus' inland journey, prophesied by Tiresias at *Od.* 11.121–137, and then retold by Odysseus to his wife at 23.267–77, functions, through extended ring composition, to draw the end of the narrative back towards the middle and the middle to some point in the future, beyond the endpoint, (known in Greek as the *peras* or *telos*) of the poem. In what follows, I interpret the formulation of the prophecy as a movement towards an alternative version of space in the *Odyssey* which has significant ramifications for the structure of epic narrative. In particular, I will argue that the shift, at the very end of the *Odyssey,* to the radically new and alien topography of inland space, corresponds to a shift in genre, which takes the reader beyond the epic parameters of Homer's world.

Peirata

The *Odyssey* draws towards the final boundaries of its story with the image of Penelope and Odysseus returning to their deep-set and secret bed, firmly entrenched within the roots of Ithacan soil. As the couple retire, moreover, they enter into a closed-off world in which time is brought to a standstill: a place where Penelope could happily have kept

her arms around her husband's neck forever (*Od.* 23.240: "οὔ πω πάμπαν ἀφίετο"),

while Athena holds the night back upon the edges of the world (*Od.* 23.243: "νύκτα μὲν

ἐν περάτῃ δολιχὴν σχέθεν")[15] in order that the two might tell their stories. Suspended

within a kind of temporal eclipse, Odysseus and Penelope are poised to relive their

pasts, recounting each separate strand of their combined histories until they culminate in

a single crystallizing point: the final *telos* of their reunion in the bed.[16] Significantly,

however, Odysseus open his narrative not with a closed account of his past adventures,

but rather with a description of a future which is decidedly open-ended (*Od.* 23.248–9):

> ὦ γύναι. οὐ γάρ πω πάντων ἐπὶ πείρατ' ἀέθλων
> ἤλθομεν. ἀλλ' ἔτ' ὄπισθεν ἀμέτρητος πόνος ἔσται

> Wife, I have not yet reached the boundary of all my trials,
> But unmeasured suffering still lies in store for me.

Within the period of just ten lines (*Od.* 23.240–249), therefore, the idea of

'endless time' is not only compounded by lexical repetition ("πω πάμπαν (240).. .. πω

πάντων" (248)) but also given a spatial dimension ("ἐν περάτῃ (243)... .. ἐπὶ

πείρατ'" (248)) which has clear topographical associations with Odysseus' journey

home.[17] For the 'boundaries of trials' which Odysseus has not yet completed

---

[15] See Stanford, *Od.* vol.2 ad. loc. for the unusual use of "ἐν περάτῃ" here.

[16] Alexandrian critics were so convinced that the reunion in the bed was the natural and only *peras* or *telos* of Odysseus' narrative that they claimed *Od.* 23.296 was the genuine end of the poem, and that everything beyond it was an interpolation. Cf. Stanford, *Od. Vol II*, ad loc, n.15 above & *Scholia* ad *Od.* 23. 296 (M. V. Vind 133): "ἀσπάσιοι λέκτροιο] ἀσπαστῶς καὶ ἐπιθυμητικῶς ὑπεμνήσθησαν τοῦ πάλαι τῆς συνουσίας νόμου. Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος πέρας τῆς Ὀδυσσείας τοῦτο ποιοῦνται."/ "*Happy to bed]* Happily, and full of desire, they recalled the site of their long-ago union. Aristophanes and Aristarchus make this the end (*peras*) of the *Odyssey*."

[17] On πείρατ' ἀέθλων as a spatial metaphor, and its associations with the concrete *peirata* of the earth or Ocean, see Bergren 1975, 28–31.

corresponds both to the 'horizon' upon which Athena holds back the night, and to the

'*peirata gaiês:*' the boundaries of the earth around which Odysseus and his crew circled

for so many years.[18] Specifically, the *peirata* of lines 243 and 248 evoke the land of the

Cimmerians, which Odysseus reaches in book 11 only after crossing through the

streams of Ocean (*Od.* 11.13–14):[19]

> ἡ δ' ἐς πείραθ' ἵκανε βαθυρρόου Ὠκεανοῖο
> ἔνθα δε Κιμμερίων ἀνδρῶν δῆμος τε πόλις τε
>
> The ship reached the boundaries of the deep-flowing Ocean
> where the community and city of the Cimmerians is located.

In both cases, Odysseus' evocation of his journey towards a boundary is set

within a timeless zone untouched by the sun (*Od.* 11.15–19; 23.241–246), and within

which the perimeters of the night magically extend to encompass the length of his story.

In book 11, Alcinous tells Odysseus that the night "seems almost endless" (*Od.* 11.373:

"νύξ δ' ἥδε μάλα μακρὴ ἀθέσφατος· οὐδέ πω ὥρη/ εὕδειν ἐν μεγάρῳ"/ "This

night stretches out to an infinite extent, and certainly it is not yet time to go to bed"),

encouraging him to finish the narrative of his travels before any of them should go to

sleep, while in book 23, for Penelope, the length of the night is similarly measured by

the length of Odysseus' tale (*Od.* 23.308–9: "ἡ δ' ἄρ' ἐτέρπετ' ἀκούσ'. οὐδέ οἱ

ὕπνος/ πίπτειν ἐπὶ βλεφάροισι πάρος καταλέξαι ἅπαντα." / "She delighted in

listening, and sleep did not fall upon her lids until he had narrated everything").

---

[18] See Romm 1992, 9–20 on the formulation of *peirate gaiês* in epic.

[19] Cf. *Od.* 10.508.

Book 23, then, even as it celebrates the reunion of Odysseus and Penelope, and

– through the strong imagery of joinery and lasting stability which the bed provides – [20]

suggests the resolution of both of their narratives, nevertheless draws the reader away

from the end of the *Odyssey* and, as if in a loop, back to its centre.[21] The story which

Odysseus tells his wife can only be, as many have already observed, a retelling of the

Odyssey itself.[22] But the kernel of that story has already been told once before, in

Odysseus' tale to the Phaeacians. In fact, the more closely that we look at Odysseus'

stories in the *Odyssey*, the more endless the repetitions become. This is especially true

in books 10, 11, and 12, where most of the events are narrated at least once through

prolepsis before they eventually 'happen' in the real time of Odysseus' story to the

Phaeacians.[23]

So it is that Odysseus not only crosses geographic space twice in his returns to

the islands of Aeolus, Circe and the straits guarded by Scylla and Charybdis, but he also

crosses the same *narrative* space more than once, especially in this section of the

Odyssey.[24] His voyages to the Underworld (*Od.* 10.504–40; 11.1ff.), and Scylla and

Charybdis (*Od.* 12.59–110; 12.234–259) are both told twice, while the ones to the

---

[20] See Zeitlin 1996, 19–52 ("Figuring Fidelity in Homer's *Odyssey*").

[21] A similar point is made by Bergren 1983b, who discusses the many '(re)turns' of Odysseus in terms of the many levels of temporality within the text (especially as the relate to the analepsis and prolepsis of narrative).

[22] See Murnaghan 1987, 148; Thalmann 1984, 161–3; Goldhill 1991, 48–49.

[23] Cf. Genette 1980, 67–79, & Bergren, n.21, above.

[24] See here my comments in ch.1 on Zielinski's Law, which stated that Homer never traversed the same temporal space twice. Zielinski did not apply his law to incidents of narrated discourse in the *Odyssey*.

Sirens (*Od.* 12.39–54; 12.154–164; 12.166–200) and the Island of the Cattle of the Sun

(*Od.* 11.104–113; 12.127–41; 12.260ff.) are told three times, within the body of

Odysseus' narrative. In each case, the description of the route is foretold through a

different narrative voice – either Circe's, Tiresias,' or Odysseus' (to his crew) – before

it is recalled as a completed action within the plot by Odysseus as narrator upon

Scheria.

Odysseus' story, therefore, revolves around the recycling of narrative incidents

through an assortment of voices and tenses. This lends a circular quality to his narrative,

especially given the larger framing device of Calypso's island, where his story both

begins and ends. In acknowledging this structure at the closure of his tale, Odysseus

comments upon the burden of repetition for the story-teller (*Od.* 12.450–453):

> τί τοι τάδε μυθολογεύω:
> ἤδη γάρ τοι χθιζὸς ἐμυθεόμην ἐνὶ οἴκῳ
> σοὶ καὶ ἰφθίμῃ ἀλόχῳ· ἐχθρὸν δέ μοί ἐστιν
> αὖτις ἀριζήλως εἰρημένα μυθολογεύειν.

> But why am I telling you these things?
> For I spoke about her [Calypso] yesterday, within the palace,
> To you and your revered wife. It is wearisome to me
> To repeat what I have already said once before.

But, although Odysseus suffers under the hardships of repetition (both narratologically

and practically, in terms of his 'endless' life upon the sea), it is only through the

recycling of events, particularly those events which may be told as completed actions

within the past, that he is able to close off the circle of his narrative.[25] In this way,

Odysseus' tale to the Phaeacians, which both begins and ends with Calypso's island and

---

[25] On the 'theraputic' aspects of narrative repetition, and the closure which is accomplished through the (re)telling of a story, see Brooks 1984, 90–112; White 1978, 86ff.; & my ch.1, pp.32–4, above.

which contains within it a whole series of embedded repetitions, follows a circular

structure which is itself plotted upon the circumference of epic's own cyclical form.

In book 23, however, as the poem cycles back to the middle of book 11, to a

narrative which has not yet been completed within the action of the story, it conversely

impedes the epic's movement towards closure and resolution. For even as the narrative

'ground' from which Odysseus speaks is transferred from the precarious and

unpredictable movement of a ship to the permanent and immobile bed which marks his

final arrival home, it still looks forward to an impending journey which exists beyond

the boundaries of the poem. The journey, which is foretold twice in the *Odyssey* (cf. *Od.*

11.121–131) but never enacted, involves Odysseus' traversal of a geography which lies

far from the boundaries of both earth and text (*Od.* 23.267–277):

μάλα πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε' ἄνωγεν
ἐλθεῖν. ἐν χείρεσσιν ἔχοντ' εὐῆρες ἐρετμόν.
εἰς ὅ κε τοὺς ἀφίκωμαι οἳ οὐ ἴσασι θάλασσαν
ἀνέρες. οὐδέ θ' ἄλεσσι μεμιγμένον εἶδαρ ἔδουσιν·
οὐδ' ἄρα τοὶ ἴσασι νέας φοινικοπαρῄους.
οὐδ' εὐῆρε' ἐρετμά. τά τε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται.
σῆμα δέ μοι τόδ' ἔειπεν ἀριφραδές. οὐδέ σε κεύσω.
ὁππότε κεν δή μοι ξυμβλήμενος ἄλλος ὁδίτης
φῇ ἀθηρηλοιγὸν ἔχειν ἀνὰ φαιδίμῳ ὤμῳ.
καὶ τότε μ' ἐν γαίῃ πήξαντ' ἐκέλευσεν ἐρετμόν.
ἔρξανθ' ἱερὰ καλὰ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι.

He [Tiresias] bid me to go to many cities of men,
Holding in my hands a well-fitted oar,
Until I should come upon a people who do not know of the sea,
Who do not eat food which has been mixed with salt,
And who know nothing of purple-cheeked ships
Or of well-fitted oars, which we call the wings of our ships.
But he told this clear sign to me, which I will not hide from you.
Whenever some other traveller coming across me in the road
Should say that I carry a winnowing-shovel upon my gleaming shoulder,
Then he bid me to fix the well-fitted oar in the earth,
And to carry out sacrifices to lord Poseidon.

Whether told first, as it is in Odysseus' narrative to Penelope, or last, as in Tiresias' speech to Odysseus, the story of the oar exists, in both cases, within the suspended, unmarked time of the Underworld, the bed, and the 'endless nights' of books 11 and 23. In this way, it exists outside the flow of narrative time, situated always at some point in the future (*Od.* 23.249: "ὄπισθεν"), but never realized within the temporality of the *Odyssey* itself. Cut loose from the action of the plot, the journey takes place within the imaginary zone of untold and unplaced time whose existence pushes the *peirata* of Odysseus' story ever further into the distance (*Od.* 23.248).[26] In a simultaneous movement, therefore, we may say that Odysseus loses sight of the limits of his suffering, that the boundary of the poem as a whole slips from view, and that the co-ordinates of Odysseus' travels are transplanted from the edges, or *peirata,* of the earth, onto an ambiguous and unmarked 'centre.'

For Odysseus calls this final journey an infinite, or 'unmeasured' toil (*Od.* 23.249: "ἀμέτρητος πόνος") precisely because its boundaries are not set: as if in mirror image to the circuitous journey from Troy, the precise location of whose ending was never held in doubt, Odysseus' movement away from Ithaca, with the oar on his shoulder, will take him to an unknown site at an immeasurable distance from home, even if he were to proceed there in an unbroken and direct line. This experience of heading, somewhat blindly, towards an invisible *telos* has – as we saw in chapter 2 – been described by Aristotle, who comments in the *Rhetoric* on how unpleasant it is to

---

[26] See here Ballabriga 1989, 298, who draws a link between Odysseus' inland journey and the concept of *to apeiron,* or boundlessness.

get lost in such a way that one's boundaries and sight-lines are continually obscured.

His description, applied here to the experience of reading a long and ungainly sentence,

could equally well be transposed onto Odysseus' endless meanderings towards an

unplaced *telos* (Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a31–2: "ἔστι δὲ ἀηδὴς διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ

τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν·/ It is ungainly due to its lack of boundaries. For

everyone wishes to have the end in sight").[27] In a similar move, as Odysseus moves

away from the boundaries of the earth, he loses sight of the endpoint (*telos/peras*) of his

narrative.

Metra

Hidden within the "ἀμέτρητος πόνος" of *Od.* 23.249 may be a further clue as to not

only the distance, but also the narratability, of the landscape which Odysseus will

ultimately enter. For the journey is never 'measured out' into the metrics of epic poetry,

nor is its 'distance' ever marked through the successive flow of narrative. In terms of

the spatialised reading of plot which I have elaborated in both of the previous

chapters,[28] the inland space where Odysseus will plant the oar exists as an alternative

narrative site beyond the boundaries of epic's poetic range. I have discussed how

Aristotle's description of the sentence as a kind of promenade, especially when read

alongside the frequent references to narrative as a path or roadway in authors such as

Homer, Pindar, Herodotus, and Callimachus, suggests that the Greeks understood their

---

[27] See my discussion of Arist. *Rh.* 3.9 in ch.2, above, pp.78–9.

[28] See Brooks 1984, 11–12, and chapter 2, p.80, above.

plots as both narratological and topographical constructs, along which the narrative moves as if a traveller along a road. For the *Odyssey*, I wish to suggest a possible connection between that use of the road as a metaliterary figure, and the inland route that Odysseus will eventually take. On that inland road, he will meet a '*hoditês*' or wayfarer, who – in his misrecognition of the oar - will speak a completely different language to the customary discourse of epic. I am suggesting, therefore, that Odysseus' final journey may also be read generically, as a path that will take him far beyond the boundaries of epic's poetic range.

This applies particularly to the ancient language of literary criticism, where *metra* applies both to the verses of a poem and to the metre in which they are composed, as well as to the poet's own specialization and knowledge in a particular field. Within the *Odyssey*, then, when Eidothea and Circe promise that a prophetic figure from sea or underworld will instruct the hero upon the "path and measures of his route" (*Od.* 4.389=10.539: "ὁδὸν καὶ μέτρα κελεύθου"),[29] they are at the same time referring, metapoetically, to the prophetic or divine voice of the poet, Homer, who has the ability to span such a broad range (*metra*) of knowledge through the 'measured out' syntax of his verse.[30]

A well-known passage in Hesiod's *Works and Days* connects precisely this terminology for *metra* with the domain of the sea, when Hesiod promises to tell his

---

[29] Cf. *Od.* 3.179, where the verb μετρέω is used of the sea: "πέλαγος μέγα μετρήσαντες," with the sense of both 'measure' and 'traverse' (Cunliffe).

[30] Cf. Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409b6–8 on the 'measurement' of syntax: "All men remember better verse (*ta metra*) rather than prose; for it has a numerical dimension by which it is measured."

brother of the "measures of the sea" but then claims to have neither the skill, nor

wisdom, to do so (*Op.* 648):

> δείξω δή τοι μέτρα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης
> ούτέ τι ναυτιλίης σεσοφισμένος ούτέ τι νηῶν.
>
> I will show you the measures of the loud-roaring sea
> Although I am skilled neither in sea matters nor in ships.

As West, Rosen, and Dougherty have all observed, there is a strong connection here

between the *sophia* that Hesiod attributes to sailing and the concept of poetic skill,

which in turn may be associated with the poetic connotations of *metra*.[31] This led Rosen

to argue for a metapoetic reading of Hesiod's use of *metra thalassês,* wherein Hesiod's

'inexperience' in sailing might then be interpreted as the farmer-poet's own generic

difference from the heroic poetics of Homer. Certainly, the reference to Hesiod's one

brief journey by sea, from Euboia to Aulis, the prize he won there for his singing, and

the mention of the Heliconian Muses later in the passage (*Op.* 658) all suggest, as

Rosen argues, that Hesiod is drawing a connection between the act of sailing and the art

of poetry.[32] Dougherty has recently pushed this connection between epic poetry and

sailing further, by underscoring the similarities between ship-building and poetic

composition (a ship's planks, which were stitched or fitted together with pegs, evoked

---

[31] West 1978 ad loc., who quotes Solon 13.52: (concerning a poet): "ἱμερτῆς σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος," and Stesichorus S (=Page's *Supplementum Lyricis Graecis*) 89.7 f. (concerning Epeios): "δαείς ... μέτ[ρα] τε καὶ σοφίαν του[,". See also Rosen 1990; Dougherty 2001, 21–3.

[32] Rosen 1990.

the same technical vocabulary as the crafting of poetry), and by highlighting the programmatic role of extensive sea travel in the *Iliad*'s Catalogue of Ships.[33]

Taken together, therefore, the association between the 'measures' (metrics, rules) of song and the 'measures' (routes, distances travelled) of the sea in Hesiod combine with the prominent role of ships and sea-faring in both the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*'s Catalogue of Ships to suggest an intimate connection between Homeric poetics and the sea.[34] When Odysseus states that he will eventually embark upon an 'unmeasured' journey at *Od.* 23.249, and, furthermore, when he proceeds to describe the people towards whom he will travel as those who know nothing of sea, salt, ships, or oars, we are reminded of Hesiod's milder placement of himself in that position at *Op.* 649. In both cases, we might suggest that the movement of a central character within the poem away from the sea entails a complementary movement away from the *metra*, or laws, of Homeric poetics.

As Odysseus' journey inland takes him off the generic map of Homer's epic, so too will it take him progressively further away from that holistic, all-encompassing view of the world which Homer was able to grasp, only with the help of the Muses, at

---

[33] Dougherty 2001, 13, 21–25. Dougherty draws her argument along similar lines to Rosen's but differs in her conclusion. According to her reasoning, Hesiod's claim to "know nothing of sailing or ships" in the Nautilia suggests not difference, but similarity with Homeric epic, since Hesiod "follows in the wake of the Iliadic poet who "only hears the report and knows nothing" of the Greeks who sailed to Troy" in the Catalogue of Ships (25). Essential to both of their arguments, however, is a connection between Homeric poetry and the sea. We can leave aside for the moment the question of whether Hesiod sought to differentiate or ally himself with this reading, but we can say that Hesiod's language suggests that such a reading was current in his time.

[34] See Romm (1992, 176–83) on further connections between Homeric poetry and the Ocean, especially as they were developed in later literary traditions.

the beginning of his narration of the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.485-93). To have knowledge over the vast expanse of the sea is to adopt the perspective of an immortal eye, looking down from above like the Pythia at Hdt. 1.47.3, who knows the "number of the sands and the measure of the seas" ("οἶδα δ' ἐγὼ ψάμμου τ' ἀριθμὸν καὶ μέτρα θαλάσσης").[35] Likewise, the four similes of uncountable things (the flames of a burning forest, a flock of birds, the leaves and flowers of spring, a swarm of insects) evoked by Homer before he embarks upon the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.455-473), prepare the reader for the vast topographical map of Greece to come.[36]

In contrast, Herodotus' world-view is not determined by the Muse but by his own grounded perspective as an eye-witness. Consequently, as Hartog has shown, he offsets such divinely inspired metrics with his own empirical calculations throughout the *Histories*, especially – and perhaps significantly – in his measurement of the Black Sea (Hdt. 4.85.2– 86.4):[37]

[ὁ Πόντος] πλαγέων γὰρ ἀπάντων πέφυκε θωμασιώτατος. τοῦ τὸ μὲν μῆκος στάδιοί εἰσι ἑκατὸν καὶ χίλιοι καὶ μύριοι. τὸ δὲ εὖρος. τῇ εὐρύτατος αὐτὸς ἑωυτοῦ. στάδιοι τριηκόσιοι καὶ τρισχίλιοι...

ὁ μέν νυν Πόντος οὗτος καὶ Βόσπορός τε καὶ Ἑλλήσποντος οὕτω τέ μοι μεμετρέαται καὶ κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα πεφύκασι.

[The Pontus] is the most awe-inspiring of all seas. Its length is eleven thousand one hundred stades and its width, at its widest part, is three thousand three hundred stades...

I have now given the measurements of the Pontus, Bosporus and Hellespont, and have also explained how these measurements were obtained.

---

[35] Ch.2, above, pp.131–32.

[36] Dougherty 2001, 24.

[37] Hartog 1988, 342.

Like Anaximander's composition of the map and prose treaty to describe the earth, termed a *perimetron* by Diogenes Laertius at DK 12 A1(2),[38] Herodotus appears here to be adapting epic's programmatic meaning of *metra* to the new discourse of the prose author who sees not through the gods, but rather through his own scientific enquiry, or *historiê*. It is no accident, I suggest, that the prose authors – in seeking to differentiate themselves from the epic perspective of the Muses – readjust the generic proportions of this particular term (*metra*) to fit their own new methodology.

Finally, in a poem by Theognis we discover that the 'wings' which the poet bestows upon his beloved, Cyrnus, in order that his *kleos* might fly above the earth and cover broad expanses of land and sea, have a twofold metaphorical function: first as the poet's voice (through which the name of Cyrnus is carried) and secondly as the oars of a ship (Hom. *Od.* 11.125=23.272: "εὐῆρ' ἐρετμά. τά τε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται" / "well-fitted oars, which are the 'wings' of ships"),[39] (Theognis 237–8):

σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ πτέρ' ἔδωκα. σὺν οἷς ἐπ' ἀπείρονα πόντον
πωτήσῃ καὶ γῆν πᾶσαν ἀειρόμενος
ῥηιδίως·

I gave you wings, with which you might fly over the limitless sea
Easily borne up above the entire earth.

---

[38] "καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης περίμετρον πρῶτος ἔγραψεν" / "He was the first to draw an outline (a 'measuring around') of the earth and sea." Cf. ch.2, 82ff, above.

[39] Cf. Hes. *Op.* 628 and West ad loc. on the analogy of ship and bird in early Greek thought. The connection between this Theognis poem and Hesiod's treatment of the sea as a poetic *topos* was first made by Rosen 1990. See 109–10 for his discussion of the poem. The association between wings, epic poetry, and *kleos* has been developed more fully by Morris, who comments on Tiresias' metaphor at 1992, 193 (cf.15–16; 191–4).

Poetry, sailing, and immortal (global) vision are thereby all brought into the same

conceptual field through the imagery of wings, which - like the ones fashioned by the

artist Daedalus for his son - elevate the spectator to a panoptic, supernatural plane.[40]

Metra, then, defined in the *LSJ* as "that by which anything is measured," may

be understood, in its most literal sense, as scale: the device by which vast expanses of

space (*to apeiron*) are brought into comprehensive and commensurate range.[41] It not

only renders legible and quantifiable the boundless expanse of the sea, but it also

operates as a device by which language and genre can be measured and encompassed.

When the gods, or the mouthpieces of the gods, such as the Muses, Proteus, the Pythia,

or Tiresias, describe the encyclopedic scope of the earth to men, and – in the same

stroke – when they aid them in their narration of a story that stretches beyond the

capacities of human time or number – there is always a process of translation, or scaling

down, in the movement from divine to human vision.[42] The distance between Ithaca and

Odysseus' final destination with the oar, on the other hand, does not fall within the

realm of divine, epic *metra*. Rather, it emerges as an 'unmeasured' linguistic space,

partly because it is never narrated, but also because it involves entering a territory

whose inhabitants do not speak the same language as Homer. The misrecognition of the

---

[40] Hence Pausanias' rationalization of the Icarus myth by interpreting the 'wings' which Daedalus invented for his son as ships' sails (Paus. 9.11.4). See further Morris 1992. Note also the hubris connected with sailing upon the seas - a predominant topos throughout Greek poetry.

[41] Peradotto (1990, 87) likens the incommensurability of Odysseus' world *within* the *Odyssey* to Penelope's ἀμέτρητον πένθος at *Od.* 19.512.

[42] Ford 1992, ch.2 (57–89); cf. my concl. to ch.2, above (pp.128–33).

oar might then be interpreted as a slip in translation between the two alternative landscapes of sea and inland.

The oar's new label as 'winnowing shovel' thereby serves to illustrate a new cultural zone, where the *metra*, or rules, of Homeric poetics (that an oar is an oar, the 'wing' of a ship) no longer apply. Furthermore, if scale is understood in terms of translation, or semantic range, then Odysseus' task is to cross beyond the boundaries of that scale, until he reaches a place where, as oar transforms into winnowing-shovel, a single, unchanging object can take on two completely different, and opposing, meanings.[43] Odysseus, in other words, is instructed to get as lost in language as in space.

It is no surprise, therefore, to find that a journey which turns on precisely such a verbal ambiguity should result in a prophecy about death which can also be taken in two ways. We may thus imagine a pole, running from the sea to inland, upon which two different extremes of meaning are located (fig.1):

Figure 1: Polarities of Sea and Inland (I)

	Sea ←————————————————————→ Inland	
1) object on Odysseus'shoulder	"oar"	"winnowing-shovel"
2) "ἐξ ἁλός"	"from the sea"	"away from the sea"

---

[43] On which, see Benardete 1997, 93–94, & nn.156–7, p.165.

The confusion over the exact meaning of "ἐξ ἁλός" at *Od.* 23.281 and 11.134

("Θάνατος δέ μοι [τοι] ἐξ ἁλὸς αὐτῷ/ ἀβληχρὸς μάλα τοῖος ἐλεύσεται" / "A

gentle death will come to me [you] away [?] from the sea") has been debated at least

since Aristarchus, and still remains undecided in current scholarship.[44] But its meaning

is best left unresolved if we are to fully appreciate its role in the narrative, for the two

opposite locations of Odysseus' death (sea or inland) each follow the forking paths of

the *Odyssey's* plot to their logical ends.[45] The dual ending of Odysseus' story, therefore,

which both describes his return to Ithaca *and* tells of his journey far away from the sea,

is finalised through the two interpretations of his death, both of which have a different

meaning depending on where they take place.

Sēma

It becomes possible, in this way, to understand the boundary of the sea as much more

than just a topographical marker, for it also functions as a semantic boundary against

which the language of Homeric epic is determined. In the context of the sea or water's

edge, Homer's oar takes on its own significance, whether through metaphor (the

"wings" of a ship) or through symbolism (as the marker of Elpenor's grave on the shore

---

[44] Those who have weighed in upon the debate include: *Scholia* ad. *Od.* 11.134 (" = ἀπό θάλασσης," possibly to be interpreted as the sting ray on the end of Telegonus' spear); Eustathius, *Comm. Od.* 1676, 43–59 (concurs with the Scholia); Dornseiff 1937, 354 ('from the sea'); Nagy 1983, 45 ('from the sea'); Hanson 1990, 246 ('away from the sea'); Carrière 1992, 21, 38 (sees the ambiguity as a necessary imitation of the oracle's obscurity); Stanford ad loc. ('away from the sea'); Hartog 1996, 43–44 (deliberately ambiguous).

[45] In this way, it is represents something similar to the 'grid of possibilities' which prophecy opens up, as described by Peradotto 1985, 439.

of Aeaea). It even partakes in a secret language which only the epic narrator may reveal, as part of the system of *sêmata* or 'hidden signs' which Penelope and Odysseus share together, described by John Miles Foley as a "metonymic sign-language" (1997, 73).[46] To carry across the oar from one place to another, therefore, is to engage in the linguistic activity of 'metaphor,' classified by Aristotle as "the transferal of a name from one thing to another" ("μεταφορὰ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ").[47] If we are to understand metaphor, moreover, as the rhetorical movement of language across space from one context to another,[48] then it also becomes clear that Odysseus' journey with the linguistic sign, or *sêma*, of the oar is, in itself, a rhetorical or narratological act.

---

[46] Tiresias characterizes the oar as a *sêma* in his prophecy to Odysseus at 11.126, and as such it has an important function within the scheme of Homeric poetics. On the six *sêmata* of *Od.* 23, see Foley 1997, 75–6; Zeitlin 1996, 19–52. Nagy 1983 has demonstrated that Tiresias' revelation of the *sêma* to Odysseus at *Od.* 11.126 shares the same language as *Il.* 23.326, where Nestor indicates to his son the *sêma* at which to turn in the race. In both of these cases the *sêmata* are marked by their position in the landscape, signalling the point at which the actor is instructed to turn back towards his starting point. As Foley 1997, 73 notes: "even when the sign [*sêma*] marks only the length of a solos- or discus- throw, it portends the direction of the narrative - whether of Aias' victory in the funeral games or of a disguised Odysseus setting himself apart in the Phaeacian competition" On the *sêma* "as a sign or token of something else" see Zeitlin 1996, 22, & n.9, and my n.45, below, for its association with Aristotle's definition of metaphor. More generally, see Lynn-George's (1988) valuable discussion of the Homeric *sêma* at 252–76.

[47] Arist. *Poet.* 21. 1457b7. Aristotle also discusses metaphor at *Rh.* 3.10–11. See especially 3.11. 1412a14–16, on the difference and similarity in metaphor: "Or if one were to say that an anchor and a pot-hook were the same; for both are the same thing, but differ by being set upwards or downwards."

[48] That metaphor might be conceived of as a spatial construct is nothing unusual in the ancient world, where rhetoric (such as sentence structure or the art of memory) was often plotted on a topographical plane (cf. my ch.6, below). For a more recent interpretation, see de Certeau 1984, 99ff., &115, who notes that in modern Greek *metaphoroi* is the term given to public transport. Cf. George Puttenham's definition of metaphor as "the figure of transport" in *The Arte of English Poesie* (1988, 189) and the 'translation' of the characters in *Midsummer Night's Dream* as they move from city to forest (when Peter Quince first sees Bottom with an ass-head, he cries "Bless thee, Bottom, bless thee, thou art translated," (III.i.119–20)). I wish to thank Clare Costley for suggesting these Renaissance analogues to me.

When Odysseus removes the oar from its rightful context, therefore, he reinvents it as a metaphor (from wing to winnowing-shovel), and in so doing rewrites the symbolic language of Homer's world (*Od.* 23.272=11.126: "τά τε πτερὰ νηυσὶ πέλονται" / "and they are the wings of ships").[49] Like the bed, the stability of whose meaning is 'fixed' by its very immobility, and which, once moved, becomes instantly invalid,[50] the oar loses its semantic value as it is moved from one place to another. These two *sêmata*, therefore, the two primary signs of book 23, both complement and undo one another: the bed creates narrative resolution and closure because, as a *sêma*, it remains fixed in place, while the oar throws not only the ending of the poem but also its whole system of meaning into question because it moves ever further away from its original position on (the shores of) the ocean.

Finally, as several scholars have pointed out, there is a connection between the concept of the *sêma*, which (especially as a tomb) preserves the hero's *kleos*, and epic

---

[49] Peradotto 1990, 158 likens the stranger to a poet, for he "recategoriz[es] the world through metaphor." The 'secret' unfamiliar language of the oar is also connected to the role of the magical token in folklore, which undoes a spell when it is correctly identified with its true secret name. See Dornseiff 1937, 353, who adduces that the use of such an unusual word has all the properties of a spell: "das erlösende Wort, das gesagt werden muß, ist so ungewohnlich, daß die Aussicht, daß bald jemand gerade dieses Vort sagen wird, erdrückend gering ist, die Reise kann außerordentlich lang werden" This reading has much to do with the rarity of the term ἀθηρηλοιγός; cf. Hanson 1990, 254: "the allusive term "chaff-wrecker" lends an oracular atmosphere to the seer's speech." Dougherty, who claims that the story is a model of the move from exploration to colonization, (2001, 172–4) sees the randomness of the 'sign' about where to plant the oar as comparable to random signs given to colonizers by the Delphic oracle (220, n.37). For an alternative interpretation of why the term ἀθηρηλοιγός is employed, see Olson 1997.

[50] Foley 1997, 79, on Odysseus' bed: "Just as with all of Homer's traditional signs, the permanence of the sign's meaning cannot be compromised, except by the most radical of misconstruals - severing the vessel that links metonym to tradition." See also Zeitlin 1996, 42: "The *sêma* that is *empedon* (i.e., the bed rooted in the earth) emerges as a *sêma empedon* (a valid sign). In these two junctures - the maker with his object, the words with their literal and figurative meanings - the system of reference gains a deeper coherence and closes in upon itself as securely as the chamber that Odysseus "built around the tree trunk, finished it, with close-set stones, and roofed it well over, adding the compacted doors, and fitting them closely together" (23.190–4)."

poetry.[51] Perhaps the most famous of these is the grave, or *sema*, that Hector envisions

for his opponent in book 7 of the *Iliad*, which will spread his *kleos* long into the future

and which is placed, significantly, on the edge of the shore (*Od.* 24.82: "ἐπὶ πλατεῖ

Ἑλλησπόντῳ"). In the *Odyssey*, the parallel has also been drawn between Elpenor's

tomb, or *sêma*, marked by an oar on the edge of the sea in book 11, by which "men who

come hereafter will learn of [him]," (*Od.* 11.76) and Odysseus' 'empty grave' as it is

signified by his planting of the inland oar as a precursor to his death, but which will

remain, presumably, anonymous.[52] We might add to the chart which marks the two

extremes of sea and inland above (fig.1), therefore, the two oars which are both 'fixed'

(πήγνυμι) at either end of the scale: Elpenor's grave, a *sêma* "on the edge of the sea"

(*Od.* 11.75: "ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης") which will mark indefinitely his role in epic history,

and the milestone,[53] or end-point, of Odysseus final journey, the point at which the

sêma becomes unrecognizable and loses all connection with its meaning in the context

of Homeric narrative (fig.2):[54]

---

[51] Redfield 1975, 34; Murnaghan 1987, 157; Lynn-George 1988, 252–76; Ford 1992, 131–71; Vernant 1991. See also ch.2, above. On *sêma* as both tomb and sign, see Pl. *Crat.* 400c1–4.

[52] On the importance of naming in the *Odyssey*, see esp. Peradotto 1990, chs.4&6.

[53] Carrière (1992, 35) compares Odysseus' fixing of the oar in the ground to the planting of milestones by Heracles at the edges of Europe or by Dionysus in India. The oar thereby both marks a certain limit, or end-point, in space, at the same time as it marks 'no-place,' a boundary-less interior.

[54] On which, see Benardete 1997, 94: "The oar, which in the proper setting designates either the tomb of the sailor or Poseidon, will alter its significance and either designate no-one or get a new label."

Figure 2: Polarities of Sea and Inland (II)

	Sea ◀————————————————————▶ Inland	
1) object on Odysseus' shoulder	"oar"	"winnowing-shovel"
2) "ἐξ ἁλός"	"from the sea"	"away from the sea"
3) oar	"wing"	"winnowing-shovel"
4) planted oar	Elpenor's grave	Odysseus' mark of anonymity.

The inland zone that Odysseus will eventually enter with his oar is thus one in which

the hero will lose not only his way, but also the signs and language by which to

navigate.[55] This translates, finally, into Odysseus' loss of his own name as – in

Benardete's formulation, he becomes truly 'outis': a nobody whose *sema* exists

nowhere – both unnamed and unplaced.[56] For, even in his passage through the fantastic

and alien spaces of books 9–12, Odysseus never loses his control over the province of

---

[55] See here Wigley's comments (1996, 49–50) on Jameson's famous description (1984) of being lost in the Bonaventura Hotel (cf. below, ch.4, pp.170–72): "The space [of the Bonaventura Hotel] produces a breakdown in the system of categories, the way of reading, of negotiating terrain, with which Jameson is familiar.. The critic is lost in the face of a new form of space, where *being lost is understood as an inability to describe 'the thing itself'*. Lost in space is the story of the crisis of the object, understood as the crisis of the subject, an identity crisis. *To be lost is to lose a sense of things. Things do not makes sense. It is no longer even clear what a thing is.*" (Italics mine). One might easily substitute 'Odysseus' or 'Homer's audience' here for 'Jameson' and 'the critic.' A similar point is made by Ingraham in her astute reading of *King Lear* (1988, 26): "The tragedy of Lear is that he becomes utterly lost in his own kingdom, and this happens because he loses the classicism of the map-world relation. In losing this classical relation, which he thinks he understands because he has divided up his kingdom through its means, he loses his plan of the world, his network of relations, his sense of space, and his evaluation of distance and measurement (surveying). He loses his ability to fix a meaning and language."

[56] Benardete 1997, 94: "The oar similarly functions in the way the proper name Outis did." The oar, which stands as a double to Elpenor's grave and, as a *sēma* or tomb, proleptically marks the death of Odysseus, nevertheless works as a kind of anti-*sēma*, in that it remains anonymous. In this way, it is also related to Odysseus' actual death, at the hands of Telegenos, in the version recorded in Proclus' summary of the *Telegony*. There, Odysseus dies at the hands of a son who "did not recognize him" (κατ' ἄγνοιαν). See Carrière 1992, 19. On *sēma*'s role as an agent of recognition, see Nagy 1983.

language. Thus Polyphemus and the Phaeacians are both seduced by Odysseus' artful handling of the disclosure of his name, while on Circe's island and in the Underworld Odysseus brings with him a magic token (Hermes' moly, blood) which grants him full power over who speaks, and when.

We might say, then, that Odysseus' skillful use of language acts as a map upon which he plots his course, ensuring that he never becomes absolutely lost, but rather that those places and peoples whom he meets along his way will bend themselves to his will or lose themselves under the force of his linguistic or semantic spell. Although he may have to rely on physical strength, sheer luck, or divine aid in order to escape from other situations, Odysseus' journey in books 9 to 12 of the *Odyssey* nevertheless take him through a world which is either linguistically familiar, or over which he is able to exert linguistic control. Finally, and most importantly, throughout the poem, Odysseus sails the waters of his own epic genre, through seas where the story of the Trojan War is well-known (Phaeacia, the Sirens' island), or where his name has already been spoken in prophecy (the island of the Cyclopes and Aeaea).[57]

But when Odysseus boasts to the Phaeacians that his fame reaches to the sky (*Od.* 9.20: "μευ κλέος οὐρανὸν ἵκει") he fails to take into account the logical consequence of Tiresias' prophecy: that there exists somewhere upon the earth a group of people who – although they are human, and 'eaters of bread' - have never heard of

---

[57] Pucci 1998, 1–6; Doherty 1995, 82.

the Trojan War, much less of a man called Odysseus.[58] The oar which Odysseus will

eventually plant marks a 'lost' or invisible space, therefore, in terms of epic narrative's

ability to cover the entire earth with its *kleos*.

To return to Michel de Certeau's description of the view from the World Trade

Center with which I began this chapter, Odysseus' final, inland journey is something

like a radical shift in scale, from a global perspective of the world (where the edges of

the sea are always in view) to an itinerant, experiential one, (where, the traveller, like a

maze-treader, constructs his own unique and fragmented narrative, in a confused and

meandering path from one edge, or *telos*, to another). Between these two perspectives

there will always be 'gaps,' or points of invisibility, regardless of which end of the

spectrum one views from. The final, untold story of the *Odyssey* stands as an ambiguous

opening in the hero's *nostos*, which, instead of reaching a fixed boundary or limit

simply recedes into a geographic and semantic vanishing point upon a fluid horizon.[59]

In this way, it may be said to offer a counter-narrative to the *Odyssey*'s representation of

---

[58] The 'Inlanders' must be eaters of bread if they mistake the oar for a winnowing-shovel (an agricultural tool used for separating wheat from chaff). On which, see esp. Carrièrre 1992, 34, who remarks on the strange juxtaposition of men who are ignorant of the sea (who, like the Cyclopes, usually represent a primitive race), and those who are eaters of bread (and so, in the *Odyssey's* lexicography, more culturally advanced). Since it is impossible to narrate the story of the Trojan War without the mention of ships (cf. the programmatic aspect of Homer's 'Catalogue of Ships,' discussed above), the Inlanders must also be a people who are ignorant of the single most important event in Greek history, the Trojan War, not to mention Homer's own account of it in verse.

[59] The walk, like modern accounts of being lost in the desert, will not only be of an indeterminable length, but will also be without any visible border or marker to break it. Compare Darius' expedition through Scythia (Hdt bk.4, & my ch.2, pp.93–100, above).

uncharted or 'lost' space in books 9–12.[60] Here, as if in mirror-image, the journey

inland presents an alternative understanding of what it means to be lost in Greek

culture; that is, to not only lose one's geographic bearings, but also the referents of

language, semantics, and even epic, the foremost Greek genre. The translation of the oar

from one *sêma*, or interpretation, to another, is thus mapped out, in spatial terms, as the

movement from a global view of the world (where oar = airborne wing) to a local,

terrestrial one (where oar = winnowing shovel fixed in the ground), just as the 'inland'

territory which it marks readjusts the terms of the scale by which the *Odyssey* is

measured.

Conclusion: Losing the Narrative Thread (Scheria)

If, as I have been arguing for the *Odyssey*, to go inland and leave the edges of the world

behind is to proceed towards a vanishing point, where it is possible to somehow slip

between the gaps upon the surface of the earth, and to fall into those 'lost spaces' which

exist, unseen, at the centre of every narrative, then it will be worth, briefly, turning

towards the Phaeacians, who are left frozen in time in the middle of the *Odyssey* as a

land-locked race without access to the sea.

In a parallel sequence to the oar's transformation into a fixed and earthbound

tool, the swift, self-guiding ship of the Phaeacians is magically turned into stone and

rooted ("ἐρρίζωσεν") in the bed of the sea. As Alcinous remembers the prophecy that

---

[60] Note Alcinous' classification of the places to which Odysseus travel in books 9–12 as 'unseen' at
Od. 11.366).

his people would one day be covered over by a vast mountain (*Od.* 13.177), his story

comes to an abrupt halt in the middle of a line (*Od.* 13.185-188). Peradotto has observed

that such mid-hexameter large scale shifts of locale are extremely rare in Homer.[61] Even

stranger, though, is Homer's subsequent silence upon the topic of the Phaeacians. We

never return to Scheria, nor are we ever again given any notion of its inhabitants'

existence. In narratological time, the Phaeacians remain suspended at the moment of

their transformation: a fragment of both syntax and geography for the remainder of the

Odyssey. Their story, whose end exists outside the borders of the poem, might then be

read as a commentary upon Odysseus' final journey. In both cases, as their plots move

beyond the reach or access of the sea, they move into an un-narratable (because un-

navigable) landscape. By contrast, in Xenophon's *Anabasis,* we do travel beyond

merely the future tense (Tiresias' prophecy) or the present (our last, incomplete image

of Scheria) into the actual historical account of a journey into an uncharted inland space

that is both more real than Homer's geography, yet in other ways equally imaginary.

---

[61] Peradotto 1990, 81.

CHAPTER 4

The Trackless Interior in Xenophon's *Anabasis*

Introduction: Towards an Understanding of Aporia

The profound sense of disorientation and dislocation (*aporia*) that settles upon

Xenophon and the Ten Thousand in their movement through the inland space of Asia

Minor results in an experience of being 'lost' which is much more explicitly

documented than it was in the *Odyssey*. I want to begin my reading of the *Anabasis* by

exploring further the experience of being lost which effects both the reader of a text or

the characters within it when they travel upon a path that is new and unfamiliar to them.

The metaliterary concept of the 'road' in both poetry and prose (already familiar from

our reading of Homer, Herodotus, and Aristotle) comes into play here, for, given the

arguments that we have made for the disappearance of Scheria in the *Odyssey* in chapter

3, it is reasonable to say that in order for a narrative to proceed it needs a clear 'road' or

passageway (whether on sea or land) by which it can progress.

Paul Carter has analyzed the mutually reflexive relationship between the acts of

travelling and narrating in his reading of the first government-sponsored explorations

into the nineteenth-century Australian interior. His study describes how the accounts of

these journeys become increasingly discontinuous and plot-less the further they

progress towards an unmarked 'centre.' Carter attributes this to the fact that they are

first journeys into a terrain where no road yet exists, claiming that "[if no road exists

then] by extension, the narrative itself cannot proceed confidently forward" (1990, 92).

Later on in the essay, he evokes J. Hillis Miller's reading of narrative, or *diêgesis*, as "the redrawing of a line already drawn,"[1] and, in doing so, shows how the activities of the Australian explorers actually precede that moment: "their task is to draw the line for the first time, to give space a narrative form, and hence the possibility of a future history..." (1990, 103).

Carter's understanding that narrative follows certain routes (the tracks of an earlier explorer or author) through a previously inscribed terrain casts light upon the breakdown of linguistic and generic markers in Odysseus' story. For Odysseus, in a move similar to the one that Carter has documented for the Australian explorers, turns off the well-marked park of epic into an unwritten (literally 'unnamed') landscape.[2] It also permits us to go some way towards classifying the sea, on the other hand, as not only a navigable (and nameable) site, but also as a familiar or intertextual one, full of literary referents and landmarks through which both protagonist and reader can establish their whereabouts.[3]

There has been an attempt in cultural and architectural theory of the last two decades to pinpoint exactly what that sense of being lost means, and how it is determined by our relationship to space. Thus, in his seminal essay of 1984, "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," Fredric Jameson attempts

---

[1] Carter 1990, 102–3; Miller 1981, 25; also quoted in Brooks 1984, 338, n.9.

[2] For the practice of naming, and its vital role in the appropriation of territory, see Carter 1987, ch.1: 'An Outline of Names,' 1–33; de Certeau 1986, 142–4.

[3] On the intertextuality of place, see Barnes and Duncan (eds.) 1992, 7–8: "Places are intertextual sites because various texts and discursive practices based on previous texts are deeply inscribed in their landscapes and institutions."

to articulate the ways in which we have become 'lost' in the space of our own, once-familiar cities. This essay, which documents his experience of walking though the new Bonaventura Hotel in downtown Los Angeles, received a great deal of attention for its attempt to label post-modern culture as one caught in a state of fragmentation and – most importantly – disorientation. Twelve years later, in 1996, the architecture critic Mark Wigley responded with his own classification of what it really means to be 'lost in space' (and in which he gently derided Jameson for having masterfully 'found his place' in a cultural landscape within which he claimed to be so lost). Their assessment of cultural space according to the category of being lost offers a valuable theoretical framework for my own reading of Xenophon.

To begin with, Jameson describes his entry into the Bonaventura Hotel as a venture into a 'new hyperspace' within which all sense of distantiation, scale, and referent, have been eradicated. Due to the perfect symmetry of its lobby, the confusion over entrances and exits, and the shifting levels (and directions) of space into which the hotel casts its occupants, the building has, according to Jameson, "finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively to map its position in a mappable external world."[4]

Jameson's understanding of that sense of being lost is framed in narrative terms, and he describes the visitor's path through the hotel as a story, or 'narrative

---

[4] Jameson 1984, 83.

promenade."[5] The sense of being lost which he experiences in the hotel, therefore,

translates onto a larger crisis within representation itself, as the author loses control over

the co-ordinates, or spatial trajectory, of his narrative. At the very end of the essay,

Jameson goes on to suggest that the means by which we find our bearings in space is by

'cognitively mapping' it: by turning it into a route, or sequence of images; a mental

picture of the new environment which we carry in our heads.[6] Only in this way, he

claims, can we bridge the gap between "the monadic 'point of view' on the world to

which we are necessarily, as biological subjects, restricted" and the larger, more global

and "properly unrepresentable" (1984, 90–1) aspect of viewing the world in its entirety.

For Jameson, then, the cognitive mapping by which we reconstruct the broken

narratives caused by *aporia* plays a crucial role in providing a conceptual framework,

or scaling system, for alternating between the two ways of viewing the world (global or

hodological) that I have been revisiting throughout this dissertation. But while the

concept of being lost is for Jameson symptomatic of the new era of postmodernism, for

Wigley it is rather the necessary adjustment that every culture or period makes when

faced with the task of adapting old narrative frames to new forms of space. In other

words, the story of being lost is really as old as story-telling itself, and certainly

predates the birth of postmodernism. Story-telling, moreover, is the key to our making

---

[5] A term coined by Le Corbusier, and used by Jameson to describe the physical trajectory of the walker's body through the space of a building. See further Jameson 1984, 82: "We know in any case that recent architectural theory has begun to borrow from narrative analysis in other fields, and to attempt to see our physical trajectories through such buildings as virtual narratives or stories, as dynamic paths and narrative paradigms which we as visitors are asked to fulfill and to complete with our own bodies and movements."

[6] The theory of 'cognitive mapping' is adapted from Lynch 1960. See also Jameson's essay by this title (1988) and Wigley 1996, 34–47.

sense of space, of making it evolve into a coherent and ordered pattern. Both authors,

therefore, are explicit in seeing one's sense of being lost as a schism between narrative

and spatial forms, claiming that alien spaces can only become familiar when "new

idioms of spatial measurement and communication" have been invented to adjust to

them.[7]

Carter, Jameson, and Wigley have each demonstrated, then, that the experiences

of disorientation and dislocation that come from being lost act as windows through

which we might glimpse what (through its absence) creates the underlying order and

narrative patterning of the worlds from which they emerge. In Greek constructions and

perceptions of geography, descriptions of being lost – because they operate as points of

disjunction upon the surface of an ordinarily smooth, invisible system of space –

provide ideal starting points for unearthing what we might call the 'secrets' of the

critical landscape.[8] By decoding the scrambled messages that lie behind the experience

of becoming lost, moreover, it is possible to extract an overall coherent logic from a

topography when it had appeared to be in its most incoherent and unreadable state.

The Greeks on Inland Space

The sense of being lost (*aporia*) that pervades the middle books of Xenophon's

Anabasis is ethnically determined by the author's Greek identity, both as an inhabitant

---

[7] Kepes 1944, 14. Quoted in Wigley 1996, 40.

[8] The term 'secrets' is Zeitlin's (1996, 1), taken from her discussion of what gender can tell us about patterns of thought in the ancient Greek world.

of a maritime nation and as a writer within a specific cultural tradition. To be lost in

Greek terms, then, is to leave the secure boundary of the sea behind. In my analysis of

Aristagoras' map at Hdt. 5.49ff., I showed how the narrator attempted to use

cartography to chart and familiarize the space of the Persian interior before the eyes of

the Spartan king.[9] Cleomenes' reaction to that attempt is by now familiar (Hdt. 5.50.3):

> Ὦ ξεῖνε Μιλήσιε. ἀπαλλάσσεο ἐκ Σπάρτης πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου· οὐδένα γὰρ λογον εὐεπέα
> λέγεις Λακεδαιμονίοισι. ἐθέλων σφέας ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τριῶν μηνῶν ὁδὸν ἀγαγεῖν.

> Milesian stranger, leave Sparta before the sun sets. For you have proposed an account which is
> in every way antithetical to the Lacedaemonians, by wishing to lead them three months away
> from the sea.

Less noted, however, is the manner in which his response contains an important

clue to the way that the Greeks (or here, the Lacedaemonians) organized the known and

unknown topographies of their world. For it is specifically the prospect of being led

such a great distance *away from the sea* that Cleomenes finds not only offensive, but

also antithetical to Spartan notions of travel and geography. To journey for three months

into the interior is, for the Spartan sensibility, to enter into a universe as boundless and

alien as the desert between Egypt and Ethiopia, a site from which Cambyses' troops

eventually tread a dejected retreat, and whose 'centre,' like Herodotus' description of

the quests for the source of the Nile, is always equivocal and ambiguous (cf. Hdt. 3.25;

2.28–34).

Similarly, in book 4 of the *Histories*, the inland topography of Scythia is

formulated as a trackless landscape lacking boundaries or markers such as graves or

---

[9] Above, ch.2, pp.112–13.

civic architecture;[10] an infinite and structure-less terrain which Darius futilely attempts

to 'plot' with his surveyor's measuring cord.[11] As Brent Shaw has pointed out,

Herodotus' Scythia is itself divided into a series of ethnic groups which get

progressively more savage the further into the North (and away from the sea) they are

located.[12]

In the *Histories*, then, the coastline marks the familiar and secure territory of

home, while the movement away from the boundary of the sea indicates a terrain which

is alien, uncharted, and often dangerously hard to either limit or categorize. This

literary schematization is reflected, as I have discussed above (ch.3, p.142–3), in the

historical practice of Greek colonization on the coasts and islands of the Aegean, Asia

Minor, Sicily, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean. As Thucydides attests at 1.7, the

first wave of colonization from 734 to 580 BCE brought most of the Greek urban centres

to the coast, transforming Greece into a nation which was primarily defined by its

proximity to the sea. Those Greeks who did live far inland, on the other hand, such as

the Thracians and Epirotes, were regarded by their fellow Hellenes as barbarous and

uncivilized.

---

[10] Hartog 1988.

[11] See my reading above, ch.2, p.94–97.

[12] Shaw 1983/2, 11: "The vertical continuum [in Herodotus' mental geography of Skythia] passes from civilization in the south near the Black Sea coast to utter savagery in the interior to the north."

The Inland Journey of the *Anabasis*

My examination of Xenophon's journey through Asia Minor in the *Anabasis* pays

careful attention to the manner in which the army lose their bearings in an unfamiliar

terrain. As with the *Odyssey*, I show how the entry into an inland landscape leaves its

author struggling to find, and mark out, the co-ordinates of his narrative. For Xenophon

attempts to plot his historical experience by carefully delineating its spatial dimensions,

as if the process of measuring the road along which he travels (by parasangs, stades,

and stages) will serve to fix in place the 'road' of his narrative, even as it travels

increasingly further from the familiar location of the sea.

The *Anabasis* is remarkable for its displacement of a significantly large Greek

population (a virtual polis, as many have contended)[13] into the very depths of a space

whose most non-Greek quality is its position inland. For here Xenophon not only

reverses Cleomenes' injunction that no Greek should travel 'three months from the sea,'

but he also spells out the exact terms of the Spartan king's foreboding, by describing a

journey within which the Ten Thousand become dangerously lost. It will be easiest,

following the practice of the commentators before me, to divide the *Anabasis* into a

series of phases.[14] In the first (*An.* 1.1–1.8), we begin in 401 BCE, with a straightforward

account of the attempt by Cyrus the Younger to wrest power from his older brother after

the death of their father Darius. Amassing a vast army made up of both Persian soldiers

and Greek mercenaries (the so-called 'Ten Thousand'), Cyrus marches them 'up-

---

[13] Cf. Dalby 1992; Nussbaum 1976.

[14] Nussbaum 1967, 147–93 (who devises a prologue and three 'acts'); Dillery 1995, 64ff.

country' (or inland) from Sardis to Babylon. The journey, which is narrated through the course of the first book, moves, for the most part, along the left bank of the Euphrates river, utilizing the network of Royal roads which ran throughout the Empire, but especially from Sardis to Susa.[15] At Cunaxa, just shy of Babylon, the battle with the king is fought, and Cyrus is killed (*An.* 1.8).

In the ensuing chaos that marks the beginning of the second phase (*An.* 1.8–4.7), most of the Greek generals are executed, and the Ten Thousand (led now by Xenophon and Cheirisophus) are chased North by the King on a long march through the Armenian interior. At Trapezus, the first point of arrival on the Black Sea, the narrative moves into its third phase (*An.* 4.8–7.8), which culminates in the Ten Thousand, having made their way down to the Bosporus by following the coast line, entering into the service of the Spartans in their war against Persia.

A Fourth-Century Odyssey

In what follows, I will concentrate on how the Ten Thousand become lost within the space of the interior in the first and second phases of the work (*An.* 1.1– 4.7) and how the breakdown of an ordered topography which occurs in the journey through Armenia thrusts the Greeks into a state of *aporia* and disorientation that continually puts them in danger of never reaching home. It is in this section of the *Anabasis* that the theme of return is made most prominent, not least by an underlying parallel with the *Odyssey* which Xenophon draws upon in his reference to the Lotus Eaters at *An.* 3.2.25, and in

---

[15] On Cyrus' route, see Farrell 1961.

the army's dream of completing the final leg of their journey "stretched out like

Odysseus on his Phaeacian ship," (*An.* 5.1.2). As Lossau has shown, there is a

considerable amount of overlap between the Homeric *nostos* of Odysseus and this, its

fourth century counterpart. Nowhere is this more true than at Trapezus, a turning point

in Xenophon's story that Lossau compares with Odysseus' arrival upon Scheria. Both

sites mark the end of their protagonists wanderings through fantastic topographies, both

share the same activities of games, sacrifices, and feasts, and in both a swift, safe return

home by ship is proposed. [16]

The parallel *nostoi* of Odysseus and the Ten Thousand, as they converge upon

the joint sites of Trapezus/Scheria, can be compared in a number of different ways. To

begin with, if we map the return of the Ten Thousand to Greece onto the model of

Odysseus' return to Ithaca, it is clear that the majority of the Ten Thousand's

experiences inland, before reaching the coast, correspond to Odysseus' experiences on

the sea before he reaches the Phaeacians. Both Trapezus and Scheria represent a return

to normalcy and safety; the point from which the Ten Thousand/Odysseus should be

able, at last, to secure a smooth passage home. The uncharted inland regions of Asia

Minor that the Ten Thousand have just passed through would thereby stand as a double

for the sea upon which Odysseus wandered for so long.

But if *Anabasis* 1–4 mirrors *Odyssey* 9–12, it also, when viewed from a different

angle, mirrors *Od.* 23.267–77. For the *Anabasis*, unlike the *Odyssey*, tells the story of

---

[16] Lossau 1990. See also Higgins 1972, 291. On *Iliadic* associations see Dalby 1992. On the Homeric overtones of Xenophon's first dream, Rinner 1978.

both a departure from home (*An.* 1.1–1.8; cf. *An.* 3.1.4–10) and a return (1.8–7),

completing a full circle with Xenophon's arrival back at his starting point on the west

coast of Asia Minor at the very end of the text. In this way, the extensive land crossing

of the *Anabasis* does not so much resemble the main part of Odysseus' narrative, which

is told as a one-way trip from Troy to Ithaca, but rather his final journey with the oar,

which is foretold as a complete expedition that both begins and ends at the same point

(Ithaca). In both of these cases, moreover, Odysseus and Xenophon wander far from the

sea, travelling an exceptional distance into the interior before either of them are able to

circle back towards home.

Finally, in my consideration of Xenophon's *Anabasis* as a fourth-century

Odyssey, it is worth observing the role that Odysseus' *nostos* had played in shaping the

patterns of Greek colonization between the Homeric age and the fourth century BCE.[17]

As I discussed in chapter 3, Malkin has persuasively argued that Odysseus should be

understood as a 'protocolonial hero', whose 'returns,' rather paradoxically, provided the

model for the departure of the *oikistês*. For the experiences of Odysseus in the multiple

versions of his return home, like the 'returns' of the heroes that followed him, provided

the eighth-century Greeks who were setting out for the coasts to the West with a model

by which to frame their encounters with alien cultures and ethnicities.[18] That paradox,

---

[17] This angle has been explored by Malkin 1998, and, more recently, Dougherty 2001 (who reads Odysseus return to and 'refoundation' of Ithaca as a colonizing narrative). See also her reading of Odysseus' journey with the oar as based on the model of colonization (2001, 271–74, & my n.49, in ch.3, above).

[18] Malkin 1998, 9 & my ch.3, p.142, above.

however, is somewhat resolved in Xenophon's journey through Asia Minor, for he too moves in an ambivalent direction in treading the route of what appears to be both a *nostos* and a mission to found a colony.[19] As the *Anabasis* treks further into the interior it enacts the combined narrative model of the Homeric *Odyssey* and the archetypal Greek foundation story – that is, a journey home, and a journey away from home – by moving in both directions at once.

It will be seen, then, that the *Anabasis* repeats the story of the *Odyssey* on a number of different levels. In each case, the inland space registers an ambivalence in terms of what it represents, as it is imagined as now the fantastic sea regions of *Odyssey* 9–12; now a limitless expanse of even mythically unfamiliar topography, without bearings or margins (*Od.* 23.267–77); now a landscape which confounds the unidirectionality of movement towards a single and clear goal (the colonizing narratives of 'return' which grow out of the *Odyssey*). Although the disorder of the Ten Thousand (and in particular, the tension between settlement and *nostos*) actually increases in the final phase of their journey after they reach the sea, it is nevertheless clear that the breakdown of books 5–7 occur within the cohesion of the social unit,[20] while in books 1–4, the breakdown is framed in terms of the topography itself. The re-ordering of that topography in books 5–7, moreover, can be easily discerned in Xenophon's return to an

---

[19] On the latter point, see esp. Dalby 1992; Malkin 1988, 102–4. Xenophon twice proposes settling a colony in the *Anabasis*, first in a dismissive or joking tone at 3.2.24–5, but then with more seriousness as they reach the Black Sea (whose coast has already been settled with several Greek colonies) at 5.6.11. Eventually, this creates tension in the narrative, causing the rest of the army to pit him as a traitor against the cause of returning home (Dillery 1995, 86–94).

[20] This point has been well-documented by others. See e.g. Dillery 1995, 77–92.

ordered sense of scale in his work, especially as it is represented in the movement from

parasang to *stade* over the course of the narrative.

Counting by Parasangs: Navigating the Persian Royal Road

Each new visual environment demands a reorientation, a new way of measuring.

Gyorgy Kepes, *Language of Vision*, p.14

In my discussion of Odysseus' journey inland, I focused upon Homer's use of

measurement, or *metra*, to document not only movement through space but also the

movement of the narrative itself, which – since it is divided into metrical units – is

'counted out' through the singing of a poem.[21] In the *Anabasis*, Xenophon picks up on

the idea of measurement and carefully breaks it down into an ordered system of units

through which the progress of the narrative is recorded. For as Cyrus' army marches

East, via the network of Royal Roads which run from Sardis to Susa,[22] Xenophon

methodically takes note of the distances travelled each day according to the Persian

units of *parasangs* (an hour's march, about 5 - 5.5 km) and *stathmoi* (stages, or stopping

---

[21] Cf. the English word 'tell,' which, like German *zählen*, means both to 'count' and to 'relate' (as documented in my introduction, pp.4–7, above).

[22] The Persian system of 'Royal Roads' were most probably inherited from a pre-existing network of roads set in place by the neo-Assyrian empire. They were used primarily as a vector of imperial administration, by which the centres of power (especially Sardis) were linked to one another. See Debord 1995; Graf 1993, & 1994; Olmstead 1948, 299–301; Briant 1996, 639–647; Joannès 1995, 182–5; How & Wells vol. 2, ad 5.52; Cook 1983, 108.

posts, en route).[23] As he travels through an alien landscape, therefore, he adopts the

foreign system of measurement upon which the roads themselves are designed. This is

similar to the technique Herodotus employed when, in his account of the distance from

Sardis to Susa after the incident with the map, he used the *parasang* to render the inland

topography of Asia Minor both safe and easily navigable (Hdt. 5.52–3).[24]

The parasang, moreover, as it breaks the journey up into a series of discrete and

measurable chunks, creates an ordered narrative 'road,' composed of a sequence of

periods, by which the reader is able to trace the linear progress of the narrative. Indeed,

the King's road was designed with precisely such a purpose in mind. Broken into

various stages, it provided an intelligence network, or *anagereïron*,[25] by which

messages could be swiftly transmitted across the empire, passed from one rider on

horseback to another at the various stages en route, thus allowing for the smooth

procession of language from one end of the road to the other. The analogy between

narrative and journey[26] which the King's postal system brings to the fore points, once

again, to an ancient way of measuring which applies equally to both language and

space. We need only examine the Greek system of measurement, which begins with the

---

[23] The parasang (like the modern *farsakh*) was a Persian unit of time which was converted into a spatial unit by the Greeks. Herodotus tells us at 2.6 that 1 parasang = 60 stades. According to Farrell 1961, 153, the speed of the parasang can be compared to the march of the British infantry, who travel at approx. 3 mph. The stathmos was a stage in the journey, perhaps symbolized by halting places en route, but also used by the Greeks as a measurement of distance. Finally the stade (from the Greek length of the stadium, or running track) was measured at 400 Grk cubits, or 600 feet. See further *OCD*, 'Measurement, Greek'; Lewis 2001, xviii–xix, 19ff.; Dilke 1987; Bauslaugh 1979; Barnett 1963, 2–3.

[24] Cf. Hdt. 6.42, where the governor of Sardis measures Ionia by parasangs for tax purposes.

[25] Olmstead 1948, 299; Graf 1994, 168.

[26] Cf. the οἴμη /οἶμος/ὀδός of words in Homer, Pindar and Herodotus (see above, ch.2, p.82, n.19).

dactyl and multiplies on from there, to understand that there is an inherent connection between the original unit by which verse was counted out (the epic hexameter, composed of six dactyls (–∪∪)), and the base factor of the dactyl (one finger's breadth) by which distances across space were also measured.[27] For the Greeks, who counted by a system of letters,[28] the analogy between language and measurement is not as far fetched as it might seem to us today.

As I discussed in chapter 2, there is further evidence to suggest that measurement and prose were intricately connected in Greek thought. Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* describes the ideal period as the one which "has number – the easiest of all things to remember" (3.9. 1409b5–6), and Kahn has demonstrated a link between the beginnings of geometry and prose in his analysis of architectural and civic plans in the archaic and classical periods.[29] For Xenophon in particular, number is a crucial ordering device by which distance and relativity are regulated; such a system should, in principle, lead to an ability to measure the entire earth as a single, proportionate unit.[30] We shall see that as he progresses through a landscape that becomes increasingly difficult to measure, the breakdown of number, as a secure category, also leads to a breakdown in the structure of his narrative.

---

[27] 2 dactyls (finger-breadths) = 1 half-finger; 4 dactyls = 1 palm; 16 dactyls = 1 foot; 100 feet = 1 acre; and so on. *OCD* s.v. 'Measurement, Greek.'

[28] The Milesian or alphabetic numeration of the Greeks was possibly invented by Thales or Anaximander. See Dilke 1987, 13.

[29] Kahn 1983 (see above, ch.2, pp.84–5).

[30] See here Hartog 1988, 340–44, on "Herodotus as Surveyor." On Xenophon's 'devotion' to the principle of order, see Dillery 1995, 27–35.

As Xenophon embarks upon his account of the route from Sardis at *An.* 1.2.3, he

begins by establishing five different numerical categories (number of troops; distances

marched; dimensions of topographical features (such as width or depth of rivers); time

passed in days and/or nights; amounts of money), which he will employ to 'measure

out' his narrative into objective and rational prose. At *An.* 1.2.5–6, near the beginning of

the journey, we can see how four of those categories come into play:

> Κῦρος δὲ ἔχων οὓς εἴρηκα ὡρμᾶτο ἀπὸ Σάρδεων· καὶ ἐξελαύνει διὰ τῆς Λυδίας σταθμοὺς τρεῖς παρασάγγας εἴκοσι καὶ δύο ἐπὶ τὸν Μαίανδρον ποταμόν. τούτου τὸ εὖρος δύο πλέθρα· γέφυρα δὲ ἐπῆν ἐζευγμένη πλοίοις. τοῦτον διαβὰς ἐξελαύνει διὰ Φρυγίας σταθμὸν ἕνα παρασάγγας ὀκτὼ εἰς Κολοσσάς. πόλιν οἰκουμένην καὶ εὐδαίμονα καὶ μεγάλην. ἐνταῦθα ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας ἑπτά· καὶ ἦκε Μένων ὁ Θετταλὸς ὁπλίτας ἔχων χιλίους καὶ πελταστὰς πεντακοσίους. Δόλοπας καὶ Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Ὀλυνθίους. ἐντεῦθεν ἐξελαύνει σταθμοὺς τρεῖς παρασάγγας εἴκοσιν εἰς Κελαινάς ..

> Having obtained the aforementioned troops, Cyrus set out from Sardis. He marched three stages (*stathmoi*), a distance of twenty-two parasangs, through Lydia to the Maeander river. The width of the river is two *plethra*,[31] and it has a bridge across it made up of boats. Having crossed the river, he marched one stage, a distance of eight parasangs, through Phrygia to Colossae, an inhabited, large, and prosperous city. He stayed there for seven days. Then Menon the Thessalian joined him, bringing a thousand hoplites and five hundred peltasts, made up of Dolopians, Aenianians, and Olynthians. From there he marched three stages, a distance of twenty parasangs, to Celaenae..

Even though not all of these units of measurement are always fixed (the

stathmos, or stage, for example can measure anything from five to ten parasangs) by

setting them in relation to one another Xenophon orders the space he is walking

through, providing stable points of reference through mathematical equations. Similarly,

the money that the Greeks mercenaries are to be paid for their services will also,

according to the terms of their employment, be measured out in proportion to the

---

[31] 1 *plethrum* = approx. 100 Greek feet. It is the breadth of a γυής, or acre.

amount of time spent on the journey.[32] Thus at *An.* 1.2.12, Cyrus pays the troops four

months' worth of wages, and he twice more promises to both increase and extend the

terms of their pay (*An.* 1.3.21; 1.4.13) in order to ensure that the army keeps moving.

It is only at the very beginning, however, that this measuring system really

works. For early on in the march, Cyrus deviates from the main route of the King's

Road, first by veering south-east from Iconium through hostile territory (*An.* 1.2.19),

and then by marching along the left bank of the Euphrates instead of the right.[33] As

Briant has observed, this takes the Ten Thousand into a difficult and inhospitable

terrain, where they are forced to march quickly and where food is scarce (*An.*

1.5.1–6).[34] As they leave the civil engineering of the King's Road behind, moreover, the

order of Xenophon's measuring system becomes increasingly unstable. The 'stage'

begins to expand in length (*An.* 1.4.13; 1.5.7; 1.7.7; 2.2.12), as Cyrus requires his army

to cover greater distances in shorter amounts of time (*An.* 1.57; cf. 2.2.12). At the same

time, both money and weight rapidly lose value, not only because the payment of the

troops is repeatedly deferred (*An.* 1.2.11; 1.3.21) but also due to the inflated prices and

poor exchange rates of the markets. The situation is grave by the time the Greeks reach

Pylae, in the hear of the barren 'Arabian desert,' where prices at the Lydian *agora* are

---

[32] It is not altogether clear how the pay system in the *Anabasis* was supposed to work, especially as it broke down so rapidly. But see Griffith 1935, 265–6, who believes that the soldiers' pay was intended to be distributed at the end of each month, citing later occasions when Cyrus raises the rate of pay per month (*An.* 1.3.21; 5.6.23).

[33] We cannot be sure of the exact route of the main Royal Road, but Joannès' assessment of the evidence from cuneiform and neo-Assyrian texts indicates that the conventional route was located on the right of the Euphrates, rather than the left (1995, 182–5). See also Debord 1995, 95.

[34] Briant 1996, 647.

inflated to about fifty times the prices at Athens (*An.* 1.5.6). When the army's prospects

worsen still further after the death of Cyrus, Xenophon proposes that the old system of

relative weights and values be rejected, and that they now take measurement into their

own hands (*An.* 3.2.21):

> τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πότερον ὠνεῖσθαι κρεῖττον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἧς οὗτοι παρεῖχον μικρὰ μέτρα πολλοῦ ἀργυρίου. μηδὲ τοῦτο ἔτι ἔχοντας. ἢ αὐτοὺς λαμβάνειν ἥνπερ κρατῶμεν. μέτρω χρωμένους ὁπόσω ἂν ἕκαστος βούληται;

> Is it better for us to buy provisions at the market, where we are offered small amounts in exchange for a lot of money, especially when we don't have money, or to take provisions for ourselves, if we are strong enough, and to set our own standards of measurement according to each of our desires?

As the text itself begins to lose its narratological markers of distance and number, so too

do its protagonists come to abandon the relative standard of measure by which they had

regulated the exchange of provisions. The Greeks' lack of relative standards of weight

and money, moreover, soon spills over into their perception of space, as Xenophon, in a

dream, envisions escaping the 'bonds' of distance altogether, using the same

grammatical construction ("ὁπόσον.. βούλομαι") that he had earlier employed in his

call for an eradication of scale in the marketplace (*An.* 4.3.8):

> Ξενοφῶν δὲ ὄναρ εἶδεν· ἔδοξεν ἐν πέδαις δεδέσθαι. αὗται δὲ αὐτῷ αὐτόμαται περιρρυῆναι. ὥστε λυθῆναι καὶ διαβαίνειν ὁπόσον ἐβούλετο.

> Xenophon had a dream. He dreamt that he was bound in chains, but that they fell off him of their own free will, so that he was released and could stride as far as he pleased.

For both narrator and protagonists, then, the importance of counting as a means

of conferring order and meaning (such as Cyrus' inventory of his troops at *An.* 1.2.15),

becomes harder and harder to perform the further that the Greeks march away from the

sea. In subtle yet decisive ways, the Ten Thousand are increasingly faced with

unquantifiable entities, whether they take the form of a 'numberless enemy' (*An.* 3.2.16:

"τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἄμετρον"), or an incommensurate landscape (*An.* 3.5.7):

> καὶ ἐνταῦθα πολλὴ ἀπορία ἦν. ἔνθεν μὲν γὰρ ὄρη ἦν ὑπερύψηλα. ἔνθεν δὲ ὁ ποταμὸς
> τοσοῦτος βάθος ὡς μηδὲ τὰ δόρατα ὑπερέχειν πειρωμένοις τοῦ βάθους.

> They were completely lost in this place. For the mountains were exceedingly high, and the river
> so deep that that not even their spears reached above it when they tested its depth.

Finally, the concept of the 'interval,' a standard measuring device that

Xenophon calls "beautiful and perfect" in the *Oeconomicus*,[35] becomes problematic and

elusive as the narrative recedes deeper into the interior. In its ordered form, it can be

found in the distances between people or places which reasserts itself when the Greeks

reach the Black Sea (the Mossynoecians face each other in rows so well choreographed

that they resemble choral dancers when marshalling for battle (*An.* 5.4.12; cf. *Oec.*

8.20), and each of their towns are set at an approximate distance of eighty stades (less

than 10 km) away from one another (*An.* 5.4.31) in an easily traversed sequence. In the

Oeconomicus, Ischomachus impresses upon his wife the importance of managing and

keeping constant *to meson,* or the 'space between things,' in order to maintain order

within the topography of the house, but uses the metaphor of the army to illustrate his

principle (Xen. *Oec.* 8.7):

> ἀλλὰ καὶ πορευομένων ἐν τάξει. κἂν πολλαὶ μυριάδες ὦσιν. ὁμοίως ὥσπερ εἷς ἕκαστος
> καθ' ἡσυχίαν πάντες πορεύονται· εἰς γὰρ τὸ κενούμενον ἀεὶ ⟨οἱ⟩ ὄπισθεν ἐπέρχονται.

---

[35] Xen. *Oec.* 8.20, (see also my discussion in ch.6, below). For the importance of the interval as a
measuring device, one need only consider the knots (*hammata*) set at fixed intervals in the measuring
cord, or *schoinion,* used to survey land in both Egypt and Greece (ch.2, above, pp.94–7; Lyons 1927, 135;
Dilke 1992, 22; Lewis 2001, 19–22), and which – like the marks on a ruler – divide space into
commensurate sections.

> An army marching in order, even if there are thousands of them, all proceed together in harmony as if they were just one man. For those coming from behind continually replace the space which those before them have vacated.

Within the disordered topography of the interior, however, the measured space of the interval becomes an incommensurate void which the Greeks repeatedly strive, often unsuccessfully, to master. On the flat, even plane of the 'Arabian desert' the army find themselves confronted with deceptive and elusive intervals as they attempt to hunt the ass ("if anyone tried to chase it, it would run ahead and stop.. until the horse caught up, and then it would do the same thing again," *An.* 1.4.2) and the ostrich (which no one was ever able to catch up with). At the same time as the Greeks struggle to master the co-ordinates of the new space of the interior, they are also forced to monitor the distance between themselves and the King's army which shadows them at an even pace, a problematic and elusive interval which manifests itself in any number of directions.

The ordered narrative, then, which began on the Persian Royal Road as a measured system of one dispatch passing on from another, is transformed, in the heart of a unformed interior, into an incommensurate and unregulated space through which its author and protagonists wander, at a loss to make sense of their place in either the plot or the landscape within which they unexpectedly find themselves. As the markers of distantiation, relativity, and scale break down in the face of an unfamiliar geography, so too does the distance between Xenophon's dual role as external narrator and internal protagonist, which is normally kept scrupulously separate by the ancient

historiographer, begin to unravel.[36] As many have observed, Xenophon's three roles of historian, autobiographer, and protagonist becomes increasingly hard to disentangle as the army continues inland. For, as the narrative takes an unplanned turn into a new environment and sequence of events, Xenophon drops his initial role of detached, anonymous narrator and begins to insert himself as a character in the plot, who, after coming of age at the beginning of the third book (*An.* 3.1.14), tells the rest of the story from a subjective and thinly-veiled first person voice.

So too, as an objective stance becomes harder to apply to both the topography and the narrative, does Xenophon stop repetitively recording stages and *parasangs*; mention of both drop dramatically as the Ten Thousand pass from books 1–3.[37] Once they reach the sea on the other side of Asia Minor, measurement is reintroduced as the army regains its bearings, but this time within the shorter, and more definitively Greek, dimensions of the stade.[38] It is at the interstice between these two measuring systems, topographically positioned between the King's Road and the sea, that Xenophon and the army wander off the perimeters of both map and scale.

---

[36] On the third person voice of the Greek historian, see Wheeldon 1989, 45; Marincola 1997, 3–11; Connor 1984, 3–19; Momigliano 1993/71. On Xenophon's authorial role in the *Anabasis,* see Tatum 1989, 42; Fornara 1983, 179.

[37] *Parasang* occurs 28 times in bk.1; 7 times in bk.2; and 4 times in bk.3. *Stathmos* occurs 32 times in bk.1; 11 times in bk.2; and, again, only 4 times in bk.3 (see fig.3, p.190, below).

[38] *Stade* appears 5 times in bk.1; 3 times in bk.2; 3 times in bk. 3; 9 times in bk.4; 5 times in bk.5; 8 times in bk.6; and 5 times in bk.7 (see fig.3, p.190, below).

Aporia: The Geography of the Interior

Without the familiar topographical signposts of boundaries, measurements, or sea, the

Ten Thousand are frequently described as 'lost,' or caught in a state of *aporia*, in their

movement through the interior. The root *apor-*, which occurs 17 times in books two and

three, is repeatedly employed in this section of the work to describe the Greeks' sense

of hopelessness in the face of the interior's unfathomable panorama.[39] The

topographical associations of the term (*a-poros* = impassable)[40] make it a particularly

apt choice within the text, where it is often employed to describe the difficulty of

crossing either rivers (*An.* 3.1.1; 3.2.22; 4.3.6) or mountains (2.5.18).[41] The Greeks are,

then, periodically 'at a loss' because they can find no 'way' (*poros*) or passage through

the landscape of Asia Minor. *Aporia*, which flourishes in those places where the roads

are bad, is thus diametrically opposed to the *parasang*, because it negates the possibility

of movement across a fixed path, from one location to another. Unsurprisingly, in book

three of the *Anabasis*, where the occurrences of *aporia* are most concentrated, there is a

corresponding dip in the number of times that any measuring term (*parasang, stathmos,*

or *stade*) is used (fig.3):[42]

---

[39] *An.* 2.5.9; 2.5.10; 2.5.18; 2.5.21; 3.1.2; 3.1.11; 3.1.13; 3.1.26; 3.2.22.2; 3.2.22.5; 3.3.4.

[40] *LSJ* s.v., I.

[41] See here the comments of Hartog (1988, 57–60) on *poros* and *aporia* in Herodotus' narrative of Scythia, and how it is especially connected to Darius' construction of a bridge across the Ister.

[42] See nn.37&38, above.

Figure 3: Frequency of the Usage of *Parasang*, *Stathmos*, and *Stade* in the *Anabasis*

The Greeks' perspective from within this vast and disorienting landscape,

especially once distanced from the global overview provided by the vast network of

roads within the Persian royal system is, therefore, a limited and hodological one.[43] As

mercenaries for Cyrus, they simply follow the tracks of an invisible enemy (*An.* 1.8.17),

and, once left to their own devices, often have little idea of where exactly they are

headed (*An.* 2.2.15; 3.1.1; 4.2.5–7). It has caused some puzzlement amongst modern

readers that the several rivers which the Greeks encounter were so difficult to cross.[44]

At that time of year, they should not only have been fordable, but even beneficial to the

army as a navigational tool. Instead, in keeping with their culturally-conditioned view

of the *aporia* of the interior, the Ten Thousand do not see the rivers as 'roads' (*poroi*) or

---

[43] See Janni 1984, Meyer 2001, 229–233, and my discussion in ch.2, above, pp.117–121.

[44] Baslez 1995, 84.

routes to travel along, but rather as obstacles which hinder (*aporoi*)[45] their movement through the landscape. Helped by guides only when they can find them (*An.* 3.1.1; 3.5.14; 4.5.25) and even then, often not for long (*An.* 4.6.3), the Greeks haphazardly make their way across rivers and navigate a route towards the sea, but the lack of reference points or markers creates an environment within which they increasingly lose the means of measuring their distance from home. For, as Hartog has observed in his discussion of the Scythians, being *aporoi* is the mark of being a nomad,[46] and thus to have no specific place, or home, on the map to move either away from or toward.

This breakdown in the evaluation of distance and direction translates, at the most heightened points of *aporia*, into a disordered and improper use of space. Thus at *An.* 3.1.1 , the Greeks are so despondent ("ἐν πολλῇ δὴ ἀπορίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες...") that they no longer even sleep in their quarters, but simply lie at random wherever they happen to be on the ground (cf. *An.* 4.4.11; 4.8.20). The disintegration of 'home' thereby operates on two levels in the text, both as a 'forgetting'[47] or loss of the correct location of Greece, and as the gradual dissolution in the ordering of domestic space within the army.[48] This reading is symbolically captured in Xenophon's dream that same night, wherein his vision of a thunderbolt falling upon his father's house and

---

[45] E.g. *An.* 3.2.22; 4.3.6.

[46] Hartog 1988, 199.

[47] Cf. Xenophon's reference to the Lotus Eaters at *An.* 3.2.24–5.

[48] It is important to note here that the army also gives up most of their property, women and slaves (*An.* 4.1.12–14); that is, the trappings of the *oikos*.

setting it on fire (*An.* 3.1.11) speaks to both the untenability of the fatherland and to the breakdown of social structures associated with the home.

Cut off from home, both spatially and symbolically, the Ten Thousand thus find themselves in a state of 'utopia,' or non-place, in the topography between Cunaxa and Trapezus.[49] In a reversal of the norms at home, they encounter a vast, abandoned citadel whose deep-set walls stand empty of inhabitants (*An.* 3.4.7), and a topsy-turvy village whose underground dwellings are inhabited by animals (*An.* 4.5.25–34). Where the Ten Thousand do find domestic normalcy, on the other hand, they quickly destabilize it, by ransacking homes in search of food.

As Dillery has pointed out, it is also important to observe that the whole of the *Anabasis* is overshadowed by Xenophon's own future status as an exile, both from Athens and subsequently from his adopted home outside Olympia.[50] The account of his departure from Athens in the *Anabasis* is deliberately equivocal (3.1.5–7), while his description of his estate outside Olympia (*An.* 5.3) is utopic both in terms of its location (on a liminal no-man's land sacred to Artemis) and its abundance (fish, crops, games, and festivals all abound). Xenophon's complicated relationship to his homeland is thus

---

[49] On Dillery's reading of utopia (with an 'e') in the last stage of the *Anabasis,* see 1995, 59–98, esp. 63–95. His use of the word to mean an 'ideal community' is different from my meaning of it as 'placelessness' with an 'o.' For a good contemporary take on the concept of utopic space, see Grosz 2001, 131–50.

[50] Dillery 1995, 94.

displaced onto the non-Greek landscape through which the Ten Thousand travel, which itself acts out the absence of a clearly marked homeland within the author's own story.[51]

The inland geography that the *Anabasis* presents, therefore, whether it is described as nomadic, utopic, or *oikos*-less, in each case amounts to the same idea: a vast, uncharted region which it is largely impossible for the Greeks to grasp, either visually or cognitively. From the indeterminate position of being somewhere 'inside' (ἐν μέσῃ τῇ χώρᾳ), surrounded by impassable rivers (ποταμῶν ἐντὸς ἀδιαβάτων) (*An.* 2.1.11; cf. 3.1.12, 3.5.7), the Ten Thousand are completely without any sense of overview by which they might map their position. Rather, as if travelling through a maze, they wander through a geography composed of blocked sight lines and unclear entrances and exits.

Since any sense of a shape or edge is so difficult to perceive from within the inland space of the *Anabasis*, the landscape takes on a quality of invisibility, especially at its horizons. As we have already seen in both Herodotus' *Histories* and Homer's *Odyssey*, it is a peculiar feature of the inland landscape for bodies to become so lost in it that they disappear without trace. Thus in Herodotus, both Salmoxis and Pytheas successfully 'vanish' within the interior space of the North. As for the graves of the Scythians' forefathers, the inhabitants confidently predict that Darius will never find them, no matter how minutely he scours their inland topography (Hdt. 4.127). In a

---

[51] My reading of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* (ch.6, below) serves as the counter-narrative to this story of being 'lost in space.' As if it were a photo-negative of the *Anabasis*, the *Oeconomicus* uses the architecture and management of the house to ensure that space remains ordered, commensurate, and stable.

similar fashion, Odysseus 'disappears' within the interior by leaving behind only an equivocal trace of his journey, in the form of a *sêma* which remains anonymous and which stands as an empty and ambiguous tomb in an unknown location.

The *Anabasis* adds to this tradition by causing the body of Orontas to disappear within its inland regions: neither his corpse nor grave ever seen again after his trial before Cyrus (*An.* 1.6.11). More dramatically still, 120 thousand men are reported to have simply vanished into the inland territory of the Carduchians, never to return (*An.* 3.5.16). The territory of the interior, then, as it displays an uncanny ability to erase the bodies that move through it, without retaining any kind of signpost or tomb (*sêma*) to mark their existence, acts as a strange double to the sea; the trackless medium *par excellence* into which sailors often vanished without trace.[52]

This transformation of the mainland into a landscape that one can imagistically drown in, and whose lack of boundaries reflects eerily back upon both the ocean's depth and the unformed horizon on its other side, re-maps Romm's sense of being lost at the edges of the earth onto the very centre of the interior. One of the first indications that the Ten Thousand are entering an alien and incommensurate territory is their discovery of the 'Arabian desert,' which, in more ways than one, is imagined as a kind of land-locked ocean (*An.* 1.5.1):

ἐν τούτῳ δε τῷ τόπῳ ἦν μὲν ἡ γῆ πεδίον ἅπαν ὁμαλὲς ὥσπερ θάλαττα. ἀψινθίου δὲ πλῆρες·

In this place the land was completely flat and unbroken, just like the sea, and teeming with absinthe.

---

[52] Note, for example, the penalty of death imposed on the generals at Arginusae for not retrieving the bodies of the dead from the sea.

The presence of the briny absinthe makes the picture of the sea complete. Furthermore, although the Greeks attempt to hunt the animals of the desert in a traditional way, even attempting to measure out the distances between them by posting themselves at intervals, their quarry act as if they were not on land but rather on sea, as the ostrich "hoists its wings like a sail" in order to outstrip them (*An.* 1.5.1–3).

Xenophon's interior also has a sluggish, retarding power more commonly associated with the outer edges of the sea. Thus Herodotus, in his account of the attempts to circumnavigate Africa (Hdt. 4.43.6), tells how Sataspes turned back because "his ship was unable to go any further forward, but simply stuck fast in the water." In the *Anabasis* too, the topography enacts a similar kind of paralysis on its inhabitants, which constantly threatens to impeded the drive of the plot.[53] Throughout books 3 and 4, Xenophon enforces his role as both leader and author in willing the army to keep moving forward through a landscape which repeatedly entices them to lie down where they are instead of continuing with the march (*An.* 3.1.14; 4.5.4; 4.5.14; 4.5.19; 4.8.20–21). Although it is primarily hunger, cold, and physical exhaustion that kill the men, the larger context of *aporia* that causes them to give up on returning home pushes the narrative itself to the brink of collapse, as the progress of the Ten Thousand becomes increasingly tenuous the further they attempt to travel away from the sea.

---

[53] On which, see Brooks 1984, 90–142.

The Route through Asia Minor and the Narrative 'Line'

The Ten Thousand, then, have a basic difficulty in moving *forward* through the narrative, either because they are held back by a great sense of despondency (*aporia, athumia*), or by the layout of the terrain (such as mountains and rivers) and its hostile inhabitants (*An.* 4.3.7). Often, they either do not know which way they are going, or are forced to take detours, sometimes even in reverse (*An.* 3.5.13, 17; 4.2.2). This has an effect on the narrative itself, placing it in danger of itself getting lost in the landscape it travels through. In this formulation, the narrative can be imagined as a line that is traced upon the surface of the topography. In my discussion of narratological theory above (pp.168–9), I alluded to Carter's adoption of this concept from Hillis Miller and Brooks.

Hillis Miller 1981, 25:

> The figure [of story-telling, or *récit*] is of one image superimposed on an earlier image and following it again with the utmost care as one follows the spoor of a beast.

Brooks 1984, 97:

> Narrative always makes the implicit claim to be in a state of repetition, as a going over again of ground already covered: a sjuzet [=*histoire*] repeating the fabula [=*récit*], as the detective retraces the tracks of a criminal.[54]

Carter 1990, 102–3:

> The explorers [of Australia] were not simply travel writers; for, unlike the purveyors of picturesque places, they traveled without roads. What they described, then, was not a succession of places, but the plotting of a track along which historical time might later flood in on a tide of names... Plotting, in this context, is the desire to bring out the meaning of the line, to endow it with form..

For Xenophon though, because the inland topography of Asia Minor emerges as a surface that is largely impervious to drawing, surveying or writing instruments, the

---

[54] See ch.1, p.17, n.2, above, for a definition of *sjuzet* and *fabula.*

original line of their journey (the *histoire*) refuses to stay in place, explaining in part why his geography is so muddled.[55] The Ten Thousand's ambivalent movement through a landscape that, like the sea, is so explicitly trackless and unmarked thereby puts the plot at risk of ever reaching its *telos*.

On the other hand, if plot, as Brooks has claimed, is always – like Tristram Shandy's arabesque – a deviance from the straight line between beginning and end; always a vacillating 'detour,' then the lost interior of books 3 and 4, as it is mapped onto the roundabout progress of the Ten Thousand, may be said to provide the *Anabasis* with its "deviant middle."[56] But that arabesque only works if there is a tension between the deviance of the middle and the desire and energy of the plot to eventually reach its goal, operating as a kind of sequence of desires that are alternately frustrated and met. In the *Anabasis,* though, it is precisely the draining of 'textual energy' that occurs when the men, at a number of points in the text, refuse to go any further, that leads to a narrative impasse which mirrors the impasse of the Ten Thousand in an indomitable topography. Although the reader knows, therefore, that the Greeks will eventually reach the sea (just as every reader knows that a sentence or text will eventually come to an end), she is as blind as the actants in the drama themselves as to her location on the narrative 'road' and her distance away from its end.[57] From a narratological point of

---

[55] Farrell 1961.

[56] Brooks 1984, 104.

[57] Even Jane Austen's "tell-tale compression of pages" (*Northanger Abbey,* ch.31) is of no help here. Not only are there no 'pages' to count in a fourth-century text, but the 'telos' of reaching the sea is hidden within the middle of the narrative as a whole.

view, then, it is instructive to compare the experience of the Ten Thousand on their inland journey, many of whom simply "turned aside and sat down, refusing to go any further,"[58] with, once again, Aristotle's description of the reader of a particular type of prose sentence (Arist. *Rh.* 3.9. 1409a29–34):

λέγω δὲ εἰρομένην ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τέλος καθ' αὐτήν. ἂν μὴ τὸ πρᾶγμα ⟨τὸ⟩ λεγόμενον τελειωθῇ. ἔστι δὲ ἀηδής διὰ τὸ ἄπειρον· τὸ γὰρ τέλος πάντες βούλονται καθορᾶν· διόπερ ἐπὶ τοῖς καμπτῆρσιν ἐκπνέουσι καὶ ἐκλύονται· προορῶντες γὰρ τὸ πέρας οὐ κάμνουσι πρότερον.

I mean by the 'running style' that which has no end (*telos*) in itself, and does not complete the action being narrated. It is disagreeable due to its endlessness (*to apeiron*). For everyone always wants the end (*to telos*) to be in sight. But because of all the turns they become exhausted and give up – only if they see the finish (*to peras*) up ahead will they not tire out ahead of time.

There is no indication of how far the Ten Thousand are from the sea throughout their time inland, until the mention of a guide who promises to lead them there in five days, just a few paragraphs before they reach the coast. But even then, both the reader and army are led to believe that the guide is deceiving them, and Xenophon holds back from mentioning the sea until the last possible moment. When the end does come in sight, the army approaches it, like Aristotle's reader, through a series of 'blind turns,' only fully realizing their position as the shout is gradually passed down the line of men, and as they approach closer and closer towards it. The crucial word "Θάλαττα" moves through the sentence in a similar fashion, experientially leading the reader from confusion to unexpected resolution as her eye tracks the sequence of the words upon the page (*An.* 4.7.21–24):

---

[58] *An.* 4.5.15: "ἐνταῦθ' ἐκτραπόμενοι ἐκάθηντο καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν πορεύεσθαι."

ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄρους.[59] κραυγὴ πολλὴ ἐγένετο. ἀκούσας δὲ ὁ Ξενοφῶν καὶ οἱ ὀπισθοφύλακες ᾠήθησαν ἔμροσθεν ἄλλους ἐπιτίθεσθαι πολεμίους· ... [a long sentence concerning the position of the enemy behind, and the spoils captured from them].. ἐπειδὴ δὲ βοὴ πλείων τε ἐγίγνετο καὶ ἐγγύτερον καὶ οἱ ἀεὶ ἐπιόντες ἔθεον δρόμῳ ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀεὶ βοῶντας καὶ πολλῷ μείζων ἐγίγνετο ἡ βοὴ ὅσῳ δὴ πλείους ἐγίγνοντο. ἐδόκει δὴ μεῖζόν τι εἶναι τῷ Ξενοφῶντι. καὶ ἀναβὰς ἐφ' ἵππον καὶ Λύκιον καὶ τοὺς ἱππέας ἀναλαβὼν παρεβοήθει· καὶ τάχα δὴ ἀκούουσι βοώντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν Θάλαττα θάλαττα καὶ παρεγγυώντων. ἔνθα δὴ ἔθεον πάντες καὶ οἱ ὀπισθοφύλακες. καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια ἠλαύνετο καὶ οἱ ἵπποι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκοντο πάντες ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον. ἐνταῦθα δὴ περιέβαλλον ἀλλήλους..

When the vanguard reached the mountain, a great shout went up, which Xenophon and the rearguard thought that was an indication that another enemy had attacked them from in front... [a long sentence concerning the position of the enemy behind, and the spoils captured from them].. But when the shout kept getting louder and closer, and those who were following kept breaking into a run towards those who were shouting and making the din even greater by themselves, so that the shouting increased as more people joined in, it seemed to Xenophon that it must be a matter of some importance. So, mounting his horse and taking with him Lycius and the cavalry to help, he went ahead. Very soon they heard the soldiers shouting "The sea, the sea!" and passing the word along. At that point, the entire rearguard broke into a run, and the pack-animals and the horses charged forward. When they reached the top, they fell upon one another and embraced..

Xenophon uses his role as the leader of the rearguard, at the very back of the line, as a narratological move by which he can hold back the events of the narrative for as long as possible from the reader. The repetition of certain key words within the passage (γίγνομαι; θέω; βοάω/βοή; πλείων; μείζων; ἀεί) serves to impede the narrative further, causing it to double back on itself and frustrate the reader's desire to 'see' the end.[60] The breakthrough that occurs, however, when the Ten Thousand do finally reach the sea, is a monumental one, signaling a procession out of a narrative space within which the route of both reader and actor was profoundly obscured.

---

[59] Marchant includes here "καὶ κατεῖδον τὴν θάλατταν," I omit it following the reading of C₁ (see Marchant's app. crit., ad loc).

[60] On repetition as a delaying device in narrative, see Brooks 1984, esp. ch.4 "Freud's Masterplot..," and Quint 1993.

Redrawing the Line

The first thing that the Ten Thousand do upon reaching the sea is to set up a monument (*kolonos megas*, *An.* 4.7.26) topped with enemy shields, ox hides, and walking sticks. Dillery has questioned the purpose of this monument, since there have been no recent victories to celebrate.[61] It makes more sense, however, to view the column not so much as a trophy but as a boundary stone, signaling a return to a kind of territory which is once again able to be marked and surveyed. Immediately following this incident, the verb ὀρίζω occurs in the text, to describe how a river forms a boundary between the Macronians and the Scythinians. (*An.* 4.8.1). This expression for boundary (in both verbal and nominal form: ὀρίζω/ὅριον) has been used only once before in the *Anabasis*, just a few sections earlier (*An.* 4.3.1), but its occurrence sharply increases (to nine more occurrences in the ensuing books) after the Greeks reach the sea.[62] At *An.* 7.5.13, for example, it is employed to describe a line of boundary stones along the Thracian coast. Nowhere inland, however, do we find any indications of such topographical markers.

As separation and distantiation enter the story, so too does measurement return. With the movement from inland to coast, the Persian parasang is replaced by the shorter Greek stade,[63] and money comes back into currency.[64] The landscape of the coast,

---

[61] Dillery 1995, 77.

[62] *An.* 4.3.1; 4.8.2; 4.8.9; 5.4.2; 6.2.19; 7.5.13.2; 7.5.13.3; 7.7.36.

[63] See fig.3, above, p.190.

[64] Cf. *An.* 5.3.4; 5.5.4; 5.6.23; 5.6.26; 6.2; 7.1.3; 7.5.13.

which is dotted with Greek towns at a distance of eighty stades from one another (*An.* 5.4.31), is ordered and regulated. Although the social structure of the Ten Thousand breaks down in the last two books of the *Anabasis*, therefore, there is no longer any sense of the Greeks being 'lost' in this landscape. Rather, the danger and unfamiliarity of the inland geography serves to unite the Greeks, while it is the more familiar Greek territories on the coast, coupled with the new idea of making a profit, that drives them into unruly and often barbaric behaviour.[65] As Xenophon observes to his troops in book 5, it would in no way be possible for anyone to become confused as to the direction of Greece or Asia, East or West, or the rising or setting of the sun, from their secure position on the Euxine coast (*An.* 5.7.6–7). The story that he told from the boundary-less space of the interior, on the other hand, lacked precisely those co-ordinates of stability, order and direction.

It is fitting to end my assessment of the role of space in the *Anabasis* with a comment on Xenophon's position as an author and authority figure in the text. For the breakdown in distantiation which Jameson identifies with getting lost, and which I have outlined in my description of the use of measurement and boundaries as distancing devices, is replayed on the authorial level in the increasingly blurred distantiation between Xenophon the author and Xenophon the protagonist. As Wigley has put it, the experience of being lost arises from an "indeterminate sense of immersion, in which the body cannot separate itself from the space it inhabits" (1996, 34). We might say that in Xenophon's case, the body of the author and the body of the actor meet and converge in

---

[65] On the Panhellenism of the Greeks before they reach the sea, see Dillery 1995, 59–77.

a landscape within which differentiation and the distantiation (objective 'measurement') are no longer possible. As I have discussed in my treatment of the overlapping of first and third person voice and objective and subjective authorial style, Xenophon oversteps the boundaries of external detachment normally upheld by the ancient historian, by twice taking us into his inner dreamworld in books 3 and 4. This is unusual because the narrative is not ostensibly about him; for as long as Cyrus was alive, he was simply a private in the troops with a walk-on part (*An.* 1.8.15). As the Ten Thousand recede further into the interior, however, Xenophon's authorial stance changes with the new role he adopts in the army.

After reaching the sea (and a return to relative normality), on the other hand, Xenophon is forced to defend his actions of the third and fourth books, a task which he never performs to the army's complete satisfaction. For the fact remains that within the unusual topography of inland space, Xenophon behaves in a way that is not so much odd in terms of his role as a general, but more for the way that he blurs boundaries and genres as an author within the established literary traditions of the Greek world. It thus becomes unclear, the further we read, whether Xenophon is actually writing history, autobiography, or *apologos,* and how we are supposed to separate his two roles as narrator and protagonist.[66] Like Odysseus, then, we might say that his journey away from the sea has the effect of undermining the perceived limits of the genre from which he sets out, and in the process of losing those edges, or scaling devices, familiar to the

---

[66] On Greek autobiography, and its roots in Persian narrative, see Momigliano 1993, 23–64.

Greek world, he also, somewhat paradoxically, renders more invisible his identity as an

author and protagonist within the story (of himself) that he is attempting to tell.

Conclusion

The Odyssean *nostos,* or journey home by sea, becomes an established motif from book

5 of the *Anabasis* on, as a goal towards which the army strives in its own attempt to

reach home.[67] While scholars such as Lossau have correctly identified this element of

the *Anabasis* as a rewriting of the *Odyssey,* I hope to have shown in my analysis of

Xenophon's presentation of inland space that the layers of comparison with the *Odyssey*

go still deeper than the references to the sea in books 5-7. For Xenophon also inserts

the final tale of Teiresias' prophecy within the structure and topography of the middle

books of the *Anabasis.* Thus Xenophon, as he loses his place in relation to authorship,

plot, and space, imitates Odysseus' loss of identity and genre in the unplaced and

unmarked landscape of the interior towards which he is directed at the very end of the

Odyssey. Both texts tell similar stories about Greek anxieties concerning the disorder

and invisibility of inland space, and in both we find the same absence of accurate

scaling and measuring devices. The perception of the world that emerges is thus one

which becomes increasingly limited and intangible the further one moves away from the

boundaries of the sea.

---

[67] *An.* 5.6.10; 6.1.14; 6.2; 6.2.19; 6.4.12; 7.8.1.

Introduction to PART III: City and House

The last third of this dissertation investigates the role of the Socratic dialogue in creating a new set of topographies in narrative discourse. I reveal how the space of the Athenian city unfolds through a series of speeches whose architecture is itself elaborately structured as it is mapped onto the house, and city, where each dialogue takes place. Plato and Xenophon engage with the 'real space' of Athens in a way that we have not previously seen, but their attempts to plot the topography of the city or home is either writ large onto the fantastic geography of Atlantis (whose scope reaches beyond the bounds of the known world), or – equally fantastically – 'writ small' onto the household inventory, whose proportions and intervals are so regular as to ensure that all space (including the space of narrative) remains relative and commensurate.

In both the *Timaeus/Critias* and the *Oeconomicus*, the question of how to represent time, especially the past, is explored through the role of memory. What has been analyzed in the epic poets as a form of divine inspiration, an access to other layers of time and 'truths' through the daughters of Memory,[1] is here recast in the form of images or architectural structures that are housed in the mind. In what follows, I demonstrate how real and imaginary topographies intersect with one another in the attempt of the internal narrator (Critias/Ischomachus) to put forward a coherent and 'complete' account of a space which is – at least in the mind's eye – composed of a perfect geometry of forms.

---

[1] On the role of memory in epic poetry, see esp. Detienne 1996, ch.2: "The Memory of the Poet," 39-52; Vernant 1983, ch.3: 'Mythical Aspects of Memory," 75–105; Murray 1981; ch.1, above.

CHAPTER 5

Picturing the Past:
Images of the City in Plato's *Timaeus/Critias*

In the previous two chapters, I examined the concept of losing one's bearings in space:

of wandering so far away from the edges of the earth that both traveller and reader

ended up in a new imaginary world beyond the familiar dimensions of either

topography or scale. In what follows, I investigate a similarly disorienting image of the

world as it is reflected in Plato's 'Myth of Atlantis,' showing how Critias' reformulation

of the earth's topography to include a vast expanse of previously undiscovered space

and time radically disrupts the reader's understanding of both geography and history. In

particular, I continue to address the ongoing question of this dissertation, by asking how

the *Critias/Timaeus* approaches the task of representing a world whose scope exceeds,

in its extensive temporal and spatial range, the human capacities of narrative. In so

doing, I also revisit important themes from chapters 1 and 2, first by showing how the

geography, or spatial 'map,' of the myth houses various levels of time within the work,

and secondly, by showing how Critias draws upon the idea of the picture as a framing

device for his narrative, through which he ultimately attempts to impose coherence and

structure on an unwieldy narrative form. Just as with Herodotus' map, I show how the

Myth of Atlantis is constructed as a painted image or picture which the interlocutors of

the *Timaeus/Critias* attempt to 'bring to life' through narrative. In the final analysis, I

read Plato's Theory of Forms from the perspective of ekphrasis and image-making, situating it within my larger thesis on the use of cartography as a device for encompassing the world in terms that were inaccessible through the written word.

The chapter is structured around the theme of 'complete' and 'incomplete' narrative frames. I begin by cataloguing the various absences in the *Timaeus/Critias* that reflect upon the central motif of the disappearance of both the island of Atlantis and Athens' pre-mythic past. I argue that these absences read as an extended commentary upon the difficulty of fully capturing the story of Atlantis 'whole' as a pristine site before it has been affected by the deteriorating effects of time and history. In the second half of the chapter, I show how Critias attempts to recover Atlantis, and even to locate it within a new map of Athens and Athenian history, by building upon the analogy between picture and language that was formulated by Socrates in the *Republic*, and which he reformulates in the opening of the *Timaeus*. Pictures, I suggest, unlike narrative, offer Critias the means of organizing history into a series of overlapping, even simultaneous, images – beginning with his own mental image of the story, "branded indelibly into his mind" since childhood, and ending with the fantastically cartographic description of Atlantis in the second half of the *Critias*.

1. Incomplete and Unwell: the Myth of Atlantis in Narrative Form

The story of Atlantis is told as two incomplete halves which are split between Plato's *Timaeus* and *Critias*, and which book-end the cosmogonical excursus of the *Timaeus* proper. In the first half (*Ti.* 20c4-29d6), Critias outlines the *traditio* of the story, as it

was first told to Solon by an Egyptian priest, and then passed down through the generations of his own family. In the second half (the *Critias*) he begins anew, describing Ancient Athens in more detail and proceeding to depict the topography of Atlantis. Just as he is about to begin his narrative of the famous war between the two ancient states, however, the text inexplicably breaks off. The half-line with which the *Critias* ends (121c4–5: "and when he [Zeus] had assembled [the other gods], he said.." / "καὶ ξυναγείρας εἶπεν...") brings the narrative to an abrupt halt. Furthermore, the fourth interlocutor in the proposed tetralogy, Hermocrates, although next in line to speak after Critias (*Crit.* 108a6, b7) never materializes with a dialogue; like the end of the *Critias*, his speech exists only as an absence within the context of the projected collection of *Republic, Timaeus, Critias, Hermocrates.*

Lest we think that the missing fourth dialogue, the *Hermocrates,* and the conclusion to the *Critias* were simply an accident of external events in Plato's life, or a reflection of the author's own change of heart,[1] the *Timaeus'* opening words ("one, two, three..") formally draws attention to this notion of an 'absent fourth' within the structure of the narrative.[2] Socrates' first question as to the whereabouts of the missing guest is never sufficiently answered, nor are we ever told whom that guest might be.[3] Instead,

---

[1] For Wilamowitz's theory that Plato simply gave up on the *Critias* due to frailty, old age, and a project that was going nowhere, see Welliver 1977, 2–7.

[2] See Clay 1997, 52, on the missing *Hermocrates:* "We have in fact been prepared for something missing and elliptical by the absence of Socrates' fourth guest of the day before."

[3] The various speculations that have been formulated over the ages run from Plato himself (although he would have been a young boy at the time of the dialogue's dramatic date) to Philolaus and others. They are collected in Taylor 1928, 25.

Timaeus' answer only serves to further expose the existence of an ever-encroaching

absence in the discourse, which he and his fellow interlocutors will attempt to 'fill' with

words (*Ti.* 17a4–b4):

> ΤΙ. Ἀσθένειά τις αὐτῷ συνέπεσεν. ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκὼν τῆσδε <u>ἀπελείπετο</u>
> τῆς συνουσίας.
> ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν σὸν τῶνδέ τε ἔργον καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀπόντος <u>ἀναπληροῦν</u> μέρος;
> ΤΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. καὶ κατὰ δύναμίν γε οὐδὲν <u>ἐλλείψομεν·</u> οὐδὲ γὰρ εἴη ἂν δίκαιον.
> χθὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ ξενισθέντας. οἷς ἦν πρέπον ξενίοις μὴ οὐ προθύμως σε τοὺς λοιποὺς ἡμῶν
> ἀντφεστιᾶν.

TI: He has come down with some sickness, Socrates. For he would not have <u>missed</u> our
gathering by choice.
SO: Well then, will it be the job of you and your friends, to refill the gap left by our absent
friend?
TI: Very much so, and as far as we are able we will <u>leave out</u> nothing. For it would not be
right for the remainder of us, having been hosted by you yesterday, to not offer you a feast in
return.

The space which the sick body of the guest leaves open (*apoleipô*) corresponds to that

which is left 'undone' or 'unsaid' in the narrative which is to follow,[4] a gap which

Socrates asks his guests to 'refill' using the same verb (*anaplêro-ô*) that Timaeus will

later employ to describe the constant replenishment of the 'void' in both the corporeal

and cosmic system (*Ti.* 78d, 81b).[5] In response to his request, Timaeus promises

Socrates that the three will endeavour, as far as they are able, to 'leave nothing out'

(*elleipô*) in their speech.[6] In metaphorical terms, Timaeus implies that since they

---

[4] *LSJ*, s.v.II.3 & III. For the meaning 'to be left undone or unsaid,' see also Pl. *R* 420a7; 509c6.

[5] *Ti.* 80d6–81b4:"ὃ καλοῦμεν αἷμα. νομὴν σαρκῶν καὶ ξύμπαντος τοῦ σώματος. ὅθεν ὑδρευόμενα
ἕκαστα <u>πληροῖ</u> τὴν τοῦ κενουμένου βάσιν. ὁ δὲ τρόπος τῆς <u>πληρώσεως</u> ἀποχωρήσεώς τε
γίγωεται. καθάπερ ἐν τῷ παντὶ παντὸς ἡ φορὰ γέγονεν. ἦν τὸ ξυγγενὲς πᾶν φέρεται πρὸς
ἑαυτό....πρὸς τὸ ξυγγενὲς οὖν φερόμενον ἕκαστον τῶν ἐντὸς μερισθέντων τὸ κενωθέν τότε
πάλιν <u>ἀνεπλήρωσεν.</u>"/ "This is called blood, which is the sustenance of the flesh and of the whole
body, from where each of the parts draw up moisture so that they might <u>fill</u> the place of the void. For this
is the method of <u>filling</u> and evacuating, just like the movement of everything in the universe, which is the
attraction of each thing towards that which is akin to itself.... So each of the divided up particles inside
us, being carried towards that to which it is akin, <u>fills up</u> the void again."

[6] The verb is repeated (in the same context) at *Ti.* 20c5.

'feasted' so well yesterday on the words of their host, it is their turn today to replenish that space (as if it were a kind of gap, or hunger, in their audience's body) with an equally fitting (and 'filling') speech.[7] But before Timaeus and his friends launch in, however, with narratives of their own, Socrates himself proposes to recapitulate his own narrative of the day before. After having done so, he too betrays his concern for the possibility of narrative ellipsis, by asking if there is anything he has left unsaid ("ἀπολειπόμενον," *Ti.* 19a9), thereby returning, via ring composition, to the 'left out' ("ἀπελείπετο," *Ti.* 17a5) body of the guest with which the dialogue began.

The absence, therefore, because it is framed in terms of a disequilibrium, is formulated as a kind of sickness within the larger body of the speech.[8] The Greeks' understanding of medicine was based upon just search a sense of balance and proportion between parts of the body, including, most importantly, a balanced release and replenishing of fluids (humours) in equal measure for the maintenance of good health. This idea is not only all-pervasive in the Hippocratic corpus, but also evident in the early formulations of some Presocratic philosophers and in the medical writings of Plato's contemporary, Philistion of Locri.[9] Most importantly for our purposes, it is

---

[7] For the analogy between speech and feast (common in Plato and Greek thought in general) cf. *Ti.* 17b2; 27b8.

[8] As if the speech itself were a macrocosm of the original body of the guest. For an alternative reading of the speech as a body, see Brague 1985; Brisson 1987. On the metaphor of disease in Plato's *Timaeus,* see Ayache 1997; Miller 1962.

[9] Particularly Empedocles, whose theory of the four elements was influential upon later medical theories. On Philistion's theories, as well as his close connection with Plato, see Taylor 1928, 599, n.1. On this section of Plato's text as a whole and its relation to the medical writers, see Cornford 1948, 322–26; Miller 1962.

formulated in the *Timaeus* itself, in Timaeus' description of the equal replenishment of parts in both the body and universe, at 80d1–86a8.[10] For example, at 81e6–82a7, Timaeus states:

Τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὅθεν συνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί. τεττάρων γὰρ ὄντων γενῶν ἐξ ὧν συμπέπηγεν τὸ σῶμα. γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος. τούτων ἡ παρὰ φύσιν <u>πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια</u> ... γιγνομένη.. στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει.

It is clear to everyone where diseases originate. For, of the four elements from which the body is made (earth, fire, water, and air), it may happen that, contrary to nature, an excess or lack of one of them might take place.. and cause disruption and disease.

In addition to the use of *pleonexia* in this excerpt, *plêro-ô* and its compounds are repeatedly used at *Ti.* 80d–81b to further categorize the conditions of bodily surfeit or lack (80d5, 81a2, 81b4). Significantly, at the end of the *Critias,* both of these words recur, this time to suggest the unhealthy connotations of Atlantis' uneven 'over-stuffing,' of power and wealth (*Crit.* 121b6–7: "<u>πλεονεξίας ἀδίκου καὶ δυνάμεως ἐμπιπλάμενοι.</u>").[11]

The imperfect balance between absence and excess that leads to incompleteness at both the beginning and end of Critias' account also prepares the reader for a similar use of disease to imply fractionality within the content of his story. For, as is well known, the myth of Atlantis was discovered by Solon on his travels to Egypt, where the whole story of an early and forgotten time-before-time is explained to him by a priest in the ancient city of Saïs. It is here that Solon learns that history is itself no more than a

---

[10] See my n.5, above.

[11] "They were filled up with an excess of injustice and power." In contrast to the disequilibrium of Atlantis and the interlocutors' speech, note the Demiurge's creation of the world as a complete and self-sufficient entity, with no parts "left over" (*hupoleipô*) at *Ti.* 32c8. On the comparison between the healthy/unhealthy human body and the body politic in the *Timaeus,* see Ayache 1997.

partial and deleted narrative, the vast majority of which has been wasted away by the

deluges of flood and fire in the cosmic cycle of the 'Great Year.' In a physical manner

that mirrors the unhealthy because 'unfilled' body of the interlocutor's discourse,

moreover, these floods and fires are said to sweep "like a sickness" ("ὥσπερ νόσημα,"

Ti. 23a7) over the material body of the earth. In the *Critias*, the after-effects of that

cosmic destruction upon the original, healthy body of ancient Attica is explicitly framed

in pathological terms, as the landscape is transformed into an emaciated and diseased

version of its former self (*Crit.* 111b4–7):

> λέλειπται δή, καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς μικραῖς νήσοις, πρὸς τὰ τότε τὰ νῦν οἶον νοσήσαντος
> σώματος ὀστᾶ, περιερρυηκυίας τῆς γῆς ὅση πίειρα καὶ μαλακή, τοῦ λεπτοῦ σώματος
> τῆς χώρας μόνον λειφθέντος.
>
> What remains, then, just as happens in small islands, is – if we compare what it is now to what it
> was then – like the bones of a sick body, with all the fat and soft parts of the land having wasted
> away, and with only the bare body of the place being left.

The gradual shrinking of Athens over the course of time, which stands as a less extreme

form of Atlantis' complete disappearance from the surface of the earth, is thereby

expressed, in physical terms, as a 'disease' which attacks the soft parts of the body. That

disease, as I have shown, similarly erodes the structure of the dialogue itself, from the

initial absence of the sick guest at the beginning of the *Timaeus* to the 'unhealthy' state

of the gorged and fragmented narrative at the end of the *Critias*.

This gradual disintegration of topography through time is analogous, I suggest,

to the physical diminution of the stories that are told and retold in the prologue of the

Timaeus. For in the section immediately preceding Timaeus' explicitly original and

singular speech,[12] the reader is presented with nothing but a series of repetitions and

recapitulations, each of which is successively shorter and less complete than in its

previous telling. The cycle is set in motion by Socrates, who, in response to Timaeus'

request that he "briefly (διὰ βραχέων) go back over those things [he said yesterday]

from the beginning" (*Ti.* 17b8), sketches a summary of the *Republic* in just under two

Stephanus pages.[13] The *Republic* itself, we might remember, is also a retelling of events

that happened "yesterday" (*R.* 327a1: "Κατέβην χθὲς εἰς Πειραιᾶ.."),[14] rendering

Socrates' version in the *Timaeus* a third-hand, drastically reduced account. As the story

of the *Republic* becomes successively shorter, or smaller (βραχύς),[15] 'losing' a little

more from its original state with each re-telling, its physical diminution may be said to

imitate, on a smaller scale, the effects of time's deluges upon the landscape of Attica.

This point is best illustrated by the intricate system of tellings and re-tellings

through which Critias structures his account of Atlantis immediately after Socrates'

speech. The narrative layering of his account is complex, for the story, as it is passed

from one narrator to the next, unfolds like a series of Russian dolls without a clear

beginning or ending, or – as Derrida has put it – "Each tale is.. the *receptacle of*

---

[12] As Osborne (1996, 185) points out, Timaeus' speech, unlike the recapitulated narratives of Socrates and Critias, is told only at first-hand.

[13] On the grounds that 1) the Panatheneia (setting of *Ti.*) cannot follow so fast upon the heels of a festival of Bendis (setting of *R.*); 2) Socrates summary in the *Ti.* does not include some important material from *R*, some argue that the *Republic* is *not* alluded to here, despite the overwhelming similarities between this summary and Plato's earlier text. See Zeyl 2000, 26–7 (not *R.*); Taylor 1928, 46 (is *R.*).

[14] "Yesterday I went down to Piraeus..."

[15] Note the preponderance of βραχυς in this section of the *Timaeus*, referring primarily to the shrinkage of either narrative or the world, through time (17b8; 22c3; 23b5; 23c2; 23e5; 25d5).

another. There is nothing but receptacles of narrative receptacles, or narrative

receptacles of receptacles. [italics his]."[16] The sequence of the *traditio* runs as follows:

[1] the ancient history of Athens and Atlantis is written upon the temple walls at Saïs;

[2] A priest at Saïs, who does not have time to consult the actual writings, gives Solon a

verbal account of the story, in summary form; [3.i] Solon attempts to write the story in

verse form, but fails due to lack of time; [3.ii] Solon tells the story to Critias' great-

grandfather, Dropides; [4] Dropides tells the story to his son (Critias' grandfather), also

named Critias; [5] Grandfather Critias tells the story to his grandson Critias (the

interlocutor of the *Timaeus/Critias*) when the latter is a child; [6.i] Critias tells the story

to Timaeus, Hermocrates (and the unknown fourth guest?) on the way back from

Socrates' lodgings, after "yesterday's" conversation (some version of the *Republic*);

[6.ii] Critias stays up all night retelling the story to himself between the occasions of

"yesterday's" dialogue (the *Republic*) and today's (the *Timaeus*); [6.iii] Critias retells

the story to his friends (Timaeus, Hermocrates, the fourth guest?) first thing in the

morning; [6.iv] Later on that same day, Critias gives a preview of his story at *Ti.*

20c4–27d4; [6.v] Critias tells the story for a fifth time, and in its eleventh incarnation in

this narrative (but still not in its complete form) in the dialogue that takes his name.

In the next section of this chapter, I will have more to say about the temporal

positioning of these accounts. For now, I wish to focus on the consistent but

unsuccessful attempt, made by each of the narrators of this story, to give a complete

---

[16] Derrida 1997, 26. See also Osborne's commentary on this section, 'Retelling the Tales,' (1996, 181–183).

rendition of the myth in the language and time available. The Egyptian priest tells

Solon, for example, that he will first give him a condensed version (*Ti.* 23e5: "διὰ

βραχέων") of the laws and deeds of Ancient Athens, followed by a more thorough,

blow-by-blow ("ἐφεξῆς") account using the written records (*Ti.* 24a1). But the longer

version never takes place in the dialogue. So too does Solon fail to complete

(ἀποτελέω. *Ti.* 21c6) his own, poetic version of the story after arriving back in Athens,

although we are told that if he had done so, his account would have rivalled the

narratives of Homer or Hesiod (*Ti.* 21d1). Both of the written out, or long versions of

their retellings, therefore, although promised or attempted, fail to materialize beyond the

initial précis. Again, the same pattern is true for Critias, who categorizes his account in

the *Timaeus* as only a brief summary (*Ti.* 25e: "so that.. to put it briefly (ὡς συντόμως

εἰπεῖν).. is the speech Solon heard"), but whose unfinished *Critias* fails to live up to an

earlier promise to give a complete account of the myth, "*not as a summary*, but just as I

heard it, point for point" (*Ti.* 26c6–7: "μὴ μόνον ἐν κεφαλαίος ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἤκουσα

καθ' ἕκαστον.").

As the sick body of ancient Athens wastes away, therefore, so too does its

narrative, which, with each retelling, obstinately fails to materialize as a complete

physical entity (whether on temple walls, in Solon's poetry, or in Plato's dialogues).

Critias' account implies, moreover, that the myth is only capable of survival in a

cognitive or mental structure, for in his own rendering of the tale on the previous night

he claims to have remembered "almost all of it" (σχεδόν τι πάντα,) better even than if

he were recalling something told to him yesterday (*Ti.* 26b2). As soon as it is articulated

into a narrative frame, however, the myth breaks down, receding with the temporal flow of language into a form that is ever harder to grasp in its entirety.

The gaps that we are left with in the discourse of the Atlantis myth, therefore, speak to an insufficiency within language to fully reproduce the events of history through time. In chapter 2, we saw how Herodotus approached this problem by balancing finely on the line between epic poetry and historiography. In Plato, the issue is nuanced in different terms. In particular, it is through the central question of mimesis that Plato addresses the concept of recasting an original, intelligible idea into a tangible and perceptible context. In the *Timaeus*, the Demiurge, on the one hand, appears to have done the best possible 'image-making' he can in his construction of the world, so that it, *although a copy*, nevertheless remains good and everlasting.[17] His image of the world is close to perfect in part because it is "ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον:" immune to the processes of aging and disease (*Ti.* 33a2). In Critias' case, on the other hand, the seemingly endless reduplication of narrative speaks to the imperfect nature of language as an imitative form, suggesting that the act of story-telling works not to preserve the events of history, but rather to erode them.

This would suggest that language itself, especially the written word, was also associated with this pattern of disease and disintegration in Plato. It is no surprise, therefore, to find that in the *Seventh Letter* Plato refers to a 'sickness' ("ἀσθενές") that is inherent in *logos* (*Ep.* VII, 343a1) and to its inability to hold the truth firmly in

---

[17] On the importance of not discounting the Demiurge's creation on the misguided grounds that, for Plato, perceptible objects are unworthy of study, see Lloyd 1991, 333–351.

place.[18] Similarly in the *Phaedrus*, although the Egyptian god Theuth claims to have

discovered in writing the "cure" or "medicine" ("φάρμακον") for the wasting-away of

memory and wisdom in the human condition (*Phdr.* 274e6), it is soon revealed that his

discovery of *grammata* will have quite the opposite ("τοὐναντίον") effect (*Phdr.*

275a1).[19]

2. The Myth as Image

If the attempts to cast the Myth of Atlantis into narrative form fail so pointedly in the

Timaeus/Critias, then the attempt to re-interpret it through pictorial imagery will be

revealed as a more successful endeavour. For Critias' story, in this re-reading, begins

with a picture (*Ti.* 26b2–c3):

> ὡς δή τοι. τὸ λεγόμενον. τὰ παίδων μαθήματα θαυμαστὸν ἔχει τι μνημεῖον. ἐγὼ γάρ. ἃ
> μὲν χθὲς ἤκουσα. οὐκ ἂν οἶδ' εἰ δυναίμην ἅπαντα ἐν μνήμῃ πάλιν λαβεῖν· ταῦτα δέ. ἃ
> πάμπολυν χρόνον διακήκοα. παντάτασι θαυμάσαιμ' ἂν εἴ τί με αὐτῶν διαπέφευγεν. ἦν
> μὲν οὖν μετὰ πολλῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ παιδικῆς τοτε ἀκουόμενα. καὶ τοῦ πρεσβύτου
> προθύμως με διδάσκοντος. ἅτ' ἐμοῦ πολλάκις ἐπανερωτῶντος. ὥστε οἷον ἐγκαύματα
> ἀνεκλύπτου γραφῆς ἔμμονά μοι γέγονε·

It is said that the lessons learned in childhood have an amazing capacity to take hold in the
memory. How true! For I don't know if I would be able to bring back into my memory all the
things that I heard yesterday, but as for the details of the story that I heard all that time ago, I
would truly be amazed if any of them had escaped my mind. I listened then with so much
pleasure and childish enthusiasm, eagerly being taught by the old man as I interrupted him at
every turn, so that the story remains burned in my mind like an indelible picture.

Impervious, then, to the destructive effect that time works upon both topography and

narrative, the perfect image of memory that Critias carries in his mind remains true and

---

[18] Cf. *Crat.* 438d–e.

[19] The pharmaceutical effects of the *pharmakon* of writing thereby have a negative and poisonous rather
than a healing effect. Cf. Derrida 1991, 126: "The King's reply presupposes that the effectiveness of the
pharmakon can be reversed: it can worsen the ill instead of remedy it."

complete. The picture thereby emerges as the ideal vehicle (unlike language) for

keeping one's hold on the past intact. But how can such an atemporal model participate

in the time-bound sequence of history through which the Atlantis myth unfolds? In the

following section, I will analyze the ways in which Critias borrows from the synchronic

properties of the picture in order to plot a vision of history that both encompasses and

escapes from the 'aging process' of time. In particular, I will explore how the

interlocutors of the two dialogues borrow from the holistic concept of the picture in his

attempt to capture an unmediated sense of the past that is complete and uncorrupted.

Picturing the Past: The City Through Time

> The picture of the city that we carry in our minds is always slightly out of date.
>
> Jorge Luis Borges, *The Unworthy*

Although the *Timaeus* opens with an explicitly forward moving sequence, (*Ti.* 17a1:

"Εἷς, δύο. τρεῖς..") the absence of the fourth guest symbolically impedes the temporal

succession, and completion, of the narrative. Specifically, it draws the conversation

backwards, to Socrates' description of "yesterday's"[20] city, itself a reflection of a

Platonic dialogue that was written at a considerably earlier date in Plato's life.[21] This is

---

[20] As Osborne has remarked, the word 'yesterday' (χθές) is emphatically repeated in the *Timaeus* prologue, from the very first sentence of the work to the end of Socrates' recapitulation of the *Republic* (cf. *Ti.* 17a2; 17b2; 17c1; 19a7; 20b1; 20c6; 25e2; 26a4; 26a7; 26b4; 26c8; 26e7).

[21] On whether Socrates' speech is a retelling of the *Republic* or not, see above, n.13. The dating of the *Timaeus* has also caused some controversy (see in particular Owen 1953, who argued, based on his perceived evolution of Plato's thought, for a "middle period" *Timaeus*) but is now accepted by most as a late dialogue, written at some point in the last 10–15 years of Plato's life (Zeyl 2000, xvi–xx). The *Republic*, on the other hand, is dated to Plato's middle period, and was probably composed a good number of years earlier.

only the first of the many recapitulations that will draw the reader ever further into the past as the *Timaeus* prologue progresses. For, as Critias embarks upon the description of his city, whose retelling also 'began' yesterday (χθές), on the road from Socrates' lodgings to his own (*Ti.* 20c8–d1), the thread of his narrative follows the history of Athens from his own childhood back, through the lineage of his grandfathers, to the time of Solon, over two hundred years ago.[22]

The *Timaeus*, then, as it ostensibly begins with Socrates' story of one city (Kallipolis) which exists outside both time and place,[23] presents it against the backdrop of a series of 'cities' from the past which are overlaid, one on top of the other, before the eye of the reader or listener. Time, as it stretches back from the date of the *Timaeus* to the archonship of Solon, is spread out in a series of mental images which jostle and overlap with one another, creating a composite narrative of the diachronic city, from its quasi-mythical beginnings as an archaic city state through the fifth century and, implicitly at least, to the fourth century when the *Timaeus* was composed. The period of history intervening between the dramatic date of Critias' speech and the time at which Plato is writing is left unfilled, but it is nevertheless a gap that is all the more significant for the silent role it plays in the dialogue. During the intervening time between the dialogue's dramatic date (c.430 BCE) and its composition (post 360), Critias will be

---

[22] For the genealogical tree of the story's oral transmission see Brisson 1998, 26; Welliver 1977, 51 (after Davies' *Athenian Propertied Families*, 1949).

[23] See Socrates' description of the ideal city as set in 'no-place' at *R.* 592a10–b1: "ἐν ᾗ νῦν διήλθομεν οἰκίζοντες πόλει λέγεις, τῇ ἐν λόγοις κειμένη· ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν εἶναι." / "the city we are founding and describing, the one that exists in words, for I don't think it exists anywhere on earth" (cf. *R.* 369a,c); and at 'no-time' at *R.* 499c–d: "At whatever time the Muse of philosophy controls a city, the constitution we've described will also exist at that time, whether it is past, present, or future."

exiled from Athens in 406 and return, as part of the infamous Thirty, in 404. Moreover, the fourth interlocutor in the dialogue, Hermocrates, will also have an important role to play in Athens' future history, as he is the Athenian general who will face and defeat the Athenians when they, at the peak of their imperial mindset, make the disastrous decision to invade Sicily in 415/4.[24]

As the layers of Athens' history are successively revealed, therefore, in the *traditio* through which Critias retraces the route of his narrative, we are able to glimpse the city stretched out upon a timeline which runs from the sixth to fourth centuries BCE. The topographical dimensions of that timeline, moreover, become more evident with each step of Critias' narrative, which is fashioned as a kind of journey through memory and the past.[25] Thus Critias' original retelling of the story (to Timaeus and Hermocrates) takes place en route ("καθ᾽ ὁδόν," *Ti.* 20c8) from Socrates lodging to his own on the previous night: a path that also marks the narrative space between the *Republic* and the *Timaeus.* Furthermore, the small distance covered by Critias between the two houses,

---

[24] It should be pointed out here that there is some confusion as to which Critias the speaker of this dialogue is, and whether he is in fact the 'tyrant' of the Thirty. Once again, those who want the timing in the *Timaeus* to fit into a chronology of 'real time,' (cf. the problem in the chronology of the two festivals at n.13, above) have argued that Critias' great-grandfather could not possibly have been old enough to consort with Solon in the mid sixth century. They have thus posited that this Critias is in fact himself the grandfather of Critias the Tyrant, whilst still being the grandson of Critias son of Dropides. Brisson believes this could be his father (Critias III) but that Plato leaves the issue deliberately ambiguous (1998, 28–29), Vidal-Naquet (1986, 263) & Clay (2000, 28, n.15), among others, take this Critias to be the tyrant. On Hermocrates deliberately silent role in the dialogues, see Clay, 1987. Since my own argument is based precisely on the overlapping of chronology and time in the *Ti./Crit.*, I endorse the identification of Plato's Critias with the 'tyrant' of 404/3.

[25] The narrative as journey was a well-defined Classical motif. See my comments in ch.2 (above, p.82, n.19). In Plato, it can be identified, for example, in the *Republic* (where Socrates compares his description of the ideal city to a sea voyage (*R.* 394d; 441c; 453d) as well as throughout the *Timaeus/Critias.* See especially *Crit.* 106a1–3, where Timaeus compares his relief at completing the his discourse to that of "a traveller who has come to rest at the end of a long road."

during which (in the process of recollecting a story heard at the age of ten) he traverses the temporal space from adulthood to childhood, may be understood as a prelude to the more extensive journey undertaken by Solon to the Egyptian city of Saïs. In that second journey, the Athenian lawgiver (like Critias, and like the reader of the *Timaeus* prologue) also travels backwards into the past, to a time when the Greeks are themselves cast as merely 'children' within the larger scheme of Egyptian history (*Ti.* 22b2–3).

Solon's journey, therefore, takes him back through several layers of the Athenian past, as if he were walking through a museum and being faced with various images of his city as it appeared through time. For Saïs, which was founded a thousand years after the Athenians' ancient city by the same goddess, Athena,[26] appears as a preserved reflection of Athens as it once existed in the forgotten recesses of the past. Even the laws which Saïs has kept in place since its foundation are, according to the Egyptian priest, very similar to those by which Ancient Athens used to be governed (*Ti.* 24a3–4). Having travelled this far back in time, to an ancient vantage point before the beginning of his city's collective memory, Solon then continues to travel further backwards, to 'visit' both more and less ancient versions of his city, as the priest's narrative unfolds. Thus his glimpse of the original and glorious Athens, which single-handedly defended the rest of the world from the inhabitants of Atlantis, is reflected, as if in a prism, in a number of images of other cities within myth. These include not only Saïs, but also Atlantis in its Golden-Age state; the Athens of the age of Marathon which

---

[26] Cf. *Ti.* 21e; 23d–e.

valiantly and independently defended Greece from Persian invasion in 490 BCE;[27] the

modern-day constitution of Sparta;[28] and, finally, the atemporal, ideal city outlined by

Socrates in the *Republic* and the prologue of the *Timaeus*.[29]

In a further extension of these reflections within reflections, Atlantis, which, in

its pre-corrupted state, resembled the original ancient Athens, grows into an imperial

power that vies for sovereignty over its neighbours. Not only does it take on the

properties of Persia in the early fifth century, therefore, but it also, more interestingly,

begins to resemble modern Athens as it was at the dramatic date of the dialogue, both in

terms of their parallel building programmes[30] and in their imperialist outlooks, which

lead, respectively, to the battle between Athens and Atlantis and the Peloponnesian

War. As Vidal-Naquet showed, the picture of Ancient Atlantis that we are given in the

Critias thereby stands as an ancient double for the contemporary Athens of the mid to

late fifth century.[31] Just as Atlantis over-reached her limits in attacking Ancient Athens,

so too would Athens make the disastrous mistake of invading Sicily, as the presence of

---

[27] Gill 1977, 294, & n.30. On Marathon as a 'paradigmatic history,' see Loraux 1986, 155–171. (Cf. her observations on the different layers of Athenian time which are collected together in the funeral oration (1986, esp. 60–76 & 118–131), which has much in common with Plato's treatment of time here).

[28] Gill 1977, 295.

[29] Like Socrates' ideal city (and like Saïs), the constitution of Ancient Athens is based on a separation of different craftsmen from one another, and, in particular, the isolation of the warrior class from the rest of the city. Cf. *Ti.* 17c–d; 24a–b.

[30] Gill 1977, 297 notes that the construction of Athenian style 'Long Walls' and an acropolis on Atlantis. In addition, Vidal-Naquet (1986, 267) notes the 'Persian-style' architecture of Atlantis, especially its irrigation system and circular palace design.

[31] Vidal-Naquet 1986 (1964). See also Gill 1977; Naddaff 1994; Clay 1997.

Hermocrates in the *Timaeus/Critias* quietly makes clear.[32] In thus vanquishing Atlantis, "Plato's Athens really overcomes herself" (Vidal-Naquet 1986, 268) by targeting what is in fact a distorted image of herself thousands of years into the future.

In stark contrast to the incomplete state of Critias' narrative which I outlined in section one, therefore, a coherent and composite picture of Athenian history (from 'yesterday' to nine thousand years ago) begins to emerge, as each stage in its past is captured by a different cityscape on the spectrum of Critias' imaginary travels. In turn, those cityscapes (of Saïs, Athens, Atlantis, and Kallipolis) create a series of frames that can be physically laid over one another in the manner of a photographic transparency or palimpsest. Critias, moreover, proves to be masterfully adept at integrating imaginary cities with real ones. He is thus careful to choose a well-established site in Lower Egypt, familiar to the Greeks, as the jumping-off point for the imaginary cities of Ancient Athens and Atlantis. Secondly, he proposes to transport (*meta-pherô*) and legally incorporate (*eisagô tous dikastas*) the images of Socrates' and the Egyptian priest's ancient and abstract cities into the concrete topography of present-day Athens.

Ti. 26c7–d5:

τοὺς δὲ πολίτας καὶ τὴν πόλιν. ἣν χθὲς ἡμῖν ὡς ἐν μύθῳ διῄεισθα σύ. νῦν μετενεγκόντες ἐπὶ τάληθὲς δεῦρο θήσομεν ὡς ἐκείνην τήνδε οὖσαν. καὶ τοὺς πολίτας. οὓς διενοοῦ. φήσομεν ἐκείνους τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς εἶναι προγόνους ἡμῶν. οὓς ἔλεγεν ὁ ἱερεύς. πάντως ἁρμόσουσι καὶ οὐκ ἀπᾳσόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ἐν τῷ τότε ὄντας χρόνῳ·

We will now convert those citizens and that city, which you [Socrates] described to us yesterday in a story (*muthos*), here and now, into a true (*alêthês*) account that exists here in our own city. And we will call the citizens, whom you described, the true ancestors of our own city, about whom the priest spoke. Everything will fit exactly, and we will not err in saying that those men [whom you described, Socrates] are the same as the ones who existed long ago.

---

[32] Clay 1997.

Ti. 27b1–6:

κατὰ δὴ τὸν Σόλωνος λόγον τε καὶ νόμον εἰσαγαγόντα αὐτοὺς ὡς εἰς δικαστὰς ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι πολίτας τῆς πόλεως τῆσδε ὡς ὄντας τοὺς τότε Ἀθηναίους. οὓς ἐμήνυσεν ἀφανεῖς ὄντας ἡ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων φήμη. τὰ λοιπὰ δὲ ὡς περὶ πολιτῶν καὶ Ἀθηναίων ὄντων ἤδη ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους.

According to the law, as well as the history, established by Solon we will introduce them [the Ancient Athenians] as if into the court, and we will make them citizens of this city, since they are the Athenians of long ago, whom the declaration of the holy writings have revealed to have become lost, so that from now on we shall consider as if the decree concerning their status as citizens and Athenians has already been passed.

The translation that Critias describes, therefore, from one type of narrative (*mûthos*) to another (*alêthês*),[33] is imagined as the physical integration of three cities into a single whole, just as the three narratives (of Socrates, the priest, and Solon) are each embedded inside one another. Finally, it takes Critias to draw all the strands of those narratives together, by imaginatively transposing them onto the location of contemporary Athens and ensuring that each city 'fits' (*ἁρμόζω*) upon or within the other as if with geometric precision. Socrates' ideal city is thereby revealed to share the same co-ordinates, both historically and geographically, as Solon's Ancient Athens,[34] and this single city is introduced, in turn, into the civic landscape of Plato's Athens by analogy to a formal, legal process. For Critias says of both Socrates' and Solon's citizens that he will "lead them into court," thereby symbolically re-locating them within one of the quintessential spaces of the democratic city in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE.

---

[33] Cf. *Ti.* 26e4, & Morgan 2000, 262, on the *mûthos/alêthês* dichotomy.

[34] On the comparison between ancient and modern Athens, see Morgan 2000, 261–271.

Finally, the complex narrative patterning of cityscape over cityscape, which

Critias succinctly engineers, is reflected in the Athenians' own re-imaging of

themselves as an archaic city in the early fourth century. As Morgan has observed in her

reading of this myth, since the restoration of democracy in 403 BCE, the 'ancient laws'

of Solon had been readopted, as if the city were folding back into its image of itself in

the past, at the very beginning of its constitution in the early sixth century.[35] Athens'

own invention of its past (and adjustment of the present in order to re-occupy that past)

in the early fourth century is thereby mirrored in Critias' superimposition of the ancient

city onto the topography of the new one, especially when the story of that transition is

told through the combined voice of Solon and the fourth century Athenian court.

Not only Saïs, therefore, but also Socrates' ideal city of the *Republic*, Ancient

Athens, and Atlantis, all stand as reflections, or counter-sites, for the contemporary city

from which Plato's interlocutors speak. The organization of those cities into a single

whole, moreover, can be traced along the thread of chronological time, from nine

thousand years into the past to the present moment of the *Timaeus*' composition, as if

each micro-narrative (whether told by Socrates, the Egyptian priest, Solon, or Critias)

were an image which occupied the same place at different moments in the city's

---

[35] Although the move was more rhetorical than real: several of 'Solon's laws' were in fact only introduced for the first time in the fourth century BCE. See Morgan 2000, 268, & her reference to Finley 1975, 39. The text of the codification proposed in 410, and completed in 403, is found in Andocides 1.83 (Finley's translation): "The Athenians shall be governed in the ancestral way (*ta patria*), using the laws, weights and measures of Solon and also the regulations of Draco, which had previously been in force." See further, Finley 1975, 39: "Clearly *patrios* here is ancestral.. not in any archaic sense of going back to the codifications of 594 and 621 BC, respectively, but in an elliptical sense.. advocates went on cheerfully citing in the courts what they called 'a law of Solon,' even when it was blatantly impossible for the enactment to have been very ancient." On the myth of Atlantis and Athens as a reflection upon contemporary Athenian practice, see Morgan 2000, 268–271; Vidal-Naquet 1986.

paradigmatic history. The global distance that separates Ancient Athens and Atlantis may thus be redefined, through the associations each shares with the modern-day city, as the distance between an idealized mythic past (now reincorporated into fourth century Athens as 'the present') and recent Athenian history (now redefined as 'the future,' from the standpoint of the dialogue's dramatic date). Despite the vast geographical distance between Ancient Athens and Atlantis, therefore, it is time, not space, that is revealed to be the crucial separating factor between the two images of the city. As a whole series of 'Athens' are stretched out, in succession, upon a spatial trajectory, the 'plot' of Plato's *Critias* and *Timaeus* is thus transformed into a vast 'unfolded map' (of time, or memory) upon which the narrator traces out the course of his story.[36]

Crossing the Same Space Twice: the Cycle of History and the Map of the World

> κατὰ περιόδους τινὰς τὰ γενόμενά ποτε πάλιν γίνεται. νέον γ' οὐδὲν
> ἁπλῶς ἔστι.
>
> According to certain cycles, that which has happened once will occur again, and nothing is completely new.
>
> Porphyry, on the teachings of Pythagoras
> (DK 14. 8A38—40)

In the first chapter of this dissertation, I discussed the process of narrative repetition which each plot works through in an attempt to make its story 'whole,' following the

---

[36] The image of memory as an 'unfolded map' comes from de Certeau's reading of Jules Verne's *l'Ile Mystérieuse* (1986, 137—49, esp. 143—4). For de Certeau, movement through space is a crucial component of narrative (1984, 129): "In Greek, "narrative" is called "diegesis": it establishes an itinerary (it "guides") and it passes through ("it transgresses"). On the "text's ability to be a narrative of space," see also his essay on Montaigne's "Of Cannibals" (1986, 67—79). On the double meaning of 'plot,' see ch.2, above, p.80, & Brooks 1984, 11—12.

psychoanalytical theory forwarded by Peter Brooks and Hayden White.[37] Here, one

might alternatively say that Plato, in his construction of a series of images of the city

which repeat and reproduce one another over time, encodes that same process of

narrative repetition within the cycles of the Pythagorean 'Great Year.' The floods and

deluges which determine the cycle of that year, as the Egyptian priest explains it to

Solon at *Ti.* 22d1-3, transform history into a continuous loop from which only certain

people (such as those who live by the Nile) are exempt.[38] In the *Timaeus/Critias*,

moreover, the reduplication of time symbolized by the theory of the Great Year is re-

plotted, on a narratological level, onto the reduplications of the same story, as the myth

of Atlantis is passed down from one storyteller to the next. Similarly, the content of the

histories themselves (whether of Ancient Athens; Atlantis; Saïs; or Athens of the sixth

century (Solon), fifth century (Critias), or fourth century (Plato)) emerge as a series of

repetitions in an continual loop, so that each history, although it appears to be unique, is

actually revealed to be nothing but a retelling of the same, ancient story.

In his discussion of the Pythagorean 'Great Year,' Sorabji poses the question of

whether the theory of reduplication over time, which had become a commonplace in

Pythagorean thought, was ever extended to the concept of reduplication in space.[39] Was

there such a thing as a spatial analogue to the Great Year, in which worlds were

reduplicated simultaneously, and separated geographically rather than chronologically?

---

[37] See above, ch.1, pp.31–33.

[38] On the Pythagorean theory of reduplicated time, see Sorabji 1988, 160–185.

[39] Sorabji 1988, 182–185.

Sorabji can find little evidence that such a "spatial analogue" did exist, although he does adduce in a fragment of Anaxagoras (DK 4) the theoretical possibility of multiple worlds (1988, 184–185). In the *Timaeus/Critias,* however, the Great Year, as its reduplication effect is spread out over space as well as time, is expressed through a spatial analogue of sorts. By plotting its repetitions upon a spatial plane, where the topographies of Saïs, Atlantis, Socrates' ideal city, and Athens old and new are all reflections or reincarnations of each other at different moments in time, Plato's historiography emerges as something like a map of a chronological landscape.

Time Travel: the ' Map' of History.

We might say, then, that fourth-century Athens creates a present for itself which is also a reliving of its past, as, through the law courts, it brings two tenses into the same civic space. In chapter 1, we saw how this synchronic overlapping of tense and time was built into the topography of Hesiod's *Theogony.* Similarly, the plot of the Atlantis myth unfolds as a series of cities which are both the same (Athens) and different (Athens at various moments in history) but that are visible in a single visual frame (the 'picture' emblazoned into Critias' mind). By using the model of the journey to access different moment in Athenian history, Plato spreads time out on a 'map,' from Athens to Egypt to the far recesses of earth beyond the Atlantic Ocean. As history is recast as geography, therefore, so is Solon – celebrated in the *Histories* for his *theôria* – re-imagined as a 'tourist of time': a traveller whose journeys take him far into the past and future, but who, at the same time, never actually leaves 'Athens.'

Solon's subsequent sense of being 'lost,' therefore, applies not so much to his position in the new landscape of Egypt, but rather to the sudden revelation that Ancient Athens and Atlantis have simply disappeared from the cultural memory of his city. Kevin Lynch has described landscape as "a vast mnemonic system" by whose familiar markers the inhabitant orients his- or her- self, especially in their own relation to 'home.'[40] As Solon is forced to reevaluate the composition of the space around him, therefore, he is also driven to 're-map' his memory, in order to include the thousands of years which have, along with the lands which accompanied them, been wiped clean from the slate of Athenian history.[41]

In the same context, moreover, in which Solon learns that his understanding of history is only a fraction of its true extent, he also learns that his perception of the world, up till now, has been drastically out of scale. For, according to much the same lesson that the map of the world teaches Alcibiades in the account related by Aelian,[42] Solon discovers that everything that lies within the Pillars of Heracles (that is, the known world) "is nothing but a bay with a narrow entrance" (*Ti.* 25a3) compared to the vast regions of space that extend beyond it.[43] Atlantis, entirely in keeping with this new

---

[40] Lynch 1960, 126.

[41] Cf. *R.* 500e2–501a10 (below, p.231), where Socrates envisions 'wiping clean the slate' of Athens in order to recast the new model of his ideal city upon it.

[42] See above, ch.2, p.123.

[43] This revelation of the true extent of the earth's space can be compared with Socrates description in the *Phaedo* of the Greeks sitting around the Mediterranean 'like frogs around a pond,' where our vision of the world is likened to that of a fish looking up through murky seas (*Phd.* 109a9–110b1). Cf. the cave analogy at *R.* 514a (ff.).

understanding of scale, is measured according to the Greeks' biggest unit of land-mass,

the continent, but is understood to be larger than two of those continents (Asia and

Libya/Africa) combined. According to the Ionians' cartography, therefore, which, as

Herodotus informs us, divided the world into the three continents of Asia, Europe, and

Libya,[44] the mere inclusion of Atlantis upon the map of the world increases the earth's

territory by more than two thirds of its original size

The simultaneous revelation of vast regions of both time and space that had

become lost or invisible aligns time with territory, transforming history into a tangible

substance, which, like Ancient Attica or Atlantis, can physically 'disappear.' Herodotus

seems to say as much for history when he proposes, at the opening of the *Histories*, to

preserve the ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά (great and wondrous deeds), in order that

they might not be forgotten through an erosion, or 'wearing away,' of time (Hdt. 1.1:

"τῷ χρόνῳ ἐξίτηλα").[45] When Critias also introduces his history, therefore, by

explaining that he will uncover the μεγάλα καὶ θαυμαστά ..ἔργα that have

"disappeared through time and human destruction" ("ὑπὸ χρόνου καὶ φθορᾶς

---

[44] Hdt.2.16. Herodotus argues that a fourth part needs to be included (the Egyptian Delta), and gives his own measurements for the circumference of Egypt in furlongs. But Herodotus' measurement of Egypt's circumference, like Solon's counting of time in both Herodotus' *Histories* and Plato's *Timaeus* (22b), shows human arithmetic to be a woefully inadequate measure in the context of the larger picture.

[45] Salman Rushdie captures something of this idea of time as a physical entity in his comparison of history and chutney in *Midnight's Children*, whose narrator writes his chronicle from a pickle factory "by day amongst pickle-vats, by night within these sheets, I spend my time at the great work of preserving. Memory, as well as fruit, is being saved from the corruption of the clocks." (1980, 38).

ἀνθρώπων ἠφανισμένα," *Ti.* 20e4–6), he takes the imagery one step further, by suggesting that the obliteration of time has already taken place.[46]

The map, however, as it positions so many versions of the Athenian city upon a unified, complete surface, reproduces history in a form that is immediately perceptible as a single, encyclopedic whole. Cartography, like painting, and – as we have established – unlike language, traditionally 'fills in' its own descriptive space, offering a more global, synoptic impression of its model.[47] But as we have also seen in Herodotus' demonstration of the map as a tool for plotting history, the accuracy of the image in relation to its model may be belied by precisely such an illusion of completeness. In Plato, that same problem of representation is nuanced, in philosophical language, in terms of the vexed relationship between the original (*idêa*) and its copy (*eikôn*).

Model vs. Image

In describing his ideal city in the *Republic*, Socrates several times compares it to a painted image, whether a statue being painted by a sculptor (*R.* 420c1; cf. 420c4–d5), or

---

[46] Cf. *Ti.* 24d. The connection between Hdt. 1.1 and *Ti.* 20e is also noted by Vidal-Naquet 1996, 267.

[47] See here the comments of Captain Warnsinck, as quoted in Boxer 1993, 125: "In contrast with the description of a fairwater or of a coast, wherein the author can easily omit anything of which he is uncertain, *the delineation of a map imperceptibly leads the cartographer to indulge in a little guess-work*, the better to conceal his lack of knowledge...If the compiler of a seaman's manual is uncertain about the configuration of a particular stretch of coast, then he need not attempt to describe it: the cartographer, on the other hand, has a strong inducement to continue his delineation of the coastline.. and sometimes misleads the navigator thereby." [Italics mine]. The same principle may also be applied to painting. I wish to thank the late Seth Benardete for drawing this passage to my attention.

a 'sketch' drawn upon a writing tablet (*R.* 501b9; cf. 548c10–d1). That image is based,

he also suggests, upon a divine *paradeigma* or model:[48]

R. 592b2:

ἐπεὶ γῆς γε οὐδαμοῦ οἶμαι αὐτὴν [πόλιν] εἶναι. 'Αλλ'. ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν.

Since this city exists nowhere on earth. But, I said, perhaps its model (*paradeigma*) is laid up somewhere in heaven, for whoever wishes to look upon it, and in looking, to found it within himself.

R. 500e2–501a10:

ὡς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἄλλως εὐδαιμονήσειε πόλις. εἰ μὴ αὐτὴν διαγράψειαν οἱ τῷ θείῳ παραδείγματι χρώμενοι ζωγράφοι;... λαβόντες.. ὥσπερ πίνακα πόλιν τε καὶ ἤθη ἀνθρώπων πρῶτον μὲν καθαρὰν ποιήσειαν ἄν... μετὰ ταῦτα οἴει ὑπογράψασθαι ἄν τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτείας;

How else would the city prosper, unless the painters sketched it according to the divine model (*paradeigma*)? ...Taking up the city and its customs as if it were a drawing tablet (*pinax*), they would first wipe the slate clean ... And after this, don't you think they would sketch the outline of the constitution [upon it]?

Although Socrates' ideal city exists 'nowhere on earth,' therefore, the *Republic* fashions

it in the form of a hypothetical 'sketch' which does exist in either painting or words (*R.*

472d9; 501a9; 529a–b; 548c10). Much like Critias' mental picture of the myth of

Atlantis, the good city of the *Republic* exists in the form of a 'cognitive map' within the

soul of the enlightened philosopher,[49] which he can – in the manner of a painter – make

constant reference to, and reproduce as exactly as possible in constructing the

conventions of the good or just upon earth (*R.* 484c7–8; cf. 540a9).

---

[48] Plato's use of the *paradeigma* in the *Republic* is complicated, because it sometimes refers to the Form, sometimes to its Image. See Burnyeat 2000, 298, and my discussion below.

[49] I borrow the concept of 'cognitive mapping' from Lynch 1960. For further theorizing on the term, cf. Jameson 1984; Wigley 1996; & my ch.4, p.169–172, above.

In reproducing that image, however, the artist or philosopher will find it very difficult to be completely accurate (*R.* 472d4–8), for, according to the theory of Forms that Plato outlines in the *Republic* and at other points in his career,[50] it is impossible to perfectly reproduce the timeless, intelligible model within the perceptible, changing media of the visible world. Thus even in the *Timaeus* the Demiurge is able to fabricate only an 'image' (*eikôn*) of the divine model (*paradeigma*) in his construction of the cosmos, even though, being supremely good, he produces the best image possible.[51] So too does Critias set his apology for the inherently mimetic (and thus imperfect) quality of his upcoming speech in the *Critias* (107b5–7):

μίμησιν μὲν γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἀπεικασίαν τὰ παρὰ πάντων ἡμῶν ῥηθέντα χρέων που γενέσθαι·

All of our speeches are, by necessity, imitations and copies to some degree.

within the context of an extensive comparison of his own words with the art of painting, in which the imitative verbs *mimeisthai* and *apeikasdô* are employed a further four times (*Crit.* 106c2, c5, d2, e3). Such a comparison is not new in Plato (see especially book ten of the *Republic,* where the equation is worked through in detail), and it is precisely through its homology with painting that Plato is able to argue that narrative is a mimetic art based on the model of Form and Image.

---

[50] Kahn 1996, 329–370; Irwin 1999; Fine 1999.

[51] For the contradictions and difficulties inherent in the Demiurge's creation of what seems to amount to a perfect and unchanging 'image' of the cosmos, see Lloyd 1991/1983; Vlastos 1995/1965.

The City as a 'Living Picture'

Ἐν δ' ἀγέλην ποίησε βοῶν ὀρθοκραιράων·
αἱ δὲ βόες χρυσοῖο τετεύχατο κασσιτέρου τε.
μυκηθμῷ δ' ἀπὸ κόπρου ἐπεσσεύοντο νομόνδε
πὰρ ποταμὸν κελάδοντα. παρὰ ῥοδανὸν δονακῆα.

And he fashioned upon the shield a herd of straight-horned cattle,
Crafting the beasts from gold and tin,
And they hurried with bellows from their farmyard to a pasture
Beside a loud-sounding river and a thicket of wavering reeds.

Homer, *Iliad* 18.573–576

The first Illustration quivered, and came to life....

Ray Bradbury, Prologue to *The Illustrated Man*, p.5

Having established in the *Republic* that the artist or poet's reproduction is always at

some 'remove from reality,' in the *Timaeus/Critias* Plato is particularly attuned to the

possibilities that the pictorial elements inherent in γραφεῖν ('to write,' but also ' to

draw') might present in the telling of a story. Throughout the *Timaeus/Critias*, he

focuses on the 'narrative picture' as an intangible mental image that has been painted

only in the mind's eye, but which is shared with all the speakers of the dialogues. In this

sense, the *Timaeus/Critias* appears to express a wish to go one step further than the

Republic in its willingness to experiment with the art of representation. At the very

beginning of the *Timaeus*, for example, after Socrates has recapitulated his 'Republic,'

he refers to it as a picture painted in the imagination that he would like to see 'brought

to life' (*Ti.* 19b4–c2):

προσέοικεν δὲ δή τινί μοι τοιῷδε τὸ πάθος. οἷον εἴ τις ζῷα καλά που θεασάμενος. εἴτε
ὑπὸ γραφῆς εἰργασμένα εἴτε καὶ ζῶντα ἀληθινῶς. ἡσυχίαν δὲ ἄγοντα. εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν
ἀφίκοιτο θεάσασθαι κινούμενά τε αὐτὰ καί τι τῶν τοῖς σώμασι δοκούντων προσήκειν
κατὰ τὴν ἀγωνίαν ἀθλοῦντα· ταὐτὸν καὶ ἐγὼ πέπονθα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἣν διήλθομεν.

> I have the same feeling concerning our city that someone might have if he were to look upon beautiful animals (*or paintings*), whether that means creatures fashioned *in a painting* or animals (*or paintings*) that were actually alive, but at rest. A desire would come upon him to look upon these same animals (*or paintings*) moving (*kinoumena*) and exercising, in competition, some of the attributes that seemed to be evident in their bodies. This is exactly how I feel about the city that we narrated.

I have stressed, in my translation, the ambiguity of the word ζῷον, which can mean either animal or painting, and which is used in both senses by Plato elsewhere in his corpus.[52] Despite the motion that is embedded within the Greek verb to narrate or 'go through' (διέρχομαι), therefore, Socrates classifies his city as an animal or picture that (either because it is an animal in a picture, or a picture or animal at rest) has not yet moved into action. In all three interpretations, the message is the same: his extemporal account of the ideal city resembles a picture in its still and lifeless quality. Since the comparison of either an image or speech to an animal with body and limbs is a common Platonic trope,[53] moreover, Plato's choice of a physical body as the operative image in his simile allows his argument to look both ways; towards the art of painting (within or through which the creature's body is captured) and towards the art of speech-making (which is likened to a 'body' of variously assembled parts in the *Phaedrus*). Similarly, the Demiurge's fashioning of the cosmos as a 'body'/ 'work of art,' (ζῷον, *Ti.* 87c4–e6; ἄγαλμα, *Ti.* 27c7) also reflects upon Timaeus' *verbal* crafting of the body of his text.[54]

---

[52] *LSJ* s.v. I, II; See Brague 1985.

[53] Cf. *Phdr.* 264c2–6, 257b2; *Ti.* 37c7, 69b2; *Gorg.* 505c/d; *Lg.* 752a (compare also Timaeus' description of the *kosmos* as a ζῷον at *Ti.* 87c4–e6). The analogy has been documented in some detail by Brisson 1987, esp. 122–4, & Brague 1985.

[54] Osborne 1996; Brisson 1987; Brague 1985; Bergren 1992, 23–26.

Socrates draws upon the same parallel between pictures and writing, on the one

hand, and pictures and 'still bodies,' on the other, at *Phdr.* 275d4–7:

Δεινὸν γάρ που.ὦ Φαῖδρε. τοῦτ' ἔχει γραφή. καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ γὰρ
τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἔστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα. ἐὰν δ' ἀνέρῃ τι. σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ. ταὐτὸν δὲ
καὶ οἱ λόγοι·

Writing is like painting, Phaedrus, in that both share a strange quality indeed. For the artistic
creations of painting stand as if alive, but if someone questions them, they maintain a strict
silence. And the same is true for words.

suggesting that, in the cases of both writing and illustration, *graphê/zoôn* is the dumb

beast that remains essentially two-dimensional: without the breath or voice that

accompanies living speech, it can only wander aimlessly as a mere image (*eidôlon,*

Phdr. 276a9) of its former self.[55]

For Plato, then, it appears that the illusionistic, mirage-like quality of painting

holds equally true for *logos*, but that, particularly in the *Timaeus*, it is the still, tableau-

like effect of language which renders his description of the city no more than a

motionless image inscribed upon a *pinax*. We have already seen how Socrates described

Kallipolis in exactly this way at *R.* 501a2–10, comparing the city to a drawing tablet

(ὥσπερ πίνακα) upon which a good man might sketch new laws and institutions (see

above, p.231). In the context of the *Republic,* the city remains hypothetical, never

entering the flow of narrative time. Although Socrates concedes that it *could* exist at

some unspecified time or place (*R.* 499c7–d6) it is never 'brought to life' in the course

of the dialogue

---

[55] Cf. *Ep.* 342e, where Plato adds to the analogy between *graphê* and the living, but inanimate, body by
referring to the "sickness (*to asthenes*) of *logoi*" (see pp.215–16, above).

In the *Timaeus,* however, Plato is explicit about what kind of narrative he needs

to wake the animal up and bring his picture to life: the city must engage in the *kinêsis* of

war (*Ti.* 19c5). Only by doing so, he suggests, will it be able to break free from its static

position as a picture. By implying, moreover, that war is the 'movement' that gets

history started, Plato is in good company. According to fragments from both the *Cypria*

and Hesiod's *Catalogue of Women,* Zeus deliberately chose war as the most suitable

machinery for setting history into motion, thereby "fanning the flames of the great strife

of the Trojan War" (*Cypria* fr. 1) in order that the overpopulated earth might be relieved,

but also – according to Hesiod – in order to introduce the cycle of the seasons, and thus

a new, separate 'human time' (*Cat. Women* fr. 204., 97–98; 124–129).[56] As Nagy has

pointed out, in the *Cypria* and the *Iliad* 'eris' is the instigator of both war and narrative

(both poems begin with a *neikos* born from *eris*).[57] More explicitly still, Thucydides

begins his history by labelling the Peloponnesian war a *megistê kinêsis* (Thuc. 1.1.2.1).

It is just such a 'movement' as war, he implies, that forces history into motion.[58]

Socrates appears to be caught, therefore, between the two poles of narration and

description: how to let the painting/animal 'speak out' (the etymological root of

'ekphrasis,' although the term had not yet been coined) when it is caught in the static

---

[56] On which, see Mayer 1996, esp. 2–3.

[57] Nagy 1999, 218–221.

[58] The connection is made by Clay 1997, 54. The *Timaeus* thereby validates its own status as 'history' (as well as meditates upon the practice of writing, or beginning, historical narrative) by reference to the openings of both Herodotus and Thucydides (see above, p.229).

form of a picture.[59] Indeed, the difficulties inherent in Socrates' request for *kinêsis* (war, but also narrative action) and depiction are made clear as the dialogues progress. For Critias' narrative breaks off at the very moment before the war between Ancient Athens and Atlantis is about to begin (*Crit.*121c5), and it is hard not to compare Zeus' impending judgment from heaven with the passages from the *Cypria* and *Catalogue of Women*. In all three passages, the divine pronouncement of a great and destructive war marks an end to a kind of golden-age existence for mankind.[60] But where Zeus' determination for war *sets the narrative in motion* in Hesiod and the cyclic poets, in Plato it *stops* the narrative from even beginning, not merely breaking the 'narrative pause' of description[61] but rather destroying the narrative altogether. More ironically still, the civil faction that Solon meets upon returning to Athens prevents him from completing a written version of the myth of Atlantis as well (*Ti.* 21c–d).[62] In both cases, the political movement of the city, either against others or within its own borders, impedes the completion of the narrative, although this is precisely the kind of *kinêsis* that Socrates calls upon to set his account of the city in motion.

---

[59] In 1991, two important essays on ekphrasis addressed this problem. The first, by D.P. Fowler, called into the question the 'problem' of description , the second, by James Heffernan, described ekphrasis' inherent (or 'embryonic') "narrative impulse" (301). See ch.2, pp.112, n.87, above.

[60] Mayer 1996, on the motif of the Golden Age coming to an end at Zeus' call for war among mankind.

[61] On which, See Genette 1976/7, esp. Part II: 'Narration and Description,' 5–8, & Fowler 1991.

[62] Plato thus appears to have reversed the events of Solon's decrees. According to the popular tradition (such as Herodotus) he travelled abroad *after* posting his decrees.

Critias' claim to remember Solon's full account of the battle as if it were etched indelibly into his mind like a picture,[63] therefore, proves incapable of being translated (literally 'moved') into the flow of historical time. Unlike an ekphrasis, where the picture is miraculously 'brought to life,' and which predominantly depicts movement through the representation of animals and war,[64] the vivid description of Atlantis in the *Critias* is, for the most part, atemporal and static. Approaching it from a bird's eye, (or, in Platonic terms, geometric) vantage point, Critias describes an island that is perfectly symmetrical according to the precise mathematical proportions laid down by its founder, Poseidon. It is thus divided into ten parts, with alternating belts of land and sea that are evenly spaced on all sides, and ruled by five pairs of twins (one for each section) (*Crit.* 113d–114a). Like a cartographer,[65] therefore, Poseidon creates a territory that is perfectly circular, "as if carving it out with a lathe-chisel" ("οἷον τορνεύων," *Crit.* 113d): a life-size model upon which he will implement his plan for the island.[66] Next the inhabitants transform Atlantis with their carefully executed architecture,

---

[63] *Ti.* 26c.

[64] Representation of moving animals: ps-Hes. *Asp.* 160–77 210–212, 230–37, 302–4, 316–17; Hom. *Il.* 18. 573–586. Representation of strife or war: ps-Hes. *Asp.* 178–200, 237–269; Hom. *Il.* 18. (497–508, 509–540). In the *Shield of Heracles*, depictions of war or animals make up a total of 90 out of the 178 lines in the ekphrasis (*Asp.* 140–318), in Homer's *Iliad*, they occupy 58 lines out of a total of 130 (*Il.* 18.478–608).

[65] The island of Atlantis shares the same shape, and division into zones, as many experiments in Presocratic science and cartography. Parmenides (DK28A37) is said to have been the first to divide a spherical earth into five zones (1 hot, 2 temperate, 2 cold). According to Dilke (1985, 250) "it seems likely that he illustrated his division on a map or globe."

[66] The same word is used of the Demiurge, as he 'rounds off' his model of the world (*Ti.* 33b), and of Herodotus' laughing description of the practice of the Ionian map-makers ("γράφουσι πέριξ τὴν γῆν ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ὡς ἀπὸ τόρνου") at Hdt. 4.36.2 (see above, ch.2, p.88–9).

comprised of bridges, roads, canals, walls and palaces of perfect symmetry and of

dazzling colour, size, and workmanship (*Crit.* 115c–117e). Lastly, they dig a deep and

enormous trench around the island's plain (which is already, in itself, perfectly

rectangular, measuring 2000 by 3000 stades) to create an irrigation system that is a

masterpiece of engineering and geometric calculation (*Crit.* 118a–e).[67]

The island of Atlantis, then, just as Critias remembered it, emerges in his

dialogue as a meticulously crafted and described picture. His description, which starts

by taking in the edges and the centre of the island at once (*Crit.* 113c), surveys its

landscape throughout as part of a global and totalizing whole. It is not by accident that

the only focalizing perspective[68] we are offered in the *Critias* is the panoptic gaze of

Zeus, who looks down upon the island in its entirety at the very moment before the text

breaks off (*Crit.* 121c2–5):

ξυνήγειρε θεοὺς πάντας εἰς τὴν τιμιωτάτην αὐτῶν οἴκησιν. ἣ δὴ κατὰ μέσον παντὸς
τοῦ κόσμου βεβηκυῖα καθορᾷ πάντα ὅσα γενέσεως μετείληφε. καὶ ξυναγείρας εἶπεν –

*   *   *   *   *

He [Zeus] gathered all the gods into their most honoured abode, which stands in the centre of the
entire cosmos, and he looked down upon everything, as much as had a share in life, and having
gathered them all together, he said....

*   *   *   *   *

Nor, on the other hand, is it surprising that Critias introduces his speech by comparing

his technique to that of a painter.[69] In appraising a picture (or, implicitly, a narrative)

---

[67] On its resemblance to irrigation systems cut into cities in the east, see Vidal-Naquet 1996, 267.

[68] For more on focalization, or the internal eye of the narrator, see Genette 1980, 185–194; de Jong 1987.

[69] *Crit* 107b5–108a4 (see p.232, above).

that represents the whole earth, with its rivers, mountains, and even all of heaven, he

explains that we do not examine it too closely, but are content to accept an inexact and

deceptive sketch. It is only concerning the depictions of those things that are already

familiar to us, such as our own bodies, that we become harsh critics, appraising the

painting according to the minutest scale of accuracy. Critias' narrative depiction, or

'map,' of Atlantis adheres to not the second painting but to the overview perspective of

the first painting in his example, with the island itself standing in as a microcosm for the

entire world (compare the shield of Achilles, also circular and 'chiselled out' by a god,

or Plato's eight differently coloured spheres upon the cosmic 'Spindle of Necessity')

which the viewer surveys from an external position.[70] As Zeus looks down upon the

Atlantians, moreover, his position at the very centre of the world ("κατὰ μέσον παντὸς

τοῦ κόσμου,"), at the point where the map-maker's compass would have pierced the

centre of the pinax,[71] only heightens the reader's impression of a cartographic gaze. Not

only do we get the sense that Atlantis, as Poseidon was crafting it, was itself a

beautifully turned-out work of art, but our own perspective as readers is channeled

through the visual medium of description.

---

[70] *R.* 616b4 – 617d1. Like the Spindle of Necessity in the 'Myth of Er,' the spheres of Atlantis have 'lips' (χεῖλη) (*R.* 616e1, e5; *Crit.* 115e4) and are designed according to precise geometric proportions. The absence of an internal focalizer in the *Critias* (except for Zeus at the text's conclusion) serves to differentiate it further from those narratives, such as Homer's description of the Shield of Achilles, and Plato's Myth of Er, with which it bears an association. For in both of those two passages, the description of the artistic object is focalized through the viewpoint of an internal human spectator, whether Achilles, Er, or those unnamed spectators who simply look upon the shield "with wonder" (see above, ch.2, 102ff., above).

[71] Kahn 1960/1985, 81–83, and Plates I & 11, provides good evidence for compass holes in the centre of the Greek map.

Critias' creative attempt, therefore, to transmit the perfectly formed picture within his mind into language, or to paint an image of the city for us in words, is foiled at the moment when he attempts to prod his life-like image into movement. As a memory-structure, the picture may help him to chart or plot out each incident in the narrative which he needs to remember,[72] but, unlike an ekphrasis, it resolutely refuses to 'come to life.' Plato's art – although it may evoke the poetic Muses (*Crit.* 108c3, d2) – draws a sharp boundary, therefore, between the optical (and aural) illusions in which Homer or ps-Hesiod will engage, in order to make their pictures both 'narrate and describe,' and his own practice in the *Critias* (whose portrait of Atlantis breaks off at the point when both speech and war are about to begin ("εἶπεν– "). Like the dumb beasts of the *Phaedrus*, therefore, the *grammata* (letters, but also the lines and markings of a picture) which Critias composes upon the *tabula rasa* of the vast, uncharted Atlantic ocean,[73] are incapable, quite literally, of speaking for themselves, rendering Plato's dialogues uncharacteristically 'silent.'

In Search of the Past

I wished I had lived in the days of *real* journeys, when it was still possible to see the full splendour of a spectacle that had not yet been blighted, polluted and spoilt. I wished I had not trodden the ground as myself, but as Bernier, Tavernier or Manucci did...

Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Tristes Tropiques*, p.43

---

[72] On the use of visual imagery in memory technique, see ch.6, below, pp.276–87.

[73] Like the 'great white page' upon which Verne travels and composes (de Certeau 1986, 143), or the slate of time which has been successively 'wiped clean' by the periodic recurrences of floods and fires (cf. *R.* 500e–501a and p.231, & n.41, above).

The sublime totality which the artist accomplishes in a picture, like the view of Zeus as he looks down from his high abode, is set in a disingenuous relationship to the state of fragmentation and ruin which time, and the limited perspectival ability of humans, affects upon the landscape itself. In Plato's *Timaeus/Critias*, this is bound up with the 'sickness' of language and narrative form that creates a wasting away within the body of both text and topography. The image of Atlantis which Critias captures as a single moment in the past exists finally, then, as that nostalgia for an imaginary, invisible period of completeness familiar to every traveller who, in Lévi-Strauss' words, "chas[es] after the vestiges of a vanished reality" in his desire to explore landscapes that are still 'undiscovered' in what amounts, finally, to a race against the debilitating effects of time.[74]

Elsner and Rubiés have described this form of travel as modernity's "desire for a past in which the fragments inherited by the present were once available in an ideal wholeness" (1999, 6). Something similar, I think, may be said for the retrospective composition of Atlantis and Ancient Athens out of the political debris of Plato's fourth-century city, for the contrast between the emaciated and fragmented state of contemporary Athens and the 'whole' geometry of Atlantis is analogous to that relationship of the present to the past which I have been exploring in both the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*. To quote Lévi-Strauss again (1974, 38):

---

[74] Lévi-Strauss 1974, 43. Quoted (from a different translation) in Elsner and Rubiés 1999, 6. See further Elsner and Rubiés 1999, 4–56, for a cultural analysis of travel which takes as its starting point Richard Burton's "search for an exotic east as a nostalgia for what modern Europe perceived itself as having lost" (4).

So I can understand the mad passion for travel books and their deceptiveness. They create the illusion of something which no longer exists but still should exist, if we were to have any hope of avoiding the overwhelming conclusion that the history of the past twenty thousand years is irrevocable.

Plato's invention of Atlantis by stepping into the shoes of Solon, wise man and traveller of a more perfect age, might then be read as a meditation upon the desire to recreate history, or the 'truth' of the past (cf. "τἀληθές" at *Ti*. 26d1), by relocating it within an imaginary landscape.[75]

The juxtaposition between the image, which is complete, yet frozen within a static point in mythical time (best captured by the unified but atemporal art of geometry),[76] and the time-bound sequentiality of language, which fragments with each retelling, plays itself out in the series of unified pictures and broken texts which Socrates and his guests attempt to piece together in the course of their dialogue. The difficulty of translating those synoptic geographies into narrative, moreover, is symbolized by the impassable barrier of mud that now separates the Atlantis site from the Mediterranean world (*Crit*. 108e8–109a1). If Solon, or any other traveller, attempts to journey this far backwards in time towards such a complete view of history, he will find his route obstructed by the underwater ruins of what has already passed, his horizon limited to the 'mere harbour' of the Greeks' conceptual map, and his narrative

---

[75]This is a familiar motif from the proto science-fiction of the nineteenth century, especially among those writers such as H. Rider Haggard, who frequently had their protagonists discover 'lost worlds' which remain, due to their extreme isolation, blissfully inaccessible to the outsider and 'stuck' in a time from long ago . Thus Allan Quatermain, in Haggard's novel of that name, is the first outsider to ever penetrate the mysterious Zu-Fendi people in Africa, whom he believes to be a lost branch of the Persian race from the fifth century BCE (Haggard 1951, ch.13, esp. 533–34.).

[76] cf. *R*. bk.7, 522–6; *Meno* 82a–86c. See also de Certeau's use of geometry to describe the holistic vision from above.

thwarted by a transition between two concepts of space and time which has, finally,

become impossible to navigate.

3. Timaeus' World

The Demiurge's translation of the world from a conceptual, ideal, model (*paradeigma*)

to a physical representation, or copy (*eikôn*) engages in a similar dichotomy between

'complete' and 'incomplete' representation, on the one hand, and between picture and

language, on the other. The account of how the copy is built, and of how it begins to

'move' in time, can only be imperfectly rendered; for, as Timaeus explains (*Ti.* 29c1–a

c8):

> τοὺς (λόγους) δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασθέντος. ὄντος δὲ εἰκόνος εἰκότας ἀνὰ
> λόγον τε ἐκείνων ὄντας· ὅ τί περ πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία. τοῦτο πρὸς πίστιν ἀλήθεια. ἐὰν
> οὖν. ὦ Σώκρατες. πολλὰ πολλῶν εἰπόντων πέρι. θεῶν καὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως μὴ
> δυνατοὶ γιγνώμεθα πάντη πάντως αὐτοὺς αὐτοῖς ὁμολογουμένους λόγους καὶ
> ἀπηκριβωμένους ἀποδοῦναι. μὴ θαυμάσῃ τις· ἀλλ' ἐὰν ἄρα μηδενὸς ἧττον παρεχώμεθα
> εἰκότας. ἀγαπᾶν χρή

> Those (accounts) of the thing that is copied from a model (*apeikazdô*), and is itself a copy
> (*eikôn*), are necessarily themselves copies (*eikotas logous*) according to the same logic. For, as
> becoming is to being, so is belief to truth. Don't be surprised, then, Socrates, if, after having
> spoken at length about the gods and the coming into being of the universe, it is not possible for
> us to render an accurate account which matches exactly with these things in every way. But if we
> can render one that is no less probable (*eikôs*) than any other, we should be happy with that.

His narrative, then, which can only be a linguistic copy (*eikôs muthos*) of what is itself

an image rendered by the Demiurge of the eternal, divine model is – like the stories of

Atlantis and Athens which frame it – necessarily incomplete. For Timaeus keeps losing

his place in the narrative, finding it necessary more than once to stop, correct himself,

and attempt to re-start from a new beginning.[77] Although the actual cosmos that he

---

[77] There are a number of such false starts in the text (*Ti.* 48d–49a, 69a). Morgan 2000, 273; Bergren
1992, 23–26.

attempts to describe mirrors the ideal 'pictures' of Ancient Athens, Atlantis and the

Socratic city which each of the interlocutors see in their mind's eye, Timaeus, like

Critias and Socrates, cannot fully articulate them.

Yet the Demiurge's representation of the world is more than simply an 'image'

(*eikôn*) that has been crafted (*apeikazdô*), like Socrates' still image of the ideal city.

Rather, it is a living, sentient creature/picture ("τὸν κόσμον ζῷον ἔμψυχον ἔννουν."

Ti. 30b7–8), which has been set in motion (*kineô, Ti.* 34a1, 37c6) by its creator. Unlike

the stories of Atlantis which frame it, this imitation is perfectly formed – there is

nothing 'left over' (*hupoleipô, Ti.* 32c8, 33a1)[78] or 'uncompleted' ("ζῷον τέλεον ἐκ

τελέων τῶν μερῶν εἴη," *Ti.* 32d1);[79] and, most importantly, it is free from the

debilitating effects of time ("ἀγήρων καὶ ἄνοσον," *Ti.* 33a2).[80] Existing as a singular,

self-contained whole, (*Ti.* 33a1, b4–5) the cosmos is differentiated from the constant

cycle of repetitions through which the cities of Critias and Socrates are relayed in an

endlessly successive chain, as each narrative generates another, less complete version of

itself through the sequence of genealogy (the transmission of Solon's story) or the cycle

of reciprocation (of food or words) within which Socrates and his friends are caught.

---

[78] Compare the use of ἀπολείπω and ἐλλείπω to describe the 'gap' in the discussion at *Ti.* 17a5, 19a9 (above, pp.208–9).

[79] "[In order that] it might be a complete creature/picture, perfect in all its parts." (Compare the use of ἀποτελέω to describe Solon's incomplete version of the Atlantis story at *Ti.* 21c (above, p.214)).

[80] Compare the physical degeneration, through old age and disease, of both text and topography at *Ti.* 22c–e, *Crit.* 111b.

Although the world, therefore, as it revolves uniformly upon its axis, is designed as a 'complete' picture, Timaeus' own description of its construction (what Morgan has called a meta-narrative and Bergren a meta-architecture)[81] stands as a mirror-image of the Demiurge's composition, but without the holistic overview that the god is able to achieve. At *Ti.* 69a, Timaeus talks about his attempt to 'fit' the pieces of the story into place, as if they were great pieces of wood that needed to be stitched together into a narrative:

"Οτ' οὖν δὴ τὰ νῦν οἷα τέκτοσιν ἡμῖν ὕλη παράκειται τὰ τῶν αἰτίων γένη διυλασμένα. ἐξ ὧν τὸν ἐπίλοιπον λογον δεῖ ξυνυφανθῆναι. πάλιν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἐπανέλθωμεν διὰ βραχέων. ταχύ τε εἰς ταὐτὸν πορευθῶμεν. ὅθεν δεῦρο ἀφικόμεθα. καὶ τελευτὴν ἤδη κεφαλήν τε τῷ μύθῳ πειρώμεθα ἁρμόττουσαν ἐπιθεῖναι τοῖς πρόσθεν.

Since the different kinds of causes now lie sorted out for us, just as wood is for carpenters, from which it is necessary to stitch together the rest of the narrative, let us briefly (*dia bracheôn*) return back to the beginning, and quickly travel back to that same place from whence we arrived here, and let us try to fit (*harmozô*) an end or crown to our story and attach it to the account which has gone before it.

Using language that evokes both the construction of a model, or work of art, and the creation of a living animal,[82] Timaeus nevertheless falters in his composition where the Demiurge does not. In particular, his return to the beginning (which, like Socrates' speech, involves an abridged (*dia bracheôn*) repetition of ground he has already covered) and his attempt to 'fit together' (ἁρμόζω) the various parts of the narrative into a seamless whole (just as Critias had attempted to 'fit' the various cities of the

---

[81] Morgan 2000, 261, Bergren 1992, 24.

[82] As is suggested by *kephalê*. Cf. *Phdr.* 264c2–5, where Socrates again compares writing to the composition of a living creature, which must have a head, legs, middle and extremities that are fitting both in relation to each other and to the whole.

tetralogy into one),[83] evokes the same problems of representation that I have been outlining for the other speakers in the dialogue.[84]

The shift in perspective, then, between the divine, geometric overview of the world and the human attempt to capture that picture in language (that is, to translate the picture into the flow of narrative time) is figured as a *trompe l'œil* around which the dialogues skirt, but ultimately refuse to engage. Although Socrates wishes it were possible that his picture of the city, like an ekphrasis, might come to life, and although Critias rehearses over and over again an 'exact' narrative of the transition of the mythical, geometric Atlantis into the sequence of history, the failure of both their projects lays bare the machinations at the heart of what Plato has often called the wizardry or illusion of poetry; the optical illusion which makes narrative (and all representation) appear 'complete.' But this is not to dismiss the importance of the *trompe l'œil* itself, which stands as a central, crucial structure around which the *Timaeus* and *Critias* revolve. For what we have already encountered in Herodotus as a deceptive shift between scales is replayed in Plato as a shift between two narrative dimensions (cast as either a two- or three- dimensional picture). For both authors, the *trompe l'œil* attempts to paper over the gap marked by the vast distances or disjunctions that exist in the fields of geography and history, depending upon which perspective they are viewed from. In the *Critias,* that gap is deliberately left exposed, both in terms of

---

[83] *Ti.* 26d. See my discussion above, p.222–25.

[84] On Plato's presentation of narrative as a form or representation which is always incomplete and imperfect (and this is especially evident in the later works), see especially Morgan 2000, 287ff.: "Plato forces us to realize that all language is a story that interprets reality, with greater or lesser degrees of success" (& passim).

the missing ending of the text and in the conception of Atlantis itself as a lost and un-navigable space located somewhere on the spectrum between image and reality.

Conclusion

Just as the *Phaedrus* is structured vis-à-vis the written text which emerges from the folds of Phaedrus' cloak at an opportune moment in the dialogue, so too is the *Timaues/Critias* structured vis-à-vis the picture that Critias brings to the discussion, which is 'emblazoned in his mind.' The images that Timaeus, Socrates, and Critias jointly create as the dialogues progress, moreover, in their attempt to fill in the 'blanks' of history, may be interpreted in two different but related ways.

First, the picture stands in the dialogues as a narratological tool, through which each of the interlocutors attempts to rescue their city (or, in Timaeus' case, world) 'whole' from the debilitating effects of language and time. I am referring in part here to the inevitably incomplete nature of historiography as it has been theorized by scholars such as Hayden White (see ch.2, above), who has stressed (White 1980, 15):

> the extent to which narrative strains to produce the effect of having filled in the gaps, to put an image of continuity, coherency, and meaning in place of the fantasies of emptiness, need, and frustrated desire that inhabit our nightmares about the destructive power of time.

But it is not through narrative, I suggest, that Socrates and his interlocutors succeed in 'filling those gaps' which are all too evident at the very beginning of their discussion. Rather, as I hope to have shown, it is through Critias' model of travel, symbolized by the figure of Solon, that they attempt to rescue the past in its complete and untouched form.

Unlike the written word, moreover, which will never be instantly accessible as an immediate and totalizing whole, and which does most explicitly fail the interlocutors at the end of the *Critias*, the picture (or at least the *ideal* of the picture) represents the past with a formal coherency that the language of the *Timaeus/Critias* lacks. Thus Timaeus is unable, in his account of the creation of the world in language, to match the perfection of the Demiurge's finished model, which resembles the form of a picture (ζῷον), although both are representations (εἰκόνες).

Pictures play such a predominant role in the *Timaeus/Critias*, I have argued, in order to balance the unstable and incomplete form of language as a mimetic art: to recuperate the space and time that have been 'lost' through the insufficiencies of language. Through a picture that might only 'move' (*Ti.* 19b8) and 'speak out' (*Phdr.* 275d6) therefore, the interlocutors attempt to present a viewpoint that reads both globally and sequentially, and through which the different stages of history might be made to fit into a single, synoptic whole.

But there is, of course, a second way in which the pictures of the *Timaeus/Critias* must be interpreted, and that is within the context of image-making and representation. As Plato's interlocutors attempt to translate their mental pictures, or *paradeigma*, into the form of 'sketches in words,' they repeatedly run into the larger problem posed by representation itself, which, in Platonic thought, cannot avoid being imperfect or incomplete. Finally, then, painting and writing return to the same conceptual sphere, as two mimetic forms rolled into a single word: *graphē*.[85] The

---

[85] *Phdr.* 275d4—7, *R* bk. X. See also Ferrrari 1989.

attempt to grasp a perfect image of the world in language is ultimately, and necessarily, rendered futile in Plato's larger philosophical project. But even though Plato discounts the ability of any representation to truly 'fill in' those ellipses of narrative or mimesis within the ordinary limits of human perception, the presence (and possibilities) of the picture in the *Timaeus/Critias* reveals an important part of the storyteller's process, in his attempt to copy the mental image of Plato's 'real' world onto *pinax* or paper.

CHAPTER 6

Architecture, Order, Memory: Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*

The scope of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* is set not by the mythical circumference of the world, nor the vast, uncharted regions of the earth, but by the interior dimensions of the *oikos*. With the entry into Ischomachus' house, therefore, the scale of this study diminishes, drawing us towards a sense of space that is small – and familiar – enough to be measured by the human eye. I have chosen to conclude with the 'real space' of Classical Athens that is presented in the *Oeconomicus* because Ischomachus' house, and the small domestic drama of the training of his wife, reflects, in miniature, upon the question of how time and space can be ordered, sequenced and catalogued.[1]

Xenophon opens his work with the question "what is an *oikos*?" (*Oec.* 1.5). Taking my cue from the analogy drawn by Socrates and his interlocutors between the

---

[1] Most discussions of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* have concerned themselves with Ischomachus' unnamed wife, the story of whose education, told in flash-back form by Ischomachus to Socrates, takes up the middle portion of the work (*Oec.* 7–10), (Murnaghan 1988; Resinski 1998, 141–173; Scaife 1995; North 1977; Foucault 1990, 152–165; Cartledge 1993; Vilatte 1986; Shero 1932; Hoffman 1985; Wigley 1992). Other approaches to the text have been spurred by an interest in social issues (especially in light of Xenophon's presentation of economics, slavery, and farming), or have come from the fields of architecture and archaeology, where Ischomachus' detailed description of his house has helped in the reconstruction of the Athenian *oikos* (Pomeroy 1984, 1994, esp. 31–67, 213–345; Joshel & Murnaghan (eds.) 1994, 1–21; Villatte (op. cit.); Foxhall 1989; MacDowell 1989; Nevett 1994, 1995. For comparison with the architectural writings of Vitruvius and Alberti, see Wigley (op. cit.)). In addition, the *Oeconomicus* remains an important text in the discipline of Socratic studies, for, alongside Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Symposium*, it presents us with an important counterpart to Plato's use of the dialogue form and the presentation of Socrates therein (Stevens 1994; Gini 1993; Ambler 1996; Strauss 1970). All of these different approaches to the *Oeconomicus* wrestle, in some way or another, with the text's place within a larger corpus, within Athens, or within its social context. It is a work that has been found more difficult than most to read in isolation. In my own interpretation, I too will use architecture and gender as models through which to understand the *Oeconomicus*, but I will seek to apply them, first and foremost, to the narrative structure, or 'ground-plan,' of the work.

house and the self, I will proceed to argue that Ischomachus' *oikos*, whose walls and rooms are explicitly built for the storage of material goods (*Oec.* 9.2), is also brilliantly designed as a kind of filing cabinet of the mind. That is, as a spatial structure, it 'houses' or provides for the past and the future in the way that ancient memory techniques were also supposed to do, at the same time as it reflects on the human ability to order space in a way that brings the narrator close to a supreme, encyclopedic vision that is so 'natural' as to be very close to the divine.

Before I can reach this conclusion, however, it will be necessary for me to examine how Xenophon uses the architecture of the house to create a specific kind of order, on a scale which is remarkable for its ability to encompass a vast range of space within the man-made dimensions of cataloguing and taxonomy. The space of the house, although ostensibly concerned only with the minutely marked out proportions of rooms and things, itself turns on a number of different oppositions (from seen to unseen, inside to outside, male to female, natural to geometric). In resolving those oppositions within the carefully structured plot of the *oikos*, Xenophon creates a model of narrative space that attempts to answer not only the questions put to Critoboulus and Ischomachus by Socrates, but also those which have been posed by Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, and Plato in this study before him. More specifically, the *Oeconomicus* may be understood as an answer to the disturbing presentation of 'plot-less' space in the *Anabasis*, where – as we saw in chapter 4 – the incommensurate, uncontainable topography of Asia Minor led to a breakdown in Xenophon's ability to order and delineate his narrative.

1. Architecture: The Topography of the *Oikos*

Plot (i)' a ground plan, chart, or diagram'

It has frequently been observed that the individual stories of the *Oeconomicus* are

nested within one another by an elaborate sequence of indirect discourse, beginning

with Xenophon's recounting of a conversation that he once heard taking place between

Socrates and Critoboulus (*Oec.* 1.1), and subsequently unfolding into Socrates'

description (to Critoboulus) of other conversations that he himself had either had, or had

recounted to him, in the past.[2] Within the larger frame of Xenophon's address to the

reader at *Oec.* 1.1 ("Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε..." / "I once heard..."),[3] these principally

comprise the exchanges between (1) Socrates and Critoboulus, beginning at *Oec.* 1.1 and

never officially completed; (2) Cyrus and Lysander at *Oec.* 4.20; (3) Ischomachus and

Socrates at *Oec.* 7–21; and (4) Ischomachus and his wife at *Oec.* 7.10–10. Each of the

tales within the *Oeconomicus* thus enjoys its own *traditio* in much the same way as the

ancient myth of Atlantis was recounted in Plato's *Timaeus/Critias*: they can be told only

through the filter of a number of different voices and settings, which themselves

become an integral part of the story as it is passed on from one narrator to the next.[4]

Yet in other ways Plato's *traditio* of the Myth of Atlantis is different, for it

stretches story telling out into a single linear sequence that extends from the past into

---

[2] Murnaghan 1988, 10; Pomeroy 1994, 17–18; Resinski 1998, 142.

[3] "I once heard..."

[4] See ch.5, pp.212–13, above. On the importance of setting in Roman Republican oratory, which – although much later – may shed some light upon Xenophon's narrative technique, see Vasaly 1993, 26–39 ('The Spirit of Place').

the present, using the physical trajectory of travel as a means of moving along that path. The *Oeconomicus*, on the other hand, builds upon a more elaborate design that is plotted onto the architecture of the city from which Socrates and Critoboulus speak. Imagined as a topography, Xenophon's narrative moves not linearly (along a 'road' of time or language, for example) but laterally, jumping from one setting to another in the movement from fields to agora, *Stoa Poikilê* to *oikos*, theatre to *boulê*. Those jumps are occasioned not only by setting, but also by simile, as – like Homer – Xenophon draws new locales into his dialogue by an ingenious use of comparison which is often grounded in a physical sense of place. In the case of both setting and simile, the plot of the *Oeconomicus* is modeled upon a plan of the city;[5] it constantly seeks to create a place for story telling within the real space of Athens.[6]

We can also say that Xenophon designs his narrative as an architect might design a house; that is, as a series of interior scenes which are partitioned by wall-like 'frames.'[7] The position of the story of Ischomachus' wife within the narrative of the *Oeconomicus* (distanced from the main body of the text by the third-hand report of her story, but also by its approximate location in the middle of the work, *Oec.*7–11) thus resembles the position of the woman's interior quarters within the house and, beyond

---

[5] This takes us back, once again, to Brooks' original formulation for 'plot': "1. a measured area of ground; 2. a ground plan, chart or diagram; 3. the outline of action; 4. a secret plan or scheme." (Brooks 1984, 11–12, see also my comments in ch.2, p.80).

[6] In this way its closest analogy may in fact be Greek drama, a literary form which turns on the axis between the imaginary space of narrative and the physical, real space of the Athenian theatre. Cf. n.23, below.

[7] On the relationship between architecture and the space of narrative, see Rakatansky 1992; Jameson 1991. On architecture and the *Oeconomicus* (including a discussion of walls) see Wigley 1992.

that, the city. Similarly, it is fitting that the *Oeconomicus* begins from the 'outside,' with a definition of the *oikos* which expands well beyond the city walls (*Oec.* 1.5 – see below), and ends with Ischomachus instructing Socrates on the arts of farming in the open fields of Attica (*Oec.* 1.16–21), since the structure of the dialogue itself moves into, and then retracts from, a succession of enclosed narrative layers.[8] Although as readers, then, we begin the dialogue on the outside, as it were, we are gradually drawn inwards – first within the city walls, to the *Stoa Poikilê* where Socrates and Ischomachus converse, then within the walls of Ischomachus' house, as we are introduced to his wife, and finally within the innermost walls of their private quarters, as the narrator leads his wife on a tour through his home. The boundaries of both *polis* and *oikos* thereby engage in the process of establishing (and – as we move through the city – continually reestablishing) new categories of inside and outside which serve to orient the narrative within an explicitly topographical setting.

On the one hand these categories of inside and outside are fluid, easily passed over by the opening interlocutors as they classify a household as much more than that which is contained by the physical space of its walls (*Oec.* 1.5–6):

Οἶκος δὲ δὴ τί δοκεῖ ἡμῖν εἶναι: ἆρα ὅπερ οἰκία. ἢ καὶ ὅσα τις ἔξω τῆς οἰκίας κέκηται. πάντα τοῦ οἴκου ταῦτά ἐστιν: Ἐμοὶ γοῦν. ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος. δοκεῖ. καὶ εἰ μηδ' ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ πόλει εἴη τῷ κεκτημένῳ. πάντα τοῦ οἴκου εἶναι ὅσα τις κέκτηται.

"What does an *oikos* mean to us? Is it the same thing as the house, or does it also include one's possessions outside the house – is the whole lot the *oikos*?" To which Critoboulos replied, "The whole lot, as I see it, even if the possessions aren't in the same city as the owner. All of one's possessions comprise the *oikos*."

---

[8] Although the sequence is incomplete, since Socrates never circles back to the original narrative frame of his discussion with Critoboulus.

On the other hand, though, such boundaries are important in maintaining the natural order of the world that the *Oeconomicus* so strongly adheres to. Most obviously, Xenophon uses the wall of the house as a dividing line for the sexes: a kind of *terminus post quem* in the categorization of a wife who is 'good.' The boundary between inside and outside remains crucially fixed as far as it relates to the difference between male and female. As Ischomachus tells his wife at *Oec.* 7.22–25, the gods have allotted distinct roles to the sexes according to their nature, and the dividing line between those natures appears to be the wall of the house.[9] It is thus fitting to both her psychological and physiological make-up that the woman remain inside, just as the man is more naturally suited to the open air. Farming will make him stronger precisely because it takes him outside the city walls (*Oec.* 6.9), while housework will keep her in excellent health and spirits because there she will be able to capitalize upon her natural tendencies to be nurturing and fearful within (*Oec.* 7.25). Although, by taking on the role of 'guardian' over both children and goods, the wife herself acts as a kind of boundary-line or wall between inside and outside, the wall of the house remains a visible reminder of her place in both city and text.

Dialectics of Inside and Outside: Pandora

Key to the wife's guardianship of the difference between inside and outside is her training in the 'ways of the stomach' (*Oec.* 7.6: "τά... ἀμφὶ γαστέρα") as part of the

---

[9] On Xenophon's 'naturalization' of gender roles, see Foucault 1990, 158–159; Scaife 1995, 227–229.

limited education that she receives before her marriage to Ischomachus.[10] Although

Ischomachus attempts to claim that such a quality is gender-neutral (*Oec.* 7.7: "it seems

to me that this sort of training is most important for men and women alike")[11] there is a

particular and meaningful way in which the control of his wife's *gastêr* bears directly

upon the way in which his household is run, in a tradition which, since Hesiod, has had

particularly gendered connotations. By analogy with both stomach and bee (the insect

which he later compares her to), Ischomachus' wife has obvious affinities with Hesiod's

classification of the difference between a good wife and a bad one in the *Theogony*, as

in his comparison of the bad wife to a drone at *Th.* 594–599:

> ὡς δ' ὁπότ' ἐν σμήνεσσι κατηρεφέεσσι μέλισσαι
> κηφῆνας βόσκωσι, κακῶν ξυνήονας ἔργων·
> αἱ μέν τε πρόπαν ἦμαρ ἐς ἡέλιον καταδύντα
> †ἡμάτιαι σπεύδουσι τιθεῖσί τε κηρία λευκά.
> οἱ δ' ἔντοσθε μένοντες ἐπηρεφέας κατὰ σίμβλους
> ἀλλότριον κάματον σφετέρην ἐς γαστέρ' ἀμῶνται·
> ὡς δ' αὔτως ἄνδρεσσι κακὸν θνητοῖσι γυναῖκας
> Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης θῆκε,..

> Just as when bees in overhanging nests
> Feed the drones, conspirators in evil works,
> Who every day until the sun goes down
> Work hard – all day - to deposit the white honeycomb,
> But the drones, waiting inside the sheltered nest,
> Reap the toil of others into their own bellies.
> So he made woman as an evil for mortal man,
> Loud-thundering Zeus,..

---

[10] This is presumably what prompts Cartledge to call Ischomachus' wife 'underfed' upon arrival in his house (1993, 10). See also West's comments on the wily woman who pokes into your granary at *Op.* 373–4: "Women stole food because they were kept half-starved by their husbands, who resented their habit of eating." As I outline below, I think this is a far too narrow (and literal) interpretation of what Xenophon intends by "τά... ἀμφὶ γαστέρα.. πεπαιδευμένη." On lack of control over the appetite as a particularly philosophical (hence male) issue, see Davidson 1997, 3-35 (cf. Foucault 1990).

[11] *Oec.* 7.6–7: "ἐπεὶ τά γε ἀμφὶ γαστέρα. ἔφη. πάνυ καλῶς. ὦ Σώκρατες. ἦλθε πεπαιδευμένη· ὅπερ μέγιστον ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ παίδευμα εἶναι καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί."

Hesiod constructs the interior of the woman's *gastêr,* like that of the inside of the nest, as 'negative space,' where the productivity of the outside bees is cancelled out by the belly's act of greedily swallowing everything into itself.[12] Little more needs to be said here about the proverbial gluttony of women in ancient Greece, which traditionally went hand in hand with their voracious sexual appetites,[13] except to re-state that the proliferation of these stories made the woman's *gastêr* a problematic site. For, as a belly, the *gastêr* 'eats up' all the goods of the house, instead of preserving them for the future, while, as a womb, it greedily ingests the seed of whomever it desires, thereby 'withering' the virility of the man (*Op.* 702–5) and leading the woman into illicit sexual liaisons.[14] As Sissa has observed (1990, 155):

> A wife may be a sober and fertile belly in which a man deposits his seed as though placing it in long-term storage (with the purpose of ensuring the continuity of his patrimony). Yet at any time a woman in the home may reveal her cavernous nature: a starving belly, a womb burning with desire, this hollow and useless object can sap a man's strength by devouring his seed and drying up his sperm.[15]

Although Ischomachus appears to be skirting such misogynistic discourse when he says that his wife's *gastêr* is restrained (just like a man's, in fact),[16] his subsequent training of her within the house is established as kind of antithesis or corrective to the

---

[12] See my association of the *gastêr* with *Chaos* in ch.1, above (p.23).

[13] The *loci classici* are collected by West ad *Op.* 373–4 (n.10, above).

[14] On the woman's (and only the woman's) capacity to determine legitimacy and illegitimacy, and its consequences for Greek myth, see Bergren 1992, 14. As Walker (1993, 82) points out, the Athenians placed such high value on legitimate childbirth because this was precisely how their property was passed on from one generation to the next.

[15] Cf. *Th.* 591–9, 603–7; *Op.* 376; 573–7, 702–5 (Sissa 1990, 229, nn.43–45).

[16] On the resemblance of Ischomachus' wife to a man, and the reasons behind such an education, see Murnaghan 1988.

dangerous possibilities of the female belly. Like Semonides, Xenophon makes the wife

not a drone, but an industrious bee (*Oec.* 7.32–34), thereby transforming Hesiod's

negative space within the nest into the model of a well-run household.[17] By keeping her

house in order, Ischomachus' wife thereby learns, by implication, how to keep that

other interior space – her belly – in order, by carefully regulating what comes in and out

of it. In this too, she can learn from Pandora, whose jar resembles a womb on the one

hand, and a house on the other. Once Pandora's container has been opened, Elpis is

described as "the only one left inside within the well-built house," (Hes. *Th.* 95–6:

"μούνη δ' αὐτόθι Ἐλπὶς ἐν ἀρρήκτοισι δόμοισιν / ἔνδον ἔμιμνε.") – like a seed

within the womb, grain within the *pithos*, or a child within the home, Elpis is stored up

for the future, or, as Zeitlin has put it, as the 'hope of the household,'[18] in much the

same way as Hesiod advises Perses to ensure that a son is left to preserve the *oikos* at

Op. 373.

As the woman herself then comes to replicate the house, through the containing

structure of her womb, and through the jar's association with both gynaecology and

household economics, she is placed in the ambiguous position of being both a container

---

[17] Semonides fr.7, 83–93; cf. Phocylides, fr.2, Diehl. For further references to women and bees, and to the social organization of the hive, see Pomeroy *Oec.* ad. 7.32 (pp.276–80) & 1984. As Pomeroy points out in her commentary, there is a difference between wild and tame bees. The latter, who are trained by the bee-keeper and kept in hives, are clearly what Xenophon is referring to here. It is harder to determine, however, whether the bees in the *Theogony* passage should be imagined as wild or tame, hence my translation of σμῆνος as 'nests.' (West, *Th.* ad loc.).

[18] Zeitlin 1996/5, 65.

and that-which-must-be-contained – both interior and exterior.[19] Already 'leaky' in the medical texts, the wife must thereby be especially careful not to replicate Pandora's mistake by creating even the smallest opening (in the house, as in herself) between inside and outside.[20] Furthermore, she must ensure that the interior, her own specific domain, is well-organized, both by controlling her own appetites and by controlling the entrance of goods into the home. Otherwise, just as a farmer who throws different kinds of grain randomly together into a bin will have trouble differentiating them in the future (*Oec.* 8.9), so the wife who lets all sorts of random things into her house, wily-nily, will lose the chance of putting them to good use. Without such self-restraint, they will simply vanish into nothingness within the unsupervised space of the *oikos*, just like the fruits of the bees' labour within the *gasteres* of Hesiod's drones.

But there is a further subtext to Ischomachus' example of the farmer and his bin, for it also speaks to the necessity for keeping strict control over the womb, a place which, at all costs, must remain the single *locus* for only one type of child (the husband's). If the dry, mud-brick walls of the house thus serve as a counter-balance to the 'wandering' and 'wetness' of the womb, then the arrangement of things within that house – in jars – is also an attempt to organize the problematic interior space of the woman's anatomy. This argument can be made although (or perhaps because) the

---

[19] In her chapter on the 'jar' (1990, 147–156) Sissa documents the case of a companion style amphora, upon which Pandora is presented in the form of a jar, with Hephaestus alongside. As Sissa points out (155), Pandora is of course fashioned from water and earth by the potter god, and both jar and woman have dangerously open 'lips' (*cheilea*, on which cf. ch.1, p.63 & n.92, above).

[20] This point is well-made by Mulvey 1990, who draws on Bachelard's chapter 'The Dialectics of Outside and Inside'(1994/1958, 211-231) as I do (hence the subtitle to this section).

interior of the female body is never once mentioned in the text. It is worth noting, though, that sex and child-rearing are frequently mentioned by Ischomachus (*Oec.* 7.11–12, 19, 24, 30, 34, 42; 9.5; 10.5, 12), but always in the context of the husband and wife's natural and simplified roles. This is because, I suggest, Xenophon displaces the woman's troubling interiority onto the interiority of the house itself. His careful articulation and categorization of the inside of the *oikos*, his naturalization of its spaces, and his analysis of its parts through mathematics and measurement, all speak to a desire to show that all space, even female space, is quantifiable, fitting into a perfectly accountable system of order and form.

As the house becomes increasingly three-dimensional, moreover, expanding into a series of spaces which even appear to have voices of their own (*Oec.* 9.2: "the rooms themselves called out for whatever was most appropriate to them" / "αὐτὰ ἐκάλει τὰ πρέποντα εἶναι ἐν ἑκάστῳ."), Ischomachus' wife loses her own sense of difference between outside and inside. At the very beginning, when she is unable to find an object requested by her husband, her alienation from the *oikos* is registered by a blush, a complex re-enactment of her position in respect to both her self and her new house (*Oec.* 8.1). For the blush rises to the surface of her face as an exterior expression of her inner turmoil, although – at the same time – it marks her as an outsider within the interior of the house. It instantly reveals to Ischomachus what the house, in keeping parts of itself hidden from her, does not: that she is able to be read on the surface, like a picture, in her entirety. When, just before her exit from the text, the wife's face is covered not by a real blush, but rather by a cosmetic one, Ischomachus' displeasure fits

succinctly into an already well-established pattern. For it appears momentarily that his

house and his wife have swapped places; with the house now having been set up to

reveal itself as an open plan to its inhabitants, the wife now takes on the capacity for a

hidden – in this case even deceitful – interior (*Oec.* 10.3):

> Ἐγὼ τοίνυν. ἔφη. ἰδών ποτε αὐτήν. ὦ Σώκρατες. ἐντετριμμένην πολλῷ μὲν ψιμυθίῳ. ὅπως ἐρυθρότερα φαίνοιτο τῆς ἀληθείας. ὑποδήματα δ' ἔχουσαν ὑψηλά. ὅπως μείζων δοκοίη εἶναι ἢ ἐπεφύκει,..

> 'Once, Socrates,' he said, 'seeing her painted with a good deal of white lead, in order that she might appear redder than she was in truth, and wearing high shoes, in order that she might appear taller than she naturally was,..'

The wife's second, voluntary, mistake, then, stemming from the application of

make-up, is like her first involuntary one, visualized as a 'redness' (*Oec.* 8.1; 10.3) on

the surface of her face. In the second case, though, her complexion masks a deceitful

interior, while in the first it had naturally exposed her inner virtue or shame. In contrast,

her 'made-up' quality here reflects upon her status as a 'man-made' sketch, conjured up

before the eyes of Socrates and the reader by Ischomachus in the narrative. Just before

this passage, Socrates complimented Ischomachus on the 'realism' of his description of

his wife, by claiming that (*Oec.* 10.1–2):

> ὡς ἐμοὶ πολὺ ἥδιον ζώσης ἀρετὴν γυναικὸς καταμανθάνειν ἢ εἰ Ζεῦξίς μοι καλὴν εἰκάσας γραφῇ γυναῖκα ἐπεδείκνυεν.

> It is much more pleasurable to me to learn about the virtue of a living woman than if Zeuxis had shown me his representation of a beautiful woman in a painting.

But Ischomachus' wife is, of course, framed by the imagery of painting on all

sides; not only in the language of the make-up episode, but also in the setting of the

Stoa Poikilê where Ischomachus and Socrates hold their conversation (*Oec.* 7.1). The

walls behind them would be painted with the pictures of fourth-century artists,[21]

perhaps like the one by Zeuxis mentioned by Socrates. And although Socrates attempts

to differentiate Ischomachus' wife from a portrait by calling her 'living' (zôsês), the

word he chooses shares the same root as the word also used for a picture (zôon).[22]

Despite the fact that Xenophon has endeavoured to ensure that his wife has a plain face

and the undecorated walls of his house a plain colouring (Oec. 9.2: "οὐ γὰρ

ποικίλμασι κεκόσμηται"), his wife's blush and make-up nevertheless converge with

both the painted walls of the Stoa Poikilê and the painted surface upon which Zeuxis'

beautiful woman is depicted. Even the painted wall of the theatrical skênê is hinted at

as a backdrop, before which the actor is placed in his high shoes and artificial, coloured

face.[23] In Ischomachus' idealized household, on the contrary, both walls and skin must

be kept natural and unadorned, in order that the viewer might not be deceived as to what

truly lies within.[24]

---

[21] Perhaps including a portrait of Xenophon's son, Gryllus, at the battle of Mantinea (Pomeroy, Oec. ad 7.1).

[22] I document the overlap between these two definitions in ch. 5, above, pp.233–41.

[23] See Padel 1990, on skênographia, as well as the skênê wall's crucial role in establishing a dialectic between inside and outside on the Classical stage. On Ischomachus' made-up face as a double of Pandora's, see Resinski 1998. On the connection between the artificial 'surface' of Pandora and the cinema screen, see Mulvey 1992.

[24] Cf. Oec. 10.3, on Ischomachus' analogy of his wife's use of make-up to a man lying about his property, by displaying counterfeit money, jewelry, and cheaply dyed cloaks (Resinski 1998, 157). On the association in architectural discourse between wall and face/skin/clothing, as well as for his comments upon the gendered painted wall/cinema screen as they relate to my n.23, above, see Wigley 1992, 352–389.

Plot (ii) 'a secret plan or scheme': Revealing the Invisible

In desiring that the interior of his house should be as like its exterior surface as possible,

Xenophon works hard to ensure that the difference between outside and inside be a

'natural' one (as marked by the 'natural' difference between the sexes), in contrast to

the artificial and deceitful exteriority set in place by adornment, make-up, and

counterfeit goods. But in laying bare the inside of his house to his reader, he does more

than simply refute the 'otherness' of female interiority, for he engages, at the same time,

with another source of anxiety in Athens, one which is associated particularly with the

material and moral worth of the *kalos kagathos*. Ischomachus opens his address to

Socrates with a direct reference to the problem (*Oec.* 7.3):

> ὁ Ἰσχόμαχος γελάσας ἐπὶ τῷ τί ποιῶν καλὸς κάγαθὸς κέκλησαι. καὶ ἡσθείς. ὥς γ' ἐμοὶ
> ἔδοξεν. εἶπεν· Ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὅταν σοι διαλέγωνται περὶ ἐμοῦ τινες καλοῦσί με τοῦτο τὸ
> ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα· οὐ γὰρ δή. ὅταν γέ με εἰς ἀντίδοσιν καλῶνται τριηραρχίας ἢ χορηγίας.
> οὐδείς. ἔφη. ζητεῖ τὸν καλόν τε κἀγαθόν..

> Ischomachus laughed to be asked 'what do you do to be called a 'gentleman'?,' and was
> obviously pleased. He said, "I don't know if people call me by this name when they talk about
> me. But I know that, whenever they call me into a property exchange for the outfitting of a
> trireme or the training of a chorus, nobody seeks me out by the name of 'gentleman,'..."

Although we know next to nothing about the Greek practice of *antidosis*, or

'property exchange,' its existence in Athenian law speaks to a general suspicion as to

the contents of one's neighbour's house. The procedure, which has been investigated in

detail by Gabrielson,[25] appears to have consisted in the right of any of the so-deemed

'wealthy' men of Athens, upon being called to a provide a service for the city at their

own expense, to deny that call on the grounds that another citizen was wealthier than

---

[25] Gabrielson 1987. On the antidosis and on the practice of wealthier citizens performing liturgies (cf.
Oec. 2.5 –6), see also Foxhall 1989, 40–41.

themselves, and thus better equipped for the job. In such cases, citizen A will formally

request an 'antidosis' with Citizen B, the man whom he believes to be wealthier than

himself. Citizen B, upon being challenged, has two options. He can either agree to take

on the civic expenses of the liturgy formerly demanded of Citizen A, or he can refuse,

in which case, he must agree to an exchange of all of his property with Citizen A (on

the grounds that he is the poorer one, this is deemed a 'fair deal'). Given the bizarre

implications of such a swap, it is altogether unsurprising that there is no evidence for it

ever having taken place in the ancient world.[26] But, since such a system was at least in

place, it is less surprising that Ischomachus is so committed to a) revealing the interior

of his house and b) making an inventory of his goods, for – as Gabrielson argues – these

were major steps in the *antidosis* procedure (Gabrielson 1987, 17, 20):

> Prior to all else the contestants required more knowledge about each other's property. Therefore, soon after the summons, the challenger had the right to inspect the counterpart's possessions in order to ascertain their value and constituents.

> It so appeared that the law ordained the contestants to take two oaths. The first one was taken ἐπὶ τὰ ἱερά ([D.] xlii.7) to the effect that each of them should deliver to the other an inventory of his property filed in a 'true' and 'just' manner; the second was taken during the delivery of the inventories (to take place three days after the first oath).

In the *Oeconomicus*, then, Ischomachus' house not only shuns the pretence

towards goods that are greater than in reality, but it also – by following, in kind, the

preliminary stages of an *antidosis* procedure – proves that it has no secret store of

---

[26] We do have evidence of *antidosis* challenges against Demosthenes and Phainippos, however: D. xxi.78–80; xxviii. 17; [D.] xlii. (Gabrielson 1987, 10, & n.9).

wealth within an unseen interior.[27] Significantly, the inventory is termed an *apophasis*,

or 'revelation,' and there is even a particular class of property named 'invisible'

(*aphanês*) in fourth-century legal terminology.[28] The choice of language betrays an

anxiety about whether all of a citizen's property can ever be fully 'visible' at one time,

and whether, in consequence, the house itself is ever truly able to be 'known,'

(mapped/opened to surveillance/inventoried) from inside to out.[29]

This attitude is at first unexpected, if only because Greek houses were relatively

simple and small in their layout.[30] But, as sites for the production and storage of a vast

number of household goods, including oil, wine, food, clothing, bedding, shoes, grain,

and cooking implements, they were forced to adapt to hold a complex amount of 'stuff.'

Indeed, in the definition of property, the legal documents in the *antidosis* cases list

"everything except silver-mine investments," just as Socrates and Critoboulus agree that

the *oikos* comprises of everything one owns, whether in the house or not (*Oec.* 1.6).[31]

---

[27] See Gabrielson 1986, 106 & 111, on the other ways in which individual wealth or property was itemized in Athens (*apographai* filed in private suits; *sunthêkai* drawn up in the exchange of property rights; *timêma* declared for tax purposes; wills). As he points out in this article (113) as an 'open society' Athens had a somewhat complicated relationship to the openness of their wealth. In practice, "it was virtually impossible to gain an accurate picture of one's wealth" in Classical Athens (110).

[28] Gabrielson 1986, esp.106–7; 1987, 18, 20.

[29] Note here the attempt to turn the houses of the city 'inside out' in the radical new reforms of the women in Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae*, beginning with the call for citizens to donate their property to the state in order to create a communal open-air dining room. As one man brings his cooking implements out of his house, he files them into a verbal inventory (*Eccl*.730–45) but a bystander, on the other hand, refuses to expose all of his property to the public eye (*Eccl*.746ff.).

[30] Nevett 1999; Wycherley 1969, 185–208; Jameson 1990.

[31] Cf. Gabrielson 1996, where he defines 'invisible' property as that which is not claimed by or attributable to the owner (104–5). This kind of property often took the form of cash or movables (110).

Because much of the goods that need to be stored within the house are produced outside

on the farm, the accumulation of property within the *oikos* is much greater than we

would first anticipate. An inventory of the goods seized from the house of Alcibiades

after the mutilation of the herms, for example, is mind-boggling in both its attention to

detail and its extent.[32] Even more than its function as a living space, then, the *oikos* is

defined by its capacity for storage (*Oec.* 9.2: "τὰ οἰκήματα ᾠκοδόμηται πρὸς αὐτὸ

τοῦτο ἐσμεμμένα. ὅπως ἀγγεῖα ὡς συμφορώτατα ᾖ τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς

ἔσεσθαι·").[33]

2. Order

It is possible, then, to see how the household could become an unstable container for the

unending stream of items that will be brought into it. But, as Ischomachus' comparison

of the house to a Phoenician merchant ship he once saw makes clear, with the due

amount of order, the spatial capacities of the house (no matter how small) can be

increased almost ad infinitum. Upon boarding the ship, Ischomachus narrates to his wife

how "I saw the greatest number of things divided up into the smallest receptacles" /

"πλεῖστα γὰρ σκεύη ἐν σμικροτάτῳ ἀγγείῳ διακεχωρισμένα ἐθεασάμην." (*Oec.*

8.11), in a space whose total surface area was not much bigger than a dining room built

---

As evidence that the old-fashioned method of hiding one's goods was also in effect, Gabrielson relates the 1969 archaeological find of "a pot containing 283 silver tetradrachms, 4 triobols and 5 gold staters, carefully buried beneath the floor of a house in the city area of Thorikos," (Gabrielson 1996, 109).

[32] Pritchett 1956.

[33] "The rooms were built in such a way as to be as efficient storage vessels (*angeia*) as possible for the things that would be put in them." Note also the premium that Hesiod places on the house as a place of storage at *Op.* 361–77.

for eleven couches (8.13). Through the mechanism of meticulous order (*taxis*),

Xenophon implies that the numerous contents of a house or ship (which include, in the

latter's case, wooden equipment, anchors, ropes, rigging, weapons, eating utensils, and

cargo) can be collected into a limited space that is able to be surveyed in an instant,

whether in the mind's eye or in actuality. Thus the ship's 'look-out man' is able to

procure any item immediately, without having to go looking for it, because he has a

perfect plan of the ship's order in his mind, while the entire contents of the boat are able

to be revealed to Ischomachus in a single display.

The ship's declaration of its goods, as a kind of visual inventory, exposes those

secret spaces where 'invisible' property might hide. By transposing such a system onto

the *oikos* (and thus re-enacting, in a sense, the inspection stage of an *antidosis* trial),

Ischomachus places his house above suspicion of artifice or duplicity. Rather, as I will

proceed to show, it is the 'naturalness' of the order in Ischomachus' house that

Xenophon sees as most crucial to its success.

Plot (iii) 'A measured area of ground:' The Paradeisos

In my discussion of Herodotus' *Histories* in chapter 2, I analysed how Croesus' display

of his goods to Solon functioned as a failed attempt to reveal not only his wealth, but

also his own character and fortune to the Athenian lawgiver.[34] The ostentatious

revelation of the gold in his thesaurus does not instantly prove, as he had hoped, that

---

[34] Ch.2, above, p.114.

Croesus is "the most fortunate man on earth" (πάντων ὀλβιώτατος),[35] but rather – as

both Solon and the narrative of the *Histories* go on to show – that his character cannot

be summed up in the 'snapshot' of a single visual instant. In that context, as I discussed

above, such an instantaneous visual command over past, present, and future was only

available to the epic Muses or Herodotean Pythia.[36] In the *Oeconomicus,* however,

another Eastern monarch (Persian for Lydian) again displays his property to another

Greek law-giver (Spartan for Athenian). The Herodotean subtext of this episode is

important, because it reveals how it *is* possible to place one's innate, unchanging self on

display, through the correct ordering, or *taxis,* of one's property.

Cyrus' *paradeisos* occupies a privileged position in Xenophon's text, introduced

by Socrates as a highly idealized and stylized model of the way a household should be

run (*Oec.* 4.20–25).[37] As a garden that is walled on all sides,[38] the *paradeisos* is an

inside-out construction, an inverse of the typical relationship between interior and

exterior.[39] As such, it plays upon the idea of containing the extensive amount of space

that one's property can occupy (stretching even beyond the boundary of the city,

according to Critoboulus at *Oec.* 1.6) within a single, self-contained whole. At the same

---

[35] Hdt. 1.30.2–3.

[36] See above, ch.2, pp.128–33.

[37] As Pomeroy notes (1984, 98–99 & *Oec.* ad loc.) the Elder Cyrus and his less fortunate son are deliberately confused here by Xenophon, in order to make the point of his story more effective. See also Pomeroy 1984 for the correspondence between the *paradeisos,* the Persian Empire, and Ischomahus' house.

[38] From the Avestan word *pairidaêza* (*pairi,* around; *daêza,* wall). Pomeroy, *Oec.* ad loc.

[39] A similar point is made by Kuttner 1999 in her reading of Roman 'garden rooms.' Cf. her title "Looking Outside Inside..."

time, instrumentally for Xenophon's purpose, it draws together the two alternative

spatial spheres of house (walls) and farm (earth, trees), creating a miniaturized

enclosure of one's *oeconomia*. And the scale of the models for *oeconomia*. which

fluctuate throughout the narrative between self, house, city, farm, and now garden,

keeps extending, for Socrates makes clear that Cyrus' *paradeisos* also stands as a

microcosm for the vast range of the Persian Empire.

There is an close correlation between the Persian king's surveillance system

over his Empire, celebrated in the *Oeconomicus* as the key to his successful control

over extensive amounts of space, and his cultivation of his garden as a model setting for

visual display.[40] When Lysander is shown the *paradeisos* at Sardis, he – most unlike

Solon – marvels (*thaumazô*) at what he sees (*Oec.* 4.21):[41]

> ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐθαύμαζεν αὐτὸν ὁ Λύσανδρος ὡς καλὰ μὲν τὰ δένδρα εἴη. δι' ἴσου δὲ
> πεφυτευμένα. ὀρθοὶ δὲ οἱ στίχοι τῶν δένδρων. εὐγώνια δὲ πάντα καλῶς εἴη. ὀσμαὶ δὲ
> πολλαὶ καὶ ἡδεῖα συμπαρομαρτοῖεν αὐτοῖς περιπατοῦσι. καὶ ταῦτα θαυμάζων εἶπεν·
> Ἀλλ' ἐγώ τοι. ὦ Κῦρε. πάντα μὲν ⟨ταῦτα⟩ θαυμάζω ἐπὶ τῷ κάλλει. πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον
> ἄγαμαι τοῦ καταμετρήσαντός σοι καὶ διατάξαντος ἕκαστα τούτων·

> When Lysander had marvelled at how beautiful the trees were, and how they had all been
> planted at equal distances, at how straight the rows of trees were, and how beautifully everything
> was spaced at regular angles, and at the many sweet smells that wafted about as they walked the
> grounds, and, utterly amazed at these things, he said: "Cyrus, I'm amazed at the beauty of all
> these things, and I admire even more the one who measured out and regulated each of these trees
> into order for you.

Upon learning that the *paradeisos* is in fact the work of Cyrus' own hands, Lysander

goes on to congratulate the King on his good fortune, associating the order and

simplicity of his horticulture with his moral worth (*Oec.* 4.25: "Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς. ὦ

---

[40] On the Persian king's personal inspection of as much of his empire as possible, see *Oec.* 4.5–11. The King's 'Eye,' a name given to the many Persian officials, is parodied at Ar. *Ach.* 94ff.

[41] In Herodotus' story it is rather Croesus who is amazed (*apothômazô*, Hdt. 1.30.4) at Solon's *lack* of amazement.

271

Κῦρε. εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γάρ ὢν ἀνήρ εὐδαιμονεῖς." / " You are justly

fortunate, as it seems to me, Cyrus. For your good fortune comes from your being a

good (*agathos*) man." Unlike in Herodotus' story, here one's good fortune can be

summed up in a single display of property; as Lysander draws a direct connection

between Cyrus' choice of an activity (farming) so cherished by the gods (*Oec.* 5.1; cf.

19.17) and his status as a rich, happy man (*eudaimôn*).

Furthermore, this divinely sanctioned connection is explicitly naturalized within

the text through an unexpected blend of agricultural imagery and geometry. For Cyrus

not only 'measured out' and 'apportioned' (*Oec.* 4.22: "διεμέτρησα καὶ διέταξα")

everything himself, but he also planted ("ἐφύτευσα") the trees with his own hands,

thereby creating a garden which grows within exact mathematical proportions, rows,

and angles (*Oec.* 4.21, above: ".. ὡς καλὰ μὲν τὰ δένδρα εἴη. δι' ἴσου δὲ

πεφυτευμένα. ὀρθοὶ δὲ οἱ στίχοι τῶν δένδρων. εὐγώνια δὲ πάντα καλῶς εἴη.." /

"..how beautiful the trees were, and how they had all been planted at equal distances, at

how straight the rows of trees were, and how beautifully everything was spaced at

regular angles"). Thus, what is beautiful, or 'good,' (*kalos*) in nature is expressed

through the beautiful lines and angles of geometry.

The same principle also applies to the natural (and spatialized) division of the

sexes. In moving from the walled interior of Cyrus' garden to the walled interior of

Ischomachus' house, we find a similar attention to nature and geometry (*Oec.* 7.24). For

Ischomachus explains to his wife that she belongs inside because the god has 'planted'

("ἐμφύω"), 'apportioned' ("προστάσσω"), and 'divided out' ("δατέομαι") in her sex a

greater share of qualities best suited to the indoor life (such as the caring for children), using language that is similar to Cyrus' activity of planting in the *paradeisos*.

Oec. 4.22:   ἐγὼ πάντα καὶ διεμέτρησα καὶ διέταξα... ἃ καὶ ἐφύτευσα αὐτός

I measured and apportioned and planted everything myself..

Oec. 7. 23–5:   ὁ θεός... τῇ γυναικὶ καὶ ἐνέφυσε καὶ προσέταξε τὴν τῶν νεογνῶν τέκνων τροφήν. καὶ τοῦ στέργειν τὰ νεογνὰ βρέφη πλέον αὐτῇ ἐδάσατο ἢ τῷ ἀνδρί.

The god... planted and apportioned the nurturing of young children in women, and divided out more care for newborn babies to her than to the man..

In this perfectly measured-out universe, the woman's role fits neatly within the ordered spatial system of the house; her own role of dividing up the household items and apportioning them to different regions within the *oikos* according to their identity in different groups or *phulai* (*Oec.* 9.6) is mirrored in the god's allotment of *her*, according to the category of her sex, to a particular place within a larger cosmic system.

As if they were planting a *paradeisos* of their own, Ischomachus and his wife arrange their possessions in a most pleasing and beautiful order. Ischomachus explains that even shoes, clothes, bedding and cooking utensils appear *kalos* when separated into rows (*Oec.* 8.19):

ὡς δὲ καλὸν φαίνεται. ἐπειδὰν ὑποδήματα ἐφεξῆς κέηται. κἂν ὁποῖα ᾖ. καλὸν δὲ ἱμάτια κεχωρισμένα ἰδεῖν. κἂν ὁποῖα ᾖ. καλὸν δὲ στρώματα. καλὸν δὲ χαλκία. καλὸν δὲ τὰ ἀμφὶ τραπέζας. καλὸν δὲ καὶ ὃ πάντων καταγελάσειεν ἂν μάλιστα οὐχ ὁ σεμνὸς ἀλλ' ὁ κομψός. [ὅτι] καὶ χύτρας [φησὶν] εὔρυθμον φαίνεσθαι εὐκρινῶς κειμένας - τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἤδη που ἀπὸ τούτου ἅπαντα καλλίω φαίνεται κατὰ κόσμον κείμενα.

How beautiful it looks, whenever shoes are laid out in rows, each according to their type, how beautiful it is to see clothes separated out in their proper places, how beautiful bedding looks, how beautiful bronze pots, how beautiful tableware! This is the kind of thing that a facetious man would laugh at but an august man would not, since he would say that even pots appear to be

> graceful when they are laid out in a discriminating manner – and so, following on from this, everything else too appears to be more beautiful when it is arranged in order.[42]

It thus emerges that it is not so much the things themselves that are beautiful, as the spatial order in which they are arranged. Ischomachus ends his eulogy of household equipment by focusing not upon the actual beauty of shoes, clothes, or tableware, but on the beauty of the the spaces which separate each thing from the other (*Oec.* 8.19: "τὸ μέσον δὲ πάντων τούτων καλὸν φαίνεται" / "the space between the things appears to be the most beautiful of all").[43]

Cataloguing and Indexing: Making a Spatial Inventory of the House

In any system of cataloguing, it is the process of dividing – of creating spaces between things – that establishes order and meaning. Thus, as Ischomachus and his wife sort their possessions into different categories, they establish a carefully delineated taxonomy based on a series of separations and divisions. Clothing, for example, is classified first by gender, then by occasion (festival (or war) / everyday); household goods are divided into those that are used daily, and those only for feasts; goods that will be consumed within a month are separated from what will be consumed within a year; bedding and shoes are separated out for men and women (*Oec.* 9.6–10).

---

[42] Translation adapted from Pomeroy, *Oec.*

[43] See my discussion of the *Anabasis* in ch.4, above, where I showed how Xenophon's increasing sense of *aporia* within the vast landscape of Asia Minor was determined in part by his inability to keep accurate measurements of the topography he was passing through. Xenophon lost his control over space (and also over his narrative) because he was unable to keep measurements relative and distances separate from one another, particularly in his regulation of the 'interval.'

The list goes on, and it could continue, of course, infinitely splitting into further categories until it reaches a state of *reductio ad absurdum*. In his much-noted preface to *The Order of Things*, Foucault had discussed the implications of such a state as it is reflected in Borges' quotation from a 'certain Chinese Encyclopaedia,' which lists an anomalous index of animals, from *(a) belonging to the Emperor*, to *(k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush*, and *(n) that from a long way off look like flies.*[44] In his analysis of this list, Foucault crucially focuses not on the strangeness of its content, but on the "interstitial blanks *separating* all these entities from one another," arguing that it is the narrowness of the distances between the categories which contributes to the true 'monstrosity' of this particular text (1970, xvi). The actual physical space (the 'table,' or 'tabula') of Borges' list is "unthinkable," existing only in the "non-place of language" (xvii), precisely because the spaces between its categories are impossible to plot.[45] They cannot, in the final analysis, be mapped onto any topography, but are rather heterotopic,[46] existing in the "disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry, of the *heteroclite*" (xvii).

But if Foucault argues for an undermining of the 'common locus' where language and space intersect and make sense, and consequently that order is never 'natural' in any kind of landscape, then Xenophon, quite the contrary, argues that order

---

[44] Foucault 1970, xv.

[45] Since they lead the indexer into an infinite system of mirrors. (One category in the list (h) = "included in the present classification," Foucault 1970, xvii).

[46] I have discussed Foucault's use of the term *heterotopia* (1970, xviii; 1986) in ch.2, above, p.99.

can be found to exist innately in spatial forms. Moreover, for Xenophon the key is precisely that the interval (*to meson*) that separates one category from another – the difference between festival and everyday wear, for example – is always demonstrably a spatial one. Not only is the cataloguing of Ischomachus and his wife a physical activity, represented by the assortment of groups of possessions into different piles, but each group is also given its own specific site within the house; its 'natural' space, to which it inherently belongs (τὰς χώρας τὰς προσηκούσας· τὰ πρέποντα).[47] Moreover, no matter how small the area within the house is, there will always be enough interstitial space to prevent one category from overlapping with the next, and it is the presence of these intervals that will prevent the order from becoming muddled.[48]

Thus, although Ischomachus and his wife make a written inventory of their possessions (*Oec.* 9.10: "ἀπαριθμήσαντες καὶ γραψάμενοι ἕκαστα"), it is the house itself that stands as the true inventory, with its χῶραι symbolizing each separate category on a table or chart. In this way, the model of housing or 'placing' items in a particular category resembles the structure of a library, for example, or any other number of index systems based on the idea of locale that became so popular in the fourth century (e.g. *bibliotheca*; *pinacotheca* (picture gallery); *dacyliotheca* (gem

---

[47] *Oec.* 9.8: "ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐχωρίσαμεν πάντα κατὰ φυλὰς τὰ ἔπιπλα. εἰς τὰς χώρας τὰς προσηκούσας ἕκαστα διηνέγκαμεν" / "After we had separated all the utensils into different categories, we carried each thing to its proper place;" *Oec.* 9.2: "ὥστε αὐτὰ ἐκάλει τὰ πρέποντα εἶναι ἐν ἑκάστῳ." / " Each (room) calls out for that which is most fitting to it."

[48] Cf. Ischomachus' description of the Phoenecian merchant ship, where everything is snug, but laid out "in order that nothing get in anything else's way" ("ὡς οὔτε ἄλληλα ἐμποδίζει," *Oec.* 8.13), and his comment about τὸ μέσον being beautiful only when there is nothing 'in the way' (*empodon*) at 8.20.

cabinet)).[49] In the increasing trend towards the encyclopedic collecting of literary and artistic works, the Greeks of the Hellenistic period began to create imaginary physical structures within which entries could be 'placed' (*tithēmi/-thēkē*).[50] In each case, we find a system of designated, ordered storage for a potentially infinite range of things, much in the same way as Ischomachus' house is constructed as a series of specific vessels (*angeia*) and places (*chorai*). In the case of the *Oeconomicus*, moreover, as with the case of the library or gem cabinet, the taxonomy works not only to house a large number of objects, but also to situate them in such a way so that any individual item can immediately be found and accessed for retrieval. It is this aspect of the structure that requires a particular kind of training in the mind of its guardian.

3. Memory

The Oeconomicus and Ancient Memory Techniques

In order for Ischomachus' tabulation to work, he must train his wife's mind and memory, so that she will remember where in the house each particular object belongs. Memory is emphasized in the text as an essential prerequisite to the system's efficiency; not only must the wife possess a capable one, but so too must the housekeeper, if she is to remember where the various things in the house are kept (*Oec.* 7.26; 9.10; 9.11). On

---

[49] I wish to thank Ann Kuttner for this idea.

[50] On the organization of 'collections of words' in the Greek art of memory, with reference to Callimachus' catalogue, see Small 1997, ch.4 (41–52), esp. 44–5.

the Phoenician ship, the look-out man regularly spends time inspecting, and presumably

remembering, the order of his equipment. In fact, he knows it so well that (*Oec.* 8.14):

> Even when he wasn't on the ship, he could say where each thing was positioned and how many
> of them there were, as easily as one who knows letters could say how many letters there are in
> the word 'Socrates' and the order in which they are arranged.
>
> καὶ ἀπὼν ἂν εἴποι ὅπου ἕκαστα κεῖται καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἧττον ἢ ὁ γράμματα
> ἐπιστάμενος εἴποι ἂν Σωκράτους καὶ ὁπόσα γράμματα καὶ ὅπου ἕκαστον τέτακται.

This calls to mind the ancient techniques of memorization, which were similarly

preoccupied with constructing mental maps of a particular building or topography in

order that one's own personal effects (those things which an individual needed to

remember) could be stored up in specific places for future use.[51]

Furthermore, the ability to remember by visualizing an imaginary 'place' (as the

look-out man can do) is paired in Aristotle with the practice of remembering a sequence

of letters (Arist. *Mem.* 452a):

> δεῖ δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον
> ὅτι ταχὺ ἀπ' ἄλλου ἐπ' ἄλλο ἔρχονται... ἔοικε δὴ καθόλου ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ μέσον πάντων·
> εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον. ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔλθῃ. μνησθήσεθαι. ἢ οὐκέτ' οὐδὲ ἄλλοθεν. οἷον εἴ
> τις νοήσειεν ἐφ' ὧν ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘ·

> (In the art of memorizing) it is necessary to find a starting point. This is why sometimes people
> seem to remember starting from places (*topoi*). The reason for this is because you can proceed
> quickly from one place to the next... *[a confusing illustration of this principle follows, based on
> the series milk – white – air – damp – autumn]*..On the whole, it is a good idea to start from the
> middle. For whenever you get to this point, if not before, it is likely that you will have
> remembered, if not – you won't remember from any other point either, just as if someone was
> thinking in terms of the series 'ABCDEFGH.'

Although his explanation of how memory works is at times unclear (especially in the

passage quoted here), Aristotle refers to both *topoi* and visualization in his explanation

---

[51] The classic works on the subject are Yates 1966; Blum 1969; Small 1997.

of mnemonic technique.[52] At *Mem.* 450a he compares memory to a painting or the

impression left in wax by a signet ring, while at 449b he claims that it is impossible to

think without imagination, or *phantasia,* which "takes place as an impression in the

mind like the composition of a picture (*diagraphein*)." Here, and in *On the Soul,*

Aristotle insists that the *phantasmata* (the images created by imagination) appear

'before the eyes' (πρὸ ὀμμάτων),[53] and that we cannot learn or think without the

faculty of mental images.[54] He also states that the art of memory is predicated on this

visualizing of mental images (*De an.* 3.3.427b):

> τοῦτο (= νόησις) μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν. ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ
> ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι. ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλοποιοῦντες)..

> This (= thought (*noêsis*)) is an impression which it is possible for us, whenever we wish, to call
> up before our eyes, just as there are those who make images and place them in their memories)..

and on arranging things into position within the mind (*Div. somn.* 1.458b):

> ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα οἷον οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν
> παράγγελμα τίθεσθαι τὰ προβαλλόμενα.

> Some people have seen the kinds of dreams like those who seem to be putting suggested subjects
> into position according to a mnemonic precept.

The system of positioning particular objects within certain places in a house is

of course familiar from the Roman rhetorical treatises which deal with the cultivation of

the *ars memoriae.* Both the anonymous author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (c. 82

BCE) and Quintilian (late first century CE) explain how one should construct a spatial

---

[52] Aristotle mentions the place system of memorizing four times (*Top.* 163b; *De an.* 427b; *Mem.* 452a; *Div. somn.* 458b). Cf. Sorabji 1972; Everson 1997, 193–5; Schofield 1977; Yates 1966, 31.

[53] Arist. *Mem.* 450a; *De an.* 427b.

[54] Arist. *De an.* 3.7.431b; 3.8.432a.

structure in the mind wherein a sequence of thoughts – represented by a number of different objects – could be housed.[55] Thus, as the orator walked through his own memory-house or street in his mind, he was supposedly able to remember the order of his speech simply by looking at what object was placed in which appropriate place. The placing of *imagines* (memory pictures) in sequence in different *loci* (architectural structures) is thus somewhat like Ischomachus and his wife's construction of a store house, or 'thesaurus' of their own possessions, in order that they might find them again in the future.[56]

Given that the system referred to by Quintilian and the author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* is deeply entrenched in a Roman sense of space and Roman practice of oratory, it will not do to push this comparison too far. However, it is worth exploring the tradition among the Roman authors that traces an artificial memory system back to Simonides. According to a number of Roman sources (many of which tell different versions of the story)[57] the technique of remembering through spatial structures was invented by Simonides after an accident involving the collapse of a house. As Cicero tells it (*De or.* 2.86.351-55), the poet devised his ingenious technique after having been called out of a banquet hall at which he was performing. Whilst Simonides was outside, the roof of the building collapsed, and everyone inside was not only killed, but crushed

---

[55] *Rhet. Her.* 3.16.28–3.24.40; Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.1–17.

[56] The 'thesaurus' was a popular term for the structure that housed one's memory system in the Latin authors. Cf. *Rhet. Her.* 3.16.28; Quint. *Inst.* 11.1; Aug. *Conf.* 10.8 & O'Donnell, *Conf.* ad loc.; my ch.1, p.44 & n.51, above.

[57] Quint. *Inst.* 11.2.14–16 (cf. Yates 1966, 27).

beyond recognition. Simonides, however, was able to identify the different bodies for

burial because he remembered the order in which the guests had been positioned within

the room (Cic. *De or.* 2.86.353-4):

> Simonides dicitur ex eo quod meminisset quo eorum loco quisque cubuisset demonstrator uniuscuiusque sepeliendi fuisse; hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime qui memoriae lumen afferret. Itaque eis qui hanc partem ingeni exercerent locos esse capiendos et ea quae memoria tenere vellent effingenda animo atque in eis locis collocanda: sic fore ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret, atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur.

> Simonides, because he remembered where each of them had been reclining, is said to have been able to point out each individual for burial. Then, inspired by this incident, he is reported to have discovered that order is by far the most important factor in bringing clarity to memory. And those who would train this part of their mind must take up places (*loci*) and create images in their mind of those things which they wish to remember and place the images in the places. Thus it would turn out that the order of places would preserve the order of the things to be remembered, that the images of the things would denote the things themselves, and that the places would work like wax, and the images like letters (in the wax).

Our Greek sources are largely silent on the topic of Simonides' invention of

mnemonics,[58] but they do tell us that some kinds of memory techniques existed in

Classical Greece. The author of the *Dissoi Logoi* has a section on artificial memory,

mostly involving a system of verbal association, perhaps visualized through pictures

("For instance, suppose you need to remember the name 'Chrysippos,' you must

connect it with *chrusos* ('gold') and *hippos* ('horse')," *Dissoi Logoi* IX, Sprague). Both

Plato and Xenophon refer to the rhapsode Hippias of Elis' famed technique for

---

[58] One exception is the *Parian Chronicle*, dated to c.264 BCE, which records Simonides as the "inventor of the system of memory-aids" (Yates 1966, 29). Note also that according to Quintilian's version of the story, Simonides appears to have written about his invention in a lost work (*Inst.* 11.2.16; Small 1997, 83).

memorization.[59] Although Plato mocks Hippias in both the Lesser and Greater

dialogues that bear his name, suggesting that the technique was not taken very seriously

in his day, the title character nevertheless claims to have the ability to recite fifty names

after only hearing them once (*Hp. mai.* 285e).

This ability to 'catalogue' is of course well-known from the epic poets, whose

oral mnemonic techniques provided them with the startling ability to recite the

Catalogue of Ships in the *Iliad,* for example, or the fifty daughters of Nereus in

Hesiod's *Theogony.*[60] There appears, then, to be an important transformation taking

place in the fifth and fourth centuries, as systems of memorizing transfer from poetry to

prose. I wish to suggest here that that transformation from catalogue poetry to prose

index may have some connection with the idea of plotting a sequence in space,

especially if memory was understood to work as a kind of physical container or

structure onto which mental images were mapped.[61] Cyrus, for example, not only

cultivated a *paradeisos* of perfect geometric proportions, but was also reported by Pliny

---

[59] Pl. *Hp. mai.* 285e9: "That's right, I forgot you had the art of memory;" *Hp. mi.* 368d6–7: (Socr. to Hp.): But I've forgotten to mention your artful technique of memory at which it seems you think you are quite excellent." Xenophon improves on the joke at *Symp.* 4.62 (where Callias, having been trained by Hippias, was constantly in a state of amorous alert, for whenever he saw a beautiful boy, he was never able to forget him.)

[60] Cf. Hdt. 7.224, where the narrator claims to have memorized the names of three hundred Spartan dead at Thermopylae.

[61] According to the author of the *Rhet. Her.,* the Greeks were particularly interested in the idea of memorizing words. "I know that most of the Greeks who have written on memory have taken the course of listing images that correspond to a great many words, so that persons who wished to learn these images by heart would have them ready without expending effort in search of them" (*Rhet. Her.* 3.23.38). As quoted in Yates 1966, 15.

to have possessed a remarkable ability to remember the name of every soldier in his

army (Plin. *HN* 7.24.88).

Can we posit a connection between Cyrus' ordering of space in his garden and

the ordering of his memory (especially as it is reflected across the vast space of the

Persian Empire)? It seems, following Homer, that we can. For at the end of the *Odyssey,*

Odysseus proves his identity to Penelope and Laertes by accurately recalling first the

exact spatial layout of his bedroom, and secondly, the order of the trees in his father's

orchard. The trees in that orchard, like in Cyrus' *paradeisos,* are arranged with great

care by the gardener, as the stranger Odysseus immediately remarks to his father (Hom.

Od. 24.243–47). It is only by precisely remembering the name of those trees, according

to their order, that Odysseus finally convinces Laertes of his true identity (*Od.* 24.336–

344):

εἰ δ' ἄγε τοι καὶ δένδρε' ἐϋκτιμένην κατ' ἀλωὴν
εἴπω. ἅ μοί ποτ' ἔδωκας. ἐγὼ δ' ᾔτεόν σε ἕκαστα
παιδνὸς ἐών. κατὰ κῆπον ἐπισπόμενος· διὰ δ' αὐτῶν
ἱκνεύμεσθα. σὺ δ' ὠνόμασας καὶ ἔειπες ἕκαστα.
ὄγχνας μοι δῶκας τριοκαίδεκα καὶ δέκα μηλέας.
συκέας τεσσαράκοντ'· ὄρχους δέ μοι ὧδ' ὀνόμηνας
δώσειν πεντήκοντα. διατρύγιος δὲ ἕκαστος
ἤην· ἔνθα δ' ἀνὰ σταφυλαὶ παντοῖαι ἔασιν.
ὁππότε δὴ Διὸς ὧραι ἐπιβρίσειαν ὕπερθεν.

Well then, what if I recite to you the trees in your well laid out orchard
Which you gave to me long ago, and I asked you what kind each one was,
Being just a boy, following you around the orchard. We walked through
The trees, and you named and spoke out each one to me.
You gave me thirteen pear trees, ten apple trees,
And forty fig trees. You named for me the fifty rows of vines
That you would give me, and each was bearing fruit.
There were grape clusters everywhere upon them,
Whenever the seasons of Zeus would press heavily upon them from above.

Odysseus' act of remembering here has a visual and spatial emphasis, both in his

manner of imaginatively retracing the steps he first took with his father in order to

remember the position and order of the trees, and in his ability to conjure up a vivid mental picture of the grapes, weighing heavily upon the branches of the vines. In this way, the well-preserved order of Laertes' garden provides a visual structure in Odysseus' mind for remembering the different species of trees contained within it.

Pliny also records the story of the Greek Charmades (*HN* 7.24.89), who was renowned for his ability to recite the names of all the books in the library. As we return to the concept of the *bibliotheca*, it is tempting to believe that Charmades' technique may have been based on the idea of memorizing a place (*topos*) for each book within the spatial layout of the library. Presumably, this would also lead one to be able to instantly retrieve (the name of) a book by rapidly scanning the ground-plan of the library in one's mind (cf. Arist. *Mem.* 452a, above p.277), in much the same way as Ischomachus' wife might instantly remember where one of her numerous possessions was kept within the house.

Plato alludes to the idea of memory acting as something like a container or house in the *Theaetetus*, when he moves from comparing the process of memorizing to making imprints upon a wax tablet (*Tht.* 191d–195a) to comparing the mind, within which different thoughts are collected, to an aviary full of birds (Pl. *Tht.* 197c):[62]

νῦν αὖ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων. τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας. ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας.

Let's devise in each person's soul a certain aviary full of all different kinds of birds, some of which separate themselves off from the rest in flocks, some in small groups, and some which fly about on their own amongst them all in whichever direction they choose.

---

[62] I wish to thank Joseph Farrell for drawing my attention to this passage.

Plato's point about the aviary is that there are two stages to the induction of knowledge. Each individual begins by filling his 'aviary' with different pieces of knowledge as he progresses through life, but he soon learns that these individual facts (or birds) are almost useless unless he is able to find a way of locating and retrieving them again whenever he needs them (*Tht.* 198d).[63] Hence the blush of Ischomachus' wife, which revealed to her husband that he had only trained her in the first stage of learning, or the precautions of the Phoenician look-out man, who warns that it is not enough to simply arrange things neatly – one must know the exact order in which things are placed in order to be able to retrieve them again in the shortest possible amount of time.

The Role of Memory in the Oeconomicus

If, as I have been arguing, Ischomachus' training of his wife is akin to the training of the mind in memory, since both are based on the principle of placing certain types of objects in specific places within a highly organized spatial structure in order that they might be quickly 'located' and retrieved whenever necessary, then it remains for me to explicate what role I believe that memory plays in the *Oeconomicus* as a whole. In what follows, I suggest three different ways in which I believe that memory informs the work as a whole, especially in relation to its narrative structure.

---

[63] In the *Gorgias*, Plato also compares the heads of forgetful men to sieves, because they are unable to retain anything (*Gorg.* 493c1: "τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν κοσκίνῳ ἀπήκασεν τὴν τῶν ἀνοήτων ὡς τετρήμενην. ἅτε οὐ δυναμένην στέγειν δι' ἀπιστίαν τε καὶ λήθην"). Ischomachus' wife is unlike a sieve in both mind and body precisely because she is able to keep her memory/house in order (cf. Ischomachus' reference to those "who draw water in a leaky jar" (i.e. manage their households inefficiently) at *Oec.* 7.40). The myth of the Danaids, who were condemned to the Underworld to draw water in sieves as a marker of the murderous and boundary-destroying capacities of their bodies, expresses the same idea (see Carson 1990, 155ff.).

1. Early on in the dialogue, Socrates and Critoboulus draw a number of

equations between the *oikos* and the self. They begin by establishing that ἡ οἰκία

comprises one's personal property and whatever is beneficial to the self, (as in the

correspondence between the adjective *oikeios*, meaning one's own, and the Greek word

for the house).[64] At *Oec.* 1.13 and 1.23, they also draw a three-part comparison between

the *sôma*, the *psûche* and the *oikos*. This suggests that one's house, as a metaphorical

and physical extension of the self, reflects upon the mental composition of one's mind. I

have already discussed how Ischomachus' wife's psychological 'interiority' is

associated with the interior of the *oikos* (working on the principle that her *psûche* is

reflected on the surface of her *sôma*, which in turn stands as a reflection of the wall of

the *oikos*).[65] The ordering of both wife and house cannot be dissociated in the text –

they both have a potential (δύναμις) which Ischomachus, in training his wife, also trains

his house :o reveal.[66] The *oikos*, because it represents the order of the wife's mind

through its own neatness or disorder, thereby emerges as an externalized version of not

only her body, but also her *psûche*. Thus, her training in the filing away of particular

objects in specific spaces within the house is predicated upon the training of her

memory, which – according to a somewhat circular logic – is itself predicated upon the

spatial model of the *oikos*.

---

[64] See above, p.255, & Foxhall 1989, 26–7, who quotes Aristotle's definition of property (including *ta oikeia*) at *Rh.* 1361a.

[65] Cf. Socrates' remarks about the colour of Ischomachus' skin, and the deductions he makes therefrom, at *Oec.* 7.2.

[66] *Oec.* 7.14; 9.2.

2. The *Oeconomicus* is structured around a series of remembered conversations

which I have suggested is based on the architecture of the house. We know from other

Socratic dialogues that the task of the narrator, in remembering an account, could

sometimes be a formidable one. Critias practiced his story by going over it again and

again in the *Timaeus* (*Ti.* 25–26), Phaedrus had Lysias' speech written down (*Phdr.*

228), and Euclides kept notes of his discussions with Socrates in order to remember

them (*Tht.* 143a). Not only would Socrates have the topographies of house and city to

guide him in his remembering of the conversations he recounts, but the increasing

emphasis on the visual in the text also suggests that he is remembering it as a series of

pictures, much in the way that Aristotle suggests that memory works through mental

images, or *phantasmata*, in *On Memory and Recollection* and *On the Soul*. While

Xenophon opens his account with "I once heard.." (*Oec.* 1.1: "Ἤκουσα δέ ποτε

αὐτοῦ"), Socrates begins his description of his encounter with Ischomachus with "I

once saw.." (*Oec.* 7.1: "Ἰδὼν οὖν ποτε αὐτὸν"), and their discussion takes place

surrounded by the paintings of the *Stoa Poikilê*. Moreover, the weight that

Ischomachus places on the visual in the training of his wife (how beautiful a chorus,

army, house, shoes, etc... all look when they are in order) is reflected in Socrates'

comparison of his description of her to watching an athletic competition or horse-race,

or to looking at a painting.[67] Like the picture 'burned' in Critias' mind, which helps him

to remember the Myth of Atlantis in the *Timaeus/Critias*, Socrates and Ischomachus

---

[67] *Oec.* 7.9; 10.1 (see above, p.262). On the mnemonic/rhetorical practice of creating an 'interior painting,' see Rouveret 1989, 323.

together fix the wife in their (and their readers') memories by a technique based on visual capacity of the imagination.

3. In the last section of the *Oeconomicus*, Ischomachus instructs Socrates in the art of farming through a process of recollection which is not unlike the process of *anamnêsis* documented by Plato in the *Meno*.[68] Although Socrates believes that he does not know how to farm, he discovers – with the prodding of Ischomachus – that he actually does know, but had somehow 'forgotten' that he knew. Ischomachus describes his education of Socrates as a 'refreshing of his memory' (*Oec.* 16.8: ὑπομιμνῄσκειν), and, finally, his pupil is forced to agree that "I had forgotten that I knew this" (*Oec.* 18.9: "Ταῦτα τοίνυν. ἔφην ἐγώ. ἐλελήθη ἐμαυτὸν ἐπιστάμενος"), although he cannot specifically remember having learnt it. Ischomachus helps Socrates to 'remember' by having him first create a picture in his mind, and then to draw a series of associations from there. By visualizing a hole he has seen dug for planting, for instance, he is then able to able to work out how deep it should be (*Oec.* 19.2–5). In this way, Ischomachus trains Socrates in the 'natural' art of farming (and hence in the principles of *taxis*), much in the way he trains his wife, by demonstrating to them both how memory works as a series of pictures or experiences stored in the mind, which – when arranged appropriately, and put to the proper use – can lead the individual to act according to an ability he or she never knew they had.

---

[68] Pl. *Meno* 80e ff., in which the 'natural' order of geometry helps to trigger the slave boy's recollection. Cf. *R.* bk.7 (ch.5, n.76, above).

Conclusion

As the *Oeconomicus* draws to a close, therefore, it focuses on the question of how memory works, and how natural or 'innate' memory is. When questioned by Socrates as to whether he must know-but-have-forgotten several other skills besides that of farming, Ischomachus replies in the negative, claiming that farming naturally teaches or reminds men, because it is the most 'benevolent and gentle' occupation (*Oec.* 19.17: "ἡ γεωργία οὕτω φιλάνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πραεῖα τέχνη"). Likewise, because of the house's strong connection with an order of the sexes which is divinely imposed, it too fosters a memory system that is – quite unlike the artificial *ars memoriae* of the Roman orators[69] – founded upon the 'natural' state of *taxis* which can be found in kinesiology (the movement of an army, or rowers in a trireme), agriculture, and aesthetics. Once that natural system is in place, moreover, (which can only happen with the right amount of discipline and training) the human mind is provided with a means of scaling down a vast amount of information into a manageable form, even to the point wherein that scaled down version is able to be glanced at, and comprehended, in a single visual instant. In this way, it comes close to achieving what the human narrator was able to do only with the help of the Muses in earlier forms of narrative. Ischomachus' wife thereby emerges as an aid to the male narrator – a Muse of sorts – who manages a system for him by which he might create narratological order.

As the house stores up elements for different times in the future, it provides space between its walls for more than one version of time (goods are separated

---

[69] On the difference between natural and artificial memory, see *Rhet. Her.* 3.16.28–9.

according to whether they used frequently or infrequently, or in the near or distant

future), just as it equips its guardian with a heightened capacity for both memory and

forethought. The memory of both wife and housekeeper is, as I have discussed, greatly

enhanced by the spatial plan provided for them by the *oikos*, but the order of this

ground-plan also provides them with the capacity for forethought, because it allows the

guardian to predict what will be needed in the future based on their inspection of their

goods. Thus the housekeeper is selected for both her memory and her foresight (*Oec.*

9.11: "πρὸς τούτοις δὲ ἡ τὸ μνημονικὸν μάλιστα ἐδόκει ἔχειν καὶ τὸ προνοεῖν"),[70]

as the Phoenician sailor arranges his possessions so as to be as prepared as possible for

any unexpected occurrence (*Oec.* 8.15–16). As Quintilian also argued, memory always

contains within it the seeds of a future idea, for by controlling one's recollection of the

past, one also organizes the order of the future (*Inst.* 11.2.3).

Thus the 'freeze-frame' map of the house does, to some extent, stretch through

time, bringing Xenophon closer to the Muses' vision of "τά τ'ἐόντα τά τ'ἐσσόμενα

πρό τ'ἐόντα," (Hes. *Th.* 38) as they are revealed as a single, encyclopedic whole

within the mind. In his design of the *oikos*, Xenophon not only creates a system for

organizing his narrative, but also for organizing the past and the future. His storage of

time in jars and rooms is, after all, a highly refined extension of Hesiod's housing of the

---

[70] "In addition to her other qualities we chose her because she seemed to have both memory and foresight." Cf. the speech of the housekeeper, Mrs. Wilson, in Robert Altman's 2002 film 'Gosford Park,' in which she explains how she was able to predict an oncoming murder in the house because "the gift of prediction" is one of the housekeeper's most vital attributes.

past underground in the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*.[71] So too, as his wife is trained

to be something like the librarian of a vast index or cataloguing system, does he replace

the divine capacity of the Muses with the architecture of what will, eventually, become

the 'Mouseion,' as it was represented by the vast and intricate design of the Hellenistic

library.

---

[71] See above, ch.1.

CONCLUSION

From Map to Catalogue, Muse to 'Mouseion'

In seeking to show how the cataloguing system of the early forth century BCE was mapped by Xenophon onto the spatial model of a building, I have ended the last chapter of this dissertation by looking forward to the establishment of the library at Alexandria. At the same time, I wish to suggest that the *pinakes* upon which the different books, authors, and collections were recorded, and which served as an extensive index for the entire contents of the library, share a tangible connection with the *pinakes* of Archaic and Classical Greece, as they are represented in the boards (or tablets) upon which maps and paintings were depicted. For both maps and pictures, as they are reflected in the texts I have examined here, have striven to freeze the sequence of narrative into a single, instantaneous whole. In this way, they have been put to use by the human narrator as he attempts to catch up with (or replace) the encyclopedic sweep of the Muses' ability to see past, present, and future in a simultaneous instant.

The *pinax* of the fourth-century cataloguing system fits well into this pattern, because it offers the author or poet access to a similarly comprehensive range across space, just as it borrows from the idea of a picture in both its association with memory, and in its ability to telescope an extensive or godlike vision into a single visual structure. In the *Oeconomicus*, moreover, these two effects (picture and catalogue) overlap in a strikingly epic way. For even though the techniques through which

Ischomachus describes his house are products of his own era and own style of story-telling, the narrative space which they create is reminiscent of what we might call the epic poet's 'spatial range.' It can be compared with Homer's ability to move between sequential and spatial representation in his narration of the Catalogue of Ships, on the one hand, and the Shield of Achilles, on the other.

I have shown how cartography, ekphrasis, image-making, and cataloguing are all used as 'technologies' in the attempt to scale a divine vision of the world, which began with the Muses, into the human, sequential form of narrative. In this sense, my intention has been to trace a development through genres, examining what happens to the relationship between space and narrative when the Muse is dropped from the field of geography, for example, or when a new structure for recording the past emerges in the form of the Socratic dialogue. In moving from the cosmic topography of Hesiod's *Theogony* through Homer's, Herodotus', and Xenophon's attempts to describe the incommensurate space of the earth, and on to the 'real' landscapes of the Athenian *polis* and *oikos*, I have also described how that development works in terms of a movement towards measured and delineated space; a quest for space that is able to be 'plotted' by the human eye, in Brooks' full sense of the term.

Each chapter has revealed how the presentation of space in Greek literature balances on the pivot between two ways of viewing. That is, seeing from above in a perfect moment of order and clarity, from the divine perspective of the epic Muses or the Ionian cartographer, and seeing from below, from the limited perspective of the traveller upon a road, and in whose position the author narrates according to a

hodological sequence where the end is out of sight. In Xenophon, we have seen both ends of that spectrum represented, where the dislocation and disorientation of the narrator of the *Anabasis*, who lost his way on the ground, is balanced by the secure topographical overview of Ischomachus' household. The *Oeconomicus* is an appropriate place to end, for, in the hodological tour of its rooms, it combines the linear, pedestrian structure of narrative with the wife's 'cognitive map.' That map, moreover, – like the Muses' instantaneous command over the past – functions as a memory system that houses time, contracting it into a synoptic picture which reaches easily across temporal and spatial divides.

Finally, this dissertation has moved from a preoccupation with narrative to a preoccupation with memory, especially when they are combined in the divergent symbols of the catalogue and the picture. Taken together, these two ancient techniques for remembering provided the author with a means of both sifting through the past, thereby placing it within the order of linear sequence and list, and of attempting to keep it pristine – as a manifest, complete structure set before the eyes of the reader or listener. By miniaturizing the breadth of the space covered by the Homeric shield and catalogue, and by re-mapping that breadth onto the space of the *oikos,* Xenophon opens up new possibilities for human memory, even if he (like Plato) has trouble setting that system into motion and creating a forward-driving plot. In the end, therefore, the tension between the problem of representing space within time and time within space, a tension which has energized this narrative from the very beginning, necessarily remains.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adam, James (1963) *The Republic of Plato: Edited, with Critical Notes, Commentary and Appendices* (2 vols.), 2nd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (1st ed. 1902).

Allen, Thomas W. (1908) *Homeri Opera, Vols.III–V* (*Od.* bks.1–24; *Hymnoi; Cyclum Fragmenta; Margites; Batrachomyomachia; Vitae*), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ambler, Wayne H. (1996) "On the *Oeconomicus*" in Robert C. Bartlett (ed.), *Xenophon: The Shorter Socratic Writings*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 102–131.

Anderson, Benedict (1991) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (rev. ed.), London: Verso.

Anderson, J. K. (1970) *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Anderson, Stanford (1998) "Memory in Architecture" in Kenneth Frampton (ed.) *Technology, Place and Architecture, The Jerusalem Seminars in Architecture 1992-6*, New York: Rizzoli, 228–230.

Andrews, John F. (ed.) (1993) *William Shakespeare's A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Everyman edition) London: J. M. Dent.

Antoniu, Manuela (1996) "The Walled-Up Bride: An Architecture of Eternal Return" in Coleman et al. (eds.), 109–129.

Archer-Hind, R. D. (1988) *The Timaeus of Plato, Edited with Introduction and Notes*, Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer (originally published London: Macmillan, 1888).

Arnaud, Pascal & Counillon, Patrick (eds.) (1998) *Geographica Historica*, Bordeaux: Ausonius Publications, Études 2.

Arthur, Marilyn B. (1983) "The Dream of a World without Women: Poetics and the Circles of Order in the *Theogony* Prooemium," *Areth.* 16, 97–116.

——— (1982) "Cultural Strategies in Hesiod's *Theogony*: Law, Family, Society," *Areth.* 15, 63-81.

Auerbach, Erich (1967) *Mimesis: dargstellte Wirklichkeit in der abendländischen Literatur*, Bern: Francke.

——— (1953) *Mimesis: the Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, transl. by Willard R. Trask, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Austin, Norman (1966) "The Function of the Digression in the *Iliad*," *GRBS* 7, 295–312.

Ayache, Laurent (1997) "Est-il vraiment question d'art medical dans le *Timée*?" in Calvo & Brisson (eds.) 55–65.

Bachelard, Gaston (1994/1958) *The Poetics of Space*, transl. by Maria Jolas, Boston: Beacon Press.

Bagrow, Leo (1964) *History of Cartography*, rev. & enl. by R.A Skelton, transl. by D. L Paisey, London: A. Watts.

Bal, Mieke (1983) "Sexuality, Semiosis and Binarism: A Narratological Comment on Bergren and Arthur," *Areth.* 16, 117–135.

Baldry, H. C. (1932) "Embryological Analogies in Pre-Socratic Cosmogony," *CQ* 26, 27–34.

Ballabriga, Allain (1989) "La Prophétie de Tirésias," *Metis* 4.2, 291–304.

Barnes, T. J. & Duncan, J. S. (1992) *Writing Worlds: Discourse, Text and Metaphor*, New York: Routledge.

Barnett, R. D. (1963) "Xenophon and the Wall of Media," *JHS* 83, 1–26.

Barthes, Roland (1977) "Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives" in *Image-Music-Text*, transl. by Stephen Heath, New York: Hill & Wang, 79–124.

Baslez, Marie-Françoise (1995) "Fleuves et voies d'eau dans l'*Anabase*" in Briant (ed.), 79–88.

Bauslaugh, Robert A. (1979) "The Text of Thucydides IV 8.6 and the South Channel at Pylos," *JHS* 99, 1–6.

Beard, Mary (1987) "A Complex of Times: No More Sheep on Romulus' Birthday," *PCPhS* n.s.33, 1–15.

Becker, A. S. (1985) *The Shield of Achilles and the Poetics of Ekphrasis*, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.

Belfiore, Elizabeth (2000) "Narratological Plots and Aristotle's Mythos," *Areth.* 33, 37–70.

Benardete, Seth (1997) *The Bow and the Lyre: a Platonic Reading of the Odyssey*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Benjamin, Walter (1968) *Illuminations*, ed. by Hannah Arendt, transl. by Harry Zohn, New York: Schocken Books.

Bergren, Ann L. T. (1992) "Architecture Gender Philosophy" in Whiteman et al. (eds.) 1992, 8–46.

————— (1983a) "Language and the Female in Early Greek Thought," *Areth.* 16, 69–95.

————— (1983b) "Odyssean Temporality: Many (Re)turns" in Carl A. Rubino & Cynthia W. Shelmerdine (eds.) *Approaches to Homer*, University of Texas Press: Austin, 38–73.

————— (1975) *The Etymology and Usage of Πεϊραρ in Early Greek Poetry*, State College, PA: American Classical Studies 2, American Philological Association.

Berryman, Sylvia (1997) "Horror Vacui in the Third Century B.C: when is a theory not a theory?" in Richard Sorabji (ed.) *Aristotle and After*, BICS Suppl. 68, London: Institute of Classical Studies, 147–58.

Blaise, Fabienne, Judet de La Combe, Pierre, & Rousseau, Philippe (1996) *Le Métier du Mythe. Lectures d'Hésiode,* Paris: Cahiers de Philologie 16, Presses Universitaires du Septentrion.

Bloch, H. (ed.) (1956) *Abhandlungen der griechischen Geschichtsschreibung,* Leiden: Brill.

Blum, Herwig (1969) *Die Antike Mnemotechnik,* New York, G. Olms.

Borges, Jorges L. (1998) *Collected Fictions,* transl. by Andrew Hurley, New York: Penguin.

———— (1971) *The Aleph and Other Stories (1933-1969),* transl. & ed. by N. T. di Giovanni, in collaboration with the author, New York: Bantam Books.

Boxer, C. R. (1974) *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650,* Berkeley: University of California Press (first published 1951).

Bradbury, Raymond (1975) *The Illustrated Man,* London: Bantam Books.

Brague, Rémi (1985) "The Body of the Speech: A New Hypothesis on the Compositional Structure of *Timaeus'* Monologue," in D. J. O'Meara (ed.) *Platonic Investigations,* Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 53-83.

Briant, Pierre (1996) *Histoire de l'Empire Perse de Cyrus à Alexandre,* Paris: Libraire Arthème Fayard.

———— (ed.) (1995) *Dans les pas des Dix-Mille: Peuples et pays du Proche-Orient vus par un Grec,* Toulouse: Presses Universitaires du Mirail.

Brisson, Luc (1998) *Plato the Myth-Maker,* transl. by Gerard Naddaf, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (originally published in French in 1994).

———— (1987) "Le Discours comme Univers et l'Univers Comme Discours. Platon et ses Interprètes Néo-Platoniciens" in *Études de Littératures Ancienne 3: Le Texte et ses Représentations,* Paris: Presses de l'école normale supérieure.

Brook, Peter (1988) *Threads of Time: Recollections,* Washington DC: Counterpoint.

Brooks, Peter (1984) *Reading for the Plot. Design and Intention in Narrative.* New York: Knopf.

Brulé, Pierre (1995) "Un nouveau monde ou le même monde?" in Briant (ed.), 3-20.

Burkert, Walter (1992) *The Orientalizing Revolution, Near Eastern Influence on Greek Culture in the Early Archaic Age,* transl. by Margaret E. Pinder & Walter Burkert, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

———— (1985) *Greek Religion: Archaic and Classical,* transl. by John Raffan, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

———— (1972) *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism,* transl. by Edwin L. Minar, Jr., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Burnet, John (1902-1906) *Platonis Opera* (6 vols.), Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts.

Burnyeat, M.F. (2000) "Utopia and Fantasy: The Practicability of Plato's Ideally Just City" in Fine (ed.) vol.2, 297-308.

Calame, Claude (ed.) (1983) *Alcman* (Introduction, texte critique, témoignages, traduction et commentaire) Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo.

Calvino, Italo (1974) *Invisible Cities*, transl. by William Weaver, New York: HBJ.

Calvo, Tomás & Brisson, Luc (eds.) (1997) *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias, Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum, Selected Papers*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag.

Carrière, J-C. (1992) "La réponse de Tirésias: le dernier voyage et la mort d'Ulysse selon l'*Odyssée*" in Marie-Madeleine Mactoux et Evelyne Geny (eds.) *MélangesPierre Lévêque 6: Religion*, Paris: Gallimard, 17–44.

Carson, Anne (1990) "Putting her in her place: Women, Dirt, and Desire" in Halperin, Winkler & Zeitlin (eds.), 135–69.

Carter, Paul (1990) "Plotting: Australia's Explorer Narratives as "Spatial History"," *YJC* 3.2, 91–107.

————— (1988) *The Road to Botany Bay: An Exploration of Landscape and History*, New York: Knopf.

Cartledge, Paul (1993) "Xenophon's Women: A Touch of the Other," *Tria Lustra, Liverpool Classical Papers* 3, 5–14.

Casevitz, Michel (1998) "Remarques sure l'histoire de quelques mots exprimant l'espace en Grec," *REA* 100, nos.3–4, 417–435.

Certeau, Michel de (1986) *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*, transl. by Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

————— (1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, transl. by Steven Rendall, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Clarke, Katherine (1999) *Between Geography and History: Hellenistic Constructions of the Roman World*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Clay, Diskin (2000) *Platonic Questions: Dialogues with the Silent Philosopher*, College Park: Penn State University Press.

————— (1997) "The Plan of Plato's *Critias*" in Calvo and Brisson (eds.) *Interpreting the Timaeus-Critias*, Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag, 49–54.

————— (1992) "The World of Hesiod," *Ramus* 21.2, 131–155.

————— (1988) "Reading the *Republic*" in Griswold (ed.), 19–33.

Clay, Jenny Strauss (1993) "The Generation of Monsters in *Hesiod*," *CP* 88.2, 105–116.

————— (1988) "What the Muses Sang: *Theogony* 1–115," *GRBS* 29, 323–333.

Cohen, Beth (ed.) (1995) *The Distaff Side: Representing the Female in Homer's Odyssey*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Cole, Thomas (1983) "Archaic Truth," *QUCC* 13, 7–28.

Coleman, Deborah, Danze, Elizabeth & Henderson, Carol (eds.) (1996) *Architecture and Feminism*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Collins, Derek (1999) "Hesiod and the Divine Voices of the Muses," *Areth.* 32, 241–262.

Colomina, Beatriz (ed.) (1992) *Sexuality and Space*, New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Connor, W. J. (1993) "The *Histor* in History" in Rosen & Farrell (eds.), 3–15.

————— (1984) *Thucydides*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Cooper, John M. (ed.) (1997) *The Complete Works of Plato*, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Cornford, Francis Macdonald (1948/1937) *Plato's Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato translated with running commentary*, London: Routledge.

Cosgrove, D. & Daniels, S. (eds.) (1988) *The Iconography of Landscape*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dalby, Andrew (1992) "Greeks Abroad: Social Organisation and Food Among the Ten Thousand," *JHS* 112, 16–30.

Davidson, Cynthia C. (ed.) (1999) *Anytime*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Davidson, James N. (1997) *Courtesans and Fishcakes: The Consuming Passions of Classical Athens*, New York: St Martin's Press.

Davidson, John (1995) "Zeus and the Stone Substitute," *Hermes* 123, 363–69.

Dean-Jones, Lesley (1994) *Women's Bodies in Classical Greek Science*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Debord, Pierre (1995) "Les routes royales en Asie Mineure Occidentale," in Briant (ed.) 89–97.

Demand, Nancy (1994) *Birth, Death and Motherhood*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Derrida, Jacques (1997) "Chora" transl. by Ian McCloud, in Jeffrey Kipnis and Thomas Leeser (eds.), *Choral Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman*, New York: Monacelli Press, 14–32.

————— (1996) *Archive Fever*, transl. by Eric Prenowitz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

————— (1991) "Plato's Pharmacy," excerpted in P. Kamuf (ed.) *A Derrida Reader: Between the Blinds*, New York: Columbia University Press, 112–142.

Detienne, Marcel (1996) *The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece*, transl. by Janet Lloyd, New York: Zone Books (first published in French 1967).

————— (ed.) (1988) *Les Savoirs de l'Écriture en Grèce Ancienne*, Lille: Presses Universitaires de Lille.

————— (1986) *The Creation of Mythology*, transl. by Margaret Cook, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (originally published in French in 1981).

Detienne, Marcel & Vernant, Jean-Pierre (1978) *Cunning Intelligence in Greek Culture and Society*, transl. by Janet Lloyd, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Dewald, Carolyn (1993) "Reading the World: The Interpretation of Objects in Herodotus' *Histories*" in Rosen & Farrell (eds.), 55–70.

———(1987) "Narrative Surface and Authorial Voice in Herodotus' *Histories*" *Areth.*, 20, 147–70.

Dilke, O. A. W. (1998) *Greek and Roman Maps*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

———(1992) *The Roman Land Surveyors, An Introduction to the Agrimensores*, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert.

———(1987) *Mathematics and Measurement*, London: University of California Press / British Museum.

Dillery, John (1995) *Xenophon and the History of his Times*, New York/London: Routledge.

Dindorf, Wilhelm (ed.) (1855) *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam, ex codicibus aucta et emendata, Vol.II*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dodds, E. R. (1951) *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Doherty, Lillian Eileen (1995) "Sirens, Muses and Female Narrators in the *Odyssey*" in Cohen (ed.), 81–92.

Doob, Penelope Reed (1990) *The Idea of the Labyrinth: from Classical Antiquity through the Middle Ages*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Dornseiff, Franz (1937) "Odysseus' Letzte Fahrt," *Hermes* 72, 351–5.

Dougherty, Carol (2001) *The Raft of Odysseus: The Ethnographic Imagination of Homer's Odyssey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Dubois, Page (1991) *Torture and Truth*, New York: Routledge.

Eade, John & Sallnow, Michael J. (eds.) (1991) *Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Christian Pilgrimage*, London: Routledge.

Edwards, Mark W. (1991) *The Iliad: A Commentary, vol.V* (bks.17–20), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eliade, Mircea (1996/1958) *Patterns in Comparative Religion*, transl. by Rosemary Sheed, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Elsner, Jas, and Rubiés, Joan-Pau (eds.) (1999) *Voyages and Visions: Towards a Cultural History of Travel*, London: Reaktion Books.

Elsner, John (Jas) (1994) "From the Pyramids to Pausanias and Piglet: Monuments, Travel and Writing," in R. Osborne and S. Goldhill (eds.) *Art and Text in Ancient Greek Culture*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 224–254.

Everson, Stephen (1997) *Aristotle on Perception*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Faraone, Christopher (1992) *Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Myth and Ritual*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Farrell, W. J. (1961) "A Revised Itinerary of the Route Followed by Cyrus the Younger through Syria, 401 B.C.," *JHS* 81, 153–156.

Feeney, Denis (1999) "Mea Tempora: Patterning of Time in the *Metamorphoses*" in P. Hardie, A. Barchiesi, & S. Hinds (eds.) *Ovidian Transformations. Essays on Ovid's Metamorphoses and its Reception*, Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society Supplement Vol.23, 13–30.

Ferrari, Giovanni (1989) "Plato and Poetry," in *Cambridge History of Literary Criticism vol.1*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 92–148.

————— (1988) "Hesiod's Mimetic Muses and the Strategies of Deconstruction" in Andrew Benjamin (ed.) *Post-structuralist Classics*, London: Routledge, 45–78.

————— (1987) *Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato's Phaedrus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fine, Gail (ed.) (1999) *Plato, vol.1: Metaphysics and Epistemology; Plato vol.2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the Soul*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

————— (1999) "Knowledge and Belief in *Republic* 5-7," in Fine (ed.) vol.1 215–246.

————— (1989) "Commentary on Sedley," in J. J. Cleary & D. C. Shartin (eds.) *Proc. Boston Area Colloq. Anc. Phil. 5*, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 384–398.

Finley, M.I. (1975) "The Ancestral Constitution," in *The Use and Abuse of History*, London/New York: Penguin Books, 34–59.

Foley, John Miles (1997) "Traditional Signs and Homeric Art" in E. Bakker and A. Kahane (eds.) *Written Voices, Spoken Signs: Tradition, Performance and the Epic Text*, Boston: Harvard University Press, 56–82.

Ford, Andrew (1992) *Homer, the Poetry of the Past*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Fornara, Charles William (1983) *The Nature of History in Ancient Greece and Rome*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Foucault, Michel (1990) *The Use of Pleasure: The History of Sexuality* vol.2, transl. by Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books (first published in French 1984).

————— (1989) "Space, Knowledge and Power" in Sylvère Lotringer (ed.) *Foucault Live (Interviews 1961–1984)*, transl. by Christian Hubert, 335–347.

————— (1986) "Of Other Spaces," *Diacritics* 16, 22–27.

————— (1980a) "Questions on Geography" in Gordon (ed.), 63–77.

————— (1980b) "The Eye of Power" in Gordon (ed.), 146–165.

—————— (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences,* transl. from the French, London: Tavistock.

Fowler, D. P. (1991) "Narrate and Describe: The Problem of Ekphrasis," *JRS* 81, 25–35.

—————— (1990) "Deviant Focalization in Vergil's *Aeneid,*" *PCPhS* 216, 42–63.

Fowler, Robert L. (1999) "The Authors Named Pherecydes," *Mnem.* 4th series, vol.52.1, 1–15.

Foxhall, Lin (1989) "Household, Gender and Property in Classical Athens," *CQ* 39(i), 22–44.

Frank, Georgia (2000) *The Memory of the Eyes: Pilgrims to Living Saints in Christian Late Antiquity,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fränkel, Hermann (1968/1931) "Die Zeitauffassung in der frühgriechischen Literatur" in Franz Tietze (ed.) Hermann Fränkel, *Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens,* Munich: C. H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1–22.

Frankfurter, David (ed.) (1998) *Pilgrimage and Holy Space in Late Antique Egypt,* Leiden: Brill.

Frazer, James George, Sir (1965) *Pausanias's Description of Greece. Translated with a commentary,* New York, Biblo and Tannen.

Frazer, R. M. (1981) "Hesiod's Titanomachy as an Illustration of Zielinski's Law," *GRBS* 22.1, 5–9.

Friedländer, P. (1966/1914) "Das Proömium von Hesiods *Theogonie,*" in Heitsch (ed.), 277–294.

Fritz, K. von (1966/1956) "Das Proömium der Hesiodischen *Theogonie,*" in Heitsch (ed.), 295–315.

Gabrielson, Vincent (1987) "The *Antidosis* Procedure in Classical Athens," *C&M* 38, 7–38.

—————— (1986) "Φανερά and Ἀφανής Οὐσία in Classical Athens," *C&M* 37, 99–114.

Genette, Gérard (1980) *Narrative Discourse,* transl. by Jane E. Lewis, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Revised French edition (1982) *Nouveau Discours du Récit,* Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

—————— (1976) "Boundaries of Narrative," *NLH* 8.1, 1–13.

Gill, Christopher (1993) "Plato on Falsehood - not Fiction" in C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman (eds.) *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World,* Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 38–87.

—————— (1979) "Plato and Politics: The *Critias* and the *Politicus,*" *Phronesis* 24, 148–167.

—————— (1977) "The Genre of the Atlantis Story," *CP* 72, 287–304.

Gini, Anthony (1993) "The Manly Intellect of his Wife: Xenophon, *Oec.* ch.7," *CW* 86, 483–488.

Girod, R. (1974) "Vision et Représentation Géographiques chez les Anciens" in R. Chevallier (ed.) *Littérature gréco-romaine et géographie historique, Mélanges offerts à Roger Dion,* Paris: A&J Picard, 481–498.

Gisinger, F. (1937) "Periplus," *RE* 37, cols. 841–850.

Godlewska, Anne (1995) "Map, Text and Image. The Mentality of Enlightened Conquerors: A New Look at the *Description de l'Egypte,*" *TIBG* 20, 5–28.

Goehring, James E. (1993) "The Encroaching Desert: Literary Production and Ascetic Space in Early Christian Egypt," *JECS* 1:3, 281–296.

Goldhill, Simon (1991) *The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goldin, Owen (1998) "Plato and the Arrow of Time," *Anc. Ph.* 18, 125–143.

Gombrich, E.H. (1980/1974) "Standards of Truth: The Arrested Image and the Moving Eye" in Mitchell (ed.), 181–217.

Goodwin, Jason (1999) *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire* New York: Henry Holt & Company, Inc.

Gordon C. (ed.) (1980) *Power/Knowledge,* New York: Pantheon.

Graf, D.F. (1993) "The Persian Royal Road System in Syria-Palestine," *Trans.* 6, 149–168.

———— (1994) "The Persian Royal Road System," *Ach. Hist.* 8: *Continuity and Change,* 167–189.

Greenblatt, Stephen (1991) *Marvelous Possessions, The Wonder of the New World,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Griffith, G. T. (1935) *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Griswold, Charles L. Jr. (ed.) (1988) *Platonic Writings/Platonic Readings,* New York: Routledge.

Grosz, Elizabeth (2001) *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space,* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haggard, Sir Henry Rider (1951) *Three Adventure Novels: She, King Solomon's Mines, Allan Quatermain,* New York: Dover.

Hall, Edith (1989) *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy,* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Halliwell, Stephen (1988) *Plato, Republic X, Text, Translation, Commentary,* Warminster: Aris and Phillips.

———— (1987) *The Poetics of Aristotle, a Translation and Commentary.* London: Duckworth.

———— (1986) *Aristotle's Poetics,* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Halperin, David (1990) *One Hundred Years of Homosexuality and Other Essays on Greek Love,* New York: Routledge.

Halperin, David M., Winkler, John J., & Zeitlin, Froma I. (eds.) (1990) *Before Sexuality: The Construction of the Erotic Experience in the Ancient World,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hamilton, Richard (1989) *The Architecture of Hesiodic Poetry*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Hansen, William F. (1990) "Odysseus and the Oar: A Folkloric Approach" in L. Edmunds (ed.) *Approaches to Greek Myth*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 239–272.

Hanson, Ann Ellis (1990) "The Medical Writer's Woman" in Halperin, Winkler & Zeitlin (eds.), 309–338.

Hardie, Philip (1985) "Imago Mundi: Cosmological and Ideological Aspects of the Shield of Achilles," *JHS* 105,11–31.

Harley, J. B. (1992) "Deconstructing the Map" in Barnes & Duncan (eds.) 231–247.

———— (1989) "Historical Geography and the Cartographic Illusion," *J. Hist. G.* 15, 80–91.

———— (1988a) "Maps, Knowledge and Power" in Cosgrove & Daniels (eds.), 277–312.

———— (1988b) "Silences and Secrecy: the Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe," *IM* 40, 57–76.

Hartog, François (1996) *Mémoire d'Ulysse : Récits sur la Frontière en Grèce Ancienne*, Paris: Gallimard.

———— (1988) *The Mirror of Herodotus*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Harvey, David (2001) *Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography*, Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.

———— (1989) *The Condition of Postmodernity: an Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*: Oxford, New York: Blackwell.

Harvey, F. D. (1984) "The Wicked Wife of Ischomachus," *EMC/CV* n.s. 3, 68–70.

Hawking, Stephen W. (1998) *A Brief History of Time, Tenth Anniversary Edition*, New York: Bantam.

Hays, K. Michael (ed.) (1998) *Architecture Theory Since 1968*, Cambridge: MA: MIT Press.

Hefferman, J. A. W. (1991) "Ekphrasis and Representation," *NLH* 22, 297–316.

Heidel, W. A. (1937) *The Frame of the Ancient Greek Maps*, Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press.

———— (1921) "Anaximander's Book: The First Known Geographical Treatise," *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, 56.7, reprinted (1980) in *Selected Papers*, New York: Garland, 239–88.

Heitsch, Ernst (ed.) (1966) *Hesiod*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Hepburn, R. W. (1984) *Wonder and Other Essays*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Herington, John (1991) "The Poem of Herodotus," *Arion* 1.3, 5–16.

Heubeck, Alfred & Hoekstra, Arie (eds.) (1989) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, Vol.II* (bks.9–16), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Heubeck, Alfred, West, Stephanie, & Hainsworth, J. B (eds.) (1988) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, Vol.I* (intro. & bks.1–8), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Higgins, W.E (1977) *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis,* Albany: SUNY Press.

————— (1972) "The Concept and the Role of the Individual in Xenophon," *HSCP* 76, 289–94.

Hoffman, Geneviève (1985) "Xénophon, la femme et les biens" in Colette Piault (ed.) *Familles et beins en Grèce et à Chypre,* Paris: L'Harmattan, 261–280.

Hoffner, H.A. (1968) "Hittite Tarpis and Hebrew Teraphim," *JNES* 27, 61–8.

Hornblower, Simon (ed.) (1994) *Greek Historiography,* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

How, W.W. & Wells, J. (1928) *A Commentary on Herodotus with Introduction and Appendices, Vol.II,* Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hubbard, Thomas K. (1992) "Nature and Art in the Shield of Achilles," *Arion* 2 (Winter), 16–41.

Hude, Carolus (1927) *Herodoti Historiae, Vols.I&II* (3rd ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hughes, Diane Owen & Trautmann, Thomas R. (eds.) *Time, Histories, and Ethnologies,* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Humphreys, S.C. (1996) "From Riddle to Rigour: Satisfactions of Scientific Prose in Ancient Greece" in S. Marchand & E. Lunbeck (eds.), 3–24.

Irwin, T. H. (1999) "The Theory of Forms" in Fine (ed.) vol.1, 143-170.

Jacob, Christian (1991) *Géographie et ethnographie en Grèce ancienne,* Paris: Armand Colin.

————— (1988) "Inscrire la Terre Habitée sur une Tablette – Réflexions sur la Fonction des Cartes Géographiques en Grèce Ancienne" in Detienne (ed.), 273–304.

————— (1985) "Lectures antiques de la carte", *Et. Fr.* 21, no. 2, 21–46.

————— (1984) "Dédale Géographique. Regard et voyage aériens en Grèce," *Lalies: Actes des sessions de linguistique et de littérature* 3, 147–64.

————— (1982) *Espace et représentation: Penser l'espace,* Paris, Editions de la Villette.

Jacoby, Felix (1947) "The First Athenian Prose Writer," *Mnem.* 3rd series, vol.13, 13–64 (=Bloch (ed.) (1956) 100–43).

————— (1930) *Hesiodi Carmina, Pars I: Theogonia,* Berlin: Wedmannos.

————— (1913) "Herodotus," *RE Supp.* II, cols. 205–250.

————— (1912) "Hekataios," *RE* VII, 2, cols. 2667–2769.

————— (1909) "Über die Entwicklung der griechiscen Geschictsscreibung und den Plan einer neuen Sammlung der griechischen Historikerfragmente," *Klio* 9, 80-123 (= H. Bloch (ed.) (1956), 16–64).

Jaeger, Mary (1999) "Guiding Metaphor and Narrative Point of View in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita,*" in Kraus (ed.), 169–195.

————— (1997) *Livy's Written Rome,* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

James, E. (1999) "Per Ardua ad Astra: Authorial Choice and the Narrative of Interstellar Travel" in Elsner & Rubiés (eds.) 252–271.

Jameson, Fredric (1991) *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,* Durham: Duke University Press.

————— (1988) "Cognitive Mapping," in Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,* Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 347–360.

————— (1984) "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism," *NLR* 146 (July-August 1984), 53–92. Reprinted in Jameson (1991).

Jameson, Michael (1990) "Private Space and the Greek City" in Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (eds.) *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander,* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 171–195.

Janni, Pietro (1998) "Cartographie et Art Nautique dans le Monde Ancien" in Arnaud & Counillon (eds.), 41–67.

————— (1984) *La Mappa e il Periplo. Cartografia antica e spazio odologico,* Macerata, Giorgio Bretschneider Editore, "Università di Macerata Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia" 19.

Joannès, Francis (1995) "L'itinéraire des Dix-Mille en Mésopotamie et l'apport des sources cuneiformes," in Briant (ed.), 173–199.

Johnson, David M. (1999) "Hesiod's Description of Tartarus (*Theogony* 721-819)," *Phoenix* 53, 8–28.

Johnson, Matthew H. (1994) "Ordering Houses, Creating Narratives" in Pearson & Richards (eds.) 170–177.

Johnston, A.E.M. (1971) "Maps on Greek Coins of the 4th Century BC," *IM* 25, 75–6.

Jong, Irene J.F. de (1992) "The Subjective Style in Odysseus' Wanderings," *CQ* 42 (i), 1–11.

————— (1987) *Narrators and Focalizers: The Presentation of the Story in the Iliad,* Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner.

Joshel, Sandra R. & Murnaghan, Sheila (eds.) (1998) *Women and Slaves in Greco-Roman Culture: Differential Equations,* London: Routledge.

Kahn, Charles H. (1996) *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: The Philosophical Use of a Literary Form,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———— (1985) *Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology*, New York: Columbia University Press. First edition published in 1960.

———— (1983) "Philosophy and the Written Word: Some Thoughts on Heraclitus and the Early Greek Use of Prose" in Robb (ed.), 110–124.

Kaplan, Philip G. (1999) *Multiple Geographies: The Greek View of Asia in the Archaic Period*, Ph. D. Diss., Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.

Kassel, Rudolfus (1976) *Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica*, Berlin: De Gruyter.

———— (1965) *Aristotelis de Arte Poetica Liber*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kennedy, George A. (1994) *A New History of Classical Rhetoric*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kepes, Gyorgy (1944) *Language of Vision*, Chicago: Paul Theobald & Co.

Kermode, Frank (2000/1966) *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction with a New Epilogue*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, Helen (1998) *Hippocrates' Woman: Reading the female body in Ancient Greece*, London: Routledge.

Kingsley, Peter (1995) *Ancient Philosophy, Mystery, and Magic: Empedocles and the Pythagorean Tradition*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Kirby, John T. (1992) "Rhetoric and Poetics in Hesiod," *Ramus* 21, 34–60.

Kirk, G. S. (1985) *The Iliad: A Commentary, Vol.I* (bks.1–4), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Knapp, Jeffrey (1992) *An Empire Nowhere: England, America, and Literature from Utopia to the Tempest*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kraus, Christina Shuttleworth (ed.) (1999) *The Limits of Historiography. Genre and Narrative in Ancient Historical Texts*, Leiden: Brill.

Krischer, Tilman (1971) *Formale Konventionen der homerischen Epik*, Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

Kuttner, Ann (1999) "Looking outside inside: ancient Roman garden rooms," *Studies in the History of Gardens & Designed Landscapes*, 19.1, 7–35.

Lamberton, Robert (1988) *Hesiod*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lawrence, Denise L. & Low, Setha M. (1990) "The Built Environment and Spatial Form," *Ann. R. Anthr.* 19, 453–505.

Leach, Eleanor Winsor (1988) *The Rhetoric of Space: Literary and Artistic Representations of Landscape in Republican and Augustan Rome*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lee, Edward N. (1966) "On the Metaphysics of the Image in Plato's *Timaeus*," *Monist* 50.3, 341–368.

Lefebvre, Henri (1991) *The Production of Space*, transl. by D. Nicholson-Smith, Oxford: Blackwell.

Lemon, Lee T. & Reis, Marion J. (eds.) (1965) *Russian Formalist Criticism, Four Essays*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Lesky, Albin (1966) *A History of Greek Literature*, transl. by James Willis and Cornelis de Heer, London: Methuen & Co.

Lestringant, Frank (1994) *Mapping the Renaissance World: The Geographical Imagination in the Age of Discovery*, transl. by David Fausset, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lévêque, Pierre & Vidal-Naquet, Pierre (1996) *Cleisthenes the Athenian, An Essay on the Representation of Space and Time in Greek Political Thought from the End of the Sixth Century to the Death of Plato*, transl. by David Ames Curtis, Atlantic Highlands, N.J: Humanities Press. Original French edition 1964.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude (1974) *Tristes Tropiques*, transl. by John and Doreen Weightman, New York: Atheneum.

Levy, G. R. (1960) *The Myths of Plato*, Carbondale, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press.

Lewis, M. J. T. (2001) *Surveying Instruments of Greece and Rome*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

LiDonnici, Lynn R. (1995) *The Epidaurian Miracle Inscriptions: Text, Translation and Commentary*, Atlanta: Scholars Press.

Lloyd, Alan B. (1976) *Herodotus, Book II, Commentary*. Leiden: Brill.

Lloyd, G. E. R. (1991/1983) "Plato on Mathematics and Nature, Myth and Science" in *Methods and Problems in Greek Science*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 333–351.

——— (1983) *Science, Folklore and Ideology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1966) *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argument in Early Greek Thought*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Long, A. A. & Sedley, D. N. (1987) *The Hellenistic Philosophers, Vols.I&II*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Loraux, Nicole (1993) *The Children of Athena: Athenian Ideas about Citizenship and the Division between the Sexes*, transl. by Caroline Levine, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

——— (1986) *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City*, transl. by Alan Sheridan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lossau, Manfred (1990) "Xenophons Odyssee," *A&A* 36, 47–52.

Luccioni, J. (1959) "Platon et la Mer," *REA* 61, 15–47.

Luce, T. J. (1997) *The Greek Historians*, London/New York: Routledge.

Lynch, Kevin (1960) *The Image of the City*, Cambridge [Mass.] Technology Press.

Lynn-George, Michael (1988) *Epos: Word, Narrative and the Iliad*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc.

Lyons, Henry, Sir (1927) "Ancient Surveying Instruments," *GJ* 69, 132–143.

MacDowell, Douglas M. (1989) "The *Oikos* in Athenian Law," *CQ* 39, 10–21.

Malkin, Irad (2001) "The *Odyssey* and the Nymphs," *Gaia. Revue interdisciplinaire sur la Grèce archaïque* 5, 11–27.

———— (1998) *The Returns of Odysseus: Colonization and Ethnicity*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

———— (1988) *Religion and Colonization in Ancient Greece*, Leiden: Brill.

Marchand, Suzanne & Lunbeck, Elizabeth (eds.) (1996) *Proof and Persuasion. Essays on Authority, Objectivity, and Evidence*, Belgium: Brepolis.

Marchant, E. C. (1901–4) *Xenophontis Opera Omnia Vols II&III*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Marin, Louis (1993) "Frontiers of Utopia: Past and Present," *CI* 19, 397–420.

———— (1984) *Utopics: Spatial Play*, transl. by Robert A. Vollrath, Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press Inc.

Marincola, John (1999) "Genre, Convention, and Innovation in Greco-Roman Historiography" in Kraus (ed.), 281–324.

———— (1997) *Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mattéi, J-F. (1988) "The Theater of Myth in Plato," in Griswold (ed.) 66–83.

Mayer, Kenneth (1996) "Helen and the ΔΙΟΣ ΒΟΥΛΗ," *AJP* 117, 1–15.

McCartney, Eugene S. (1934) "The Couch as a Unit of Measurement," *CP* 34, 30–35.

McInerney, Jeremy (1999) *The Folds of Parnassus*, Austin: University of Texas Press.

———— (1997) "Parnassus, Delphi, and the Thyiades," *GRBS* 38.3, 263–283.

McLeod, Mary (1996) "Everyday and "Other" Spaces" in Coleman et al. (eds.) 1–37.

Meyer, Doris (2001) "Apollonius as a Hellenistic Geographer," in T. Papanghelis & A. Rengokos (eds.) *A Companion to Apollonius Rhodius*, Leiden, Brill, 217–235.

Miller, Harold W. (1962) "The Aetiology of Disease in Plato's *Timaeus*," *TAPA* 93, 175–187.

Mitchell, W. J. T. (ed.) (1980/1) *On Narrative*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

———— (ed.) (1980/1974) *The Language of Images*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Momigliano, Arnaldo (1993) *The Development of Greek Biography*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (expanded ed., first published 1971).

Monmonier, M. (1991) *How to Lie With Maps*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Monro, David B. & Allen, Thomas W. (1902) *Homeri Opera, Vols.I&II* (*Iliad* bks.1–24), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Moors, Kent F. (1982) *Platonic Myth, An Introductory Study*, Washington DC: University Press of America.

Morgan, Kathryn (2000) *Myth and Philosophy from the Presocratics to Plato*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Morris, Ian (2000) *Archaeology as Cultural History: Words and Things in Iron Age Greece*, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

Morris, Sarah P. (1992) *Daidalos and the Origins of Greek Art*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Most, Glenn W. (1997) "Hesiod's Myth of the Five (or Three or Four) Races," *PCPhS* 43, 104–127.

———— (1987) "Alcman's 'Cosmogonic' Fragment,' *CQ* 37, 1–19.

Mulvey, Laura (1992) "Pandora: Topographies of the Mask and Curiosity," in Colomina (ed.), 52–71.

Mumford, Lewis (1963) *Technics and Civilization, with a new Introduction*, San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovitch, first published in 1934.

Murnaghan, Sheila (2001) "The Superfluous Bag: Rhetoric and Display in the *Histories* of Herodotus" in Cecil W. Wooten (ed.), *The Orator in Action and Theory in Ancient Greece and Rome*, Leiden: Brill, 55–72.

———— (1992) "Maternity and Mortality in Homeric Poetry," *CA* 11.2, 242–264.

———— (1988) "How a Woman Can Be More Like a Man: The Dialogue Between Ischomachus and his Wife in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*," *Helios* 15.1, 9–22.

———— (1987) *Disguise and Recognition in the Odyssey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Murray, Oswyn (1987) "Herodotus and Oral History" in Sancisi-Weerdenburg & Kuhrt (eds.), 93–115.

Murray, Penelope (1981) "Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece," *JHS* 101, 87–100.

Naddaf, Gerard (1998) "On the Origin of Anaximander's Cosmological Model," *JHI* 59.1, 1–28.

———— (1994) "The Atlantis Myth: An Introduction to Plato's Later Philosophy of History," *Phoenix* 48.3, 189–209.

310

Nagy, Gregory (2000) "Epic as Music: Rhapsodic Models of Homer in the *Timaeus* and *Critias*," in K. Reichl (ed.) *The Oral Epic: Performance and Music*, Berlin: VWB.

—— (1999) *The Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (rev. ed.), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press (first published 1979).

—— (1992) "Authorisation and Authorship in the Hesiodic Theogony," *Ramus* 21, 119–130.

—— (1990a) *Greek Mythology and Poetics*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

—— (1990b) *Pindar's Homer – the Lyric Possession of an Ancient Past*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

—— (1983) "Sêma and Nóêsis: Some Illustrations," *Areth.* 16, 35–55.

—— (1982) "Hesiod" in T. James Luce (ed.) *Ancient Writers*, vol.1, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 43–73.

Neitzel, Heinz (1977) " Zum zeitlichen Verhältnis von *Theogonie* (80–93) und *Odyssee* (8, 166–177)," *Philologus* 121, 24–44.

Nevett, Lisa C. (1999) *House and Society in the Ancient Greek World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

—— (1995) "Gender Relations in the Classical Greek Household: The Archaeological Evidence," *BSA*, 90, 363–381.

—— (1994) "Separation or Seclusion? Towards an Archaeological Approach to Investigating Women in the Greek Household in the Fifth to Third Centuries BC" in Pearson & Richards (eds.), 98–112.

Nicolet, Claude (1991) *Space, Geography and Politics in the Early Roman Empire*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Nightingale, Andrea Wilson (1995) *Genres in Dialogue – Plato and the Construct of Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, Helen F. (1977) "The Mare, the Vixen, and the Bee: *Sophrosyne* as the Virtue for Women in Antiquity," *ICS* 2, 35–48.

Nowotny, Helga (1994) *Time: the Modern and Postmodern Experience*, transl. by Neville Plaice, Cambridge: Polity Press.

Nussbaum, G. B. (1967) *The Ten Thousand: A Study in Social Organization and Action in Xenophon's Anabasis*, Leiden: Brill.

O'Donnell, James J. (1992) *Augustine's Confessions, Text and Commentary* (3 vols.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Olmstead, A. T. (1948) *History of the Persian Empire (Achaemenid Period)*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Olson, S. Douglas (1997) "Odysseus' "Winnowing-Shovel" (Homer *Od* 11.119-37) and the Island of the Cattle of the Sun," *ICS* 22, 7–9.

———— (1995) *Blood and Iron: Stories and Storytelling in Homer's Odyssey*, Leiden: Brill.

Opsomer, Jan (1999) "*Antiperistasis:* A Platonic Theory" in A. Pérez Jiménez, J. García López & R. Ma. Aguilar (eds.), *Plutarco, Platón y Aristóteles. Actas del V Congreso Internacional de la I.P.S. (Madrid-Cuenca, 4-7 de mayo de 1999)*, Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 417–429.

Osborne, Catherine (1996) "Space, Time, Shape, and Direction: Creative Discourse in the *Timaeus*" in C. Gill and M. M. McCabe (eds.) *Form and Argument in Late Plato*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 179–211.

———— (1988) "Topography in the *Timaeus*: Plato and Augustine on Mankind's Place in the Natural World," *PCPhS* 34, 104–114.

Østerud, Svein (1976) "The Individuality of Hesiod," *Hermes* 104, 13–29.

Owen G. E. L (1973) "Plato on the Undepictable" in E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, & R. M. Rorty (eds.) *Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, Phronesis Suppl.* vol.1, Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorum and Company, 349–361.

———— (1953) "The Place of the *Timaeus* in Plato's Dialogues," *CQ* 3, 79–95.

Paassen, Christiaan Van (1957) *The Classical Tradition of Geography*, Gronigen: J.B. Wolters.

Padel, Ruth (1990) "Making Space Speak" in Winkler & Zeitlin (eds), 336–365.

Page, Denys (1955) *The Homeric Odyssey*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Panofsky, Erwin (1991) *Perspective as Symbolic Form*, New York: Zone Books.

Parry, Hugh (1994) "The *Apologos* of Odysseus: Lies, All Lies?" *Phoenix* 48.1, 1–20.

Pearson, Michael Parker & Richards, Colin (eds.) (1994) *Architecture and Order: Approaches to Social Space*, London: Routledge.

Pedrick, Victoria (1992) "The Muse Corrects: the Openings of the *Odyssey*," *YCS* 29, 39–62.

Peradotto, John (1990) *Man in the Middle Voice: Name and Narration in the Odyssey*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———— (1985) "Prophecy Degree Zero: Tiresias and the end of the *Odyssey*" in Bruno Gentili & Giuseppe Paioni (eds.) *Oralità : cultura, letteratura, discorso :* atti del Convegno internazionale, Urbino 21-25 luglio 1980, Rome: Ateneo, 429–460.

Pomeroy, Sarah B. (1995) "Women's Identity and the family in the Classical Polis" in Richard Hawley and Barbara Levick (eds.) *Women in Antiquity: New Assessments*, 111–121.

———— (1994) *Xenophon Oeconomicus, A Social and Historical Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

——— (1984) "The Persian King and the Queen Bee," *AJAH* 9.2, 98–108.

Preziosi, Donald (1989) *Rethinking Art History: Meditations on a Coy Science*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

——— (1986) "Reckoning with the World: Figure, Text and Trace in the Built Environment," *AJS* 4, nos.1–2, 1–15.

Prier, R.A. (1989) *Thauma Idesthai: The Phenomenology of Sight and Appearance in Archaic Greek*, Tallahassee: Florida State University Press.

Pritchett, W. Kendrick (1956) "The Attic Stelai, Part II," *Hesperia* 25, 178–328.

Pucci, Pietro (1998) *The Song of the Sirens: Essays on Homer*, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

——— (1977) *Hesiod and the Language of Poetry*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Purcell, Nicholas (1990) "Mobility and the Polis" in O. Murray & S. Prince (eds.) *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29–58.

Putnam, Michael C. J. (1998) *Virgil's Epic Designs: Ekphrasis in the Aeneid*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Puttenham, George (1988) *The Arte of English Poesie*, (Facsimile reproduction). Kent, OH: Kent State University Press.

Quint, David (1993) "Repetition and Ideology in the *Aeneid*" in *Epic and Empire – Politics and Generic Form from Virgil to Milton*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 50–96.

Rabkin, Eric S. (1981) "Spatial Form and Plot" in Smitten and Daghistany (eds.) 79–99.

Rakatansky, Mark (1992) "Spatial Narratives" in Whiteman et al. (eds.), 198–221.

Raubitschek, A (1955) "Gyges in Herodotus," *CW* 48.4, 48–50.

Reden, Sitta Von (1995) "Poetry and its Value Reconsidered," *CQ* 45, 30–50.

Redfield, James (1994/1975) *Nature and Culture in the Iliad: the Tragedy of Hector*, Durham: Duke University Press.

——— (1985) "Herodotus the Tourist," *CP* 80, 97–118.

Reece, Steven (1994) "The Cretan Odyssey: A Lie Truer than Truth," *AJP* 115, 157–73.

Rees, Ronald (1980) "Historical Links Between Cartography and Art," *GR* 70.1, 61–78.

Regenbogen, (1950) "Pinax," *RE* bd.20, cols. 1408–1482.

Resinski, Rebecca (1998) *Cosmos and Cosmetics: Constituting an Adorned Female Body in Ancient Greek Literature*, Ph.D. diss., Los Angeles: UCLA.

Ricoeur, Paul (1984) *Time and Narrative, Vol. I*, transl. by Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

————— (1980/1) "Narrative Time" in Mitchell (ed.), 165–186.

Rimmon-Kenan, Shlomith (1983) *Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics*, London: Routledge.

Rinner, Werner (1978) "Zur Darstellungsweise bei Xenophon, Anabasis III, 1–2," *Philologus* 122, 144–9.

Robb, Kevin (1983) *Language and Thought in Early Greek Philosophy*, La Salle, Illinois: The Hegeler Institute.

Romm, James S. (1992) *The Edges of the Earth in Ancient Thought: Geography, Exploration and Fiction*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

————— (1989) "Herodotus and Mythic Geography: The Case of the Hyperboreans," *TAPA* 119, 97–113.

Rosaldo, Michelle Zimbalist & Lamphere, Louise (1974) *Woman, Culture, and Society*, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Rosen, Ralph M. & Farrell, Joseph (eds.) (1993) *Nomodeiktes: Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Rosen, Ralph M. (1990) "Poetry and Sailing in Hesiod's *Works and Days*," *CA* 9.1, 99–113.

Rosenmeyer, T. G. (1956) "Plato's Atlantis Myth: *Timaeus* or *Critias*?" *Phoenix* 10.4, 163–172.

Ross, David, Sir (1961) *Aristotle, De Anima*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ross, G. R. T. (1973) *Aristotle, De Sensu and De Memoria, text and transl. with intro. and comm.*, New York: Arno.

Ross, W. D. (1957) *Aristotelis Politica*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rouveret, Agnès (1989) *Histoire et Imaginaire de la Peinture Ancienne*, Paris: École Française de Rome.

Rudhardt, Jean (1996) "Le Préambule de la *Théogonie* – La Vocation du Poète. Le Language des Muses" in Blaise et al. (eds.), 25–39.

Russo, Joseph; Fernandez-Galiaono, Manuel, & Heubeck, Alfred (1992) *A Commentary on Homer's Odyssey, Vol. III* (bks.17–24), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Saïd, Edward W (1994) *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books.

————— (1975) *Beginnings: Intentions and Methods*, New York: Basic Books.

Sallis, John (1999) *Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Heleen, & Kuhrt, Amélie (eds.) (1987) *Ach. Hist. 2 – The Greek Sources*, Leiden: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten.

Scaife, Ross (1995) "Ritual and Persuasion in the House of Ischomachus," *CJ* 90.3, 225–32.

Scheid, John & Svenbro, Jesper (1996) *The Craft of Zeus: Myths of Weaving and Fabric*, transl. by Carol Volk, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schibli, Hermann S. (1990) *Pherekydes of Syros*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Schofield, M. (1977) "Aristotle on the Imagination" in G. E. R. Lloyd & G. E. L. Owen (eds.) *Aristotle on the Mind and the Senses*, Proceedings of the 7th Symposium Aristotelicum, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 99–140.

Schwabl, Hans (1966) *Hesiods Theogonie: Eine Unitarische Analyse*, Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf.

Schwenn, Friedrich (1934) *Die Theogonie des Hesiodos*, Heidelberg: Carl Winters Universitätsbuchhandlung.

Sedley, David (1989) "Teleology and Myth in the *Phaedo*" in J. J. Cleary & D. C. Shartin (eds.) *Proc. Boston Area Colloq. Anc. Phil.* vol.5, Lanham: MD: University Press of America, 359–383.

Sellschopp, Inez (1967) *Stilistische Untersuchungen zu Hesiod*, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

Shaw, Brent (1982/3) "<<Eaters of Flesh, Drinkers of Milk>>: The Ancient Mediterranean Ideology of the Pastoral Nomad," *Anc. Soc.* 13/14, 5–31.

Shero, L. R. (1932) "Xenophon's Portrait of a Young Wife," *CW* 26, 17–21.

Shklovsky, Victor (1965) "Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*: Stylistic Commentary" in Lemon & Reis (eds.), 25–60.

Sissa, Giulia (1990) *Greek Virginity*, transl. by Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Small, Jocelyn Penny (1997) *Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Literacy and Memory in Classical Antiquity*, London: Routledge.

Smitten, Jeffrey R. & Daghistany, Ann (eds.) (1981) *Spatial Form in Narrative*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Soja, Edward W. (1996) *Thirdspace. Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places*, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

―――― (1989) *Postmodern Geographies. The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory*, London: Verso.

Solmsen, Friedrich (1982) "The Earliest Stages in the History of Hesiod's Text," *HSCP* 86, 1–32.

―――― (1970) *Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et Dies, Scutum*, et *Fragmenta Selecta* (ed. R. Merkelbach & M. L. West), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sorabji, Richard (1988) *Matter, Space and Motion: Theories in Antiquity and their Sequel*, London: Duckworth.

―――― (1972) *Aristotle on Memory*, London: Duckworth.

Sprague, Rosemary Kent (ed.) (1972) *The Older Sophists*, A complete translation by several hands of the fragments in *Die Fragmente derVorsokratiker*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Stallybrass, Peter (1986) "Patriarchal Tendencies: the Body Enclosed" in Margaret W. Ferguson, Maureen Quilligan, & Nancy J. Vickers (eds.) *Rewriting the Renaissance: The Discourses of Sexual Difference in Early Modern Europe*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 123–142.

Stanford, William B. (1965): *The Odyssey of Homer, Vols.I&II.*, Edited, with Introduction and Commentary, and Indexes, London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's Press.

Steiner, Deborah Tarn (1994) *The Tyrant's Writ. Myths and Images of Writing in Ancient Greece*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sterne, Laurence (1967) *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy*, Graham Petrie (ed.), London: Penguin.

Strauss, Leo (1970) *Xenophon's Socratic Discourse: An Interpretation of the Oeconomicus*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Strohm, Paul (2000) *Theory and the Premodern Text*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Svenbro, Jesper (1993) *Phrasikleia: An Anthropology of Reading in Ancient Greece*, transl. by Janet Lloyd, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (first published in French in 1988).

——— (1976) *La parole et le marbre: Aux origines de la poétique grecque*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.

Taplin, Oliver (1998) "The Shield of Achilles within the *Iliad*" in I. McAuslan and P. Walcot (eds.) *Homer*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 96–115.

Tatum, James (1989) *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: The Education of Cyrus*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, A. E. (1928) *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Temkin, Owsei (1956) *Soranus' Gynecology* (translated, with introduction), Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Thalmann, William G. (1984) *Conventions of Form and Thought in Early Greek Epic Poetry*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Thomas, Rosalind (2000) *Herodotus in Context. Ethnography, Science and the Art of Persuasion*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

——— (1992) *Literacy and Orality in Ancient Greece*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thomson, J. O. (1948) *History of Ancient Geography*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Todorov, Tzvetan (1977) *The Poetics of Prose*, transl. by Richard Howard, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (first published in French 1971).

——— (1971) "The Two Principles of Narrative," *Diacritics* 1, Fall, 37–44.

Tomashevsky, Boris (1965/1925) "Thematics," in Lemon & Reis (eds.) 61–98.

Toye, D. L. (1997) "Pherecydes of Syros: Ancient Theologian and Genealogist," *Mnem.* 3rd series, vol.50.5, 530–560.

Tschumi, Bernard (1994) "The Architectural Paradox" in *Architecture and Disjunction,* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 27–51.

Unger, Eckhard (1937) "From the Cosmos Picture to the World Map," *IM* 2, 1–7.

Vasaly, Ann (1993) *Representations: Images of the World in Ciceronian Oratory,* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Vernant, Jean-Pierre (1999) (oral paper) "Semblances of Pandora: Imitation and Identity", delivered at Princeton University, 11/11/99, transl. by Froma I. Zeitlin.

—— (1991) "A "Beautiful Death" and the Disfigured Corpse in Homeric Epic" in *Mortals and Immortals: Collected Essays,* Froma I. Zeitlin (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 50–74 (first published 1982).

—— (1990) *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece,* transl. by Janet Lloyd, New York: Zone Books.

—— (1983) *Myth and Thought Among the Greeks,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (originally published in French 1965).

—— (1982) *The Origins of Greek Thought,* transl. by Janet Lloyd, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Vidal-Naquet, Pierre (1986) "Athens and Atlantis: Structure and Meaning of a Platonic Myth," in *Black Hunter: Forms of Thought and Forms of Society in the Greek World,* transl. Andrew Szegedy-Maszat, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 263-84 (originally published in *REG* 77 (1964) 420–44).

Vlastos, Gregory (1997) "A Metaphysical Paradox," in R. Kraut (ed.) *Plato's Republic, Critical Essays,* Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlehead, 181–195.

—— (ed.) (1995) *Studies in Greek Philosophy vol.2: Socrates, Plato, and their tradition,* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

—— (1995/1980) "The Role of Observation in Plato's Conception of Astronomy" in Vlastos (ed.), 223–246.

—— (1995/1965) "Creation in the *Timaeus:* Is it a Fiction?" in Vlastos (ed.), 265–279.

—— (1995/1939) "Disorderly Motion in Plato's *Timaeus,*" in Vlastos (ed.), 247–264.

Wagenvoort, H. (1956) *Studies in Roman Literature, Culture and Religion,* Leiden: Brill.

Walcot, Peter (1966) *Hesiod and the Near East,* Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

—— (1961) "Pandora's Jar, Erga 83–105," *Hermes* 89, 249–251.

Walker, Susan (1993) "Women and Housing in Classical Greece: The Archaeological Evidence" in Averil Cameron & Amélie Kuhrt (eds.) *Images of Women in Antiquity*, (rev. ed.) Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 81–91.

Walsh, George B. (1984) *The Varieties of Enchantment, Early Greek Views of the Nature and Function of Poetry*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Walsh, Kevin (1995) "A Sense of Place: A Role for Cognitive Mapping in the 'Postmodern' World?" in Ian Hodder et al (eds.) *Interpreting Archaeology, Finding Meaning in the Past*, 131–140.

Welliver, Warman (1977) *Character, Plot and Thought in Plato's Timaeus-Critias*, Leiden: Brill.

West, M.L. (1997) *The East Face of Helicon: West Asiatic Elements in Greek Poetry and Myth*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

—————— (1983) *The Orphic Poems*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

—————— (1978) *Hesiod's Works and Days, with Prolegomena and Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

—————— (1971) *Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

—————— (1966) *Hesiod's Theogony, with Prolegomena and Commentary*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

—————— (1963) "Three Presocratic Cosmogonies," *CQ* 13, 154–76.

West, Stephanie (1991) "Herodotus' Portrait of Hecataeus," *JHS* 111, 144–160.

Wheeldon, M. J. (1989) "'True Stories': the reception of historiography in antiquity," in A. Cameron (ed.) *History as Text: The Writing of Ancient History*, London: Duckworth, 33–63.

White, Hayden (1980) "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality", *CI* 7.1 Autumn, 5–27.

—————— (1978) "The Historical Text as Literary Artifact" in *Tropics of Discourse, Essays in Cultural Criticism*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 81–99.

Whiteman, John, Kipnis, Jeffrey & Burdett, Richard (eds.) (1992) *Strategies in Architectural Thinking*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Whitman, Cedric H. & Scodel, Ruth (1981) "Sequence and Simultaneity in *Iliad* N. Ξ. and O." *HSCP* 85, 1–15.

Wigley, Mark (1996) "Lost in Space" in Michael Speaks (ed.) *The Critical Landscape*, Rotterdam: 010 Publishers, 30–57.

—————— (1992) "Untitled: The Housing of Gender," in Colomina (ed.), 356–389.

Williams, B (1999) "The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato's *Republic*," in Fine (ed.), vol.2, 255-264.

Winkler, John J. & Zeitlin, Froma I. (1990) *Nothing to Do With Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Winterson, Jeanette (1989) *Sexing the Cherry*, New York: Vintage International.

Wood, D. & Fel, J. (1992) *The Power of Maps*, New York: Guilford Press.

Woodward D. & Harley J. B. (1988) *The History of Cartography*, vol.1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Woodward, David (ed.) (1987) *Art and Cartography*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wright, M. R. (ed.) (2000) *Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato's Timaeus*, London: Gerald Duckworth & Co.

Wycherley, R. E. (1969) *How the Greeks Built Cities*, 2nd ed., New York: Anchor Books.

Yates, Frances A. (1966) *The Art of Memory*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Zanker, Paul (1981) "Enargeia in the Ancient Criticism of Poetry," *RhMPh* 124, 297–311.

Zeitlin, Froma I. (1996) "Signifying Difference: The Case of Hesiod's Pandora" in *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 53–86.

———— (1996/1995) "Figuring Fidelity in Homer's *Odyssey*" in *Playing the Other: Gender and Society in Classical Greek Literature*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19–52 (originally published in Cohen (ed.), 117–154).

Zeyl, Donald J. (2000) *Plato's Timaeus*, transl., with Introduction, Indianapolis: Hackett.

Zielinski, T. (1901) *Die Behandlung gleichzeitiger Ereignisse im antiken Epos*, Philologus Suppl. VIII, Heft 3.

Zimmermann, Klaus (1997) "Hdt. IV 36,2 et le développement de l'image du monde d'Hécatée à Hérodote," *Ktèma, Civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques*, 22, 285–298.

ABBREVIATIONS

A&A	*Antike und Abendland*
Ach. Hist.	*Achaemenid History*, Heleen Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Amélie Kuhrt & Margaret Cool Root (eds.), Leiden: Brill.
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
AJP	*American Journal of Philology*
AJS	*American Journal of Semiotics*
AJAH	*American Journal of Ancient History*
Anc. Ph.	*Ancient Philosophy*
Anc. Soc.	*Ancient Society*
Ann. R. Anthr.	*Annual Review of Anthropology*
Areth.	*Arethusa*
BSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
C&M	*Classica et Mediaevalia*
CA	*Classical Antiquity*
CI	*Critical Inquiry*
CJ	*Classical Journal*
CP	*Classical Philology*
CQ	*Classical Quarterly*
CW	*Classical World* (formerly *Classical Weekly*)
Cunliffe	*A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect*, by Richard John Cunliffe, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press (1977/1922).
DK	*Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 3 vols, H. Diels & W. Kranz (eds.), Berlin, 1951 (6th ed.).
EMC/CV	*Echos du Monde Classique/Classical Views*

Et. Fr.	*Études Francaises*
Fr. Gr. Hist.	*Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, F. Jacoby et al. (eds.) Berlin/Leiden, 1922–1956.
GGM	*Geographici Graeci Minores*, 2 vols. ed. by Carl Müller, Paris 1861/1855.
GJ	*Geographical Journal*
GR	*Geographical Review*
GRBS	*Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*
HSCP	*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*
ICS	*Illinois Classical Studies*
IM	*Imago Mundi*
JAAR	*Journal of the American Academy of Religions*
JECS	*Journal of Early Christian Studies*
J. Hist. G.	*Journal of the History of Geography*
JHI	*Journal of the History of Ideas*
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JRS	*Journal of Roman Studies*
K&R	*The Presocratic Philosophers* (2nd ed.), ed. by G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven & M. Schofield, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995/1983).
LSJ	*Greek-English Lexicon* by Henry George Liddell & Robert Scott, rev. & ann. by Henry Stuart Jones, Oxford: Oxford University Press (9th ed., 1996).
Mnem.	*Mnemosyne*
NLH	*New Literary History*
NLR	*New Left Review*
OCD	*Oxford Classical Dictionary, Third Edition*, ed. by Simon Hornblower & Anthony Spawforth, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1996).
OED	*The Complete Oxford English Dictionary, in 20 vols.* 2nd ed. 1989.
PCPhS	*Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society*

Pomeroy, *Oec.*	*Xenophon's Oeconomicus: A Social and Historical Commentary* by Sarah B. Pomeroy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
QUCC	*Quaderni Urbaniti di Cultura Classica*
RE	*Real-encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, A. von Pauly, G. Wissowa & W. Kroll (eds.), Stuttgart 1849–1978.
REA	*Révue des Études Anciennes*
REG	*Révue des Études Grèques*
RhMPh	*Rheinisches Museum für Philologie*
Schibli	*Pherekydes of Syros*, by Hermann S. Schibli, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990.
TAPA	*Transactions of the American Philological Association*
TIBG	*Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*
Trans.	*Transeuphratene*
West, *Hes. Fr.*	*Fragmenta Selecta* R. Merkelbach & M.L. West (eds.)) in F. Solmsen (ed.) *Hesiodi Opera*, Oxford: Oxford Classical Texts, 1970.
West, *Op.*	*Hesiod's Works and Days*, ed. with Prolegomena & Commentary by M. L. West, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978.
West, *Th.*	*Hesiod's Theogony*, ed. with Prolegomena & Commentary by M. L West, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.
YCS	*Yale Classical Studies*
YJC	*Yale Journal of Criticism*